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Preface
This is the second time that the International PhD Conference has 
been organized by the International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral 
School of Corvinus University of Budapest. We hope this is a sign that 
we have created a tradition, and that the conference will be organized in 
the future as well. As in the previous year, most of the presentations given 
at this year’s conference will again be published in a collected volume 
in the form of edited studies, with the aim of promoting the publication 
performance of PhD students.
The comprehensive profile of the Doctoral School, the diversity of its 
three subprograms – International and Security Studies, World Economy 
and Geopolitics – is reflected in the various topics of the studies in this 
volume. These include e.g. security and defence policy, challenges the 
world economy is facing nowadays, the institutions and policies of the 
European Union, the emerging powers of Asia, as well as sustainability 
and other important, highly relevant issues. The regions examined in the 
studies range from the EU through the Arab world to Latin America and 
Asia, and countries such as the United States, Russia, Ukraine, China, 
India, Jordan and Tunisia are analysed, to name just a few.
The multidisciplinary nature of the Doctoral School has long been 
expressed in its name, mainly due to the fact that it is entitled to award degrees 
in two disciplines (economics and political science). Multidisciplinarity is 
also manifested in the diversity of the topics of this volume. Not only 
multidisciplinarity, but also interdisciplinarity, the presence of “frontiers” 
in the field of mutually interdependent disciplines can be traced in the 
articles, as the authors refer to e.g. law, history, security policy as well as 
theories of international relations.
The studies in the volume were carried out during an unprecedented, 
difficult period, as the coronavirus epidemic made traditional forms of 
education almost impossible all of a sudden, and doctoral training also had 
to switch to online education. All this coincided with the substantive and 
organizational renewal of the doctoral programs at Corvinus University of 
Budapest. Due to the fusion of the International Relations Multidisciplinary 
Doctoral School and the Doctoral School of Political Science, the Doctoral 
School of International Relations and Political Science was established on 
1 July 2020, and the number of subprograms increased from three to four, 
by adding Political Science.
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
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Finally, let us express our gratitude to the Central Bank of Hungary 
and the Pallas Athene Domus Meriti Foundation (PADME) for the support 
they have given to the Doctoral School over the years, especially the 
Geopolitical Subprogram, which has made this volume possible.
Prof. Zsolt Rostoványi
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I. Political and Economic 
Processes of the arabic 
World
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
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I.1. Saudi aramco IPo: the Primary 
reasons behind It
Bálint BaRtha1
Abstract
In January 2016, Prince Mohammad bin Salman surprised the world by announcing 
that the Saudi government intended to initiate the biggest initial public offering (IPO) in 
history. Saudi Aramco is the world’s largest oil producer. Riyadh delayed the transaction 
several times, although it was the centrepiece of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 plan to 
diversify the kingdom’s economy which is highly reliant on oil.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the political reasons for the Saudi Aramco’s IPO 
delay. The paper’s main assumption is that the Kingdom overestimated Western investors’ 
financial leverage, because in spite of their qualms more than 5 million investors set 
aside concerns over the company’s close ties to a state with a controversial human rights 
record, and the uncertainty over the global oil industry’s future.
The paper will analyse the key factors, and major internal and external political 
conflicts which had an effect on the Saudi Aramco’s IPO. As a result, the paper will 
challenge the necessity of the IPO from an economic point of view, because the timing 
was the worst possible.
Keywords: Saudi Aramco, IPO, Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia, oil market
1  PhD Student – CUB IR Doctoral School, ifjbarthabalint@gmail.com
I�1�1� Introduction
In January 2016, Deputy 
Crown Prince Mohammad bin 
Salman (MBS) announced that 
he intended to sell 5% of Saudi 
Aramco in an international initial 
public offering (IPO) to fund Saudi 
Arabia’s ambitious economic 
reform plans called Vision 2030. 
The oil company had been under 
government control since it was 
nationalized in the 1970s. Aramco 
is the world’s largest oil producer, 
it has 297,700 million barrels 
proven crude oil reserves, the 
second highest in the world after 
Venezuela (homepage of opec 
annual statistical Bulletin). 
MBS expected to raise $100 billion 
from the sale, valuing Aramco at 
$2 trillion. On December 11th, 
2019, shares began trading only 
on Tadawul, Saudi Arabia’s stock 
exchange. It took four years to 
initiate the deal, because of the lack 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
14
of transparency and continuous 
political crises. The Saudis 
postponed the IPO several times. 
More than two dozen banks were 
involved in the process, but most of 
them flinched from the transaction 
because the most important 
stock exchanges have certain 
requirements that Saudi Aramco 
could not, or did not want to, fulfil. 
In mid-October, 2019 the investors 
informed Aramco’s management 
that they expected the value of the 
company to be between $1.1-1.7 
trillion, far below the $2 trillion 
target figure set by MBS. Then the 
Saudis decided to proceed with 
a scaled-back IPO on the Saudi 
stock market instead of the most 
important stock markets. 
The aim of this paper is 
to analyse the political reasons 
for Saudi Aramco’s IPO delay. 
The paper’s main assumption is 
that the Kingdom overestimated 
Western investors’ financial 
leverage, because in spite of 
their qualms more than 5 million 
investors set aside concerns over 
the company’s close ties to a state 
with a controversial human rights 
record, and the uncertainty over the 
global oil industry’s future (jolly, 
j. – amBRose, j. 2019).
The paper will analyse the 
key factors, and major internal and 
external political conflicts which 
had an effect on the Saudi Aramco’s 
IPO. As a result, the paper will 
challenge the Vision 2030 idea, 
which aims to open and liberalise 
Saudi society, but the key factors 
are to the East: engage the Asian 
investors with stability and regional 
security.
I�1�2� Vision 2030
The economic development 
of Saudi Arabia is at or above the 
level of Western democracies. 
The GDP per capita figures of the 
Kingdom is the 38th highest in the 
World, the same level as Portugal, 
the Czech Republic or Estonia (imF 
2019). However, the structure of its 
economy is one-sided, and 90% 
of its export income comes from 
oil production (homepage2 of cia 
FactBooK). The Saudi economy 
is vulnerable, and it is exposed to 
the oil market. Inorganic economic 
integration and the country’s 
internal economic structure have 
not allowed the state to develop a 
functionally redistributive system. 
According to Giacomo Luciani, 
we may distinguish between 
production states and rentier 
states accordingly the source of 
a state’s revenue (luciani, g. 
1994). The In a rentier state, the 
2  https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
sa.html – 2020. 03. 14.
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state is independent from society, 
the tax system is underdeveloped, 
and we cannot talk about political 
representation. Almost 90% of the 
Saudi Government’s export income 
derives from oil exports.
Mohamed Bin Salman 
recognized that the Kingdom’s 
economy is vulnerable, so he 
decided to initiate a programme 
four years ago, called Vision 
2030, which aims to make the 
economy independent from oil 
exports. The oil price is fluctuating 
and too volatile to rely on solely, 
and it cannot sustain economic 
development. The Saudis have 
missed decades of technological 
improvement. The developed 
countries adopted new technologies 
and built infrastructure to serve 
development. Demographic 
changes are also important: 40% 
of the population are under the 
age of 25; they are educated, well-
informed, and they have access to 
the internet, and the social media 
(homepage3 of cia FactBooK). The 
new generation is eager for change. 
Transforming the Saudi economy 
requires creating around one million 
new jobs in the next few years for 
the many young people entering the 
workforce (hendeRson, s. 2019).
The programme goals 
3  https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
sa.html – 2020. 03. 14.
include reinforcing economic 
and investment activities, and 
increasing non-oil industry trade 
between countries through goods, 
consumer products and tourism. 
The Saudi Commission for Tourism 
and National Heritage started 
issuing tourist visas in October 
2019. More than 100,000 tourists 
visited Saudi Arabia in one month 
(BintuRKi, t. a. 2020). A most 
impressive megaproject has also 
been proposed, the so called Neom 
project, which seeks to become the 
flagship of the country’s touristic 
and entertainment potential. That 
project envisioned a $500 billion, 
ultra-high-tech economic zone in 
the northwest part of the kingdom 
near Egypt and Jordan. Yet, there 
will be comparatively few jobs for 
humans in the robot-filled facilities 
envisioned for Neom, which so far 
has only completed a new airport 
and some palaces.
To finance these ideas MBS 
initiated the IPO of Aramco stocks. 
The successor of the Arabian 
American Oil Company, originally 
established by the US, Aramco 
is the largest oil producer in the 
world, with the lowest production 
costs; consequently, it is the most 
profitable company on earth.
It is standard practice in 
Saudi Arabia that the income of 
the government will likely be 
invested outside the country. The 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
16
kingdom has suffered losses on 
several fintech investments. The 
Public Investment Fund lost so far 
in Uber and WeWork. For these 
reasons, the IPO progress should 
be watched carefully by investors, 
who often find themselves puzzled 
by the Kingdom’s decision-making 
processes (hendeRson, s. 2019).
I�1�3� Reasons for the delay
In December 2019, the Saudi 
Aramco stocks were traded for the 
first time after years of preparation 
and delay. The income from the 
transaction is going to be invested 
in the Vision 2030 economic 
development plans. The Saudi 
government offered 5% of the 
shares in Aramco (gRoss, s. 2019).
A number of questions 
emerged about the IPO: What is 
Aramco worth? Will the IPO be 
transparent? Where will Aramco 
shares be listed? Is the country 
stable enough to earn the trust of 
the international investors?
Diversifying the economy is 
not a new idea: it has been a question 
in Saudi Arabia for decades. This 
time, the reason why now is the 
time to diversify the economy, is 
not solely Mohamed Bin Salman, 
but also the environment. In the 
mid 2010s there were multiple 
pressures on the global oil market 
from environmentalists arguing 
that mankind is living on borrowed 
time, and we have to reduce 
hydrocarbon usage. There was also 
internal pressure because, as the 
Arab Human Development Reports 
(AHDR) found, there are three 
deficits in the Arab countries: a 
freedom deficit, a lack of women’s 
empowerment, and a knowledge 
deficit4. All of these issues affect 
Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi leadership 
identified these problems, and 
they have decided to initiate a 
socioeconomic reform, which 
includes the following measures: 
women can drive a car (2017), 
cinemas will reopen after 40 years, 
women will be allowed to visit 
football matches (2018), and so on. 
The economic aspect to the renewal 
is the Vision 2030 project, which is 
expensive. That is why they have 
decided to sell 5% of the shares 
of the Saudi Aramco oil company 
every year, to generate cash for the 
public investment fund.
Transparency
There are several concerns 
about the IPO. First of all, some 
worry whether the money thus 
raised will arrive in the public 
fund, or it could instead be a tool of 
4  Arab Human Development Reports 
– http://www.arab-hdr.org – 
2020. 06. 09.
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corruption. Meanwhile, converting 
to a public company is a game 
changer, so the IPO can serve 
strategic goals for the state. Riyadh 
initially proposed to sell off 5% of 
the company per year for ten years, 
then afterwards stopping in order 
to maintain the control over the 
company, but its plans are unclear. 
The state-owned oil company 
never previously had to think 
about the interests of investors, 
but now thanks to the bipartite 
ownership (both state and public), 
it has to pursue strategies which 
are good for the state, and good 
for the shareholders. They have to 
issue quarterly reports about the 
company, something they have 
not done before. The Saudis had 
to disclose everything after they 
became an open public company. 
The company had other interests 
besides oil reserves, but since an 
independent third party has not 
been able to verify the amount of 
the oil reserves, the amount of the 
reserves still remains unclear. The 
company, until December 2019, 
had not been listed on any market, 
it was not transparent, there was no 
free press in the country, and the 
political situation there was still 
shaky.
Regulatory
It goes without saying that 
stock in the largest company in the 
world should be sold through the 
largest stock exchange (New York 
or London stock exchange) but due 
to regulatory issues this plan was 
not realised. The months of delay 
since the original idea of an IPO 
has been attributed to hesitation on 
the Saudi leadership’s part about 
revealing the company’s financial 
details, as well as concern that its 
assets might become vulnerable to 
legal action, particularly if Saudi 
Arabia is found to bear any official 
responsibility for the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks (hendeRson, s. 2019). 
From the legal point of view, it is 
hard to determine the outcome of a 
litigation case, but if an American 
court finds the Saudi Government 
indirectly responsible for the terror 
attacks, due to the fact that 15 of the 
19 hijackers were Saudi citizens, it 
would be a political issue, not an 
economic one, because the company 
could pay the compensation to the 
victim’s families.
Market value
The company’s total value 
was a big question. The Saudis 
expected that it was worth $2 
trillion, which would have meant 
that selling off 5% would result in 
a $100 billion inflow to the Saudi 
government. Western analysts 
have expressed doubts about the 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
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valuation, and its credibility, and 
suggested instead a $1.1-$1.5 
trillion range. In December, 2019 
Aramco achieved a record, and the 
market gave it a $1.7 trillion price 
tag, making it the world’s most 
valuable company. The stock price 
hit an intraday high of 38.70 riyals 
on its second day of trading but has 
subsided since then.
 MBS did not get what he 
expected. The company was valued 
at 15% less than he anticipated and 
has been losing value ever since. 
Aramco is listed only in Saudi 
Arabia, meaning that Western 
investors were not present, and 
most of the shareholders are Saudi 
citizens, or Asian investors.
Besides the described issues, 
the biggest challenge is the instable 
internal political situation. A 
number of prominent Saudi Arabian 
princes, government ministers, and 
business people were arrested in 
Saudi Arabia on 4 November 2017, 
and detained in Riyadh Ritz-Carlton 
Hotel for alleged corruption and 
profiteering. The action resulted 
that MBS consolidated his power 
over all three branches of the 
security forces, making him the 
most powerful man in Saudi Arabia. 
Today, the company is 
increasing the oil supply at the time 
when demand is falling down as the 
global economy is shocked by the 
coronavirus. The company has said 
it will maintain its oil production 
to flood the market to compensate 
for the 65% drop in prices in 2020 
(jacoBs, t. 2020).
Domestic attraction of 
business
The Crown Prince 
emphasizes the importance of soft 
power. There are fundamentally two 
main sources of Saudi soft power: 
domestic policies and actions and 
international policies and actions. 
Saudi Arabia considered in the 
Muslim world as the „Land of the 
Two Holy Shrines”, referring to 
the two holiest places in Islam: Al-
Masjid al-Haram in Makkah and 
Al-Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina. 
The government is financing 
several projects abroad to extend its 
soft power capabilities.
The overambitious MBS does 
not tolerate opposition voices. The 
Saudi Government is not scared to 
use force to shut down dissenting 
opinion. In October 2018 at the 
Saudi consulate in Istanbul agents 
of the Saudi government killed 
Jamal Khashoggi, an American-
living dissident journalist, who was 
constantly criticizing MBS and 
the Saudi government (schmitt, 
e. – Fandos, n. 2018). That 
action astonished the international 
community. A major foreign 
investment conference immediately 
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ended in Riyadh, when the murder 
of dissident journalist Jamal 
Khashoggi cast a shadow over the 
proceedings. Critics argue that 
such activities by the government 
may cost the country years of 
development, because a foreign 
investor does not want to live in 
such an environment: they would 
rather go to invest in the United Arab 
Emirates or Qatar. Nevertheless, 
reporting suggests that in this 
instance, foreign executives were 
more interested in securing fee 
income for new fundraising or 
investment assistance for overseas 
projects rather than actually putting 
money into the kingdom.
International challenges
Regional adversaries also 
threaten the Kingdom’s stability. 
Iran after the nuclear deal (JPCOA 
– 2015) adopted a more assertive 
form of behaviour towards their 
regional enemies, but it continued 
to conduct cyberattack against 
Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure 
in August 2017, and provided 
military and weaponry supports to 
the Houthis in Yemen, who fired 
missiles at Riyadh in November 
2017 (eisenstadt, m. 2018).
In Riyadh, they assumed 
that Tehran had shifted the balance 
of power to coincide with the 
Iranian economic rebirth. If we 
are comparing the hard power 
capabilities, it is clear that the only 
advantage that Saudi-Arabia had 
over Iran before the JCPOA was 
the economy. From that perspective 
the nuclear deal threatened the 
Saudi-led Sunni block5, which 
are US allies. To understand that 
we have to make a simple hard 
power comparison between the two 
regional superpower aspirants.
5  The United States after 1979 when 
they lost the Iran as an ally, turned 
towards the Sunnis. This is an 
informal alliance which based on three 
points: the US is the security provider; 
Saudi Arabia is a leader on religious 
basis as the guardian of the two holy 
sites in Islam and ultimately the 
purpose of this covenant to contain the 
Iranian leverage.
hard power capability Iran Saudi-Arabia index
population 81 million 33 million Iran
territory 1.6 million km2 2 million km2 neutral
geopolitical position strategical strategical neutral
natural resources
4th largest oil 
reserves, 2nd 
largest gas reserves
2nd largest oil 
reserves Iran
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hard power capability Iran Saudi-Arabia index
military
active personnel 523,000 251,000 Iran
budget 20 billion USD
67 billion USD 
(3rd highest in the 
world)
Saudi-Arabia
economy
GDP 440 billion USD 684 billion USD
Saudi-Arabia
GPD per capita 5,500 USD 20,700 USD
Table 1: Hard power capabilities Iran and Saudi-Arabia, 2019
Source: compilation of the author based on the data of CIA Factbook6
6  Iran: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html – 
2020. 03. 14.; Saudi-Arabia: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sa.html – 2020. 03. 14.
It is really hard to overcome 
the Iranian military capabilities 
(Table 1), despite the size of the 
Saudi military budget, which is 
almost 70 billion dollars yearly, a 
figure that represents 10% of the 
county’s GDP, nominally the third 
highest in the world. This simple 
table shows that the only arrears 
that the Islamic Republic has is 
its economy. The decade-long 
sanctions have ruined the Iranian 
economy, their inflation is over 30%, 
for a long time they were unable 
to export their oil production, and 
from 2012 until the signing of the 
JCPOA the annual GDP shrinkage 
was more than 1% on average. That 
is why Iran needed the nuclear deal 
badly.
On 14th September 2019, 
just a couple of days before the 
United Nations General Assembly 
meeting7, the state-owned Saudi 
Aramco oil processing facilities at 
Abqaiq and Khurais in eastern Saudi 
Arabia were attacked by drones 
and cruise missiles. Yemen’s Iran-
aligned Houthi rebels, at the centre 
of a civil war against Saudi-backed 
forces, claimed responsibility, trying 
to hide the Iranian involvement and 
blame the Saudi intervention into 
the Yemeni Civil War. The United 
States and Saudi Arabia stated that 
Iran was behind the attack while the 
European Union also jointly stated 
that Iran bears responsibility for it. 
Iran has denied any involvement.
Saudi Arabia was a strategic 
target. The attack temporarily 
halved Saudi Arabia’s oil production 
and knocked out 5% of the world’s 
oil supply. Global crude oil prices 
7  There were some expectations that 
behind the scenes President Rouhani 
and President Trump can meet, but it 
quickly evaporated after the attack.
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spiked, for a couple of weeks, but 
the Saudis calmed the market, 
since they were able to rebuild the 
facilities in a short time (diapola, 
a. – BloomBeRg 2019).
The plan by Iranian 
military leaders to strike Saudi oil 
installations developed over several 
months, according to the official 
close to Iran’s decision making 
(geoRgy, m. 2019). The possible 
targets were initially discussed and 
categorized based on the possible 
casualties and the rate of retaliation. 
They dismissed those targets 
where any United States personnel 
could be harmed, because it could 
provoke a massive counterattack. 
The agreement on Aramco facilities 
was almost unanimous. This idea, to 
attack the enemy’s oil infrastructure 
is not new, as since the 1980s Iran 
has declared that if it cannot export 
oil, then none of its neighbours 
will either. The idea was to display 
Iran’s deep access to intelligence 
and military capabilities. The attack 
has been the worst on Middle East 
oil facilities since Saddam Hussein 
torched Kuwait’s oil fields during 
the 1990s Gulf crisis.
Riyadh said it believes 
Iran conducted the attacks on its 
oil facilities and will consider 
a military response once its 
investigation is complete. The 
Carter Doctrine, which calls for an 
American military response to any 
outside effort to threaten or seize 
oil fields in the Persian Gulf, is 
officially dead because Tehran is 
too powerful, and with this attack it 
is clear, that Saudi Arabia is ready 
neither to protect its neighbours nor 
to enter a war against the Islamic 
Republic. Although Washington is 
trying to “lead from behind” – as we 
saw in the Libyan intervention – the 
only evident response was the US 
Defense Department’s announced 
deployment of 1,800 more US 
troops to Saudi Arabia (saaB, B. y. 
2019).
With this attack Tehran sent 
a message to Saudi Arabia and the 
US as well. The Persian country 
showed that they have a very 
sophisticated technology and they 
are able to execute precise and 
quick attacks from more than 1000 
km away. Despite its huge military 
spending Saudi Arabia could do 
nothing against those drones and 
low-flying missiles. It has been 
clear in recent months that Riyadh’s 
strategy is now to be reconciled 
with the Yemenis in the interests of 
to calming down the tensions on its 
border, because it is clear that they 
are unable to focus on more than 
one adversary at the same time.
Tehran showed with this 
attack that they are much more 
powerful than Riyadh thinks, and 
it still has an unbeatable advantage 
on military side. However, the 
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balance of power inside Iran has 
also shaped the regime. Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei gave a green 
light to diplomacy and pragmatic 
conservatives like President Hassan 
Rouhani with the acceptance of 
the JCPOA, but this agreement 
failed within 3 years. On the 
other hand, the hardliners, namely 
the Revolutionary Guard Corps 
commander Qasem Soleimani got a 
free hand to pursue their preferences 
in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and 
Gaza.
I�1�4� Conclusion
It is not clear why Riyadh 
went ahead with selling one of their 
most important assets at the bottom 
of the oil market. The only reason 
was that the Kingdom has cash 
flow problems. Why else would 
Aramco would proceed with the 
IPO, unless the State needed the 
cash immediately? The Vision 2030 
ideas did not correspond to reality, 
and the programme has so far been 
financed by loans, which confirms 
the above finding that the Kingdom 
has financial problems (imF 2016).
Although Saudi Arabia 
appears to be the brink of radical 
change with the vision 2030 
project, if we take a closer look 
to the Saudi house, it appears that 
there is a power struggle in which 
Mohammed Bin Salman, who is the 
Defence Minister and the Crown 
Prince at the same time, has in-
house challengers. If MBS wants to 
consolidate his power it is crucial to 
find some modus vivendi with his 
biggest enemy in order to execute 
his sweeping socioeconomic and 
political reforms in Saudi Arabia, 
moderate the country’s Wahhabi 
ideology, make Saudi Arabia a 
more appealing destination for 
international investment, and lay 
the groundwork for a prosperous 
post-oil future. Recent events have 
showed that despite possessing 
high-quality military hardware, 
the Kingdom cannot be a security 
provider in the Middle East, and as 
it seems at least possible that the 
US will withdraw from the MENA 
region, this appears unlikely to 
happen within the foreseeable 
future.
As it is clear that there is no 
stability in the region, it can be 
expected that the powers are going 
to balance against each other. This 
will accelerate the security dilemma 
unless a miracle happens and one of 
the main actors gives up the game, 
which today seems very unlikely. 
A transparent IPO could lead 
to a more transparent country, but 
we should emphasise that only 
1.5% of the shares were sold on 
Tadawul for the first round and 
most of the investors were Saudi 
citizens, most of whom were locked 
Contemporary Global Challenges in Geopolitics, Security Policy and World Economy
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
23
down at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in 
2017. A successful Saudi Aramco 
IPO is an indirect valuation of the 
Saudi economy. At the closure of 
the IPO Brent crude oil cost around 
$34/barrel, which could determine 
the profitability of the company 
(homepage8 of BBc neWs). The 
US-Saudi strategic partnership 
relies on there being cheap and 
plentiful oil on the market, in 
return for which the US provides 
security for the country. In the 
recent years the US has become 
the 4th biggest oil exporter in 
the world, and it is important to 
emphasise that Saudi Aramco has 
around 1 million barrels/day of so 
far unused capacity, because that is 
only provision for emergency times 
(homepage9 of cia FactBooK). If 
the company is going to be more 
public than it is today, a 1 million 
barrel provision for the Americans 
cannot be sustained on cost/benefit 
8  https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/
cmjpj223708t/oil – 2020. 03. 15.
9  https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2242rank.html – 
2020. 03. 14.
grounds, unless the shareholders 
are interested in financing the US-
Saudi partnership, which is again, 
very unlikely. 
The Western investors should 
attend the next round of the IPO, 
because this transaction could 
determine future of the global 
oil market for decades. In 2020 
it is unrealistic to expect liberal 
principles to hold sway in the 
most closed Arabic country. Thus, 
the West should design a feasible 
cooperation if they do not want 
to fall behind Asia, and want to 
receive more information about the 
Kingdom.
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I.2. Institutional reforms in north 
africa: the Example of the “advanced 
regionalization” in Morocco
ilham BouRas10
Abstract
The process of regionalization was conceived, in the case of Morocco, in order 
to tend to a series of socio-economic issues resulting from the centralized set up of the 
institutional body of the country. The disparities that the different regions of the country 
saw emerge required the inclusion of the “territory” as a key element in the socio-
economic balance of the country. This paper analyses the process of the “advanced 
regionalization” which was implemented in Morocco in 2015 and was backed by 
the country’s Constitution. It focuses on the current state of implementing advanced 
regionalization, the core challenges it involves and the contribution of the European 
Union as an international actor. The analysis relies on a qualitative approach. It consists 
of combining the outcomes of the review of the relevant documents (constitution, laws, 
statements, etc) with the results of a review of the literature focusing on the specific 
question of advanced regionalization. The main findings of the paper are that, on one 
hand, while slowly but steadily moving forward, the advanced regionalization will need 
more time in order to allow for its internal organization related issues to be solved and to 
thus aim towards more optimal results. On the other hand, and regarding the international 
aspect, the EU’s input proves limited to technical support.
Keywords: advanced regionalization, Morocco, institutional reform, 
decentralization
10  International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School
I�2�1� Introduction
The concept of 
“regionalization” can be defined 
in two major ways, depending 
on whether we are considering 
the worldwide scale, or the case 
of one specific country. The term 
“region”, which is also subject 
to the same rule, and as defined 
by the Cambridge dictionary can 
either refer to a certain part of the 
world (including several countries) 
or to the areas into which a single 
country is divided officially. The 
present paper concerns the second 
category which looks at the 
region as a geographically defined 
part of a country with specific 
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characteristics, needs and set ups. 
Processes of regionalization 
and decentralization are commonly 
noticed within the countries of the 
South influenced by Structural 
Adjustment Plans (lacRoiX, th. 
2018). “Advanced regionalization”, 
under this specific name, is defined 
as a “purely Moroccan project”11 due 
to the fact that it is strongly related 
to the political as well as the socio-
economic set up of the country. It 
is thus a major reform project. The 
main idea of this reform is to bring 
the administrative territory closer 
to the “real”12 territory, which 
is structured by the social and 
economic behaviors of the local 
populations (BeRRiane, m. 2015). 
The advanced regionalization is 
thus based on the diversity of the 
socio-economic realities of the 
different regions of Morocco. Its 
aim, in the precise case of Morocco, 
is to disperse the public action in 
a more effective way, in order to 
remedy disparities.
The advanced regionalization 
marks a certain break up, 
considering the domination of the 
centralized set up which had marked 
the country since its independence 
11  As it was defined by Khalid Safir, 
who’s in charge of leading the 
implementation of the project, in an 
interview with Medias24.com (nhaili, 
s. 2019)
12  As described Berriane, referring to the 
physical territory (BeRRiane, m. 2015)
in 1956 (lacRoiX, th. 2018). The 
present paper is going to address 
the advanced regionalization 
process in Morocco as a major 
gradual reform and to assess 
its evolution through the years. 
While the historical background 
of the decentralization process in 
Morocco is briefly addressed in the 
present paper, the main time frame 
of the analysis begins in 2011, 
following the constitutionalization 
of the “Advanced regionalization” 
and continues until the current year. 
The challenges of the advanced 
regionalization, as a major 
institutional reform, are also to be 
discussed in the present paper, and 
finally, the paper will focus on the 
European Union’s input.
I�2�2� From decentralization 
to Advanced 
Regionalization: a brief 
history
The centralized set-up of 
Morocco’s administrative body 
was inherited from the French 
protectorate, which chose the 
city of Rabat as its capital and set 
its administration and the core 
of its institutions there13. Three 
13  Morocco’s capitals have changed 
throughout history until Rabat, which 
remains the current capital and is 
referred to as the “administrative 
capital” since it held all the central 
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years after its independence, 
Morocco started to implement 
its strategy of “decentralization”, 
which grants more competences 
to local communities (jaFaRi, m. 
– el moujaddidi, n. 2016). The 
following year (1960) witnessed 
the establishment of the Dahir14 
related to municipal organization as 
well as the first municipal elections. 
The phase of “decentralization” 
then took a major step forward, 
marked mainly by the communal 
charter of 1976 which addressed 
the management of the resources 
of local communities and the 
extension of the competences of the 
municipal councils (jaFaRi, m. – el 
moujaddidi, n. 2016).
Regionalization and regional 
issues started attracting attention 
many years prior to the launch of the 
“Advanced regionalization” process 
under its current form, having for 
a main mission the handling of 
the many unbalances that were 
the result of Morocco’s previous 
centralized politico-institutional 
setup. It is thus important to 
evaluate the depth of the advanced 
regionalization process, taking 
into consideration the concrete 
results of its implementation since 
2015, as well as the challenges that 
administrative and governmental 
institutions of the Kingdom.
14  The word “Dahir or Dhahir” (singular) 
refers to a royal decree made by the 
Moroccan king.
still hinder it and their causes and 
origins.
The transition from the general 
concept of regionalization, which is 
the highest form of decentralization 
(goeuRy, d. et al. 2017), to that of 
advanced regionalization was done 
gradually. On the 4th of January 
2010, the King Mohammed VI 
announced during his speech 
the creation of a Consultative 
commission of regionalization 
(Commission consultative de la 
régionalisation/ CCR) (lugan, 
B. 2011). Although it had been 
addressed in different forms in 
past versions of the Constitution, 
it is the last revision of 2011 that 
mentions “regionalization” as an 
integral reform and confirms thus 
its constitutionality. In 2015, the 
organic law related to the region was 
passed by the parliament to mark 
the launch of the operationalization 
of the reform15.
In terms of novelty, advanced 
regionalization is a major reform; 
in fact it can even be considered the 
“biggest devolution of powers in 
Morocco’s institutional history”16. 
The first change that was done on the 
regional level was the decreasing of 
the number of regions from 16 to 
15  Organic laws are laws through which 
elements of the Constitution are 
applied.
16  As described by Youssef Aït Akdim, 
Author’s translation (see full article 
ait aKdim, y. 2017)
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12, with the aim of achieving a more 
effective territorial management. 
On the organizational level, one of 
the major changes is the placement 
of the president of the region at the 
top of the institutional structure 
as an elected regional official and 
therefore benefitting from electoral 
legitimacy. The regions are thus 
equipped with their elected council 
and by resources allocated to its 
development and management. 
The regional councils oversee the 
economic and social development 
of the region and work along with 
the State. And regarding the central 
State, the coordination between the 
local level and the central one is 
handled by the Walis (officials in 
charge of representing the King and 
the government on the local level17) 
and governors.
The aims of the process of 
advanced regionalization can be 
summed up in three main categories: 
social development, economic 
and democracy related aims. The 
first category of aims consists 
of working on decreasing the 
disparities caused by the centralized 
set up, contributing thus to a better 
distribution of the resources on the 
different regions and the overall 
improvement of the population’s 
quality of life. This set of aims 
targets mainly the inclusion of the 
regions which are geographically 
17  Ibidem
far from the country’s political 
and economic hubs (respectively 
Rabat and Casablanca and their 
surrounding areas). Regarding the 
economic aspect of the advanced 
regionalization, increasing the 
competitiveness of the regions, in a 
sense of open and globalized markets, 
is one of the main aims (jaFaRi, m. 
– el moujaddidi, n. 2016). This 
means that the improvement of 
the competitiveness of the regions 
within the country, which is to be 
achieved through a better allocation 
of resources and an economic 
activity focused on the assets of 
the region in question, is bound to 
contribute to the improvement of 
the overall economy of the country. 
The third and last category consists 
of the set of aims related to the 
implementation of local democracy. 
This set of aims was conceptualized 
to take regional governance to the 
next level by strengthening the 
democratic legitimacy of regional 
political activity (through regional 
and municipal elections) and 
through the representativeness of 
the specific needs of the regions.
I�2�3� The advanced 
regionalization: reform and 
challenges
The advanced regionalization, 
despite being particular to the 
Moroccan case took decades to get 
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to the stage it is at right now. It is 
nonetheless not exempt from facing 
challenges, both on the conceptual 
level and on the concrete one. 
Regarding the conceptual aspect, 
and although the advanced 
regionalization presents itself 
as a total break up with the past 
institutional set up, and a complete 
reform, the extent of these changes 
is still subject to evaluations. 
The main challenges that the 
advanced regionalization is facing 
are in relation to its organization, 
whether it is financial or human 
resources related. One of the 
central issues is the multitude of 
actors and the absence of clear 
precisions regarding their roles 
and field of intervention, which 
can cause their responsibilities and 
missions to overlap (jaFaRi, m. – 
el moujaddidi, n. 2016).
Morocco’s most advanced 
project of decentralization was 
conceived, unlike many other 
autonomy and regionalization 
projects worldwide, based on 
economic growth, competitivity 
increase and diminishing 
inequalities, rather than on 
“regional identity” (BeRgh, i. s. 
2016 p. 11.). This means that the 
need for decentralization had for an 
initial motive the need for solving 
the inequalities that were caused 
by the centralized set up in order 
to improve the quality of life of the 
population, rather than a motive 
related to the cultural or linguistic 
difference between the regions, 
despite Morocco being rich in 
cultural and linguistic diversity.
I�2�4� The input of the 
European Union
The shaping of the advanced 
regionalization and the formulation 
of its constitutive elements was 
mainly handled by the CCR. The 
CCR was nonetheless not the only 
organ whose input was considered 
in forming the regionalization 
agenda, since EU and the World 
Bank funded analyses were also 
used in the process (BeRgh, i. s. 
2016). The EU’s contribution to 
the advanced regionalization is an 
interesting point to analyse when it 
comes to analyzing the Morocco-EU 
relations, and so for the following 
reasons: first, and considering that 
the advanced regionalization is a 
very “local” project, analyzing the 
EU’s involvement could potentially 
help in the understanding of the 
extent of its general conditionality 
in the case of Morocco. The 
second reason for which advanced 
regionalization demonstrates once 
again the limits of the EU-Morocco 
relations (and mainly the limits of 
the EU’s policy promotion as well as 
general influence on policy making 
in Morocco) is the sensitivity of 
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the advanced regionalization and 
its connection to the kingdom’s 
sovereignty (BeRgh, i. s. 2016). 
Finally, the third element which can 
be used in the same sense is the set 
of internal issues that are inherent 
to the Moroccan set up and which 
can’t be addressed by mean of the 
EU’s intervention.
Regarding the EU’s 
conditionality, and as it has been 
demonstrated in the past in many 
works done on Europeanization 
beyond Europe (see 
Schimmelfennig and Lavenex’s 
works on the EU’s conditionality 
in its southern neighbourhood), 
the advanced regionalization is 
not an exception in the sense that 
the EU’s conditionality when 
it comes to Morocco’s ultimate 
decentralization project is rather 
weak. Here we can combine all 
three reasons (conditionality, 
sovereignty and Morocco’s internal 
matters) in order to explain why the 
EU’s input is limited. 
According to Sylvia Bergh 
(BeRgh, i. s. 2016 p. 11.), the EU has 
not supported Morocco’s process 
of decentralization/ regionalization, 
apart from its funding of the 
previously mentioned studies and 
other study visits, and so in order to 
avoid interfering with a sovereignty 
linked matter. In the same article, 
Bergh demonstrates that the EU 
chooses to engage in activities that 
do have a link to governance but 
that are of a technical nature, like 
twinning projects18, since “local 
governance is a sensitive topic if 
it is not presented as a technical 
exercise” (BeRgh, i. s. 2016). This 
technical support, which can be 
noticed for example through the 
“Hakama”19 project, is adopted for 
the mere reason that it is, as Lavenex 
and Schimmelfennig put it while 
referring to the EU’s democracy 
promotion in its neighbourhood, 
“less overtly political” (laveneX, s. 
– schimmelFenning, F. 2011).
But is the EU’s support 
in the success of the advanced 
regionalization necessary? It is 
important to note that, in addition 
to the fact that the EU is Morocco’s 
biggest economic partner, the 
two parties are engaged in a 
“regulatory convergence” process. 
The process in question consists 
of the harmonization of rules 
and regulations between the two 
entities (and needless to say that 
more adaptation is to be done from 
the Moroccan side than from the 
EU one due to the difference of the 
sizes of the two economies), and 
18  Twinning projects consist of training 
the Moroccan Elite in order to 
achieve the planned gradual à la 
carte implementation of the EU’s 
Acquis Communautaire through 
administrative reforms.
19  Hakama: from Arabic, meaning 
“governance”.
Contemporary Global Challenges in Geopolitics, Security Policy and World Economy
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
33
so in order to allow for a smoother 
integration of Morocco into the 
EU’s common market. In addition 
to this, Morocco and the EU are 
currently negotiating the conclusion 
of a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement (DCFTA), which 
is ought to take the economic links 
between the two parties even further. 
These elements attest indeed of the 
strength of the relations between 
Morocco and the EU, but it is 
important to note here that some of 
the processes involved (including 
the regulatory convergence) have 
been through a rough patch in the 
recent years, since Morocco and the 
EU faced a series of issues related 
mainly to the Sahara question. The 
most significant one of these issues 
followed the general court of the EU 
making a series of rulings excluding 
the Sahara from Morocco’s national 
territory, which meant the exclusion 
of the Sahara region from the 
agriculture and fisheries agreement 
concluded between the Kingdom 
and the EU. This incident resulted 
in the suspension of political 
dialogue between the two parties20. 
These issues were later unblocked, 
and the dialogue resumed21. The 
20  See Special Report 09/2019: EU 
support to Morocco - Limited 
results [so far] together with the 
Commission’s replies https://www.eca.
europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/sr19_09/
sr_morocco_en.pdf
21  In March 2019, the European 
aforementioned elements allow 
of a better understanding of the 
changes that shaped the Morocco-
EU relations. According to Sylvia 
Bergh, the changes that characterize 
the current relations are mainly due 
to Morocco’s decreased dependence 
on the EU (BeRgh, i. s. 2016).
I�2�5� Conclusion
The advanced regionalization 
is a complex, multi-level process 
that will take more time in order to 
fully reshape the institutional body 
of Morocco. It can be defined as an 
extension of the “nationalization” 
process of the Moroccan 
administration which followed 
the country’s independence, with 
the main goal of detaching from 
the institutional legacy of the 
French protectorate, which has 
left a strongly centralized set-up, 
resulting in the concentration of 
the country’s administrations in the 
capital. 
As for assessing the 
advancement of the reform, the 
advanced regionalization has 
been progressing steadily (for 
example, 11 out of 12 Programs of 
regional development (PDR)22 were 
Parliament agreed to include the 
Sahara territory in the ENP, see http://
www.senat.fr/ga/ga155/ga15512.html
22  In French: Programmes de 
développement régional.
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validated, and two Regional land 
use plans (SRAT)23 were adopted). 
Regarding the current phase of 
the reform, an acceleration of the 
processes is expected, and it includes 
as a main goal the implementation 
of the National Charter for 
Administrative Deconcentration24 
(nhaili, s. 2019).
While being inspired of other 
regionalization experiences, the 
input of the external actors is, as 
it was demonstrated through the 
example of the EU, limited to the 
technical support in the case of 
Morocco. This limit does not discard 
the fact that the EU’s support of 
Morocco on the international level 
23  Schémas Régionaux d’Aménagement 
du Territoire
24  Charte Nationale de Déconcentration 
Administrative
remains important. This particular 
aspect can be further addressed in 
future studies.
While 2020 is presented as a 
promising year for taking advanced 
regionalization to the next level, 
it is important to keep in mind the 
possible challenges that accompany 
the upcoming legislative, regional 
and municipal elections in 2021. 
The question remains open for more 
research on the development of the 
complex reform that is advanced 
regionalization.
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I.3. libyan nationhood and regionalism: 
tribal society in a modern era
Bálint Kása25
Abstract
This paper’s main focus is to explore underlying social hardships and focal points 
within the Libyan society with the purpose of proving their value to foreign actors’ mostly 
covert operations in the ongoing civil war. 20th century developments will receive prime 
attention due to the great scale of influence they have had on the current structure, 
operation and affairs. Throughout the argumentations, the paper will rely on a set of 
qualitative sources that are going to facilitate identifying the essential factors behind 
lack of order and hence stability. Consequently, the predominantly domestic nature of the 
persisting opposition is a central thought of this work. Expected findings include weak 
sense of nationhood, dominance of regional linkages over a single national bond, as well 
as sense of suppression fostered by dispersed and insufficient scale of modernity.
Keywords: Libya, tribalism, Qadhafi, civil war, proxy war
25  PhD student – CUB IR Doctoral School, balint.kasa@outlook.com
I�3�1� Introduction
It seems to be a characteristic 
of our age that when it comes to 
crisis analysis and even crisis-
management, the symptoms of the 
given problem are addressed, while 
the roots of it remain untouched 
or even neglected. Comprehensive 
analyses do not always receive the 
necessary attention, sometimes 
even in relation to major issues 
with global relevance. Instead, 
single narratives are preferred 
(haRchaoui, j. 2018). It is a pity 
inasmuch as a deep and parallel 
investigation of those would 
also allow better estimation of 
crisis management and eventual 
remedies. It is not the purpose of 
this paper to explore the missed 
opportunities stemming from this 
overly-narrowed approach that is 
ultimately leading up to multiple 
junctions of conflicts around 
the globe. Still, choosing one of 
today’s major conflicts with direct 
and significant influence on foreign 
powers’ interests and conducting a 
deep investigation with the above-
mentioned approach might take 
one closer to the fundamental 
understanding of the chaos itself. In 
light of these, Libya’s case will be 
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discussed throughout the following 
pages with the intention to identify 
those historic milestones within the 
society that have led up to today’s 
opposition and lack of order as 
well as stability. Many of these 
milestones can be traced back to the 
bipolar era (haddad, s. 2014) and 
so by addressing them, one might 
gain a better understanding on their 
significance. Importantly, the goal 
of this paper is not to highlight the 
solution of the Libyan conflict at 
all costs, for it would most likely 
result in an over-simplification of a 
sophisticated case with inaccurate 
and counterproductive assentation. 
Instead, those factors are to be 
alleged that radiate the core issues 
throughout the multiple layers of 
society, ultimately leading up to 
the seemingly unresolvable chaos 
with no visible light at the end 
of the tunnel. Unfortunately, this 
is a matter significantly under-
researched and under-discussed – 
underdiscussed these years as the 
resolution agendas predominantly 
include different methodologies 
applied by foreign nations: 
humanitarian, financial, military, 
material, etc. aid (dessi, a. – 
gReco, e. 2018). This paper offers 
a Libyan perspective on the root 
designated to present a universal 
background on the multiple grips 
that are being used to manipulate 
domestic stakeholders against each 
other.
With the commencement of 
the Arab Spring 1.0, a region-wide 
transformation and subsequent 
conflicts (commenced), some of 
these lack sight of an end even from 
a decade’s perspective. Libya is a 
fitting instance for the reason that 
the resolution today seems further 
than five years ago. More and 
more signs are out there proving 
the existence of a proxy war in 
the country (gRoh, t. l. 2019), 
where foreign countries justify or 
deny their involvement alongside 
their own agenda. The anarchy is 
complete and palpable. But this 
was not always the case. Even 
during the ten-year time frame, 
foreign presence – and especially 
the opposition inside it – was not on 
a constant intensity. Precisely, one 
might argue that after the removal 
of the notorious dictator Qadhafi, 
it was exceedingly marginal. The 
subsequent change and trend of 
intensifying occurred around after 
the time of the outbreak of the 
Crimea and East-Ukraine crisis, as 
well as the heated-up international 
environment around the Syria civil-
war. It would be a proper statement 
to call these three the most important 
junctures of our current time. Still, 
arguably the Libyan conflict is 
the blurriest out of the three when 
it comes to state and non-state 
actors’ involvement. Importantly, 
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the first hypothesis of this paper 
is going to argue that Libya’s 
vulnerability to these actions roots 
within its social structure that is 
up to date based on tribalism. In 
itself, this would not constitute a 
problem – in fact many countries 
share this characteristic – but as a 
result of decades-old grievances 
among these groups, they are more 
prone to instigation. In order to 
understand why the application of 
such intricate strategies may be 
advantageous, the relevant period 
of the country’s history must be 
understood: the 20th century. The 
second hypothesis will argue that 
the Libyan society went through its 
biggest development phase during 
the bipolar era, which is also the 
source of underlying tension and 
sense of oppression. Finally, the last 
hypothesis will prove that the sense 
of nationhood in Libya is still weak 
and local patriotism outweighs it.
I�3�2� From colonialism to 
coup d’état
At the beginning of the 
20th century, the relationship 
between Libya and its new colonial 
master, Italy was characterized 
by challenges since Rome started 
to destroy local communities’ 
means of income by preparing to 
transform the infrastructure for 
incoming Italian settlers. This was 
a significant investment that never 
had equal return but imperialist 
motivations were prevailing, 
contributing to a great deal of social 
marginalization (WRight, j. 1982). 
Indeed, a sharp separation among 
Arab and Berber tribes of Cyrenaica 
(East) and Tripolitania (West) was 
present and developments were 
focused on the latter (moRRis, K. 
2010). After the Second World War, 
Libya became independent from 
Italian colonial reign and in 1951, 
by establishing the United Kingdom 
of Libya, a new era began with the 
rule of King Idris, the first and only 
monarch of the country. A new 
territory, Fezzan (Southwest) also 
became part of the state resulting 
in the birth of geographic borders 
existing still today. Nevertheless, 
this also included the addition of 
multiple more Tuareg and Toubou 
tribes to Libya. This has led up to 
two significant implications. Firstly, 
homogeneity was further decreased; 
the only common feature among 
the various tribes was of territorial 
nature. Secondly – and from the 
perspective of the future more 
importantly –, this was not a fought 
out secession, the country was 
abandoned and left to its own rule 
purely because no better solution 
was laid down. For the fact that 
this was a freedom reached without 
sacrificed blood and stress, it might 
seem an enviable case. However, 
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the lack of unified standup against 
an oppressor also represented the 
lack of common ideology, cause 
and national movement. Examining 
today’s liberal democracies, the 
significance of these in relation 
to their own development is 
unquestionable. The task for Libya 
was not smaller than attempting 
to forge fundamentally different 
tribes into an alliance that would 
contribute to a functioning state. 
King Idris’s dedication to live 
up to this challenge was debated 
(BlacKWell, s. 2003) but it was 
not his personality that blocked 
social, economic or any other sort 
of development aimed at state 
building. Libya was an exceedingly 
poor country hit by regular droughts 
and locust plagues, there was no 
significant source of income to 
rely on. The room for movement 
was extremely narrow. At the 
same time, there existed a lack 
of desire towards a modern state, 
which formulated during the Italian 
colonial period (vandeWalle, d. 
2012). A conservative attitude was 
state-wide practiced and there was 
no intention to make an approach 
towards Western values and state-
characteristics.
Nevertheless, foreign actors’ 
approach soon became hard to 
oppose. Overt American interests 
significantly increased in 1959, 
when a huge oil field was discovered 
by Standard Oil of New Jersey. 
Up until the discovery, Libya’s 
importance exclusively relied on 
a strategic ground that had classic 
Cold War – predominantly realist 
thought – motivated relevance 
for both West and East. Precisely, 
its geographic location qualified 
it an essential part of strategies 
of containment, defense and in 
general, influence. However, the 
new explorations elevated the role 
of Libya as both the quality and 
quantity of the country’s newly 
found commodity transformed 
regional and global markets (st 
john, R. B. 2011) at a record pace 
and opened a new chapter in the 
history of the whole oil industry 
(yeRgin, d. 1991). The explorations 
and subsequent upstream activities 
fundamentally changed the 
country’s labor structure too, oil-
industry became prominent. The 
coming years of the 60s brought an 
intense US pressure to lure Libya to 
the West through trade unions and 
labor policies within the oil sector 
due to their high influence over 
society. Precisely, anti-communist 
trade unions received support from 
Washington in an attempt to counter 
the spread of groups deemed as 
radical (Bini, e. 2012). The US 
government’s intent was to prevent 
the establishment of strong trade 
unions in order to avoid strikes and 
to ensure the steady improvement 
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of Libya to become one of the top 
oil-producing countries. At the 
same time, the development of 
Libyan life conditions was crucial 
in order to oppose Communist 
influence’s spreading. Economy-
boosting steps followed with the 
Eisenhower-doctrine being the 
most comprehensive, and the oil-
sector-transforming actions being 
the most debated ones. The Soviet 
Union also provided economic 
help, especially at the coastal – 
and mostly inhabited – parts of 
the country and opened its own 
Embassy in Tripoli, which had 
strategic relevance (st john, R. B. 
1983). Shortly after the opening of 
this Soviet Embassy, small groups 
constituting of Egyptian nationals 
started attempts to influence society 
from bottom levels, including 
schools, small shops, markets, 
etc. with communist ideology (us 
emBassy in tRipoli 1957). The 
bipolar game of chess was on in the 
Libyan society.
The federal state of Libya 
had an evolving issue: corruption 
circulating around oil trade. With 
abundance of demand from the 
Mediterranean Sea and no other 
source of income, many tried to 
get rich through such deals in an 
environment far from decent. It 
was a single but important indicator 
of the incapability of the central 
authority to effectively govern 
domestically. The three territories 
possessed greater autonomy 
than the central government and 
they were immensely different. 
Tripolitania was the closest to 
the attributes of modern state 
with its denser, more educated 
and experienced population, 
while Fezzan was the other end 
of the scale. In this environment, 
American and British oil companies 
continuously raised their presence 
in the country, requiring the import 
of skilled labor as the country was 
not ready for this scale of demand. 
However, the Libyan government 
also took measures to ‘Libyanize’ 
workforce aiming to preserve 
national sovereignty (Bini, e. 2019). 
Still, it aligned with American 
interests in repressing trade unions 
sympathizing with communist 
ideals. This has brought about the 
dominance of corporations and the 
total exploitation of workers in the 
subsequent period. It was also an 
opportunity for those, who sensed 
the vulnerability of the monarch. 
And so, somewhat ironically, 
it ultimately contributed to the 
outbreak of the Six Day War, from 
which Qadhafi emerged to be the 
leader of the country.
I�3�3� Decades of ‘revolution’
In 1969, the Muammar 
Qadhafi-led Revolutionary 
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Command Council (RCC) 
overthrew King Idris and began his 
42-year-long reign as the leader of 
Libya. The aspects of this revolution 
were similar to the one executed in 
Egypt by Gamal Abdel Nasser and 
the newly established socialist party 
was immensely comparable to that 
of its Eastern neighbor’s. Until the 
introduction of the Jamahiriya, 
the state of masses in 1977, this 
single party-state was in place, 
where debates and discussions 
occurred within the boundaries of 
the Libyan Arab Socialist Union 
(ASU). The power of tribes started 
to decrease simultaneously with the 
strengthening of central authority. 
The state of masses effectively 
steered the country through the 
“revolution” that achieved a central 
motive in the everyday operations 
(mundy, j. 2018). Assets were 
taken and redistributed on a great 
scale and the number of workers’ 
associations was on a steady 
increase. The greatest sign of 
unpredictability was the lack of 
constitution and hence any legal 
baseline. Over 400 Congresses 
operated at municipality level 
dealing with local issues while 
national matters were meant to be 
handled in the General People’s 
Congress. However, the insufficient 
attendance truly represented the 
stage of democracy (mattes, 
h. 2008). The strong central 
government held a total control over 
the planned economy (vandeWalle, 
d. 1998). The Jamahiriya did not 
uphold a significant central army, 
military power comprised regional 
militias (andeRson, l. 1986) that 
were all deployed in case of war. 
On the other hand, an exceedingly 
wide-range of network of domestic 
intelligence was maintained to 
ensure nothing was missed (aiKins, 
m. 2012). The strong grip of state 
was only eased by the end of 
the 80s. It was necessary, due to 
the combination of sharp fall of 
oil prices, unsuccessful military 
conformation with Chad, inability to 
supply the population appropriately 
but mostly due to a changing 
international environment. Libya 
opened up to the world at the dawn 
of the new century and a sort of 
liberalization commenced, only it 
was too late.
Qadhafi’s actions in domestic 
politics are best described as 
balancing (ogun, m. n. et al. 2020) 
among the various tribes. Coming 
from a small one of these that had 
no vital debate with the others, he 
effectively managed to maintain 
stability and control at the wheel 
(implemented Sharia law, built up 
an extensive surveillance web and 
became domestically untouchable). 
As he was receiving the support of 
the Qadhafi, Maqariha and Warfalla 
tribes, he had comprehensive 
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influence over the military, 
police and surveillance bodies. 
Even though public institutions 
existed, those were intentionally 
weakened (comBaZ, e. 2014) and 
the power was exercised through 
these tribes (smits, R. et al. 2013). 
Nevertheless, he was the first leader 
of the country who effectively 
attempted to modernize the state 
and improve life conditions and 
living standards while maintaining 
sovereignty and preventing getting 
indebted to foreign actors. Efforts 
on nationalization of the oil sector 
composed a part of this strategy. 
Still, it was never an intention 
to reach a workforce of Libyan 
nationals above 70 percent within 
this sector due to the unavailability 
of sufficient skilled labor in the 
country. As a result of massive 
oil incomes, GDP per capita was 
around a steady 6500 USD by the 
1990s, which was multiple times 
higher than that of Syria, Morocco, 
Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Tunis or 
Lebanon (WoRldBanK 2019). On 
the other hand, regional differences 
– most notably between Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica – strengthened over 
the decades leading up to tensions 
on the Tripoli-Benghazi axis.
I�3�4� The Gordian knot: 
real expectations for light at 
the end
Nowadays, a heavy flow of 
criticism is being directed towards 
Libya, countless researchers and 
politicians pronounce it to be a failed 
state (engel, a. 2014). The severity 
or accuracy of these claims receives 
support or refutation depending on 
subjective views. Notwithstanding, 
a couple of factors should not be 
omitted from such debates. What 
we call Libya today has gone 
through its biggest development 
over the course of the past hundred 
years and has arguably reached its 
current stage at a faster pace than 
the average. The tribal society, 
which previously maintained a 
conservative attitude found itself 
at the core of an extensively 
nationalized labor environment 
under an administration that 
commenced to lay a previously 
unexpected magnitude of effort 
into organizing every aspect of life. 
Paradoxically, this four decades did 
increase attributes of nationhood 
within the borders. Obviously, the 
“failure” to avoid tribal oppositions 
have led to the massive unrest, 
which receives greater visibility 
today. Still, historic experience 
tells us that the great territorial size, 
scarcity of peoples and diversity 
of tribes (Kaplan, s. 2019) would 
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have required a lengthier timeframe 
to reach a thorough sense of national 
unity.
Furthermore, the lack of 
experience with democratic 
institutions and political 
participation presented various 
obstacles (sZmolKa, i. 2014) in 
the UN-created Government of 
National Accord (GNA). This vast 
‘institutional vacuum’ rooted in 
influential tribes’ elevated role in 
state matters (munoZ, g. m. 2014) 
during the Qadhafi era but once 
this sort of ‘balancing’ ceased to 
exist, domestic politics became 
anarchic for the first time. The 
structure of society was broken by 
the betrayal of the political elite 
(BaRtu, p. 2014) resulting in a 
further loss of credit and trust but 
most importantly in an impairment 
of a slowly-reached level of 
integrity. At the same time, the role 
of tribalism remained essential – if 
not even more important – within 
security and political context. 
Many signs show that communities 
today attest a preference of tribal 
bonds over national requirements 
(al-shadeedi, a.-h. – eZZedine, n. 
2019) as no single entity proves to be 
influential enough. Unintentionally, 
the UN has contributed to the status 
quo since the Skhirat Agreement 
in 2015 neglected tendencies of 
historic influence among tribes of 
West and East; it brought about 
new winners and losers. Thus, the 
biggest criticisms against the GNA 
– the inability to ever have been 
able to take control and to survive 
without tangible international 
support – were actually triggered 
by the UN itself.
Another structural 
disturbance this seems to have aided 
is the strengthening of local identity 
at the detriment of tribal influence. 
The strongest support of this 
argument is the battle for Tripoli, 
which was preceded by a relatively 
fast march of the Libyan National 
Army (LNA) deploying local 
tribes (lacheR, W. 2019) supported 
by various foreign groups. The 
stalemate was reached South of the 
capital and a trench war developed 
as the territories of four powerful 
tribes (lacheR, W. 2020) were 
reached. The subsequent defection 
from Haftar’s troops and hence the 
need to increase the involvement 
of outer parties, i.e. the Wagner 
group came as a necessity. Namely, 
it manifested that multiple Eastern 
militias prefer their territories’ 
protection over the conquest of 
remote lands, even if those are 
in country. In addition, Haftar’s 
circuitous taking of Benghazi also 
fits into this equation for it would 
hardly have succeeded without the 
support received from Russia, Egypt 
and France. These raise questions 
on the real influence and capability 
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of the Commander of the East. In 
a greater context, this implies any 
sense of nationhood secondary 
at best behind regionalism and 
local patriotism. On the other 
hand, it should be noted that both 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica have 
firmly denied the possibility of 
splitting up the country (hüsKen, 
th. 2013), which does signal the 
presence of some national bonding. 
Still, fundamental differences in 
political orientation (jalu, a. t. 
2017), radical views (vaRvelli, 
a. 2013) and the presence of 
insurgencies and terrorist groups 
(pusZtai, W. 2014) will most likely 
hinder any meaningful development 
for the foreseeable future.
Arguably the most important 
constituents of the outbreak of the 
first Civil War were the sense of 
unjust, oppression, as well as lack 
of sufficient representation among 
territories. Nothing could exemplify 
this better than the fact that Qadhafi 
first lost support in Benghazi. In 
the capital of Cyrenaica and most 
urban-developed city – alongside 
Tripoli –, a deeply-rooted sense of 
abuse was perceivable as riots broke 
out. Tripoli was perceived to have 
been prioritized over the decades 
amid of obvious differences in 
economic capacities. By the first 
decade of the new millennia, 
approximately 70 percent of 
Libya’s oil incomes originated in 
Cyrenaica but the generated value 
was not reimbursed with sufficient 
developments (maRtin, ph. – 
WeBeR, ch. 2012). Instead, this 
region accommodated the country’s 
poorest living standards and state 
of infrastructure (el-KiKhia, o. 
m. 2013). This was the heritage 
from being the No. 1 oil producing 
region in Africa for four decades. 
Qadhafi’s stubbornness during 
the bipolar era could be balanced 
through the available channels 
but changes in world politics and 
economics left the dictator without 
the room for movement he was used 
to. Henceforth, he was not anymore 
able to balance these underlying 
tensions out, they only needed a 
spark to come to the fore.
It seems obvious from the 
above pages that the Libyan society 
is at a decisive crossroads. But the 
outcome of the Second Civil War 
is not purely a national matter. As 
opposed to the first one, it entails 
an increasing number of foreign 
actors in the form of proxies that 
participate due to geopolitical, 
economic and security reasons. 
The problem is that these actors 
are competing each other alongside 
their own interests thus continuing 
to fuel the flame of conflict. Most 
notable instances include the 
France – Italy and Russia – Turkey 
dimensions but there are many 
more. The core of this issue is that 
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this exceedingly high number of 
foreign participants are able to build 
on the divided Libyan society. The 
manifold tensions and oppositions 
articulated above all serve the 
opportunity for these actors to 
get involved. Purchasing oil from 
the Civil War-torn country and 
so financing military operations, 
deploying UAVs to neutralize 
hostile groups endangering 
operations of domestic militias, 
providing training, weapons and 
other supply all constitute their 
toolset and they have immensely 
been part of past years’ happenings. 
Most importantly, they do not 
foster settlement among the parties 
as (1) those are trying to get the 
most favorable deal, which would 
guarantee them the desired rights, 
or (2) they are welcoming the 
financial attributes of the status 
quo too much to be interested 
in stability. As a result, all the 
foreign-mediated permanent truce 
negotiations fail to achieve their 
articulated purpose. Any positive 
advancement towards order stands 
on vulnerable ground due to the 
presence of the numerous points 
of influence of patrons operating 
proxies in the current conflict.
I�3�5� Conclusion
This work has explored 
motives governing social issues 
within today’s Libyan society that 
have evolved and strengthened 
during the Cold War. Unequal 
return from invested labor and 
representation – among others – 
have led to heightened tensions 
and eventually to riots against the 
regime. This conflict erupted with 
significant European and NATO 
involvement but the aftermath 
brought about a predominantly 
Libyan-paved path under the UN-
created government. This entity 
overruled some decades-old 
unwritten concepts functioning 
within the society, contributing to 
further fragmentation. The inability 
of the international community-
recognized GNA to preserve its 
power and the simultaneous build-
up of General Haftar by foreign 
actors have together induced the 
subsequent fierce fights. As a result 
of significant social vulnerability, 
an extensive number of foreign 
powers could initiate building 
up their proxies to take benefit 
and influence the outcome of the 
struggle for political power in 
Libya to their advantage. Hence, 
the conflict became even more 
complex. The results of the 
investigation presented a weak 
but existing sense of nationhood, 
which is preceded by regionalist 
motives deriving from systematic 
inequalities inherited from the 
Qadhafi-era and exploited by 
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various actors at the present time.
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II. Current Challenges of 
Sustainability
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II.1. Interagency cooperation of un 
agencies within the framework of SDGs
BoRa Besgül26
Abstract
This paper aims to draw an accurate picture of the interagency cooperation of 
United Nations (UN) agencies within the framework of the newly established Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). In order to understand how and to what extent different agents 
in the UN system cooperate, the research project applies semi-structured interviews with 
UN officials as the primary data collection method. Expert interviews have been selected 
within UNIDO, UNDP, UNODC, and WHO, taking into account that these agencies have 
strong cooperation due to the nature of their assigned tasks. Although UN funds and 
programmes are overall highly diverse, this research focuses only on the cooperation 
within the UNIDO-UNDP and UNODC-WHO partnerships and seeks to conduct a 
cooperation analysis that can be applied easily to other complex institutions within the 
UN system. The author also investigates to what extent the inter-agency cooperation has 
changed after the adoption of the SDGs and what are the virtues and shortcomings of 
the inter-agency cooperation as things stand. Overall, cooperation problems, horizontal 
governance, a lack of joint programming, and the absence of a decent communication 
channel hinder attaining a strengthened partnership between the agencies.
Keywords: United Nations, agencies, cooperation, Sustainable Development 
Goals
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II�1�1� Introduction
A crucial development 
in terms of UN interagency 
cooperation was the adoption of 
the Millennium Declaration and its 
Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) (le Blanc, d. 2014). 
Although it can be claimed that 
these goals have been successful on 
a large scale, it is hard to maintain 
that the interagency cooperation has 
been strengthened, a problem which 
seems to have led to less efficient 
service delivery. Nevertheless, 
the adoption of the 2030 Agenda 
and its Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) in September 2015 
appeared to be the cutting edge of 
the United Nations system. The 
United Nations agencies have 
aligned themselves with specific 
goals which are cross-cutting, 
allowing for greater cooperation 
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among different agencies and 
ensuring effective implementation 
in order to resolve one of the 
foremost criticisms the UN received 
in the time of MDGs (namely, that 
UN activities were not unified 
due to duplication of tasks and 
miscommunication) (KlingeBiel, s. 
1998). This research starts with the 
questions: How has inter-agency 
cooperation changed after the 
adoption of the SDGs? Plus: What 
are the virtues and shortcomings of 
inter-agency cooperation now? 
In order to answer these 
questions, the author has had to 
investigate existent cooperations 
among UN agencies. However, 
concentrating on every partnership 
in the UN system would make the 
research very broad and hardly 
possible due to the high number 
of joint projects among agencies 
as well as time and budget 
constraints. The activities of the 
UN funds and programmes are 
highly diverse (BaRKin, j. 2015). 
Some institutions have a sectoral 
orientation (e.g. nutrition), others 
a target-group-specific one (e.g. 
children). Meanwhile, the most 
extensive UN program, UNDP 
(United Nations Development 
Programme), has no fixed focus but 
nevertheless plays a crucial role in 
coordinating the UN’s development 
activities. Therefore, the author has 
had to narrow down the scope of 
their research by focusing only on 
specific agencies. Agencies were 
selected on the basis of the fields 
they operate in common, and of 
their links to another UN organ.
The data collection process 
was conducted with semi-structured 
interviews with UN officials 
of certain agencies as United 
Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), United 
Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and 
World Health Organisation (WHO). 
Moreover, the preliminary research 
has revealed that no previous 
research has been done in terms 
of inter-agency cooperation in the 
time of SDGs. Even though SDG 
17 aims to increase partnership for 
the goals, it barely emphasises the 
importance of the UN agencies’ 
interagency cooperation. Finally, 
because there is a practical 
application for the future activities 
of the UN, and there is an evidence-
based gap concerning interagency 
cooperation within the UN system, 
researching this topic appears to be 
both relevant and timely. To this 
end, the paper aims to address this 
evidence-based gap and to attract 
subsequent analysts into the topic.
Even though some documents 
point out the problem of inter-agency 
cooperation in the UN system 
(Sixty-ninth General Assembly 
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Thematic Debate United Nations 
2015), the existing literature puts its 
emphasis more on the possibilities 
of strengthening cooperation of UN 
with the regional and sub-regional 
organisations in the field (silva, 
m. l. 2003) and overlooks the 
importance of cooperation among 
UN agencies to reach desired 
targets. As emphasised earlier, Goal 
17 itself also barely draws attention 
to the UN agencies’ cooperation 
with only some partial exceptions: 
“In order to gain access to science, 
technology, and innovation and 
enhance knowledge sharing on 
mutually agreed terms, improved 
coordination among existing 
mechanisms, in particular at the 
United Nations level, should be 
enhanced,” “Global macroeconomic 
stability, including through policy 
coordination and policy coherence, 
enhances policy coherence for 
sustainable development. (UNDP 
Goal 17 Targets 2018).
Stephan Kliengebiel made 
the following claim about UN 
cooperation: some substantive 
profiles of some agencies were 
unclear – notably, UNDP’s 
functions; there was inadequate 
political control and coordination 
within the UN; there was 
insufficient coordination between 
the UN and the specialized UN 
agencies and, last but not least, 
there had been a proliferation of UN 
development-cooperation agencies, 
entailing fragmentation of tasks 
as well as overlapping functions 
and duplicated work, inadequate 
quality and insufficient cost 
awareness (KlingeBiel, s. 1998). 
Further relevant research was 
done by Steffan Bauer and Frank 
Biermann (BaueR, s. – BieRmann, 
F. 2004). This study analyses 
the progress of cooperation and 
collaboration between UNDP and 
the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), with a view 
to the integration of their respective 
policy objectives within the 
overall framework of Sustainable 
Development (SD) in particular. The 
paper also indicates that the policy 
integration for SDGs between 
this cooperation is somewhat 
problematic due to administrative 
pathologies. Additionally, it points 
out that the structural imbalance 
between environmental and 
development institutions obstructs 
policy integration on the ground. A 
cohesive approach that recognises 
how the SDGs are interlinked is 
required (UNODC Guidance Note 
2018). Finally, after resolution A/72.
L52 of the General Assembly, UN 
Deputy Secretary-General Amina 
Mohammed claims that there is 
strong evidence that the cooperation 
among the UN Agencies has so far 
been a cacophony whereas today 
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we have an opportunity to make a 
symphony for the SDGs, which can 
make a real difference to the UN on 
the ground (UN News 2018).
In this respect, the Digital 
Era Governance (DEG) concept 
can make a particular difference 
in the context of the UN system; 
reverse agentification and 
disruption, joined-up governance, 
a horizontal approach, re-
planning of back-office functions, 
network simplification, interactive 
information-giving and searching, 
restructuring on the ground of 
demand, data warehousing, 
agile administrative processes, 
sustainability, providing electronic 
services, utility computing, a new 
form of automated processes, 
channel streaming, and open-book 
government are some key elements 
and components of DEG which can 
be applied to the UN administration 
system in order to achieve the 
increase in service efficiency and 
effectiveness that the UN craves.
The UN is an 
intergovernmental organization 
with social, environmental, and 
economic goals. “The work of 
the UN can be divided into two 
broad categories: promoting 
economic and social development, 
and enhancing regional and 
international security” (moRan, t. 
h. 2009). SDGs bring a change of 
paradigm for international policies 
on cooperation and their targets, 
so they can also increase inter-
agency cooperation. In this regard, 
this paper suggests; “Paradigm 
change in the paradigm change” by 
proposing that the new paradigm, 
in cooperation with SDGs, fits 
well with the new understanding 
of public administration with the 
concept of DEG, since it highlights 
networking, information and 
knowledge management, the “best 
mixture” and horizontal governance. 
These principles should be used as 
a means to achieving much needed 
inter-agency cooperation.
One of the most significant 
characteristics of Government 
2.0 – another name for DEG - 
is networking, facilitating total 
information awareness for all 
participants in cooperation with 
net-centered governance to make 
the right decisions and react at short 
notice. Moreover, it determines the 
design, architecture, and processes 
of the working organization as a 
platform – the stage of interaction 
for the smart masses (KaRvalics, 
l. Z. 2008). The UN system, 
inevitably, needs a new way 
of networking which unites all 
the relevant agencies (UNIDO, 
UNDP, etc.), local institutions, and 
individuals within a single, joint 
platform. 
 Significantly, all the 
information and knowledge 
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processes must be planned, 
maintained, watched, and, last but 
not least, measured. More reliable 
and more professional knowledge 
management is a must, since 
government 2.0 implies a solution for 
supplementing needed knowledge 
from a broader community that 
crosses the borders of inter-agency 
cooperation (KaRvalics, l. Z. 
2008). Then again, well-planned, 
well-maintained, and measured 
information and knowledge 
management can contribute to 
total information awareness for the 
agencies, enabling them to reach 
information synchronously from 
more comprehensively constructed 
data sets. Importantly, DEG also 
offers an opportunity to integrate 
all knowledge processes of crucial 
importance and accordingly, helps 
agencies to achieve better service 
delivery. The new organisational 
order is not based on a command 
and control or hierarchical structure, 
but is more like a flat organisation, 
which is known as a delayered 
(horizontal) organisational 
structure.
The use of the Government 
2.0 approach to the UN serves as 
practical foundation. The approach 
is mostly based on horizontal 
governance, which replaces 
hierarchical leadership with 
collaboration, shared responsibility, 
and coordination for decisions and 
outcomes (moRan, t. h. 2009). 
SDGs aspire for much-needed 
cooperation between UN agencies. 
However, whether UN agencies’ 
central relations are based on 
hierarchical (vertical) or horizontal 
governance remains an important 
question. There have been tensions 
between upper-ranked and lower-
ranked employees over the delivery 
of services and meeting the 
community needs (ibid.). Pollitt 
and Bouckaert have emphasised 
the issue with their use of the 
term “incompatible statements” 
(pollitt, c. – BoucKaeRt, g. 2004).
Following the literature 
review, the research indicates 
that there is no quantitative data 
available capable of measuring 
the interagency cooperation of 
intergovernmental organizations 
such as can be seen in the UN system. 
Therefore, in this study, qualitative 
data collection methods inevitably 
came to the fore in order to answer 
the research questions. Hence, 
the paper analyses cooperation 
between chosen agencies in the 
UN system by means of semi-
structured interviews. The author 
expected to reveal the extent to 
which UN agencies cooperate 
during the implementation of 
UN services by conducting semi-
structured interviews with internal 
and external experts of the UN 
system. The questions were 
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prepared under three different 
headings: introductory questions, 
specific areas of analysis, and 
concluding questions. The areas 
of analysis section features five 
different sub-categories, which this 
study claims are essential points 
to be investigated: these are joint 
projects, knowledge, coherence, 
performance, and mainstreaming.
On the other hand, this 
study was limited due to the lack 
of relevant documentation that 
can be tracked. Although the 
agencies cooperated well with the 
researcher, not all the answers were 
documented as files that can be 
accessed. Moreover, even though 
it is possible to find documents on 
joint projects, it is unlikely that 
they will help understand the true 
level of cooperation between the 
agencies. Therefore, it was essential 
to conduct expert interviews as well 
as interviews with staff members 
who are involved in inter-agency 
communication. This research 
particularly emphasised this part 
of the data collection methods. 
However, while the statements of 
experts are well-grounded, they are 
still subject to criticism on account 
of various types of unconscious/
conscious bias or subjectivity. In 
order not to fall into the trap of 
only seeing one side of the story, it 
is essential to talk to people from 
as many different backgrounds as 
possible, as well as to talk to staff 
members of different ranks in the 
agencies. Ultimately, the author 
considers this study to be more 
policy-oriented research rather than 
causal research.
II�1�2� Interviews
The author has conducted 
eight expert interviews: one 
interview in the field of UNODC-
WHO cooperation, three interviews 
in UNIDO-UNDP cooperation, and 
two external university professors 
with a thorough knowledge of 
the subjects and who cooperates 
closely with the UNODC. 
The first interviewees in both 
associations were chosen based 
on the network of the author, who 
continued to select the following 
interviewees with the snowball 
method. However, in the field of 
UNODC-WHO cooperation, the 
desired number of interviews could 
not be achieved due to very tight 
schedules of staff members of the 
UN. Consequently, two university 
professors from Vienna University 
were chosen to complement the 
one expert in this cooperation who 
had been interviewed before. On 
the other hand, a semi-structured 
interview process was applied 
because the questions to be asked 
were predetermined, and the 
difficulties of setting up another 
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interview with those interviewees 
had to be taken into account. The 
answers are anonymous in this 
paper due to some of the statements 
made by the interviewees in 
sensitive areas that could bring 
them administrative problems 
in their institutions. Therefore, 
indications such as „Interviewee 
1”, „Interviewee 2”, and so on have 
been used. The interviews were 
divided into parts comprising a 
basic introduction to interagency 
cooperation; knowledge, 
coherence, performance and 
mainstreaming; and a conclusion 
with recommendations regarding 
the chosen agency’s cooperation.
II�1�3� UNODC – WHO 
Interagency Cooperation
Every interviewee stressed 
the importance of good cooperation. 
The organizations benefit from 
cooperation on account of their 
systems and similar objectives. 
According to Interviewee 1, the 
cooperation of UNODC-WHO 
seemed to require an integrated 
approach to reach desired outcomes 
since drug issues require both 
health (WHO) and law enforcement 
(UNODC) to approach problems 
together. “The Executive Heads 
of UNODC and WHO committed 
fully to implement within their 
respective mandates and roles 
operational recommendations of 
the outcome document entitled ‘Our 
joint commitment to effectively 
addressing and countering the 
world drug problem’ adopted by the 
thirtieth special session of United 
Nations General Assembly.”27 
WHO is the directing authority 
in the UN system on health 
issues at the international level 
and is responsible for providing 
leadership on global health matters. 
On the other hand, UNODC is the 
directive entity for addressing and 
countering the world drug problem, 
preventing crime and violence, 
and strengthening the Member 
States’s justice systems, and it is 
the convening agency of UNAIDS 
for the response to HIV among 
people who use drugs. Both of 
these mandates are complementary 
in nature and practice, as the 
expert from UNODC stated 
(Interviewee 1). On the other hand, 
the cooperation between UNODC 
and WHO is not necessarily a 
result of the SDGs framework, 
according to Interviewees 1, 2, 
and 4, 7. Despite this, SDGs 
have become an additional 
instrument that allows greater 
cooperation, serves as a means of 
identifying common ground, and 
represents an aspect of strategic 
engagement that is both holistic 
27  MOU was signed between UNODC 
and WHO in 2017.
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and comprehensive, according to 
Interviewee 2. Interviewee 2 stated 
that SDGs make projects even more 
relevant, measurable, and give both 
organizations another instrument 
for cooperation to strengthen 
existing efforts and thereby 
foster both the information and 
knowledge management of DEG 
and overall coherence. According 
to Interviewee 3, “All UNODC 
programs are now tagged to SDGs, 
meaning that all programming has 
to take into account the different 
SDG targets and report on them. 
UNODC is a custodian to some 
indicators also related to SDGs 3, 
5, 10, 11, 15, and 16. Therefore 
the work is mainstreaming to 
contribute to the achievement of 
these indicators”. 
Cooperation within the 
framework of SDGs is rather 
difficult to analyse, as it always 
intertwines with other SDGs and 
non-SDG-related matters; due to 
their mandates, all the projects 
that UNODC and WHO jointly 
undertake implement a focus on 
SDGs. For example, according to 
Interviewee 2, UNODC-WHO joint 
prevention work on substance/drug 
use disorder is reflected in SDG 
3.5 “Strengthen the prevention 
and treatment of substance abuse, 
including narcotic drug abuse 
and harmful use of alcohol.” At 
the same time, drug prevention 
and treatment contribute to the 
achievement of SDG5 “Achieve 
Gender Equality and Empower All 
Women and Girls,” Target 16.1 of 
SDG 16 “Significantly reduce all 
forms of violence and related death 
rates everywhere,” Target 16.2 “End 
abuse, exploitation, trafficking and 
all forms of violence against and 
torture of children” and Target 16.4 
“By 2030, significantly reduce illicit 
financial flows, combat all forms of 
organized crime”. One of the main 
principles of the UN, according to 
Interviewee 2, is to do evidence-
based programming in order to 
get the numbers right. UNODC 
and WHO support networking as 
well as information and knowledge 
management (and the overall 
knowledge and performance of the 
UN) by conducting joint studies 
on homicide, which is one of the 
SDG indicators, namely 16.1 
“Significantly reduce all forms of 
violence and related death rates 
everywhere.” On SDG 5, for 
example, according to Interviewee 
2, UNODC has developed a 
comprehensive gender strategy 
agenda – the strategy for gender 
equality and the empowerment of 
women (2018-2021) -which is the 
first institutional framework on 
gender equality for the UN Office in 
Vienna (UNOV) and the UNODC. 
The strategy was developed with 
the recommendation of UN Women, 
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which assisted the development of 
its terms of reference and reviewed 
it. This gender strategy agenda is a 
clear example both of knowledge 
management and of ensuring the 
participation of other agencies 
and organizations (even though 
UN Women is not classified as 
an epistemic community). The 
strategy seeks to ensure that gender 
equality and the empowerment 
of women are integral parts of all 
aspects of the work of UNOV/
UNODC in making the world safer 
from drugs, crime, and terrorism 
and in ensuring the peaceful uses 
of outer space. Interviewee 5, in 
turn, mentioned that UNODC and 
WHO have had an MoU since 2017 
which created a joint programme 
on the prevention of drug use and 
drug use disorders; the treatment 
of drug use disorders; access 
to controlled drugs for medical 
purposes; new psychoactive 
substances; prevention, diagnosis, 
treatment, care and support for HIV, 
viral hepatitis and tuberculosis; 
prevention of violence and 
violence-related deaths; and finally, 
monitoring drug use and its health 
and social consequences. UNODC 
and WHO also conduct studies 
on drug use disorders, aiming at 
understanding the root causes, as 
well as on homicide.
The mainstreaming of 
cooperation between UN institutions 
has created a more effective and 
efficient means of communication 
to third parties as well. UNODC is 
now able to get access to ministries 
of health in order to give advice 
and provide assistance in scaling up 
fundamental prevention, treatment, 
and care assistance throughout the 
health sector in the Member States. 
In contrast, the Health Ministries 
traditionally do not fall under 
the scope of UNODC but WHO. 
Thanks to the cooperation between 
UNODC and WHO, today, the 
Ministries of Health in the Member 
States have evaluated UNODC’s 
incentives and suggestions with 
the same procedure as if they 
came from WHO and have 
started to organise their health 
policies accordingly, especially 
in the matter of drug matters and 
sexually transmitted diseases. 
“This is significant for carrying 
out comprehensive programming. 
We have reached over 30 countries 
globally in West Africa, Southeast 
Asia, Southeast Europe, and Latin 
America” (Interviewee 2). At the 
same time, there are challenges and 
obstacles. The main challenges, as 
Interviewee 2 mentioned, have been 
due to the different organisational 
structures and cultural differences 
between the two organisations. 
Although the mandates are related, 
the implementation carried out 
differently. Interviewee 3 said 
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that communication is not entirely 
efficient. The goals of the projects, 
according to the interviewee, are 
significant, and, in his opinion, 
there is no decent communication 
channel with constant reporting 
and information exchange. The 
interviewee mentioned that very 
often, only one side reports on 
progress, and which of the sides is 
more proactive usually depends on 
the project and funding (donors). 
This statement highlights an 
example of there being room for 
better information and knowledge 
management by means of Digital 
Era Governance (DEG) between 
UNODC and WHO. According to 
Interviewee 2, a more structured 
coordination mechanism would 
benefit cooperation between both 
organisations. Similarly, additional 
joint programming would further 
increase efficiency and avoid 
duplications and donor fatigue.
From the interviews, it 
became clear that the current 
achievements are not directly a 
result of the SDGs. However, the 
SDGs have provided an additional 
mechanism for cooperation and, as 
such, have made joint programming 
more likely. Some of the best 
practices include joint studies and 
comprehensive programming, 
including ministries of health and 
law enforcement.
II�1�4� UNIDO – UNDP 
Interagency Cooperation
All the interviewees 
mentioned the importance of 
constant cooperation in order to 
achieve beneficial communication 
and successful ongoing work on joint 
projects. According to Interviewee 
2, sufficient communication and 
cooperation among the system are 
vital to identifying common goals 
and learning from each other, which, 
in turn, result in creating good 
practices. At the same time, what 
became clear from the interviews 
is that cooperation is instead based 
on joint projects and not directly 
on SDGs. It is because the projects 
include SDGs and are not created 
per se because of one particular 
SDG. However, the SDGs are cross-
cutting issues in all agencies and 
have made cooperation stronger.
In this sense, interviewees 4 
and 6 state that the works of UNIDO 
and UNDP tagged to similar targets 
related to poverty reduction, creating 
shared prosperity, advancing 
economic competitiveness, 
environment, and energy in which 
objectives embodied with the SDG 
9, which calls to “Build resilient 
infrastructure, promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialisation 
and foster innovation.” • To this 
end, in 2018, UNDP and UNIDO 
strengthened their cooperation 
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through an inter-agency 
agreement that combines the core 
competencies and specialised 
expertise of UNIDO with the broad 
country-level representation and 
delivery capacity of UNDP. The 
operational focus of the agreement 
lies in two components: cost-
effectively expanding UNIDO field 
coverage through the establishment 
of UNIDO Desks in UNDP 
Country Offices, and developing 
joint activities in private sector 
development. As a result, UNIDO 
Desks have been set up in 16 
countries, and UNDP and UNIDO 
have developed several joint 
programmes aimed at strengthening 
private sector enterprises and 
institutions in support of national 
development goals.
However, the positive 
expectation from the interagency 
cooperation agreement framework 
established between UNIDO and 
UNDP is just one side of the coin, 
because the cooperation between 
UNIDO and UNDP turned out 
to be very difficult due to some 
reasons that were uncovered in 
this analysis. Interviewees 4 and 6 
mentioned that after the cooperation 
interagency agreement was signed, 
a few UNIDO staff members were 
positioned in the offices at UNDP, 
which was supposed to increase 
the level of communication and 
networking of DEG between the 
Agencies. Instead, according to the 
interviewees, it has caused a lot of 
internal conflicts and confrontations 
since both agencies have a different 
organizational culture in addition 
to being accountable to different 
organs: UNDP to the General 
Assembly (which is financed 
through voluntary rather than 
assessed contributions), UNIDO 
to the ECOSOC (which is funded 
by both voluntary and assessed 
contributions). For example, while 
UNIDO applies more to the use of 
the tools of Government 2.0, UNDP 
would follow more traditional 
methods of knowledge sharing.
Moreover, with regard 
to coherence, information, and 
knowledge sharing, Interviewee 5 
said that it is only in a few projects 
that the organizations are working 
together and that the cooperation 
observed is rather weak. No constant 
communication or reporting is 
taking place, but instead, there is a 
task that has to be done. According 
to Interviewee 4, much of the work 
that the UN does is, in general, very 
interconnected and complementary: 
when the work is coordinated or, 
better still, if it is jointly carried 
out, this ensures effectiveness, 
prevents duplications, and is 
cost-effective. Consequently, 
the interviewee believes that the 
organisations should work on a 
better communication strategy. 
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Interviewee 6 mentioned that the 
variety of organisational structures 
is one of the main differences, 
meaning that the communication 
channels are different in both 
horizontal as well as vertical 
organization structures, and, 
therefore, it is difficult to unify the 
communication flow. Interviewee 
4 said that even though they 
work with UNDP, he never meets 
with them, not just because the 
communication is weak, but also 
because the locations are different, 
the headquarters of UNIDO is in 
Vienna and headquarters of UNDP 
is in New York. Finally, although 
the research paper focuses on 
the cooperation of the agencies 
within the framework of the SDGs, 
interviewee 4 pointed out that it is 
difficult to measure the cooperation 
in terms of the SDGs because the 
projects have had a longer lifespan 
than simply since the time the SDGs 
were adopted until now.
II�1�5� Conclusion
After the semi-structured 
interviews with UN experts, the 
study has revealed that there is 
significant coherence in the UNODC 
and WHO joint Programme on Drug 
Dependence Treatment as well as in 
the activities of UNIDO and UNDP. 
However, it also discovered that 
there is no decent communication 
channel based on constant reporting 
and information exchange in the 
observed partnerships; or if there 
is reporting, very often only one 
side reports on progress. It appears 
that knowledge management and 
mainstreaming is performed well 
by UNDP through monitoring and 
reporting by providing support 
to governments to integrate 
SDGs. The participation of non-
members is secured in UNDP by 
the executive board and by the 
participation of other organisations 
in UNODC (UN Women) and 
by an access of UNODC to the 
ministries. The performance of 
the UN is also ensured through 
programme harmonisation (MoU 
of UNODC and WHO from 
2017). The mainstreaming of 
the development activities and 
paradigm is also seen in the efficient 
reorganisation of offices (UNDP). 
However, mainstreaming could 
still be improved so as to achieve 
an efficient, more structured 
coordination mechanism between 
the agencies.
On the other hand, the study 
has discovered that the SDGs 
have made the projects more 
relevant and measurable, and have 
given both organisations another 
instrument for cooperation to 
strengthen existing efforts and 
thereby foster information and 
knowledge management and 
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improve coherence as a whole. 
SDGs were also found to be a 
motive to strengthen development 
cooperation across the whole UN 
System and UN Agencies. However, 
the projects in question have a 
longer lifespan than the SDGs, and 
some preconditions were secured 
shortly before the adoption of the 
Agenda 2030, mainly thanks to 
the resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly on UN reform and global 
governance. In other words, some 
projects started before the adoption 
of SDGs and will end after the SDG 
period. Consequently, the author 
strongly recommends further 
research should be done after the 
ongoing projects have ended. Then 
the real impact of the SDGs may be 
understood more precisely.
The research also introduces 
DEG into the UN system. It 
seems that the solutions of 
DEG play an essential role in 
the newly formed social and 
technological environment. Even 
though some features of DEG 
(restructuring, sustainability, 
joined-up governance, networking, 
and information and knowledge 
management) have already been 
applied in observed partnerships 
of UN Agencies, as revealed by 
interviews, there are still some other 
affordances of DEG which could 
usefully increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service delivery.
The author strongly 
recommends rethinking the 
interagency cooperation and 
horizontal governance based on the 
“best mixture”, in the meantime 
adopting a new way of networking 
that includes all the relevant local 
institutions and individuals on a 
single electronic platform (so that 
all of the actors - local, regional 
and global - could share their 
knowledge quickly and easily). 
This would create more durable 
and more professional knowledge 
management system, one which 
would cross the boundaries of 
interagency cooperation (so as 
to ensure broader participation 
of epistemic communities and 
synchronised access to information 
from more extensively created 
data sets). The author recommends 
firstly prioritising horizontal 
governance based on shared 
responsibility and coordination, 
and secondly encouraging MoUs 
and interagency agreements, since 
MoUs have played an essential 
role in improving coordination and 
decreasing duplicated work among 
agencies.
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II.2. on the effectiveness of the „greening” 
component of the Eu’s Common 
agricultural Policy
antal FeRenc Kovács28
Abstract
This article addresses the effectiveness of the greening component in the EU’s 
new, post-2020 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Reflecting on the insufficiencies 
in the environmental performance of the current CAP, the EC regulation proposal for 
the new CAP places environment and climate goals at high priority, and ‘greening’, in 
addition to farmers’ income support, is in the centre of the proposed measures. In the new 
delivery model, Member States shall draw-up their own CAP strategies, aligned with 
their own, local, specific conditions. In this article it is proposed that CAP ‘greening’ is 
conceptually a Payments for Environmental Services (PES) program and Member States 
could reference research findings on PES effectiveness globally in their CAP strategy 
planning.
Keywords: agri-environmental programs, EU Common Agricultural Policy, 
greening, Payments for Environmental Services
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II�2�1� Setting the scene
The European Commission’s 
Communication in 2017 set the 
conceptual framework for the new, 
post-2020 Common Agricultural 
Policy of the European Union 
(CAP), titled “The Future of Food 
and Farming” (ec 2017). Within 
a new EU strategic context, the 
new CAP model aims at more 
result driven, smarter, modern 
and sustainable agriculture in the 
next financial period (ibid. p. 10). 
The new CAP would be framed in 
three main objectives: (1) to foster 
a smart and resilient agricultural 
sector; (2) to bolster environmental 
care and climate action to 
contribute to the environmental 
and climate objectives of the EU 
and (3) to strengthen the socio-
economic fabric of rural areas. 
These objectives were designed 
using inputs from evaluations on 
the performance of the 2014-2020 
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CAP29.
Conceptionally, the CAP 
‘greening’ mechanism is an 
institution, which is aimed to pursue 
farmers to choose agricultural 
practices and implement efforts 
to conserve, or improve the state 
of the environment. For these 
practices, direct payments are 
granted to farmers, in the current, 
reformed CAP, in an amount of 
30% of the member state’s annual 
budget (ceiling) for Pillar I30. 
(euRopean paRliament 2013 title 
III), therefore, from the perspective 
of the overall performance of the 
CAP, the effectiveness of these 
payments is of crucial importance.
Matthews envisaged the 
failure of CAP greening (mattheWs, 
a. 2013). That time he concluded 
that … (the Commission) wanted 
a universal set of measures …to 
apply to all farms …avoid giving 
Member States discretion…and 
most importantly wanted greening 
to be associated with Pillar 1 
payments in order to promote 
legitimacy…(ibid., p.5). Gocht and 
others using a CAPRI model31 based 
29  2014-2020 refers to the multiannual 
financial framework of the EU.
30  CAP is composed of two pillars: agri-
environmental measures are part of 
Pillar I; Pillar II are focused on agri 
related regional development.
31  CAPRI is a modeling and analytical 
framework of CAP ‘gereening’ 
developed as part of the project: 
simulation found, ex-ante, that both 
the economic and environmental 
impacts of CAP would be minor 
(gocht, a. et al. 2017).
Ex-post evaluations found 
CAP successful in the economic 
and social cohesion areas, 
however, pointed out mixed results 
concerning environmental and 
climate goals (ec 2018b p. 6). 
Allience Environment (allience 
enviRonment 2019) concludes 
that biodiversity, alongside other 
environmental objectives, was 
secondary to socio-economic 
concerns (allience enviRonment 
2019 p. 158). The EC states: 
… (CAP) had not always been 
found sufficiently focused and the 
“greening” measures had not fully 
realized their intended potential (ec 
2018c p. 10). …implementation 
of greening by Member States 
and farmers could be improved 
to deliver better on its objectives 
(ibid. p.7). Simoncini and others 
in a recent paper, to enhance the 
mainstreaming of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, recommend 
further CAP reforms (simoncini, R. 
et al. 2019).
The strategic objectives of the 
new CAP have been designed with 
this background, and, in particular, 
details of objective (2) of the new 
The Common Agricultural Policy 
Regionalized Impact, financed by the 
European Commission.
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CAP point out the need for …higher 
ambitions…and more focus…on 
resource efficiency, environmental 
care, and climate action…(ec 
2019b) The Commission identified 
three top priorities for the post-
2020 CAP: higher environmental 
and climate action ambitions, 
better targeting of support and 
stronger reliance on the virtuous 
Research-Innovation-Advice nexus 
as (ec 2018b, sec. 1.1). Further, as 
regards the nine specific objectives, 
three of them concern directly the 
environment and climate:
⊕	 contribute to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, as 
well as sustainable energy;
⊕	 foster sustainable 
development and efficient 
management of natural 
resources such as water, soil 
and air;
⊕	 contribute to the protection 
of biodiversity, enhance 
ecosystem services and 
preserve habitats and 
landscapes.
To emphasize the high priority 
on environment and climate, the 
intervention logic of the new CAP 
is built on a “need” basis, then 
why the intervention is beneficial 
for the environment and climate 
and finally, where simplification 
rests, compared with the 2013-
2020 CAP scheme32 (ec 2019b). 
The core of the new delivery model 
is that, to implement the CAP, 
each Member State (MS), shall 
design its own strategic plan (CAP 
Strategic Plan) on the country 
specific need basis (ec 2018a). 
An improved system (Performance 
Monitoring an Evaluation System, 
PMES) will support monitoring 
and evaluation of each MS’s 
contribution to the objectives of 
CAP, as well as the objectives 
in the EU’s environmental and 
climate legislation (ec 2019b p. 4) 
The new CAP would require strong 
ambitions from MSs and improved 
effectiveness in designing and 
implementing the CAP ‘greening’ 
element. Matthews concludes that 
the new CAP is … a potential, or 
the possibility, for MSs that wish 
focus more on raising the level of 
environmental and climate ambition 
to do so (mattheWs, a. 2018b). 
That regards ambitions, during the 
early phase of policy debate on the 
post-2020 CAP, the Commission 
proposed the idea of national co-
financing of CAP Pillar I measures. 
MSs agri-ministers rejected the idea 
upfront: a big question mark if the 
ambitions are real. Nevertheless, it 
is foreseen that the idea will come 
up again in future CAP proposals, 
as recommended strongly by 
32  Complexity also is a general critique 
of the 2014-2020 CAP
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
74
Matthews (mattheWs, a. 2018a). 
This would require genuine 
ambitions from MSs, as well as 
creativity and innovation. Best 
practices and financing schemes for 
PES programs, introduced later in 
this paper, could provide references 
in this endeavor.
The environmental focus in the 
proposed new CAP implementation 
would be reinforced by three 
central tools, each concerning 
‘greening’. First, conditionality, 
i.e. the linkage between payments 
and delivery of environmental 
obligations, meaning that, if the 
obligation is not met, the payments 
may be reduced. Second, Eco-
Schemes, new payment schemes for 
environment and climate conscious 
practices in Pillar I that will replace 
environmentaly conscious practices 
in Pillar I and cross-complience in 
Pillar II in the current, 2014-2020 
CAP. Under the new regime, MSs 
will be offered the flexibility to 
draw-up several eco-schemes, and 
farmers would be allowed to choose 
which one to apply.
The construct of the new CAP 
implies strengthened subsidiarity 
by shifting the responsibility of 
implementation from Brussels to 
the national governments. The 
EU will provide the framework, 
but the effectiveness of the policy 
will largely depend on the strategic 
design and implementation by the 
Member States.
In the context of environmental 
economics, the concept of CAP 
‘greening’ is not new. It is an 
agri-environmental program 
(AEP), which has several decades 
of history in Europe and other 
parts of the industrialized world. 
Historically, AEPs have either 
been managed by governments, 
covering whole national territories, 
or privately organized, focusing on 
a defined ecological area. Examples 
for government lead programs are 
the Conservation Security Program 
in the US, dating back the 1930s, 
or in Europe, in the early 1990s, 
the Agri-Environmental Program, 
a supplement to the Common 
Agricultural Policy. (Council 
Regulation 2078/92). The Catskill 
project in the US33 and the Vittel 
case in France34 are the most well-
known AEPs organized privately 
33  In the 1980’s New York city chose 
natural filtration of its drinking water 
reserves in the Catskill Mountains 
region, by providing long-term 
payments for land management 
changes, as an alternative to investing 
in water treatment facilities.
34  Initiated in the 1990’s, Nestlé Waters, 
the owner of Vittel, a prime brand of 
bottled water, in order to protect the 
quality of water, entered into long-
term contracts with the landowners in 
the Vittel catchment area in North-East 
France to dramatically change their 
agricultural practices (peRRot-maitRe, 
d. 2006).
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in developed countries. The basic 
concept of both public and private 
AEPs has been that changes in 
agricultural practices would result 
in conserving, or improving the state 
of the environment, i.e. resulting in 
healthier ecosystems and improved 
ecosystem services. In general, 
public programs tend to address 
nature conservation in its entirety 
and complexity, while privately 
organized programs usually focus 
on a specific ecosystem service, 
e.g. maintaining the quality of 
a drinking water reserve. While 
both types are meant to address 
the problem of environmental 
externalities, there are several major 
conceptual differences between 
government and private programs. 
Governmental programs are seen to 
follow mostly the Pigou-concept: 
taxing negative and subsidizing 
positive externalities, beneficiaries 
are indirect and cannot be excluded 
(e.g. from enjoying cleaner 
air). Private programs are more 
Coasean: enforceable property 
rights (and low transactional costs) 
are preconditions. Beneficiaries are 
direct and others can be excluded. 
For example, one has to pay to visit 
and enjoy nature in a protected 
park (Baumol, W. j. – oates, W. 
e. 1988; KeReKes s. et al. 2018). 
Nevertheless, both government 
and private programs are usually 
implemented within complex 
institutional and regulatory 
environments and carry a mixture 
of both Pigouvian and Coasean 
features (schomeRs, s. – matZdoRF, 
B. 2013).
Over the past three decades, 
similar to government lead 
AEPs in industrialized countries, 
Payments for Environmental 
Services (PES) have gained 
popularity in the developing world, 
primarily pursued by the World 
Bank (FeRRaRo, p. j. – Kiss, a. 
2002). By the end of the 2010s, 
more than 500 PES, or PES-like 
programs have been implemented 
globally. While the concept of 
the PES scheme is more-or-less 
standardized, each program has its 
own particular features, depending 
on the geographical location, 
ecological conditions and socio-
economic framework. Over the 
past three decades enormous data 
and information have accumulated 
on implemented PES programs 
allowing research, among others, 
on the drivers of effectiveness 
and efficiency, recently in the 
mainstream of scholarly discourse 
and the foci of this article.
In this article it is proposed 
that, as CAP ‘greening’ is a construct 
that complies with the criteria 
of Payments for Environmental 
Services schemes, research 
findings on the effectiveness 
of PES programs would serve 
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reference to MSs CAP Strategic 
Planning. The setup of the article is 
the following: In Section 2, the new 
CAP regulation proposal, focusing 
on ‘greening’ is put in context, 
reviewing the policy background 
and intervention logic of both the 
current and the proposed new CAP. 
Chapter 3 introduces PES and the 
research on PES effectiveness, 
and argues why CAP ‘greening’ 
is a PES-type construct and how 
its effectiveness can be viewed in 
the PES framework. In Chapter 4, 
potentials in the effectiveness of the 
new CAP will be discussed in the 
PES framework, then Conclusion 
in Chapter 6 sets directions for 
further research.
II�2�2� CAP and its 
„greening” component
As agriculture has 
pivotal impact on climate and 
environmental sustainability, CAP 
is a major instrument to implement 
the EU’s environmental policies. 
Sustainable management of natural 
resources is one of the three policy 
objectives in the 2014-2020 CAP 
(along with assuring viable food 
production and balanced territorial 
development), and its greening 
component (CAP ‘greening’) relate 
directly to the EU’s biodiversity 
strategy. CAP financing amounts to 
about 30% of the total EU budget, 
and ‘greening’ is a major element 
in the CAP intervention logic 
and direct payments mechanism. 
Therefore, financial efficiency 
and environmental effectiveness 
of the CAP ‘greening’ is of 
crucial importance. To provide a 
framework for further analysis 
in the subsequent sections, in 
this section the policy context of 
the CAP greening measures is 
reviewed.
Policy framework of the 
CAP greening component
The policy framework of the 
CAP greening component is set by 
the EU’s biodiversity strategy, along 
with the Birds Directive and Habitat 
Directive. The headline target of the 
Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 (ec 
2011) positions the objectives of 
the EU in a global context: “Halting 
the loss of biodiversity and the 
degradation of ecosystem services 
in the EU by 2020, and restoring 
them in so far as feasible, while 
stepping up the EU contribution 
to averting global biodiversity 
loss. Among the six targets of 
the strategy, Target 3. (Ensuring 
the sustainability of agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries) has particular 
relevance to the CAP:…by 2020 
the agricultural area …under 
the CAP shall be maximized, so 
as to ensure the conservation of 
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biodiversity and to bring about 
measurable improvement in the 
conservation status of species 
and habitats that depend on 
or are affected by agriculture 
and the provision of ecosystem 
services… Action 8 within Target 
3 is specified as follows: Enhance 
CAP direct payments to reward 
environmental public goods such 
as crop rotation and permanent 
pasture; improve cross compliance 
standards for Good Agricultural 
and Environmental Conditions 
(GAEC)… (allience enviRonment 
2019 p. 4). 
Since 2015, the economic 
and policy context of CAP has 
changed significantly: agricultural 
prices have fallen substantially; 
international trade negotiations 
moved from multilateral to 
bilateral and the EU signed up to 
new international commitments: 
COP21, i.e. the Paris climate 
agreement and the UN Sustainable 
development goals (SGD). The 
commission concluded that, in 
order to maximize its contribution 
to the (EUs) Sustainable 
Development Objectives the CAP 
must be modernized…simplified…
and made more coherent with other 
EU policies… (ec 2018a).
The intervention logic of the 
current CAP is framed in the setup 
of horizontal, Pillar 1 and Pillar II 
measures. In the current, reformed 
CAP, the long time existing direct 
payments to farmers (Pillar I) were 
complemented with measures with 
direct impact on the environment 
(euRopean paRliament 2013), as 
defined in Chaper 3 of the regulation: 
Payments for agricultural practices 
beneficial for the climate and the 
environment. These payment for 
‘greening’ is conditional to the 
practices of diversifying crops, 
the maintenance of permanent 
grasslands and designating 
ecological focus areas (ibid. Article 
43, 2.).
The architecture of the new 
CAP (Figure 1) is supposed to 
deliver the higher environmental 
ambitions. Hereinafter, to discuss 
the detailes, the relevant EC 
Communication (ec 2018a) and a 
blog by Matthews (mattheWs, a. 
2018b) are referenced. Increased 
flexibility towards implementation 
and voluntary actions are two 
key elements of the setup and the 
whole system rests on enhanced 
conditionality.226 thousand station 
(Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Architecture of the new CAP
Source: mattheWs, a. 2018b
Policy framework of the 
CAP greening component
The core of the new proposal 
on conditionality relates to the 10 
Good Agricultural Environmental 
Conditions (GAEC) in four effect 
groups: (1) climate change; (2) 
water; (3) soil and (4) biodiversity 
and landscape. In the proposal, 
new requirements are added 
to crop rotation, maintaining 
permanent grassland and ecological 
focus area, in the currect CAP, 
and direct reference is made to 
respect obligations under the 
Water Framework Directive and 
the Sustainable Use of Pesticide 
Directive. The requirement of 
enhanced conditionality (i.e. the 
possibility to reduce payments 
upon non-performance), as it will 
be discussed later, would align 
with researchers’ findings that 
suggest conditonality to be one 
of the three key PES effectivenss 
factors. However, it is not clear, 
if, in practice, payments would be 
reduced, or even rejected upon non-
performance.
Eco-schemes
In the new CAP, MSs would 
be required to draw-up various eco-
schemes, depending on their local 
conditions and needs, defined as 
voluntary schemes for farmers. 
Eco-shcemes would be paid for 
additional to the basic income 
support, or as a compensation 
for additional costs incurred. The 
Commission would recommend 
designs for eco-schemes, however, 
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Member States would be free to 
design their own ones, subject to 
approval by the Commission.
Agri-environment-
climate measures
In the AECM scheme 
beneficiaries are compensated for the 
costs incurred and income foregone 
resulting from the commitments 
made. As opposed to eco-schemes, 
which incentivises farmers, under 
AECM payments it was allowed 
to make payments to both farmers, 
as well as other beneficiaries. As 
regards voluntary AECM, several 
intervention measures in the Rural 
Development Regulation would be 
collapsed into a single scheme in 
the new simplified system.
II�2�3� CAP „greening” in 
the PES framework
The PES concept
In the academic literature PES 
is the acronym for Payments for 
Ecosystem Services, or Payments 
for Environmental Services. 
PES is a program of voluntary 
transactions between buyers and 
providers of ecosystem services, 
or land-use practices that lead to 
the services. The orginal definition, 
broadly accepted by the scholarly 
community, is attributed to Wunder 
(WundeR, s. 2005). A Payment for 
Environmental Services scheme is:
1. A voluntary transaction, 
where
2. A well-defined ecosystem 
service (or land-use likely to 
secure that service)
3. Is being ‘bought’ by a 
(minimum one) buyer
4. From a (minimum one) 
ecosystem services provider
5. If and only if the provider 
secures the ecosystem services 
provision (conditionality).
II�2�4� CAP „greening” in 
the PES framework
PES, an economic instrument, 
is supposed to align with the 
underlying ecological processes. 
These processes are conceptualized 
as ecosystems and ecosystem 
services represented with the 
cascade model (Figure 2):
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Figure 2: Cascade model of ecosystems and ecosystem services
Source: haines-young, R. – potschin, m. 2010
Conceptually, the biophysical 
structure, i.e. ecosystems, with 
complex functioning provide 
ecosystem services to beneficiaries. 
In the PES scheme the beneficiary 
is willing to pay for the ecosystem 
service and the provider of the 
service (with a title to the land where 
the biophysical structure is located) 
is willing to accept the payment 
and deliver the service. With broad 
academic consensus, ecosystem 
functions and services are grouped 
in four categories: provisioning 
(e.g. supply of wood, fish, etc.), 
regulating (e.g. carbon absorption, 
water retaining, etc.), cultural (e.g. 
touristic sites, etc.) and supporting 
services, this latter supports all 
other services. The biophysical and 
financial flows in the PES scheme 
is shown in Figure 3. The essence 
of the PES scheme is that payment 
is made to initiate the conservation, 
or improvement of the biophysical 
structure that would entail improved 
supporting functioning, finally 
resulting in improved provisioning, 
regulating and/or cultural services.
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Figure 3: PES scheme – biophysical and financial flows
Source: author’s design
The PES program can 
be organized and the services 
bought directly by the beneficiary, 
or by an intermediary, such as 
the government. User-financed 
programs typically focus on 
benefiting from a single ecosystem 
service, for instance improved 
quality of waters enjoyed by 
the population of a downstream 
settlement. A reforestation program 
by the government can provide 
benefits indirectly to people in large 
distances, as well. 
The concept of Payments 
for Environmental Programs in 
developing countries was developed 
by World Bank economists as a 
means to shift international aid to 
environmental investments. The 
first PES program, a construction 
on World Bank loan and ODA 
funding, was implemented in 
Costa Rica, aiming at reducing 
deforestation (pagiola, s. 2008). 
As information and experience 
accumulated from programs around 
the world, the number of academic 
writings has been growing and 
beyond analyzing individual 
programs, research shifted on 
empirical analysis and drawing 
conclusions on structuring, design, 
governance, implementation and 
operational issues (engel, s. 2016). 
Schomers and Matzdorf suggest 
that pooling research findings and 
experience both from developed 
and developing countries would 
result in research synergies for 
all (schomeRs, s. – matZdoRF, 
B. 2013). This article argues for 
moving beyond this proposition 
and use research findings on PES 
effectiveness in CAP Strategic 
Planning, outside the classic 
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domain of PES.
CAP ‘greening’, as a PES 
scheme
With reference to Matzdorf 
and Meyer, it is argued that the CAP 
‘greening’ component, an agri-
environmental policy instrument, 
is conceptually a PES scheme 
(matZdoRF, B. – meyeR, c. 2014), 
as it fulfills all the conceptual 
requirements for PES, as defined 
by Wunder:
1. farmers can voluntarily apply 
for direct payment, including 
the greening component;
2. the land-use, or land-use 
change (the subject of the 
transaction) is defined: crop 
diversification, maintaining 
permanent grasslands and 
ecological focus areas in the 
current CAP and eco-schemes 
in the upcoming CAP;
3. The buyer of the land-use 
service is the government of 
the Member State – indirectly 
the EU;
4. The service provider is the 
farmer – all eligible farmers 
in the EU can apply;
5. Conditionality: In principle, 
if the service is not provided, 
payment is withdrawn and 
penalty levied.
This argument is supported 
by another article by Matzdorf, 
ascertaining that around the 
world PES commonly refers to 
government lead payment schemes 
that cover territories at national level 
(schomeRs, s. – matZdoRF, B. 2013). 
This applies to CAP ‘greening’, 
too, as the implementation of 
CAP is managed on a member 
state level. This classification 
leads to the proposition that 
findings related to PES programs 
globally would serve references 
to assessing CAP ‘greening’, as 
well. Figure 4 presents the logic of 
the CAP green intervention in the 
PES conceptual framework. The 
Member State government is the 
service buyer, the farmers are the 
service providers. CAP payments 
are made for the services provided: 
diversifying crops, maintaining 
permanent grasslands and meeting 
the requirements in terms of EFA. 
It needs to be emphasized that 
the CAP payments are made for 
the actions that lead to ecological 
(socio-economic) outputs, not for 
the additionalities in ecosystem 
services, per se. Therefore, 
conditionalities of payments are 
linked to monitoring the actions 
by the farmers’, and not for 
ecological improvements, which 
is an important feature of the CAP 
model, addressed further in the 
Discussion section.
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Figure 4: The 2014-2020 CAP in the PES conceptual framework
Source: author’s design
The outcome of the CAP 
implementation is measured using 
the outcome, result and impact 
indicators, set in the CMEF. Also, 
the outcome can be assessed using 
measures of improved ecosystems 
and ecosystem services additions. 
This can lead to linking the outcome 
of the CAP with ecosystems 
accounting, the global, United 
Nations lead program, which 
aims at integrating environmental 
assets and services in the national 
statistical systems (Kovács a. F. 
2018).
Research on the 
effectiveness of PES 
programs
Due to the differences and 
availability of data, comparative 
analysis of PES programs is difficult 
and complex, nevertheless several 
recent studies report on analytic 
works at higher abstractions, using 
meta-data, primarily sourced from 
related academic papers (schomeRs, 
s. – matZdoRF, B. 2013). Recent 
research works on PES highlight that 
effectiveness would largely depend 
on the specific features of each PES 
program. Börner and others, using 
the approach of change theory, 
synthetize 30 influencing factors 
of PES effectiveness, classified in 
three groups: context ~, design ~ and 
implementation factors, and along 
five dimensions: costs, additionality 
(compared to the counterfactual), 
spill-over (indirect effects on 
lands not in the program), link-
conditions (e.g. monitoring costs) 
and welfare effects (e.g. equity) 
(BÖRneR, j. et al. 2017). As each 
PES program is a unique institution 
with specific governance system, 
Meyer and others apply qualitative 
comparative institutional analysis 
to investigate the governance 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
84
structures of PES programs in 
Germany and China, respectively. 
This research suggests that in each 
case (i.e. Germany and China) the 
preferred, effective institutional 
arrangements are dominated by a 
combination of factors (meyeR, 
c. et al. 2018). Overall, scholarly 
articles highlight three main 
factors, which are key to the 
outcome and effectiveness of PES 
programs: (1) geographic targeting, 
(2) payment differentiation and (3) 
conditionality.
Geographic targeting
Geographic, or spatial 
targeting means the method of 
allocation of financial resources 
over a selected geographic area on 
a costs-benefit basis. In practical 
terms, it is a payment scheme aiming 
at yielding the most significant 
increase in environmental service 
delivery (WünscheR, t. et al. 2008). 
A comparative scenario analysis 
showed that targeting, using spatial 
data, would lead to higher efficiency 
outcomes (ibid.).
Payment differentiation
As opposed to lump-sum 
payments per area, payments 
can be differentiated on the basis 
of provisioning costs (cost of 
providing the service), or on the 
basis of environmental benefits 
(paying higher amounts to sites that 
provide higher benefits) (engel, s. 
2016).
Conditionality
Conditionality refers to the 
idea that payments are made if 
and only if the ecosystem service 
is provided or an activity is 
implemented that is clearly linked 
to provisioning the service (engel, 
s. 2016). Payments can be made ex-
ante, or ex-post. Implementation of 
conditionality requires monitoring 
compliance and sanctioning non-
compliance. 
It is concluded by various 
authors that applying these three 
conditions is very data-demanding 
and can significantly increase PES 
implementation costs, while the 
risks associated with the program’s 
outcome remains high, due to other 
influencing factors. Nevertheless, 
Engel references cases, when 50-
100% increase in biodiversity 
benefits could be attained combining 
the tools of spatial targeting and 
payment differentiation, which 
could compensate for an increase 
of about 70% in costs (engel, s. 
2016).
II�2�5� Discussion
In this article, it is argued 
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that CAP is a PES-like program, 
therefore, research findings on 
PES effectiveness can serve 
useful references to studying the 
effectiveness of the CAP, but 
more importantly, designing the 
measures in the new CAP, i.e. the 
CAP Strategic Planning by Member 
States. 
Research on PES effectiveness 
identified three key factors that 
drive effectiveness: conditionality, 
geographic targeting and payment 
differentiation. It is reasonable 
to propose that the potentials for 
improved effectiveness of the new 
CAP should be searched within 
the context of these three factors. 
In particular, the subject for 
investigation is the following: to 
what extent the choices of Member 
States offered by the flexibilities in 
the new CAP can direct the CAP 
mechanisms towards improved 
conditionality, geographic targeting 
and payment differentiation – so that 
to induce improved effectiveness of 
CAP?
As pointed out, enhanced 
conditionality is the foundation 
for every measure, both in Pillar 
I and Pillar II. It is assumed that 
monitoring and evaluation would 
largely advance through the new 
Performance Monitoring and 
Evaluation Framework. Indicators 
would be chosen aligned with the 
CAP strategic objectives, and a 
major change, compared with the 
current CMES, is the intent to select 
a limited, but more targeted set of 
indicators that reflect whether the 
supported intervention contributes 
to achieving the objectives versus 
an established baseline. 
Apart from the advanced 
monitoring system for the overall 
performance of CAP, the success 
of conditionality depends on the 
mechanism if individual farmers’ 
practices meet the requirements, 
and payment is made accordingly. 
The author has not found evidence 
on reduced, or rejected payments 
due to non-performance regarding 
the current CAP. In the PES context, 
conditionality would mean payment 
conditional to action, therefore 
the real effect of conditionality 
on effectiveness in the new CAP 
would depend on a mechanism of 
payment conditionality in place at 
the MS level. It is not yet clear how 
such conditionality would be made 
operational by the member states, 
supervised by the EC.
In the proposed regulation 
of the new CAP, improving the 
targeting of payments refers to 
payments targeting farmers. This 
seems to be a socio-economic goal 
and not an environmental one that 
would influence environmental 
effectiveness of the new CAP. The 
PES context suggests geographic 
targeting, rather than targeting the 
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farmers, meaning that payments 
should be focused on geographic 
locations with foreseen higher 
ecological impact. The new CAP 
would allow Member States to 
draw-up eco-scheme alternatives 
that could account for different 
ecological impacts in different 
geographic locations. This 
could, in principle, drive the new 
CAP towards environmental 
effectiveness. Likewise, payments 
for agri-environment-climate 
measures should be differentiated 
depending on geographic locations. 
Or, alternatively, payment for such 
measures would be offered for 
farmers in areas with the highest 
potential output, i.e. ecological 
improvement. It has to be noted 
that some elements of geographic 
focusing already exist in the current 
CAP. For example, payments for 
certain agricultural or forestry 
practices in Natura 2020 regions. 
Finally, payment 
differentiation is a very problematic 
issue. As discussed in the section 
on the PES concept, in most PES 
programs, including the CAP, 
payments are made for measures, 
or acts that lead to improved 
ecological status. However, the 
same agricultural measure in one 
geographic location would result 
in different ecological outcome in 
another location. Environmental 
economics would suggest that in 
such cases payments should be 
differentiated, likewise, when the 
cost structures of the measures vary 
in different locations. Nevertheless, 
from a political perspective it 
would be difficult to effectuate 
differentiated payments for the 
same measures within a given 
Member State.
II�2�6� Conclusion
In this article it is proposed 
that CAP can be seen as a PES 
program and findings on PES 
effectiveness would apply in case 
of the new, upcoming CAP. It was 
presented that elements, that regard 
the key drivers of environmental 
effectiveness, are embedded in 
the EC’s proposal for new CAP 
regulation, nevertheless, there 
seems to be a gap between how 
the concepts of conditionality, 
ecological targeting and payment 
differentiation are conceptualized 
by researchers in the PES 
framework, and the system of 
interventions in the CAP. PES 
findings could support further 
research on the intervention logic 
and measures both regarding the 
current and the upcoming CAP, 
so that Member States’ ambitions 
could be underlined by creativity 
and innovative approaches in their 
CAP Strategic Planning, aimed at a 
new, innovative CAP with enhanced 
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environmental effectiveness.
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II.3. Industry 4.0 and the circular economy
ZsóFia nemes35
Abstract
Industry 4.0 and circular economy (CE) have been mutually interdependent 
concepts since the beginning of the 21st century. The key drivers behind them are 
undoubtedly very similar: enhancing productivity through more sustainable and 
efficient resource management (including waste as well), plus optimising material flows 
and building networks between different actors such as corporations, public sector 
organisations and customers. This paper aims to introduce the main pillars, goals 
and benefits of Industry 4.0, while reflecting on the potential correlations with CE and 
industrial symbiosis. The methodology is based on a literature review, focusing on global 
trends in industrial production innovation during the 2010s and the significance of the 
newest industrial revolution in terms of sustainability.
Keywords: Industry 4.0, circular economy, smart solutions, sustainability
35  3rd PhD student, IR Multidisciplinary Doctoral School – Geopolitical Doctoral 
Subprogram of CUB nemeszsofi9600@gmail.com
II�3�1� Introduction – What 
is Industry 4�0?
Industry 4.036 is a term 
which refers to the so called fourth 
industrial revolution and has been 
widely used in regulation and 
policy-making processes, as well as 
in practice, since the beginning of the 
2000s. According to the definition 
of the Directorate General for 
Economic and Scientific Policy of 
the European Parliament, “Industry 
4.0” describes the organisation 
of production processes based 
on technology and devices 
36  also referred as to I4.0
autonomously communicating with 
each other along the value chain: 
a model of the ‘smart’ factory 
of the future where computer-
driven systems monitor physical 
processes, create a virtual copy 
of the physical world and make 
decentralised decisions based on 
self-organisation mechanisms.” 
(euRopean paRliament – dg FoR 
economic and scientiFic policy 
2016 p. 6).
An integral part of the concept 
of Industry 4.0 is the development 
of a lifecycle approach to all 
products, which requires very tight 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
92
and intelligent business-to-business 
networking from the raw material 
phase through production, delivery 
and use to the end of the product 
life cycle. Key to this is a smart 
approach to design, manufacturing 
and logistics, which strives 
for the most efficient resource 
management possible, and provides 
an excellent basis for industrial 
symbiosis. This, of course, has very 
significant environmental benefits, 
as it can greatly reduce the use 
of raw materials and energy. The 
model can also contribute to the 
social and economic dimensions 
of sustainable development, e.g. it 
offers new forms of training and job 
opportunities, and can help social 
inclusion (stocK, t. – seligeR, g. 
2016). 
Figure 5 shows the four 
industrial revolutions and their 
main achievements, starting from 
the introduction of the steam engine 
and mechanisation of production 
at the end of the 18th century, 
continuing through the evolution 
of mass production and computer-
led, automated technologies until 
we reach today’s ongoing and 
developing phase which is based 
on ‘smart’ industry, and connects 
the whole process of production, 
distribution and consumption 
via the internet and different 
applications.
Figure 5: The Four Industrial Revolutions
Source: spectRal engines 2018
II�3�2� Industry 4�0 and the 
model of Circular Economy
The connections between 
this new approach of industrial 
production and the concept of 
circular economy (CE) are very 
obvious: both aim at closing the 
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loop of material and resource 
flows while creating a lot of added 
value across all dimensions of 
sustainability. Industry 4.0 and 
CE may play crucial roles in the 
development of the so-called early-
industrialised countries, but their 
effect is also highly relevant and 
significant in the most developed 
economies, e.g. Germany, where 
the original scientific background 
of the fourth industrial revolution 
was created thanks to a manifesto 
published in 2013 by the German 
National Academy of Science and 
Engineering (FoRschungsunion/
acatech 2013).
Industry 4.0 requires a high 
level of research and development 
activity, computer technology, 
smart solutions, newly invented 
applications etc. which affect 
the manufacturing equipment, 
jobs, organisational issues, the 
production process and in the end, 
the product itself. In economic 
terms, the main aim is to bring 
demand and supply as close as 
possible to each other, through 
taking into consideration individual 
preferences and requirements from 
the customers’ side, and at the same 
time, integrating the customer in 
the value chain in the earliest phase 
(hagel iii, j. et al. 2015).
The vision of circularity 
appears everywhere in the new 
business models of Industry 4.0. 
Easier and faster adaptation to 
changes in the market and demand 
have always been in the focus 
of companies, and thanks to the 
new technologies, access to data 
and the already mentioned smart 
tools and solutions, this aim is 
becoming more and more realisable 
– resulting in lower material and 
environmental costs, while shifting 
towards a circular paradigm and 
leaving linear systems behind 
(gaRcia-muina, F. e. et al. 2018). 
According to the recent literature 
and the theoretical background of 
the concept, but even more based on 
the already existing best practices 
worldwide, connecting a circular 
approach with smart industrial 
production may contribute to the 
competitiveness not just of certain 
companies, but also communities, 
regions, and even states (so from 
micro to macro, from local to global 
level).
Networking and enhancing 
cross-sectoral cooperation 
between companies, stakeholders, 
NGOs, local communities etc. 
are both equally important in 
the implementation of CE and 
Industry 4.0. The basic principles 
of the cooperation are the same 
in both cases – in actual fact, the 
one serves and supports the other 
(Zimmerman, 2018). The word 
‘symbiosis’ appears everywhere 
when it comes to describing a more 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
94
effective and environmentally 
conscious production process. 
Creating symbiosis starts with 
exploring interdependence and the 
potential added value of coordinated 
activities. Industrial symbiosis 
is one of the most important 
dimensions of the circular economy 
and the industrial revolution of the 
21st century.
II�3�3� Industry 4�0 and the 
Internet of Things (IoT)
Internet of Things (IoT) 
is a commonly used buzzword, 
usually referred to as a synonym 
for Industry 4.0. It is obvious that 
there is an overlap between the 
two; however, it is very important 
to distinguish and precisely define 
the meanings. IoT is a vital element 
of smart manufacturing (Figure 6) 
and makes it possible for physical 
products of different industries to 
communicate with each other via 
microchips and sensors embedded 
into the objects, as well as to 
be connected to the internet. In 
short, thanks to the IoT system, it 
is possible to track the lifecycle 
of each product. This smart 
technology is crucial for managing 
waste once a product cannot be used 
by the customer any more. More 
precisely, it helps avoid producing 
waste; instead, tracking the given 
product might contribute to finding 
the most suitable form of reuse, 
recycle or any other sustainable, 
environmentally and economically 
beneficial solution. (mcKinsey & 
company 2010).
Figure 6: The role of IoT in Industry 4.0.
Source: ZiguRat gloBal institute oF technology 2020
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The Internet of things 
and Industry 4.0 are mutually 
interdependent concepts and 
approaches towards the economic 
development of the 21st century, 
providing digital solutions 
for making production and 
consumption of goods and services 
more sustainable, effective and 
easily accessible. If properly 
implemented, IoT and Industry 
4.0 can foster data, information, 
material and resource flows, and 
serve the transition of the economy 
towards a circular model (CE).
II�3�4� Benefits of Industry 
4�0
The most important benefits 
of Industry 4.0 can be summarised 
and categorised as follows 
(Business development BanK oF 
canada 2017):
1. Moving towards Overall 
Equipment Effectiveness 
(OEE), boosting productivity 
and providing optimal 
solutions e.g. for equipment 
maintenance. 
2. educing and saving costs of 
manufacturing, primarily 
thanks to real-time production 
monitoring and control.
3. Improving quality through 
a real-time control process, 
eliminating customer returns 
and decreasing waste 
production.
4. Faster and more effective 
innovation capacities, 
supporting collaboration 
between experts.
It must be highlighted that 
the original motivation or guiding 
principle of Industry 4.0 was not 
providing solutions to ecological/
environmental challenges, much 
rather it was enhancing productivity 
and competitiveness. But at the same 
time, while increasing productivity 
at corporate or sector level, all the 
innovation and initiatives have 
supported the change of traditional 
– linear – patterns of economy and 
manufacturing. Current literature is 
focusing more and more intensively 
on the deep and detailed analysis 
of the environmental impacts of 
Industry 4.0. The positive effects 
can be as difficult to identify and 
measure accurately as the potential 
negative effects. However, the topic 
is highly relevant for environmental 
economics, industrial ecology and 
many other fields of science. Some 
sources claim that even though 
the positive theoretical correlation 
between smart manufacturing, 
circularity and sustainability are 
undoubted, the long-term effects 
of such an economic/industrial 
transition are still unpredictable and 
unclear (Bonilla, s. h. et al. 2018).
Measuring energy and 
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material efficiency through case 
studies and research at companies 
implies Industry 4.0 is a possible 
tool for a complex environmental/
economic evaluation of the 
situation (BeieR, g. et al. 2017). 
Other studies intend to analyse the 
effects of cooperation networks 
between companies and institutions 
of the public sector – and pay 
special attention to how smarter 
technologies and new business 
models appear in the sustainability 
strategies of corporations and 
environment policies of different 
regions or countries (lin, K. et al. 
2017).
II�3�5� Industrial parks, 
ecosystems and I4�0
The methodology of 
evaluating the environmental 
‘effectiveness’ of I4.0 is very 
complex and depends on what 
researchers would like to focus 
on (networking, energy issues, 
business models, value chain, 
waste management etc.), but one 
thing is certain: despite all the 
methodological and conceptual 
barriers, case study analyses are 
crucial. The connections between 
the concept of circular economy 
and the practice of sustainable 
industrial production can be 
examined through the operation of 
industrial parks in different parts 
of the world. There are already 
existing best practices of Industry 
4.0 in these industrial parks which 
might contribute to a much better 
understanding of the issue and 
shed light on further important 
correlations between CE and I4.0.
Since the 1990s, the number of 
the so-called eco-industrial parks37 
has been increasing worldwide. 
“An EIP is an industrial park where 
businesses cooperate with each 
other and, at times, with the local 
community to reduce waste and 
pollution, efficiently share resources 
(such as information, materials, 
water, energy, infrastructure 
and natural resources), and 
minimise environmental impact 
while simultaneously increasing 
business success” (pan, m. et al. 
2015). These entities are based 
on new, innovative solutions, 
and contribute to the renewal of 
traditional industrial sectors. The 
eco-parks are appropriate tools 
for creating high added value in 
environmental, economic and 
social terms, as well as for paying 
special attention to the protection of 
natural resources and ecosystems. 
That is why it can be stated that 
eco-industrial parks include the 
key elements and aims of the 
model of circular economy. When 
examining eco-industrial parks, 
the concept of industrial symbiosis 
37  also referred to as EIP
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(IS) must necessarily be taken 
into consideration. The essence of 
IS is a sustainable, resource- and 
cost-efficient industrial production 
through creating synergies between 
economic, governmental and 
civil actors, in order to support 
sustainability. Applying Industry 
4.0 to EIPs might be the best way 
to create the highest value added in 
terms of environment protection, 
economic and social benefits. 
One of the most important 
conditions of creating and 
maintaining a well-functioning 
symbiosis is the access to 
information and providing enough 
data to the members of the network. 
High quality ICT infrastructure 
is an essential element of any 
industrial ecosystem. The 
innovations of Industry 4.0 can help 
overcome the potential barriers of 
communication between the actors 
of the cooperation network within 
an EIP; they may also optimise the 
symbiotic relations and resource 
flows and as a consequence, 
decrease the costs of sharing 
information and any goods. 
As has been discussed above, 
the number of eco-industrial parks is 
growing worldwide, and nowadays 
the question arises in many cases: 
How can the model of Industry 4.0 
be ‘translated’, that is to say, applied 
to a symbiotic unit? There are some 
very interesting case studies which 
examine the possibilities for how 
physical entities like industrial 
companies can become part of 
a virtual space which supports 
maximising all benefits from their 
collaboration. One of the most 
dynamically developing EIPs of 
the world is located in Singapore, 
called Jurong Island. The artificial 
island has an extremely modern 
infrastructure and more than 100 
multinational companies located 
there, e.g. Shell, ExxonMobil 
or British Petrol. The aim of 
mathematicians and IT experts is to 
use data and cyberspace to optimise 
the symbiotic connections and 
circularity in this given example 
(pan, m. et al. 2015).
Why is it necessary to facilitate 
the spread and development of 
Industry 4.0 worldwide? The 
answer is strongly connected to 
one of the biggest challenges of 
our times: the rapidly growing 
population and consumption 
which lead to an extremely high 
level of environmental risks and 
unsustainable use of resources. In 
the new terminology of Industry 
4.0, experts, policy makers and 
practitioners often substitute the 
expression ‘supply chain’ with 
‘supply network’. The supply 
network requires a very tight 
partnership between manufacturers, 
customers and a lot of other actors 
in order to establish an ecosystem 
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of production and logistics (WoRld 
economic FoRum 2019). From a 
circular economic point of view, 
the key issue is the optimisation of 
waste management and utilisation 
of resource surpluses – the latter 
includes, in addition to waste, 
other resources as well, such as 
by-products or even surpluses of 
human resources that can be shared 
within an industrial symbiosis.
II�3�6� Conclusion
The implementation of CE 
and Industry 4.0 are determining 
factors in the rise of developing 
economies as well as for the future 
of the richest countries. It seems to 
be even more obvious that making 
the secondary sector circular and 
adopting symbiotic models will 
play a decisive role in determining 
which regions or countries will be 
able to rise and catch up the most 
developed ones in years to come. 
However, smart manufacturing 
has numerous barriers which must 
be taken into consideration. Some 
barriers can be interpreted as high 
risks or challenges, primarily 
arising from cyber security and data 
protection issues. The potential 
risks of making even more and more 
data online available are, of course, 
real and might concern all of those 
actors who would play a central role 
in spreading I4.0. The crucial point 
is to have favourable regulation, 
financial resources, technology and 
institutionalised cooperation which 
can support the spread of smart 
industrial production and circular 
economy – under secure conditions. 
This will definitely influence the 
global competition between the 
three ‘great players’ (the EU, China 
and the USA), and the sustainability 
and competitiveness of many 
developing economies as well.
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III.1. russian gas export towards Bulgaria: 
inconsistent political response due to 
energy security challenge
neli KiRilova38
Abstract
This paper39 examines the relation of state ownership in Russian oil and gas 
companies, why they are interested in export through Bulgaria as a transit country towards 
Europe, and why they face an inconsistent political response by Bulgaria since its EU 
membership. The theoretical body is split in three parts, applying deductive approach. 
First, the role of state ownership is compared in motivation factors for multinational 
enterprises of Russia, China, India, and Turkey. Second, the importance of oil and gas 
companies for Russia is outlined, and the aim for monopoly of Gazprom on European 
markets. Third, a gap is found in the necessity to examine geopolitical factors shaping the 
individual interests of different EU Member States concerning energy import from Russia. 
The empirical part addresses the effects of the energy security strategies of Russia and the 
EU to the inconsistent political responses of Bulgaria. 
Among the main findings, three factors are identified to influence Bulgaria’s 
political decisions regarding its energy security. First, it is the geopolitical location as a 
transit route for Russia and Turkey towards the EU. Second, it is the high dependence on 
Russian import, and third, the obligation to follow EU rules for diversification of supply. 
In this context, it is concluded that Bulgaria could undertake stable political decisions 
regarding its energy market only if agreed with both Russia and the EU. The opportunities 
for EU-Russia compromise agreement on the energy security contradiction are examined 
on the example of Turkish Stream gas pipeline project. Recommendations for further 
analysis on Russian energy projects towards Bulgaria suggest research on the stability of 
political affiliation of its governments40.
Keywords: Europe, Bulgaria, Russia, energy, geopolitics?41
38  PhD Candidate – CUB International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, 
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40  The structure of energy relations Russia-Bulgaria-EU is assessed. It does not reflect 
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III�1�1� Introduction
Previous studies have 
explored which are the motivation 
factors of Russian multinational 
enterprises for outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) towards 
Europe, as well as the push and pull 
factors of other leading regional 
investors such as China, India 
and Turkey. The current paper 
briefly compares the role of state 
ownership for them, outlining the 
advantages and disadvantages of 
state ownership for Russian FDI 
in oil and gas companies, with an 
overview of the main Russian oil 
and gas MNEs investing in EU 
countries.
This paper evaluates how 
political changes affect investment 
in gas-transit pipelines, for example 
the change of Russian energy export 
towards Europe after worsening 
the relations with Ukraine. In the 
case study of Bulgaria, it discusses 
why Bulgaria attracts Russian 
energy investment, and which 
are the geopolitical reasons for 
contradictory political decisions 
towards Russian energy import. 
The contradictory interests of 
Bulgaria, due to its EU membership 
requirement for diversification and 
its geopolitical proximity with 
Russia causing energy dependence, 
are outlined as a source of blocking 
political decisions. Finally, the 
opportunities for compromise 
agreement between Russia and 
the EU, which could contribute 
for a stable political discourse of 
Bulgaria, and the perspectives for 
Turkish Stream, are analysed.
III�1�2� Theoretical 
Background
This section compares the 
role of state ownership in the main 
motivation factors of Chinese, 
Indian, Turkish and Russian MNEs 
to expand towards Europe. Then, it 
shows the importance of Russian 
state interests in private oil and gas 
companies, and the need to examine 
specific examples of Russian export 
to South-East European countries.
Motivation factors for 
China, India, Turkey and 
Russia to invest in Europe
China. The main motivation 
factors for foreign direct investment 
of Chinese multinational 
enterprises explained by Schüler-
Zhou, Schüller, and Brod, are 
driven by the Chinese government 
which guides the global growth of 
its companies, while the domestic 
market growth is highly restricted. 
They see Europe as a target for 
market and asset growth of Chinese 
companies, especially in high-tech 
and brand names, while the global 
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financial crisis sets welcoming 
investment climate (schüleR-Zhou, 
y. et al. 2012). The main obstacle 
in Chinese expansion towards 
Europe is the lack of harmonized 
FDI policy, statistical reporting, 
and clear rules for MNEs location 
among the EU Member States, 
despite the common foreign and 
trade policy of the EU (schüleR-
Zhou, y. et al. 2012). The Chinese 
government is strongly supportive 
for the OFDI of Chinese MNEs. 
However, it needs to approve in 
advance which companies and 
where exactly could invest, using 
the economy as a part of its foreign 
policy strategy for growth and 
influence.
India. In contrast to China’s 
government expansion strategy, 
the main motivation factors for 
foreign direct investment of Indian 
multinational enterprises are 
based on India’s family ownership 
structure (Gerőcs T. 2017). Gerőcs 
argues whether Indian companies 
are able to successfully compete 
with dominant Western companies 
within the multipolar economy. 
India is closely related to the 
British colonization, therefore its 
historically inherited competitive 
advantages include cheaper labour 
market and quickly adopting 
strategies to fit the European 
market requirements (Gerőcs T. 
2017). However, Gerőcs argues 
that their main disadvantages are 
lack of experience and proper 
assessment of the foreign markets, 
as well as wrong choice of partners 
and inadequate governmental 
policy. The lack of experience and 
knowledge in investing abroad are 
disadvantages for companies not 
supported by the government. The 
private investment structure of 
Indian MNEs considerably slows 
down the process of expansion. 
Turkey is a regional power in 
the EU neighborhood, ‘a natural heir 
of the Ottoman empire’ (sZigetváRi 
t. 2018 p. 14.). Turkey has specific 
interest in growing its multinational 
companies towards South-Eastern 
Europe due to cultural proximity 
and minor geographic distance 
(sZigetváRi t. 2018 p. 13.). Its 
interest preference is diversified 
towards countries of the Southern 
Caucasus, Balkans, Southern 
and Eastern Europe based on 
industry specifics, where Bulgaria 
is preferred for manufacturing 
(sZigetváRi t. 2018 p. 24.) and 
as a main transit road of Turkish 
export towards the EU (sZigetváRi 
t. 2018 p. 31.). Among China, 
India and Turkey, only the least 
is highly interested in investing 
in Bulgaria due to its geopolitical 
location. Bulgaria provides for 
Turkey a transport link towards 
Western Europe. This is among the 
main pull factors of Turkish MNEs 
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investment, based on geographic 
and partially cultural proximity. 
Russia. Weiner sees as 
main pull factors for Russia the 
combination of resources, markets 
and strategic assets, considering that 
control over gas pipelines would 
minimize the costs and secure 
the export for Russia. Among the 
main push factors for Russia are 
the flight of capital escaping state 
capture and the unity with Russia’s 
foreign policy aims (WeineR cs. 
2017 p. 22.). Weiner compares 
Russian outward companies which 
are mostly private, to the Chinese 
ones which are mostly government 
supported. Nevertheless, he 
underlines that Russian embassies 
regularly provide information 
allowing Russian companies to 
contact the foreign companies, 
while in return the Russian state 
influences them via oligarchic 
ownership (WeineR cs. 2017 
p. 25.). Therefore, government 
support is essential for the rapid and 
successful expansion of MNEs, but 
it is only possible if the company is 
in line with Russia’s foreign policy 
goals. 
Investment in South-
Eastern Europe. Considering 
the difference of motivation 
for foreign direct investment in 
multinational enterprises, after 
the brief comparison it is visible 
that companies supported by the 
government, which is the case of 
China and Russia, have much more 
chances for successful investment 
abroad. They have access to the 
necessary information of how to 
approach the foreign market, but 
also the obligation to adhere to 
the foreign policy goals of their 
country. Looking at the geographic 
scope of aimed investment, Russia 
and Turkey would be the most 
interested in the South-Eastern part 
of Europe due to their geographic 
proximity and historical past, which 
would stimulate either rivalry or 
partnership.
State interests in Russian 
oil and gas companies and 
selection of markets
State interests in Russian 
oil and gas companies. In the 
case of Russia, despite declared 
independence of its state-owned 
energy companies, they comply 
with Russia’s foreign policy goals 
(Jirusek, Vlcek, and Henderson). 
Oil and gas companies are of highest 
strategic importance for Russia, as 
well as those for defence, electricity 
and mining (jiRuseK, m. et al. 2017). 
The high importance of oil and gas 
for Russia means that they could 
be used as a political instrument 
for influence. For example, the 
Russian oil company Lukoil is 
suppressed by the government 
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to invest in Kazakhstan (WeineR 
cs. 2017 p. 28.), which shows its 
high dependence on governmental 
approval. The functioning of 
Russian energy multinational 
companies follows the principle 
of oil companies buying refineries 
and gas stations abroad, and 
specifically Gazprom investing in 
infrastructure (WeineR cs. 2017 p. 
44.). Gazprom is found to invest in 
Poland via EuROPol GAZ, along 
with Lukoil and Severstal, in the 
Czech Republic via Vemex, in 
Hungary through a former Gazprom 
manager, M. Rakhimkulov and 
ownership by Gazprombank of the 
Hungarian bank ÁÉB’ (WeineR cs. 
2017 p. 51.). Gazprom invests in 
Slovakia via Vemex, Sofrusgas, the 
oil revenues of Russia via Lukoil, 
Yukos, and Transpetrol prior to 
the privatization in 2002 (WeineR 
cs. 2017 p. 54.), while Slovenia 
would benefit as a transit country 
of South Stream. However, the 
created single gas and electricity 
market of the EU and the improved 
climate governance, in the view 
of Deák, is a reason for change of 
this established strategy, leading 
to Lukoil selling European assets, 
while Rosneft decreasing European 
investment (deáK a. 2017).
Selection of markets. The 
interest of Russian companies to 
invest in Europe and Asia depends on 
location factors such as geographic 
and economic proximity, as well 
as administrative and cultural 
similarity (WeineR cs. 2017 p. 30.). 
More specifically, Weiner considers 
Russia’s investment to be tied with 
the presence of Slavic languages 
and Russian diaspora, and 
attracted by the positive narrative 
for the historical past, which is 
present in Bulgaria. Analysing 
its neighbourhood investments, 
Weiner concludes that in the Baltic 
countries Russia faces Swedish 
competition, in Poland it faces 
German competition, while political 
disputes destabilize the investment 
climate. Due to cultural and 
linguistic similarity, Russia tends 
to invest in South-Eastern Europe 
and the post-Soviet space (WeineR 
cs. 2017 p. 37.). Weiner considers 
that Russian multinationals mainly 
export towards their main trading 
partner - the EU, while the EU 
weights less importance to Russian 
import (WeineR cs. 2017 p. 32.). 
Therefore, in his view, Russia needs 
the EU’s south-eastern countries 
more than the EU needs Russia, 
neglecting the fact that Russian 
market could expand towards the 
East or to address bilateral relations.
The Gap: geopolitical 
interests of individual EU 
Member States
The particular situation of 
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different south-eastern EU Member 
States is not widely discussed 
in the literature, especially their 
consideration due to geopolitical 
proximity and energy dependence 
on Russia. Therefore, to identify 
what are the specific interests of 
such countries, and whether an EU 
or other alternative could satisfy 
the needs of their energy markets 
should be explored. For this reason, 
we will focus on the case study of 
Bulgaria to find out whether Russia 
needs export towards Bulgaria, 
whether Bulgaria needs Russian 
import, whether its EU membership 
provides a better alternative, or 
other options exist.
Despite planning 
diversification energy policies, 
the EU import for 2018 is mostly 
from Russia, Norway and Nigeria 
(Eurostat, 2018). By the end of 
2019 Russia plans to finish three 
gas pipelines - TurkStream under 
the Black Sea, Power of Siberia 
towards China, and Nord Stream2 
towards Germany (cholaKov, 
p. 2019). A conflict of interest 
appears if any of these routes is 
not in line with the EU regulations 
for energy diversification. Such 
conflict of interest concerning the 
Russian energy import in Bulgaria 
is the result of two main factors - 
its energy dependence on Russian 
gas and its commitments to comply 
with the EU energy diversification 
as a Member State since 2007 
(KiRilova, n. 2015). This conflict 
of interest results in contradictory 
political behaviour of Bulgaria 
regarding the import of Russian gas 
(KiRilova, n. 2015).
This contradiction raises the 
following questions: Why Bulgaria 
attracts Russian state-owned oil and 
gas companies? Why its political 
decisions concerning the energy 
transit pipelines are unstable – 
destabilising its partnership with 
both the EU and Russia at the same 
time?
III�1�3� Methodology and 
methods
The methodology is based on 
qualitative analysis of secondary 
data through publications in 
European, Russian and Bulgarian 
journals, combined with analysis 
of the energy strategies of the EU, 
Russia and Bulgaria. The case 
study of Bulgaria is applied to show 
whether the EU needs Russian 
energy import or Russia needs oil 
and gas export towards the EU. 
Bulgaria is examined as a transit 
opportunity for Russian OFDIs, 
followed by an overview of the 
Bulgarian energy market. Based on 
this, it is discussed why Bulgaria 
attracts state-owned Russian oil 
and gas companies, and why its 
political decisions concerning 
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the EU - Russia energy relations 
are unstable. The contradiction 
between Bulgarian energy relations 
with Russia and its commitments as 
an EU Member State are examined. 
The opportunities for compromise 
agreement between Russia and 
the EU are outlined, and Turkish 
Stream in this context.
III�1�4� Discussion: reasons 
for contradictory political 
decisions of Bulgaria
Russian view of Bulgarian 
energy market – a transit 
opportunity towards the 
EU
Through its energy security 
strategy and particularly the 
transport of gas, Russia implements 
its foreign policy goals in political, 
economic and security spheres 
(noWaK, Z. et al. 2015). The 
foreign investment of Russia, being 
a global player, reflects changes in 
the world order and global crises, 
such as the global financial crisis 
in 2008, the worsening of Russia-
Ukraine relations after 2014 and 
the COVID-19 in 2020. The role 
of state ownership is positive in 
providing guarantees during crises, 
but it negatively affects the relations 
during interstate conflict due to its 
control over management presence 
and interests (WeineR cs. 2017 p. 
26.). For example, after worsening 
the Russia-Ukraine relations in 
2014, the Russian pipeline projects 
Nord Stream and TurkStream had to 
avoid crossing Ukrainian territory 
in supplying the EU with natural 
gas (cholaKov, p. 2019). Therefore, 
for Russia exporting gas through 
alternative transit pipeline routes 
became highly important. Raychev 
outlines the importance of energy 
security within a contemporary 
hybrid war, showing the Russian 
pressure via cut of the delivery to 
Ukraine which blocks EU delivery; 
dominance over gas fields near 
Crimea; presenting itself as a 
credible partner, simultaneously 
pursuing alternative energy markets 
(Raychev, y. 2017).
The Russian point of view 
on Bulgaria as a gas market is 
ambivalent. Russia acknowledges 
the close relations with Bulgaria 
due to historical ties, cultural 
similarity and energy dependence 
(KRemlinWatch 2019). But it is 
aware of the political divisions 
within Bulgaria, some in support 
of, while others opposing Russia 
(KRemlinWatch 2019). Russia 
defines the current governmental 
stream from Bulgaria as ambivalent, 
due to pressure of pro-Russian 
groups, while vocal criticism 
towards Russia is not expressed 
(KRemlinWatch 2019). Despite that, 
Russia keeps the monopoly on the 
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Bulgarian gas market since 1974, 
currently operated by Bulgargaz, 
delivering to the Bulgarian Energy 
Holding, while the latest contract 
for supplies dates forth to 2030 
(homepage42 of gaZpRom eXpoRt). 
A possible reason for this monopoly 
is that in Bulgaria, Poland, and 
Hungary the energy companies are 
either state owned or favoured by the 
government, which is an obstacle 
to market competition, while prices 
are centrally controlled in line with 
income (laBelle, m. 2015). Russia 
gains a huge part of its taxes via 
energy export - 67%, so it aims to 
support elites in Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Turkey, Hungary and Germany 
(cholaKov, p. 2019). This would 
guarantee positive attitude of these 
countries to provide access to their 
territory for alternative energy 
transit routes.
42  http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/
partners/bulgaria/  – 2019. 05. 25.
Bulgaria’s contradictory 
needs: energy dependence 
on Russia, but 
diversification required by 
the EU
Bulgaria perceives Russia as 
a security guarantor rather than a 
threat until its EU membership, after 
which the amity-enmity relations 
develop (hiteva, R. p. – maltBy, 
t. 2014 p. 125.). The National 
Security Strategy from 2011 states 
that energy stability is crucial, 
while the dependence on energy 
resources leads to vulnerability. 
In Bulgaria, diversification of 
suppliers and market participants 
is needed, while state-ownership 
and monopoly create obstacles 
for liberalization (hiteva, R. p. 
– maltBy, t. 2014). The main 
disparity is between the attitude 
of Bulgaria towards Russia before 
being an EU member welcoming 
Russia´s energy monopoly, and 
after being an EU member claiming 
that diversification is crucial for 
the stability, therefore gas market 
monopoly is unacceptable. This 
disparity is a root cause for Bulgaria´s 
changing attitude towards Russia´s 
energy investments, which is 
further discussed.
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Figure 7: Map of the Bulgarian natural gas pipeline network, which denotes areas with 
no access to natural gas
Source: hiteva, R. p. – maltBy, t. 2014 p. 124.
The prism of the Regional 
Security Complex Theory explains 
the concept for Russia in Bulgaria, 
which changed from a guarantor of 
the energy security to obstacle for 
diversifying the energy market by 
EU model (maltBy, t. 2015). In 
line with this argument, Politico 
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announced that the reason for a 
fall of the Bulgarian government in 
2014 was the withdrawal from South 
Stream gas pipeline project, which 
Bulgaria originally supported, but 
due to EU requirements, it had to 
leave (gaRdneR, a. 2014). Other 
authors claim that Bulgaria stopped 
the construction of South Stream 
due to pressure not only from the 
EU, but also NATO, opposing to 
Gazprom’s leadership of the project 
(geRopoulos, K. 2014). Among 
the main reasons for Bulgaria’s 
hesitative behaviour could be 
the EU avoidance of Russia in its 
external energy policy, aiming 
alternative routes and suppliers 
(siddi, m. 2019). Siddi explores the 
strategic importance of energy for 
the governments, which they aim 
to secure by all means, according 
to strategic EU policies. On this 
background, Bulgaria is considered 
to adapt to EU membership via 
revising its energy security strategy, 
and responding to unexpected 
changes of Russia’s gas supply 
in 2006, 2009, and increasing gas 
prices (maltBy, t. 2015).
Analysis from 2012 proposes 
two guiding directions for Bulgaria’s 
energy security policy – to invest in 
green energy or to diversify its gas 
supply developing own reserves 
(steFanov, R. – tsanov, m. 2012). 
Some Western authors consider that 
Bulgaria has the duty to implement 
its obligations with the Western 
allies, not its relations with Russia 
(hanlon, B. 2018). But Bulgaria is 
nearly 100% dependent on Russian 
gas import (nitZov, B. et al. 2010). 
Oil import from Russia to Bulgaria 
is rather high, too (nitZov, B. 
et al. 2010). Hiteva and Maltby 
outline as major deficiencies of the 
Bulgarian energy policy the delayed 
diversification of gas import, slow 
liberalization of internal market, 
EU legislation, and low residential 
gasification. They examine the 
reasons for delay of a strategic 
position for national gas pipeline 
of Bulgaria as a source of power 
for opposing stakeholders (hiteva, 
R. p. – maltBy, t. 2014). Indeed, 
a main challenge in the National 
Security Strategy of Bulgaria from 
2011 is whether to choose nuclear 
energy or the European Energy 
Market renewables, while the 
monopoly of gas supply burdens 
the country (decheva, R. 2015). 
Hiteva and Maltby argue that 
state ownership of Bulgargaz and 
Bulgartransgaz, which closely 
collaborate with Gazprom, is an 
obstacle to the EU legislation, 
and opposes the Bulgarian Energy 
Strategy’s objectives (hiteva, R. p. 
– maltBy, t. 2014).
Due to the necessity to 
cover contradictory interests, the 
Bulgarian attitude towards Russia 
as a supplier is simultaneously 
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supportive and denying. A basic 
contradiction is that Bulgaria 
interrupted two of the energy 
projects of Russia, South Stream 
and Belene, while officially not 
considering Russia as a threat to 
the security, rather than a “brother 
(Slavic) country” (Raychev, y. 
2017). In 2014 Bulgaria rejected 
participation in South Stream, the 
predecessor of TurkStream, after 
the assessment that it did not comply 
with EU regulations (cholaKov, p. 
2019), not providing an opportunity 
for Russian gas pipelines to cross its 
territory. But it did not state a clear 
denial either, showing inconsistent 
political response towards energy 
trade with Russia. In 2018 Bulgaria 
explored options to restart joint with 
Russia nuclear plant project Belene, 
assessed in 2013 by the government 
of the same prime minister as 
unprofitable and corrupt (assenova, 
m. 2018). This contradiction of the 
same government is an indication 
for attempt to serve the unilateral 
interest once of the EU, and second 
time of Russia. Nevertheless, it 
does not comply with either of 
them, showing that Bulgaria could 
not defend one single interest under 
the same government, which makes 
it inconsistent. Externally it is not 
clear whether Bulgaria opposes 
or accepts the actions of Russia, 
for which reason it should clarify 
its national interests and goals 
(Raychev, y. 2017). The main 
challenge is a contradiction present 
since Bulgaria’s EU membership 
in 2007. The EU diversification 
standards and Russia’s gas 
monopoly in Bulgaria leave the 
country in a stalemate.
Stability of Bulgaria’s 
political decisions: via EU 
– Russia agreement� The 
compromise of Turkish 
Stream
Explaining the opportunities 
for compromise agreement 
between Russia and the EU is 
a necessary condition prior to 
Bulgaria undertaking any decisive 
action. Both Russia and the EU 
are currently interdependent in 
terms of energy security, looking 
for alternative guarantees for 
demand and supply in the long term 
(noWaK, Z. et al. 2015). The legal 
foundation which sets the energy 
relations between Russia and the 
EU is based on several strategic 
documents. After the Russia-
Ukraine gas dispute in 2009, the EU 
and Russia created an Early warning 
mechanism aiming to prevent 
interruptions of gas, electricity, 
oil, and to provide communication 
(European Commission, 2019). 
The EU-Russia energy dialogue, 
set in 2000, was needed by the 
EU which imports oil, uranium, 
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coal and natural gas, and needed 
by Russia which used its markets 
(European Commission, 2019). 
This dialogue was interrupted after 
2014 due to the crisis in Ukraine. 
Both examples show that the EU 
and Russia implement an energy 
dialogue. However, it is not stable 
due to the lack of stability in 
energy transit countries, such as in 
Ukraine. The stability in the EU-
Russia energy dialogue depends on 
the stable political decisions of the 
energy security of transit countries. 
Such stability could replace the 
inconsistent political behaviour 
of Bulgaria regarding its energy 
market, only if it is agreed with 
both the EU and Russia. 
For Russian energy export, 
Bulgaria is a country of strategic 
importance for transit, opening 
access towards Western Europe. 
Due to its geographic location, 
Bulgaria is seen in a similar way by 
Turkey – as a gas transport corridor 
towards the EU. In the context of 
unsuccessful energy projects led 
by Russia, appears the question 
of how the gas transit pipeline 
Turkish Stream could progress 
successfully. It is an energy export 
project from Russia though Turkey 
towards Bulgaria and the EU. Due 
to Turkish Stream, the dependence 
of Turkey from Russia increases, 
and the access of Russia to Europe 
through the Balkans increases 
(pieRini, m. 2018). It is possible 
only in coherence with the EU 
regulations, with proven interest of 
Russia and Turkey, and if Bulgaria 
agrees to provide its territory for 
transit towards Western Europe. 
Surprisingly, despite its previously 
ambiguous response, since January 
2020, Bulgaria started receiving gas 
from Turkish Stream. Due to that, 
Russia decreased the price of gas 
import towards Bulgaria with 40% 
in 2020. Analysing this opportunity 
a year earlier, Bechev thought that 
the attempt of Russia to operate 
TurkStream via the Balkans would 
not be successful. The geopolitical 
advantage for Russia in building 
TurkStream was deepening the 
relations with Turkey towards the 
Balkans and avoiding Ukraine, 
planning to cross Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Hungary and Austria (Bechev, 
d. 2019). Opposing Gazprom’s 
interests, EU monopoly rules did 
not allow a company to own an 
infrastructure through which it may 
sell its own gas (Bechev, d. 2019). 
If the infrastructure was owned 
by the Serbian Srbiajagas and the 
Bulgarian Bulgartransgaz, and if 
Bulgaria provided the investment 
of $1.6 billion which was not likely 
to receive neither from Moscow, 
nor from Brussels (Bechev, d. 
2019), it could succeed. But the 
main problem for the EU remained 
- the ownership of gas and transit 
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route could not belong to the same 
company, in contrast to Gazprom’s 
interest to own both. 
It could be concluded that 
Russia is highly dependent on 
energy export towards the EU, 
even though it could diversify its 
routes towards the East. One of 
the opportunities for a successful 
project is Turkish Stream, but it is 
only possible if the EU regulations 
change or if Russia adapts to the 
EU standards. This means that 
Gazprom cannot be simultaneously 
the owner of the energy transit 
pipelines and the natural gas. 
However, in order to sell shares 
to local companies from Bulgaria 
and Serbia, they should possess 
enough funding to buy the shares. 
If Bulgaria cannot provide enough 
funding from Russia, or the EU, or 
any other source, the project cannot 
cross its territory. The fact that 
gas from Turkish Stream reaches 
Bulgaria since January 2020 shows 
consensus in the political decision 
of the country to accept it. However, 
it is not clear how this was funded. 
There is no guarantee how this 
would develop in the future.
It would be an achievement 
if the inconsistent line of political 
behavior was interrupted. But the 
political uncertainty is a result of 
the contradictory needs of Bulgaria. 
It became even more dependent on 
Russian gas, and at the same time 
still obliged to comply with the EU 
diversification rules. The country 
needed to either prove interest 
in operating the project, or to 
withdraw on time, without raising 
any doubtful expectations. Russia 
already faced Bulgaria’s hesitation 
in South Stream, the EU also faced 
the unstable government choices 
of the country. It was a matter of 
political will to implement one 
stable decision, no matter whether 
approving the project or rejecting 
it. The only way for Bulgaria to 
prove itself as a reliable partner 
was by defending steadily a certain 
decision. In recent decades, in the 
light of unstable governance, stable 
decisions have been barely possible. 
Therefore, Turkish Stream and any 
other energy transit project planned 
to cross the territory of Bulgaria 
are only possible during internal 
political stability. Bulgaria’s 
political decisions should be, 
coordinated with both the EU and 
Russia, in the interest of the country. 
But the questionable consistency 
of political decisions of Bulgaria’s 
current government raises doubts 
regarding the continuity of their 
implementation.
III�1�5� Conclusion
The current paper provided 
a wider context of Russian state 
owned MNEs compared with the 
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structure of Chinese, Indian and 
Turkish MNEs. It explored their 
motivation to invest in Europe. It 
outlined Russian oil and gas state 
owned companies Lukoil and 
Gazprom, reaching the EU markets 
and particularly Bulgaria as an 
energy transit country. It assessed 
the reasons for unsuccessful energy 
transit pipelines through the country, 
discussing the inconsistent political 
response of Bulgaria after its EU 
membership which contradicted 
its dependence on Russian energy 
monopoly. 
The findings show that the 
main reason for unstable political 
behaviour of Bulgaria towards the 
energy projects initiated by Russia 
is its obligation to comply with the 
EU rules for diversification of routes 
and suppliers. At the same time, 
Bulgaria remains highly dependent 
on Russia’s energy import, whose 
monopoly over the Bulgarian gas 
markets has been increased since 
2020. This contradiction captures 
Bulgaria in a position of perplexed 
own interest, incapable to respond 
to the needs of either Russia, or the 
EU. Specifically, Bulgaria needs 
diversification of its markets in 
order to comply with EU rules. But 
it is highly dependent on Russian 
energy import, which creates 
a limitation for diversification. 
Bulgaria cannot afford to lose 
Russia as an energy import partner. 
At the same time, the EU requires 
Russia to change its approach, 
which is barely possible. This 
outlines the complicated situation 
of Bulgaria, between energy import 
from Russia and EU requirements 
for diversification. The only 
solution, which would allow 
Bulgaria to take a decisive action, 
is that Russia and the EU discuss 
together with Bulgaria and agree 
how the energy transit pipelines 
through the country to be addressed 
in a common approach.
III�1�6� Recommendations
For further analysis of gas 
pipeline projects, led by Russia 
and operated through the territory 
of Bulgaria towards the EU, I 
would highly recommend the 
stability of Bulgarian governments 
to be explored. The reasons for 
change between pro-Russian and 
pro-Western attitude of the same 
government should be enlightened, 
and specifically the effect on the 
energy security of the country.
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III.2. the End of the Superpower Era 
– retrenchment of the uSa and the 
resurgence of Great Power Politics
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Abstract
My paper tries to answer the question what actions should the USA take in order 
to keep its pre-eminence in the medium to long term future. The 21st century presents 
the USA with several challenges around the globe and the country needs to adjust its 
commitments to the new era. I try to examine the balance of power with the help of the 
neoclassical realist school. The increasingly multipolar world changes the contemporary 
realities of international relations and with the help of balancing strategies my paper 
tries to identify how the actions of the United States will shape the international relations 
in the coming decades. In my opinion, the inevitable retrenchment of the United States 
will bring back traditional great power politics.
Keywords: USA, neoclassical realism, balance of power, retrenchment, 
multipolarity
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III�2�1� Introduction
The 21st century ushered in 
a new era in international relations. 
The quick dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the fast integration of 
Central and Eastern European 
countries into the European Union 
increased the relative power of 
the United States tremendously. It 
seemed that the unipolar world has 
finally arrived and the United States 
would dominate the world virtually 
uncontested.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and 
the USA’s prolonged quagmires 
in Afghanistan and Iraq were not 
foreseen by the leadership of the 
country because their perception 
about the capabilities of the United 
States were excessive. Quick and 
decisive victories were envisaged 
in both states by then President 
George W. Bush (Butt, a. i. 2019).
However, as the United States 
got overburdened by the costs of 
these foreign adventures the balance 
of power started to shift. Russia 
elected Vladimir Putin, a strong 
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president to lead the country out 
of its miserable place where it got 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
In addition to that, after the end of 
the 1970’s China’s GDP growth has 
been outstanding thanks to several 
reforms the country implemented 
(Zhu, X. 2012).
The costly “war on terror”, 
the new challenges of a rising China 
and a defiant Russia coupled with 
a more and more inward looking 
American population have caused 
the United States to re-evaluate 
its place in the world. The threats 
to continued global primacy are 
summarized (Table 2).
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actors external threats internal threats
state Rising China Opportunist Russia
non-state „War on Terror” disillusioned population
Table 2: Problems that threaten the global primacy of the United States of America
Source: edition of the author
III�2�2� Isolationism or 
Global Leadership?
The vast majority of 
international relations experts see 
the problems that the United States 
of America, the current strongest 
state in the international system 
faces. However, there are different 
approaches to these problems. 
What does the United States need 
to do in order to ensure its primacy 
in the coming decades as well? 
Isolationism or leadership around 
the globe? 
America faced similar 
questions in the 20th century 
as well. After each world war, 
different approaches were adopted. 
The main question is, what should 
the USA do now, when the balance 
of power seems to change. In my 
opinion, neither isolationism nor 
global leadership should be the 
answer.
The Case Against 
Isolationism
In my opinion, the 
isolationism that the country 
practiced before and after the First 
World War cannot be repeated in 
the 21st century. The international 
system that the USA built after the 
Second World War, globalization 
and the global interdependence 
of the world economy make it 
virtually impossible to withdraw 
from the world stage as the country 
did a century ago.
The post WWII system is still 
dominant regardless the attempt 
of emerging (or re-emerging in 
case of Russia) powers’ efforts. 
The Bretton Woods system ended 
in the 1970s, but the USD is still 
a major reserve currency and its 
role in the international economy is 
still substantial. No other currency 
comes close to its influence on the 
international economy. The Russian 
ruble or the Chinese renminbi 
are both far behind the USD in 
importance.
Furthermore, the United 
Nations is still a cornerstone of the 
system, and every major power is 
heavily invested in maintaining its 
relevance. There are no alternative 
institutions in the world that 
substantially threaten the power or 
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influence of the post-Second World 
War ones. There were initiatives to 
create rival economic institutions 
without the Western powers. The 
most glaring example for an effort 
to create a quasi-economic alliance 
is the BRICS.
This informal group of states 
comprising Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa could have 
been the most threatening initiative 
to the power of the United States. 
However, the threat of combining 
the major emerging powers never 
really materialized. Nowadays 
thanks to the different growth of 
its members the BRICS countries 
do not seem to be successfully 
cooperating against the USA. Its 
alternative international financial 
institution the New Development 
Bank (NDB) which intended to 
provide an alternative to the IMF 
and World Bank has only a capital 
of $100 billion (haRpeR, j. 2019). In 
comparison the IMF has more than 
two and a half times more money to 
distribute immediately if necessary 
(WRoughton, l. 2010).
In addition to the weak 
alternative institutions that the rivals 
of Western states half-heartedly 
started, all the major powers stayed 
committed to the above mentioned 
international institutions (UN, IMF, 
WB etc.) that are the cornerstones 
of the post-WWII international 
system. This means that the United 
States cannot withdraw from the 
existing structure. If it would like 
to abandon or decrease its role 
unilaterally, the rising economic 
powers such as China could utilize 
the vacuum and fill it, thereby 
taking advantage of the system 
and exerting influence through it 
with relative ease. Additionally, 
the cautionary tale of the League 
of Nations serves as a powerful 
analogy that dissuades the United 
States to leave the international 
structure. The story of the League 
showed that without the backing 
of the great powers another major 
conflict could broke out.
Those who see problems the 
country faces (Table 2) can reach 
the conclusion that a major step 
back from the world stage would 
release the burdens the United 
States has to carry thanks to its 
global engagement. The USA pays 
a lot financially in order to maintain 
the international institutions it 
helped to create. However, the 
United States cannot relinquish its 
global commitments from one day 
to another. Its defence umbrella 
and its alliance systems keep a 
lid on a lot of problems. Nuclear 
proliferation and regional rivalries 
would multiply if the United 
States withdrew its forces and 
commitments rapidly (hicKs, K. 
2020).
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The Case Against Global 
Leadership
Isolationism seems not to be 
an option. Should the United States 
continue to be a global leader as was 
practiced during the presidency of 
George W. Bush? After the end of 
the bipolar world, for nearly three 
decades the United States has vastly 
extended its commitments and its 
military deployments (WeRtheim, 
s. 2020).
The era of seemingly 
unchallenged unipolarity has ended, 
and the country seems to show the 
symptoms of overextension. The 
U.S. presidential election of 2016 
showed that the American people 
would like to leave global leadership 
behind. Trump won the presidency 
with a nationalist and more inward 
looking message. Global leadership 
and extension of external 
commitments are especially hard in 
a democracy where the voters are 
disillusioned. The prolonged and 
unsuccessful endeavours to topple 
hostile governments and non-
state actors in the Middle East and 
replace them with strong friendly 
democracies failed to convince the 
voters to commit more resources 
around the globe. A lot of them 
wanted Trump’s “America First” 
approach (Kagan, R. 2018).
More than three years have 
passed since the inauguration of 
the new president, and the new 
2020 presidential election seems 
to follow the pattern of a decreased 
importance of foreign policy as 
well. Trump’s approach to foreign 
policy has not changed. The debates 
among the leading Democratic 
candidates were heavily focused 
on domestic issues and the topic 
rarely changed to the foreign policy 
realm. Former Vice President Joe 
Biden stresses the importance of 
American leadership around the 
globe (Biden, j. R. 2020). As of this 
writing the former VP is defeated 
all of his rivals and he is the leading 
democratic candidate for presidency 
(homepage44 of FivethiRtyeight). 
Even if Joe Biden would win the 
2020 US election, his rhetoric is 
focused more on relying on allies 
rather than on going in alone. 
Furthermore, Congress would be a 
check on Mr. Biden’s more active 
foreign affairs, because a vast 
portion of the American population 
would not support a foreign policy 
similar to the approach of President 
George W. Bush.
The second top democratic 
contender (who dropped out of the 
race, but had a lot of support in 
the beginning of the Democratic 
primary) Bernie Sanders would 
not have changed the course of the 
44  https://projects.fivethirtyeight.
com/2020-primary-forecast – 
2020. 03. 23.
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Trump administration’s ‘America 
First’ approach a lot. The former 
candidate would have implemented 
a more value based foreign policy, 
although it would have backed this 
approach by diplomacy. Sanders (as 
well as Trump) would like to avoid 
another endless war, and would 
even roll back support for regimes 
that have been important U.S. allies 
for decades such as Saudi Arabia. 
(homepage45 of BeRnie sandeRs)
It seems that the American 
public left the idea of the global 
leadership behind. If the public 
does not endorse this policy the 
leadership of the country cannot 
go down a path that resembles the 
course of American foreign policy 
in the 1990s and early 2000s.
This domestic factor cannot 
be left out of the equation when 
it comes to evaluating the foreign 
policy of the country. Structural 
theories lack the importance of 
unit level factors and emphasize 
the international system instead 
of paying attention to the internal 
characteristics of the states. 
However, Innenpolitik theories 
overemphasize the importance of 
domestic variables over systemic 
ones. In my opinion this approach 
is flawed as well, because the 
relative power should be the chief 
45  https://berniesanders.com/issues/
responsible-foreign-policy – 
2020. 03. 02.
independent variable as neoclassical 
realists suggest. (gideon, R. 1998 
pp. 149–151.)
III�2�3� Balance of Power
I argued against the two 
extremes: isolationism and global 
leadership in the chapters above. 
The international system and the 
balance of power is constantly 
changing. This change explains the 
behaviour of states that is why it 
is important to define it carefully. 
The balance of power as a concept 
aims to describe the production of 
certain constellation of forces in 
the international system. Several 
international relations scholars tried 
to capture this phenomenon. My 
definition of the concept of what 
balance of power is: An inherent 
tendency of international politics 
to produce a certain distribution 
of power that is acceptable by the 
major players of the world.
The distribution of power 
in the beginning of the 21st 
century is no longer acceptable 
for several major stakeholders in 
the international system. States as 
China and Russia feel themselves 
emboldened to challenge the status 
quo and the factors (Table 2) explain 
the behaviour of the United States. 
The seemingly unchallenged global 
primacy of the USA has ended 
and the country has to adjust its 
Contemporary Global Challenges in Geopolitics, Security Policy and World Economy
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
127
course of action accordingly. On 
the surface the United States is 
still the primus inter pares, but the 
perception of relative power has 
changed over the years.
I use the neoclassical realist 
school to analyse the situation, 
because I think it describes the 
different foreign policy choices of 
the major powers better than other 
international relations theories. 
In my opinion structural realist 
theories (neorealism, offensive 
realism, defensive realism) do not 
take into account the unit level 
factors that influences the foreign 
policy decision making. And 
Innenpolitik theories highlight the 
domestic factors and downplay the 
importance of the systemic forces.
The systemic pressures on 
the United States would encourage 
more engagement without leaving 
several parts of the globe to 
be handled by allies. The main 
thesis of John J. Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism is that states look 
for opportunities to gain power. 
And defensive realism claims 
that preserving power rather than 
increasing it is the main goal of 
states (meiRsheimeR, j. 2014 p. 21.).
The United States has been 
worrying too much about too many 
problems connected to foreign 
policy in the past century (WaltZ, K. 
n. 2008 p. 328.). This has made the 
country’s population (as Table 2) 
and the presidential races of 2016 
and 2020 show) disillusioned about 
the constant overseas engagements. 
Domestic factors such as this 
heavily affect the USA’s foreign 
policy decision making.
On one hand, structural realist 
theories have a hard time explaining 
the changes in contemporary 
international relations. Offensive 
realism would prescribe the United 
States an approach that is more 
direct without leaving certain parts 
of the world behind. In contrast, the 
decreasing influence of the country 
in the Middle East is a good 
example of a decline in influence 
and a strategic modest withdrawal 
from a region thanks to mainly 
domestic factors. In addition, 
defensive realism would suggest 
that China and Russia would not 
have made several risky steps in 
order to upset the balance of power. 
The annexation of Crimea and the 
Chinese activities in the South 
China Sea are glaring examples that 
defy the logic of defensive realism. 
On the other hand, 
neoclassical realist theory suggests 
as the relative power of a state rises, 
it will seek influence abroad. This 
is clearly the case with Russia and 
China and as the perceived relative 
power of a state such as the USA 
falls, its action and ambition will be 
scaled back accordingly. (gideon, 
R. 1998 p. 152.)
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It does not matter that the 
absolute power of the United States 
does still overshadows China’s and 
especially Russia’s. Both of the new 
contenders would like to challenge 
the United States even though their 
material and military capabilities in 
absolute term are dwarfed by the 
USA. The perceived relative power 
of China and Russia has been 
increasing and this phenomenon 
means the United States has to alter 
its course if it would like to maintain 
its position as the strongest state in 
the international system.
Balance of power theory 
suggest several approaches to the 
problems the United States faces. 
Table 3 shows how the threat 
of China and Russia has been 
encountered recently.
type mechanisms objectives examples
hard 
balancing
formal alliances
matching arms build-
ups
confront/
balance 
powerful/
threatening 
state
Triple Alliance vs. Triple Entente
Allied vs. Axis Powers
NATO vs. Warsaw Pact
limited 
hard 
balancing
coordinated military 
activity, short of 
formal alliances
limited, asymmetrical 
arms build-ups
restrain 
power/
threatening 
behaviour
China vs. U.S.
India and U.S. vs. China (2010-)
soft 
balancing
limited institutional 
alignments
informal ententes
restrain 
power/
threatening 
behaviour
Concert of Europe (1815-53)
Russia and China vs. U.S. (1996-)
India and Japan vs. China (2014-)
Table 3: Types of Balancing
Source: paul, t. v. 2018 p. 22.
III�2�4� Retrenchment
The United States has been 
trying to save the world order 
and its position with limited hard 
balancing and soft balancing 
behavior (Table 3). The George 
W. Bush and Barack Obama 
administrations emphasized a 
world without spheres of influence, 
and based their actions accordingly. 
However, the Trump administration 
de facto departed from this point of 
view. I agree with an international 
relations scholar, Graham Allison’s 
assessment that now is the time to 
return to great power politics and 
revive the approach of spheres 
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of influence in the coming years 
(allison, g. 2020).
This means that the United 
States has to rely more heavily on 
its allies to carry out operations 
especially in the anti-terrorist front 
to relive pressure on the country. 
A good example for this approach 
is France’s operations in Africa, 
especially in Mali (melly, p. 2019).
The alliance system of the 
United States is extensive and 
leaves no corner of the world 
behind. The country can utilize 
these relationships to contain the 
external threats. It shall retrench 
from positions that are not vital to 
its national interest. The question is: 
what are the regions and problems 
that the United States should no 
longer waste resources solving? 
The internal factors of the country 
pushes it out of regions such as the 
Middle East. Several endless and 
costly wars threaten the president’s 
perceived leverage in the foreign 
policy questions concerning the 
region.
In addition to the domestic 
pressures, Russia entered the 
region through its ally: Syria. The 
resurgence of great power politics 
is the most visible in the Syrian 
civil war. The country is not vital to 
the United States’ national interest 
and the Trump administration has 
tried several attempts to withdrew 
from the troubled region. Besides 
Russia, another regional power 
Turkey also stepped in as a major 
player in the Syrian civil war 
(FeaveR, p. – inBoden, W. 2019). In 
addition to that Turkey and Russia 
are both active in Libya as well 
(el-gamaty, g. 2020). This part 
of the world is not the major realm 
the United States should focus its 
resources. It should leave great 
power politics to decide the future 
of these regions instead of trying to 
solve the problems by itself. 
The relative perceived power 
of the USA declined since the war 
on terror started in the beginning 
of the 21st century. Now, with a 
more inward oriented president the 
country is beginning to withdraw 
from Afghanistan and hopes to 
find a resolution to the 18-year-
long war. It is not the outcome the 
country hoped for in the beginning 
of combat operations, but it can 
relieve a lot of stress and burden 
from the shoulders of the country 
(gaZi, s. 2020).
Furthermore, the EU, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, 
South Korea and Canada are all 
major allies of the United States 
with substantial economic and 
military might. Even though the 
Trump administration withdrew the 
USA from the TPP (Trans-Pacific 
Partnership), the trade deal was 
salvaged. Australia, Canada and 
Japan led efforts to preserve the 
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deal to create a free-trade zone of 
500 million people with 11 member 
states. In addition to these countries 
Colombia, Indonesia and South 
Korea signalled their interest to join 
the TPP. These steps show how the 
allies of the United States could fill 
the place of the country in regions 
where the country needs to scale 
back its presence. (daaldeR, i. h. – 
lindsay, j. m. 2018)
III�2�5� Resurgence of Great 
Power Politics
The second half of the 21st 
century and the beginning of the 
21st brought different eras in 
international relations. Now the 
inherent tendency of international 
politics produces a new 
constellation of world order that 
emphasizes great power politics 
more than in the recent decades. 
As the relative power of the United 
States declines, new challengers 
appear on the international scene. 
The American taxpayers seem no 
longer interested in paying virtually 
alone the bill of maintaining the 
current liberal world order. The 
United States has been encountering 
both internal and external factors 
that increase consumption and the 
costs of protection and production. 
If we take a look at the enormous 
military budget of the country it is 
easy to see that maintaining several 
overseas military bases and military 
operations in multiple countries cost 
a lot. The comparative advantages 
over other societies have been 
undercut by the diffusion of the 
country’s economic, technological, 
and organizational skills. In 
comparison, the rising states on 
the periphery such as China enjoy 
lower costs, rising rates of return 
on its resources and the advantages 
of relative backwardness. The 
constant high growth rate of China 
has been increasing its relative 
position in the international system 
that produces a disequilibrium 
(gilpin, R. 1981).
This disequilibrium is 
balanced by the United States and 
its allies (Table 3). Compared to the 
past, the difference is the relative 
position of the United States in the 
system. In the coming decades the 
country has to rely more and more 
on its allies to carry out the tasks of 
maintaining the liberal world order. 
The partial withdrawal otherwise 
known as retrenchment of the USA 
paves the way for the revival of 
spheres of influence from their 
slumber. As the example of France 
shows, the former colonial power 
carries out anti-terrorist operations 
on the ground with its own forces 
in its former sphere of interest. The 
USA should pay special attention 
to rival great power’s overseas 
military bases. China’s base in 
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Djibouti is troubling (headley, 
t. 2018). The USA should use 
its alliance system and already 
existing international institutions 
to counter the spread of foreign 
military bases of its competitors. 
The Russian naval base in Tartus 
(Syria) is a good example how 
these facilities can help expand the 
power projection capabilities of a 
great power (KaRmanau, y. 2019). 
These foreign bases are much more 
important tools for influencing the 
balance of power than the weak 
alternative institutions the emerging 
powers tried to create.
Russia is active not just in 
Syria, but in Europe as well. Eastern 
and Central European countries are 
threatened the most by the resurgent 
Russia. The sanctions of the EU 
and the increased military spending 
of European NATO member states 
shows the burden-sharing of the 
alliance that seems to take place. 
(BesWicK, e. 2019) Even though 
the United States no longer has the 
position it held in the 20th century, 
its allies have major military and 
economic potential. The USA 
should encourage its allies to take 
up more responsibility to maintain 
the current international system and 
not let rival powers get opportunities 
to grow without balancing them.
III�2�6� Conclusion
My paper tries to show 
the external and internal factors 
that lead the strongest state in the 
international system to re-evaluate 
its positions around the globe. The 
seemingly uncontested primacy 
of the United States enabled the 
country to send its military into 
conflicts that cost a lot of resources. 
These engagements drained the 
USA and its voters and made 
them disillusioned about foreign 
endeavours. Furthermore, China and 
Russia have perceived their relative 
power grew in the international 
system. This phenomenon has been 
making them challenge the position 
of the United States in the system.
The USA has been trying to 
balance and maintain its dominant 
position around the globe with 
soft balancing and limited hard 
balancing. (paul, t. v. 2018 p. 22.) 
On the surface, this strategy can 
remain the same. The country has 
a wide alliance system across the 
globe.
However, the approach to 
foreign policy and the international 
system needs to be changed. The 
United States needs to retrench 
from regions that are not vital to 
its national interest and share more 
burden of maintaining the dominant 
position in the system with its allies. 
European allies can help contain 
Russia since they are the ones who 
are the most incentivized to do so. 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
132
France and other stakeholders can 
help mitigate the threat international 
terrorist organisations pose. 
Australia, Japan, South Korea and 
other allies can use their economic 
power to contain China.
These developments have 
been resurrecting spheres of 
influence. The coming decades will 
no longer resemble the virtually 
unipolar position of the USA as 
was the case in the 1990’s and 
early 2000’s. In my opinion the 
resurgence of great power politics 
is inevitable. The United States 
and its allies can maintain their 
pre-eminence in the international 
system with burden-sharing. These 
states can use their economic and 
military might to balance against 
rising powers and keep them in 
check. If they miss this opportunity, 
and follow outdated strategies, their 
relative position in the international 
system will deteriorate.
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III.3. Building resilience as a Security 
Strategy for Donors and hosts: the Case of 
the Eu and jordan concerning the Syrian 
refugees
aleassa lina dhahi saliBah46
Abstract
Resilience became a cornerstone of the 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign and 
Security Policy (EUGS), which refers to building state and societal resilience among 
EU neighbors as one of the key strategic priorities of the EU foreign policy, as well as 
an immigration combat tool, especially, after the 2015-2016 immigration crisis. Thus, 
building resilience aims to secure the EU and its neighbors. Thus, this paper’s question 
is What are the implications of building resilience as a security strategy for the donors 
in case of the EU and Syrian refugees hosting countries in case of Jordan? Although, the 
EU’s approach toward building resilience has been criticized as jeopardizing the national 
security of the hosting countries by affecting the economy and the social cohesion of 
the hosting countries, however, in this paper, based on document analysis from official 
websites for the EU and Jordan, and textual analysis, I argued that the implications of 
building resilience for the donors in case of the EU is that it is a strategy to achieve 
security on the national level while for Jordan as a hosting country, it is a strategy to 
achieve security on the national and humanitarian level.
Keywords: resilience, the Syrian crisis, national security, humanitarian 
security
46  PhD Student – CUB IR Doctoral School, lina.farahat@yahoo.com
III�3�1� Introduction
“Syria is the biggest 
humanitarian and refugee crisis 
of our time, a continuing cause of 
suffering for millions which should 
be garnering a groundswell of 
support around the world.” This is 
how 
Filippo Grandi, UNHCR 
High Commissioner describes the 
Syrian crisis (gRandi, F. 2020). 
Nine years have already passed 
this on-going war in Syria with 
no glimpse of a light at the end of 
the tunnel. Since 2011, the world 
has been watching one of its worst 
crises ever, with no signs of a 
feasible peaceful resolution for the 
conflict in the near future. Until now, 
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400.000 people have been killed 
since 2011 as estimated (Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2020) 
,millions have become displaced 
in their home, other millions have 
become refugees. The United 
Nation Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 
has registered over 5.6 million 
Syrian refugees mostly in Turkey, 
Lebanon and Jordan, Iraq and 
Egypt (The United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees, 2020). 
While some of those refugees 
have dangerously managed their 
way through the Mediterranean to 
Europe, the majority remain in at 
the neighboring countries including 
Jordan.
For this reason, the on-going 
war in Syria does not only affect 
Syria alone, but it has drastic 
consequences on the whole region. 
As for Europe , the on- going crisis 
cannot be separated from its 2015-
2016 Europe Migrant Crisis , also 
known as the refugee crisis, when 
Europe received more than 1.3 
million asylum seekers, of whom 
378,000 were Syrians , accounting 
for 29% of all of Europe’s asylum 
seekers , the highest share of any 
country (Pew Research Center , 
2016). This crisis made the EU adopt 
a different approach to respond to 
its current problems, in particular, 
the refugee crisis. Hence, building 
state and societal resilience became 
one of its five priorities of foreign 
and security policy as emphasized 
in its 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS) 
(European Union Extrenal Action, 
2016).
This shift was in parallel to 
the international community’s shift 
to building resilience of the refugees 
and the hosting communities in 
response to the Syrian crisis , 2015 
Regional Refugee and Resilience 
Plan (United Nations Development 
Program, 2019) .Hence, Building 
resilience as illustrated by the 
commission as the ability of the 
states, societies, communities and 
individuals to manage, tackle, 
adapt, and recover from shocks 
and crises (European Commission, 
2012) became the new approach 
for the EU and the international 
community in response for this 
crisis. For this reason, this paper’s 
main question is.
III�3�2� What are the 
implications of building 
resilience as a security 
strategy for the donors in 
case of the EU and Syrian 
refugees hosting countries 
in case of Jordan?
In order to answer this 
question, the paper will proceed as 
follows׃ the first section addresses 
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how the Syrian refugee crisis has 
been securitized to be considered 
as a threat for both Jordan and the 
EU and the need for a different 
response. The second section 
conceptualizes resilience, traces its 
origin and mapping it in the EU’s 
humanitarian and development 
policy, to understand the EU’s 
building resilience characteristics. 
Next, the paper proceeds to map 
resilience in the EU’s foreign and 
security policy, tracing the context 
of the EU’s-Jordan relation and 
analyze the shift in the EU’s foreign 
and security policy in terms of its 
relations with its southern neighbors 
including Jordan; this shift that 
moves from a duty-responsibility 
approach to a threat-responsibility 
approach as illustrated in building 
resilience. The following section 
provides empirical insights on the 
EU’s building resilience in Jordan 
and some evidence on the ground. 
Next, the significance of building 
resilience in response of the crisis 
for both Jordan and the EU is 
illustrated. Finally, the conclusion 
and the implication for policy 
makers and upcoming research in 
regard of resilience. 
As for the methodology of 
this paper, a descriptive mythology 
is used to describe building 
resilience, the characteristics of 
the EU’s resilient approach and 
the EU’s empirical approach for 
building resilience in Jordan. For 
this reason, this paper primarily 
builds upon the analysis of various 
texts, including official EU’s and 
Jordanian policy documents, 
websites, NGO’s websites, NEWS 
reports, and scholarly literature.
III�3�3� Securitizing the 
Syrian Refugee crisis
The impact of the on-
going war is not only restricted to 
Syria, but also the whole region 
including Jordan. The sudden 
influx of refugees has magnified the 
country’s own problems; as Jordan 
is a middle-low class country 
with a very limited resources, an 
increasing rate of poverty and a 
high rate of unemployment amid a 
region of turmoil, the Syrian refugee 
crisis has placed financial, social, 
and institutional strains on Jordan 
as a host community. The latest 
Jordanian census of November 
2015 shows that there are about 
1.4 million Syrian refugees in the 
country’s different governorates. 
As of April 2020, there were 
656,213 registered Syrian refugees 
and asylum seekers in Jordan by 
the (UNHCR) (The United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, 
2020) which means that more than 
50% of Syrian refugees in Jordan 
are unregistered. The majority of 
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the 656,213 Syrian refugees in 
Jordan live in the local communities 
rather than refugee camps. Out 
of the registered Syrian refugees, 
only (123,366) live in the official 
camps for the Syrian refugees in 
Jordan -Zaatari, Margeeb Alfhood, 
and Azraq- consisting 16% of the 
total Syrian refugees registered 
with UNHCR. The distribution 
of registered refugees in Jordan 
within the camps and the Jordanian 
governates according to the UNHR 
in March 2020 (Figure 8).
Figure 8: UNHCR Registered Syrian in Jordan April 15 2020
Source: Operational Portal Refugee Status UNHR, 2020
It is in the light of this and 
the distribution of refugees within 
the local communities that the 
Syrian refugees are securitized and 
might be considered as a threat to 
the socio-economic stability, social 
cohesion, political stability of the 
kingdom, its national security, 
and the humanitarian security of 
the refugees and the Jordanian 
host communities. For this 
reason, conceptualize national and 
humanitarian security is crucial for 
this paper to see how the refugees 
were securitized. 
A classical definition of 
security has been an issue of debate, 
especially from a realist view of 
security which recognizes the state 
as the main actor, and survival 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
140
as its ultimate objective, thus, it 
simplifies the complex concept of 
security as almost a „synonym for 
power”. Therefore, the concept 
of security emphasizes the use of 
force and military power to deal 
with external threats and ensure 
the survival of the state (BuZan, B. 
1983). In addition, Joseph J. Romm 
indicates that the phrase ‘’national 
security’’ was not so often used until 
World War II in the 1947 National 
Security Act, which established the 
National Security Council (Romm, 
j. j. 1983).
Yet, the concept of security 
has been broadened after the cold 
war, because threats were not only 
restricted to traditional military 
threats, but also of economic, 
political, social, environmental 
form. The United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
expanded the definition of security 
calls to emphasize the humanitarian 
security. Hence, security also covers 
tackling different threats including; 
economic: indicates the need of 
the creation of jobs and applying 
measures against poverty; Food: 
applying measures against hunger 
and famine ;health: implementing 
measures against disease, unsafe 
food and lack of access to basic 
health care ;environmental: 
implementing measures to address 
environmental degradation, natural 
disasters and pollution; personal: 
implementing measures against 
physical violence, crime, terrorism, 
domestic violence and child 
labor; community: implementing 
measures against inter-ethnic, 
religious and other identity tensions; 
and political: measures against 
political oppression and human 
rights abuses (Human Security 
Unit, United Nations , 2009). 
For this reason, Buzan, 
Waever and Wilde categorize sectors 
of security analysis as follows: 
military -political security which 
is the framework for the stability 
of states, organizational systems of 
government and ideologies that give 
them legitimacy; economic security 
and its essence is the access to the 
resources, finance and markets 
necessary to maintain suitable 
levels of welfare and state power; 
societal security is concerned with 
sustainability and satisfied level of 
development; and environmental 
security (BuZan, B. et al. 1997).
The impact of the Syrian 
refugees on Jordan can only be 
understood within the framework 
proposed by Buzan. The scope of 
this paper cannot cover in details 
the impact of the refugees on 
Jordan; the socio-economic impacts 
of massive number of refugees and 
their pressure that burdened the 
poor infrastructure of the country, 
the extra demand on water, energy, 
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shelter, educational and health 
services, the competition on the 
labor sector that had burdened the 
country, the political and security 
impacts as the country is a part of a 
coalition that targets terrorist groups 
and combats extremist radical 
ideologies, a threat to its internal 
and external security is likely to 
happen as al Rukban attacks (BBc 
neWs 2016). This reason forced 
Jordan to adopt different policies 
to deal with security challenges in 
term of refugees from an open door 
policy at first to more tightened and 
strict policy in front of refugees 
(Rasheed, a. – Beaujouan, j. 2020).
Consequently, refugees can 
be seen as a threat to Jordan on the 
national and humanitarian level. 
As for Europe, the on- going crisis 
cannot be separated from its 2015-
2016 Europe Migrant Crisis, also 
known as the refugee crisis, when 
Europe received more than 1.3 
million asylum seekers, from which 
378,000 were Syrians, accounting 
for 29% of all of Europe’s 
asylum seekers, the highest share 
(Figure 9).
Figure 9: Number of first-time applications to Europe from countries of origin with a 
long -lasting conflicts in thousands (Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan from 2013 to 2015)
Source: Pew Research Center, 2016
This chart illustrates the 
security fears of a new wave of 
refugees to Europe especially 
from Syria, when in compared 
with other conflicted countries, it 
has the highest share of applicants 
.The securitizing of refugees as 
a threat to Europe as they might 
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affect its social cohesion, fears 
from terrorists among refugees or 
terrorist attack, beside the problem 
of securing its borders in the face of 
new wave of refugees.
 All of these can make 
refugees as a threat to Europe’s 
national security. For this reason, 
and in parallel to the absent of a 
foreseeable solution in the near 
future for the crisis, building 
resilience of the refugees and the 
host community became the new 
national, regional and international 
approach in response of the Syrian 
refugee crisis for both Jordan and 
Europe. The following section will 
conceptualize resilience as a term 
and its use in foreign and security 
policy for the EU and Jordan.
III�3�4� Conceptualizing 
resilience
The crisis of the Syrian 
refugees does not only represent a 
humanitarian crisis, but moreover, 
after the Europe Migrant Crisis , 
also known as the refugee crisis, 
which began in 2015, the European 
Union (EU) has taken the migration 
and displacement as key priority in 
the 2016 European Union Global 
Strategy (EUGS) for Foreign and 
Security Policy. In other words, in 
order to respond to such a crisis, the 
EU has adopted building resilience 
of states and societies as one of its 
five priorities and a key security 
policy (European Union Extrenal 
Action, 2016).
Resilience as a word stems 
from the Latin word “resilire.” 
“Salire” means to leap or jump; the 
suffix “re” indicates repetition, or 
backward motion. As for its origin, 
resilience is often traced back and 
attributed to the ecologist Holling 
who used the concept to refer to 
the ecological systems’ ability 
to absorb change and disruption 
(holling, c. s. 1973; WalKeR , 
j. – coopeR , m. 2011). Others 
have emphasized the important 
contributions from psychology, 
where resilience implies a shift in 
the focus from vulnerability and 
deficits to protective factors and 
adaptive capacities (BouRBeau, p. 
2013).
Risk scholars as the risk 
scholar Wildavsky, illustrated 
and defined resilience as “the 
capacity to deal with unanticipated 
dangers after they have become 
manifest, learning to bounce back” 
(WildavsKy, a. 1988 p. 77.). 
Consequently, resilience also found 
a home in the natural disasters 
studies.
As for the EU, building 
resilience has been integrated 
into the EU humanitarian and 
development policy by the EU 
Commission from 2012, as it was 
understood as the capability of 
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states, societies, communities and 
individuals to manage ,tackle , 
adapt, and recover from shocks 
and crises (European Commission, 
2012). However, it is important 
to be mentioned here that the EU 
was not the only one to consolidate 
resilience to its policies, others like 
the UN, the US and other NGOs 
have also adopted it, but it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to trace the 
resilience history for them.
On the other side, mapping 
resilience in the EU humanitarian 
and development policy, as will 
be illustrated in the following 
section, is crucial to understand the 
characteristics of the EU building 
resilience and how it is applied on 
its Foreign and security policy.
Mapping resilience in the 
EU humanitarian and 
development policy
Since its publication of 
The EU Approach to Resilience: 
Learning from Food Security Crises 
in 2012 (European Commission, 
2012), the European Commission 
has systemically used the term in 
its humanitarian and development 
policy. In this document, the 
Commission has illustrated that 
resilience is the ability of the 
states, societies, communities and 
individuals to manage, tackle, 
adapt, and recover from shocks and 
crises. Borrowing from the Global 
Alliance for Resilience Initiative, 
it confirms that resilience-based 
approach is the base to reduce 
vulnerability, in particular, to 
climate change-induced disasters 
(tocci, n. 2019). 
In the Conclusion of the 
Council of the European Union on 
The EU Approach to Resilience in 
2013, resilience has been stretched 
to be more comprehensive; it was 
not only restricted to natural crisis, 
but also resilience to other kinds 
of crisis including, for instance, 
conflicts and weak governance. 
More importantly, the council has 
highlighted two important aspects 
of building resilience. Firstly, the 
humanitarian and development 
nexus and the significance of 
their actors working together; 
secondly, the Council’s emphasis 
that building resilience requires 
working closely with local 
communities, civil society, local 
authorities, and the private sector. 
Nevertheless, it recognizes that 
resilience is an overall national 
government responsibility (Council 
of the European Union, 2013).
Following that shortly, the 
European Commission published 
the Action Plan for Resilience in 
Crisis Prone Countries, designed 
to reinforce the momentum of 
the resilience agenda (European 
Commission, 2013).The 
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importance of this document as 
Tocci confirms is that the three 
characteristics of the EU building 
resilience are clearly notable. 
First, the plan affirms that all EU 
actors (humanitarian, development, 
political) should work diffierently 
and more effiectively together 
to achieve resilience objectives. 
Second, it asserts the responsibility 
of the national and local government 
to achieve resilience, which implies 
the need for integrating resilience in 
national policies and planning for 
development. In addition, the plan 
asserts that a resilience approach 
has to be sustainable, multi-
sectoral, multi-level, multi-partner, 
and jointly planned by the people, 
communities, or governments at 
risk (tocci, n. 2019).
Third, a resilience approach 
is characterized as people-
centered and focused on the most 
vulnerable groups .The indication 
is that resilience does not only 
aim to increase their ability to 
absorb shocks and to cope with 
stresses, but it also constitutes an 
opportunity for transformation, in 
regard to adaptation, to changing 
environments, improving 
livelihoods and economic 
opportunities (Council of the 
European Union, 2013).
What is important here, in term 
of the Syrian refugee crisis, is the 
indication of the notion that crises 
present possibilities and chances 
for development, which can be read 
as a precursor for the EU framing 
refugees as an economic asset and 
a development opportunity for the 
refugee׳s hosting states. This can 
be found in later policy documents 
like Lives in Dignity: From Aid-
dependence to Self-reliance: Forced 
Displacement and Development 
(European Commission, 2016). 
Growing concerns over the refugee 
and migration crisis in 2015 paved 
the way for this policy which aims 
to fostering the resilience and 
self-reliance of forcibly displaced 
people. 
This illustration was crucial 
in order to understand the EU׳s 
approach towards resilience and its 
characteristics, and since this paper 
aims to illustrate resilience as a 
security strategy of the EU towards 
the Syrian refugee crisis, the 
following section addressing and 
mapping briefly the EU foreign and 
security policy in term of its relation 
with Jordan, the shift in its approach 
after the 2015 refugee crisis toward 
its Southern neighboring countries, 
and its adoption of building 
resilience as one of its five priorities 
in its 2016 European Union Global 
Strategy (EUGS), in comparison 
with the 2003 European Security 
Strategy (ESS). Though this shift 
was not only restricted to Jordan, in 
particular, but it was extended to be 
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a priority of building resilience of 
the EU as a whole, its states, and the 
Southern and Eastern neighboring 
countries.
III�3�5� Mapping EU-Jordan 
foreign and Security Policy
As Jordan is a significant 
partner of the EU at the global 
and regional level, and due to 
its important role in promoting 
stability, moderation and inter-faith 
tolerance in the Middle East, the 
EU has realized the important role 
of Jordan as a source of stability 
in the region, and the importance 
of increasing its support for such 
a significant actor in the region. 
Hence, the EU has sought for 
the advancement of its relation 
with Jordan and increasing its 
cooperation with it on different 
levels and across different sectors. 
In this regard, the mission of the EU 
Delegation to Jordan is to ensure 
the representation of the European 
Union to the country ,to implement 
, to follow up and to advance their 
bilateral relation in different fields 
ranging from politics, economy, 
trade, security, rule of law ,external 
assistance and cooperation (Press 
and information team of the 
Delegation to Jordan, 2019).
On the multilateral level, 
Jordan- EU relation can be traced 
back to the 1970s, when the founders 
of the EU (the European Economic 
Community and the European 
Community) started to design 
various processes as a principal 
guide to their relationships with 
Mediterranean countries, including 
Jordan. The implementation of 
this was through several policy 
frameworks including the Global 
Mediterranean Policy of 1972 
(Bocci, F. 2007), the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue of 1973 (allen, d. 
1977) ,the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP)Barcelona 
Process of 1995 , the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) of 
2003/2004, as well as the Union for 
the Mediterranean (UFM) of 2008 
(youngs, R. 2015).
On the bilateral level, the EU 
and Jordan have an Association 
Agreement since 2002, which is 
considered as the main block for 
their bilateral relationship. This 
agreement has linked them together 
and has established a strong 
partnership across many sectors. 
In October 2010, the EU-Jordan 
Association Council agreed on an 
advanced status’ partnership, which 
has resulted in an increase in the 
scope of political cooperation, open 
up doors for greater integration, 
an approximation of economic 
legislation and the reduction of 
trade barriers. The EU-Jordan 
action-plan, which governed their 
cooperation from 2012-2016, 
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demonstrated this advanced status. 
In 2014, the EU and Jordan agreed 
on a mobility partnership that aimed 
to improve the management of 
mobility and migration (Press and 
inforamtion team of the Delegation 
to Jordan, 2019).
In line with the 2015 revised 
European Neighborhood Policy, the 
EU and Jordan have adopted the 
EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities. 
Under the Partnership Priorities, the 
cooperation is designed to mutually 
reinforce these objectives: i) macro-
economic stability, sustainable 
and knowledge-based growth; 
ii) strengthening democratic 
governance, the rule of law and 
human rights; and iii) regional 
stability and security, including 
counter terrorism. Moreover, it 
seeks to enhance cooperation 
in different issues including 
migration and mobility, economic, 
social and political inclusion of 
vulnerable groups, including youth 
and women (FaKhouRy, t. 2019). 
Further, as will be illustrated in a 
following section, Jordan signed 
the 2016 Jordan -EU compact, 
after London conference 2016 for 
supporting Syria and the Region. 
The compact aims at improving the 
living conditions of refugees and 
their host communities (Briefing 
European Parliamentary Research 
Service, 2017).
As mentioned, Jordan 
is covered by the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 2003-
2004, which is a broad framework 
of bilateral agreements between the 
EU and other Southern neighboring 
countries through regional 
cooperation initiatives including 
the Eastern Partnership and the 
Union for the Mediterranean. This 
framework aims to strengthen the 
prosperity, the stability and security 
of all members and It is based on 
democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights (damen, 
m. – jongBeRg, K. 2019).
Driven by overwhelming 
internal developments, including, 
not restrictively, the Eurozone crisis, 
the entering into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty and regional developments 
including the Arab uprisings in 
2011. The EU has revised the ENP 
twice ;First, throughout the first 
months of 2011 in which the EU 
,resorting to the ENP, as a response 
to the Arab uprisings, demonstrated 
support for the emerging processes 
of political liberalization 
(European Commission and High 
Represntative of the Union For 
Foreing Affairs and Security 
Policy, 2011). The second revision 
of the ENP was in 2015; the 2011 
revised ENP’s ineffectiveness to 
accommodate the promise of the 
Arab uprisings in line with the 
outbreak of new conflicts in the 
southern neighboring countries 
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led to this review (BadaRin, e. – 
schumacheR, t. 2020).
The significance of the 
2015 ENP revision policy is its 
implication in term of the EU foreign 
and security policy in regard of its 
southern neighboring countries, 
and how it became a watershed 
for the EU-neighborhood relations 
that showed the de facto abolition 
of the EU’s long-standing ambition 
to pursue a values-based agenda, 
in favor of democracy promotion 
in the EU southern neighborhood 
(delcouR, l. 2015). Moreover, the 
2015 review of the ENP integrated 
building resilience for the first time 
into the realm of EU foreign policy 
towards the southern neighbors, 
though vaguely and abruptly 
(BadaRin, e. – schumacheR, t. 
2020).
What is more, the latest ENP 
review was concluded in November 
2015, eight months before the 
adoption of the 2016 European 
Union Global Strategy (EUGS). 
In that respect, it was closely 
coordinated with the deliberations 
leading to the EUGS. The Global 
Strategy was presented in June 
2016, after a comprehensive review 
of the EU’s external policies. In the 
EUGS, resilience is emphasized as 
a strategic priority out of the five 
priorities of the EU. The EUGS 
mentions the commitment to state 
and societal resilience, to the east 
and south neighbors, as the main 
objective of EU external action 
(European Union Extrenal Action, 
2016) (colomBo, s. et al. 2017).
Borrowing from the 2012 
Commission Communication on 
the EU׳s approach to resilience, 
the EUGS defines resilience as ‘the 
ability of an individual, a household, 
a community, a country or a region 
to withstand, adapt and quickly 
recover from stresses and shocks’ 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 5) 
(European Union Extrenal Action, 
2016). The implication of resilience, 
in the EUGS on its relation with 
the southern neighbors, represents 
a complete shift in its paradigm 
towards its southern neighbors 
including Jordan. 
Indeed, the European Union’s 
policy towards its Southern 
neighborhood has been through 
different changes. From the 
‘Barcelona Process’ of the 1990s 
to the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) of 2003 (youngs, R. 2015) 
,the EUs׳ policy frameworks 
championed and portrayed the EU 
as a normative power whose impact 
resorted on being an exemplary 
source of peace, wealth, and 
democracy (manneRs, i. 2003).
The EU, reflecting on itself, saw 
the usefulness of its norms and 
values starting from democracy, 
free trade, human rights and rule of 
law, consequently, wanted to export 
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them to its southern neighbors as a 
common interest for both (paRis, 
R. 2010). Thus, as the south was 
seen by the EU as unstable and a 
source of dominant threat, both the 
ESS and ENP aimed to present a 
fit-sized policy to stabilize the EU 
southern neighbors by exporting 
EU’s norms.
This narrative of duty- 
responsibility dominated the EU 
foreign policy discourse even 
during the initial response to the 
Arab uprisings ,as emphasized by 
the first review of the 2011 ENP and 
its so called “strategic option” that 
emphasize its support to the Arab 
risings (The European Parliament, 
2011).
However, driven by internal 
and external development, the 
second review of the 2015 ENP 
implied the significance of 
supporting its partners in the region. 
More than ever, stabilization has 
become the main principal guiding 
the EU’s new strategy for security 
and prosperity, through ‘more 
effective partnerships towards a 
more stable EU Neighborhood’. 
Achieving this goal required 
mainly building resilience of [the] 
partners with whom the EU will 
engage to enhance cooperation 
on security and migration-related 
issues (European Union Extrenal 
Action, 2016).
In addition, the EU׳s 
optimistic view of Europe itself 
with the ESS opening assertion 
that ‘Europe has never been so 
prosperous, so secure, nor so free’ 
(Council of the European Union , 
2003, p. 3) has been transformed in 
the EUGS with the acknowledgment 
of Europe insecurity as the opening 
asserts that; ‘we need a stronger 
Europe. This is what our citizens 
deserve, this is what the wider 
world expects. We live in times of 
existential crisis, within and beyond 
the European Union’ (European 
Union Extrenal Action, 2016, p. 
13). Hence, crisis and instability 
are inventible and framed as normal 
while peace and stability are the 
exception (dennison, s. – Witney 
, n. 2015).
This shift in the EU’s view 
about itself, the neighboring and the 
whole world; the need to embrace 
insecurity narrative, learn to live with 
it pro-actively, and the inevitability 
of shocks and crisis (Reid, j. – 
evans, B. 2014) transformed the 
EU duty-responsibility to threat- 
responsibility narrative. As a 
result, building state and societal 
resilience of the EU, the southern 
and eastern neighboring states 
became the priority of the EU 
foreign and security policy and the 
path to stability and security.
However, this shift does 
not mean that the EU has simply 
abandoned its normative agenda 
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in favor of a crude transactional 
one that makes the EU simply 
overpasses and ignores severe 
violations of rights and laws by 
states beyond the EU’s borders 
(Bicchi, F. – maRtin, m. 2006) 
,rather, the EU pragmatically 
faces the reality that this agenda 
is insufficient to unstable region. 
Thus, building resilience is like 
a middle ground between over-
ambitious liberal peacebuilding and 
under-ambitious stability (anholt, 
R. – WagneR, W. 2016).
In other words, in order to 
achieve these goals and to spread 
the EU’s norm, building resilience 
is essential. The emphasis is not 
only on state resilience, but also 
on societal resilience through 
coping and learning. This requires 
cooperation and working with the 
partners in the south, with emphasis 
on the local and the host state’s 
responsibility of building resilience. 
More importantly, the EUGS 
emphasis on the state and societal 
resilience implies not only the need 
for strengthening the capability of 
states to prevent crisis and reduces 
their impact after occurring ,but 
also signifying the importance of 
the political, social, economic, 
and governance resources of 
societies to prevent shocks, as well 
as to cope with them, not only by 
absorbing them, but rather, by 
actively strengthening themselves 
(colomBo, s. et al. 2017).
The same notion applies to 
Jordan, resilience was not absent 
from the local mind as a response 
for the Syrian crisis, the following 
section will map resilience in Jordan 
planning toward the Syrian crisis as 
it became a security strategy against 
the negative impacts of refugees.
III�3�6� Jordan policies 
in response to the Syrian 
refugee crisis and the shift 
to building resilience
Amid a region of turmoil 
and surrounded by intractable 
conflicts, Jordan has always been a 
safe haven for refugees and forced 
migrants throughout its history. 
Although Jordan is not a signatory 
to the 1951 Refugees Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol, it has always 
shared the burden of refugees in the 
context of international cooperation 
and burden-sharing. Despite of all 
the challenges it faces, as Jordan is 
a middle-low class country with a 
very limited resources, an increasing 
rate of poverty and a high rate of 
unemployment, Jordan has received 
different waves of refugees. After 
receiving Palestinians since the first 
Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Jordan 
has also received refugees from 
Lebanon during the 1975-1991 
civil war, Iraqis refugees in two 
waves; the 1991 Gulf War and after 
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the American invasion in 2003, and 
most recently Syrian refugees with 
the rising of the Syrian conflict 
since 2011 (alougili, m. a. 2019).
As mentioned earlier, the 
impact of the influx of 1.4 million 
refugees had added a large strain 
on the country with increasing 
external and internal pressures and 
threats. On the external level, the 
influx of refugees reflected the need 
to secure its borders fearing from 
terrorist attacks, as the latest 2016 
Al-Rukban attack along the Syrian-
Jordan northern borders where five 
soldiers were killed (BBc neWs 
2016), or fears from terrorists 
disguised among the refugees. As 
for the internal level, strains on 
the infrastructure with an increase 
demand on water, electricity, 
health and educational services, 
and more importantly, security 
services for the refugees and the 
local communities meant a great 
pressure on the already limited-
resources country. Moreover, an 
increasing discontent among the 
local communities created another 
pressure on the government with 
fears of instrumentalizing this 
discontent to destabilize the country 
(alougili, m. a. 2019).
However, despite of all these 
challenges, the government and, 
by the help of the intranational 
community including the EU, has 
managed to contain the crisis to a 
certain extent. The government’s 
adoption of a reactive and shifting 
approach, based on the course of 
the Syrian conflict, enabled it to 
make such a containment (Jordan 
Response Platform for the Syria 
Crisis, 2014).
Tracing this shifting approach 
goes back to the rising of the conflict 
in 2011. At first, Jordan followed up 
an open policy and welcomed those 
refugees. This is not something 
new, as the country historically had 
open policies towards migration 
and refugees in general. Al Za’atari, 
the first official refugee camp for 
the Syrian refugees, was created by 
the UNHCR in July 2012, followed 
by Mrajeeb Al Fhood in April 
2013, by the United Arab States 
of Emirates funding. Al Azraq was 
opened in April 2014, and King 
Abdullah Park as a temporary 
camp in Irbid Governorate was 
opened (achilli, l. 2017). On the 
other side, authorizing building 
camps thought as a way to increase 
international visibility and to 
attract international aids through 
encampment (alshouBaKi, W. 
2020).
Although the government 
was tolerant and welcomed the 
Syrian refugees at the beginning, 
those refugees were denied the 
right to work and were strongly 
incentivized to settle in camps rather 
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than in urban areas Neighboring. 
However, as the conflict escalated 
from 2013, security fears increased 
restrictions over refugees and 
securitizing Syrian refugees began 
by the government since then. 
In March 2013, the government 
established the Syrian Refugee 
Camp Directorate (SRCD), later 
was replaced by the Syrian Refugee 
Affairs Directorate (SRAD) as a 
branch of Jordan’s security services 
aiming at policing refugees’ 
movements inside and outside 
the Syrian camps (Rasheed, a. – 
Beaujouan, j. 2020).
The rapidly increasing 
number of the Syrian refugees in 
the country changed the Syrian 
refugee crisis into a Jordanian crisis 
that proved the inadequacy of its 
legal framework for dealing with 
refugees. Jordan’s legal framework 
is based on its 1998 Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) signed 
with UNHCR, according to this 
memorandum, Jordan accepts 
the definition of “refugee” as 
contained in the 1951 Convention 
and agrees that refugees should 
receive treatment according to 
internationally accepted standards 
(saliBa, i. 2016).
For this reason, the 
government realized the need to 
establish a better legal framework 
and a national policy to deal with 
such a crisis. Its efforts with the UN 
support, led to the formulation of the 
National Resilience Plan (NRP) in 
June 2014, a three-year programme 
of high priority investments by the 
government in order to respond to 
the impact of the Syrian refugees 
in Jordan. According to this plan, 
Jordan intended to invest US$2.41 
billion over three years in local 
institutions and host communities 
in these sectors: health, education, 
water and sanitation, livelihood and 
employment, energy, housing, and 
social protection (United Nations 
and Host Community Support 
Platform, 2014).
In line with the NRP, the 
Jordan Response Platform for the 
Syria Crisis (JRPSC) was created 
in September 2014. It aimed at 
coordinating, guiding, and helping 
in the preparation, implementation 
and monitoring of the (Jordan 
Response Plan) JRP 2015 and 
the JRP 2016. The JRP was first 
launched in December 2014, a one-
year programme. It was planned 
as a co-work between the Ministry 
of Planning and International 
Cooperation (MoPIC) and the UN 
(Jordan Response Platform for the 
Syria Crisis, 2014).
The significance of the 2015 
JRP is that it reflected the drastic 
shift in the approach to the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Before 2013, the 
priority of the Jordanian government 
was the humanitarian relief to those 
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refugees, however, from 2014, 
national and international actors 
worked together to implement an 
integrated and a comprehensive 
response to the crisis. Put differently, 
resilience approach was adopted 
by Jordan and the UN. Based on a 
long-term sustainable development 
for both the refugee population and 
the host communities, it addressed 
issues of social integration, capacity 
building, prevention of extremism, 
with an emphasis on the protection 
of the Syrian refugees (Rasheed, a. 
– Beaujouan, j. 2020).
The JRP estimated almost 
US$3 billion to be pledged in 
11 strategic sectors. Donors’ 
contributions to the plan are 
arranged through one channel, 
the Jordan Resilience Fund (JRF), 
launched by Jordan and the UN. 
As a result of the continuous 
influx of the Syrian refugees, and 
to emphasize on a more long-term 
resilient planning, the JRP 2015 was 
renewed until 2020 in two periods: 
the JRP 2016–2018 and the current 
JRP 2018–2020 (Rasheed, a. – 
Beaujouan, j. 2020). The shift of 
the JRP, to cover two years instead 
of one, indicates a shift from 
emergency intervention to a more 
sustainable, long-term planning to 
endure the crisis.
However, the government’s 
strong commitment to achieve 
development since 2014 failed 
to address the need of both the 
refugees and the host communities 
leading to discontent among the 
host communities and increased 
tension between the two sides. 
Thus, the Jordanian authorities 
added two essential pillars to the 
2016 JRP – refugees and resilience 
– to address both the needs of 
the Syrian refugees and the host 
communities as a consequence of 
the demographic pressure there. 
In other words, building resilience 
for both the refugees and the host 
communities became the priority 
of the Jordanian government, to 
ensure its stability, preserve its 
social cohesion, and consequently 
its security.
 As a result, the country 
managed to address those needs 
and preserve its social cohesion, 
though in a limited way. In the field 
of education, for instance, several 
initiatives that aim to address 
disrupted social cohesion among 
the host communities have made 
limited, but positive, progress. One 
of these initiatives, Generations for 
Peace, that came into existence in 
2015 and still going, as a result of 
cooperation between UNICEF and 
the ministry of education in Jordan. 
It aims to address violence at 
schools and reduce it by designing 
different after-school activities 
bringing Syrian and Jordanian 
students together (salem, h. – 
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moRRice, l. 2019).
Another way in which Jordan 
has tried to achieve the refugee-
resilience pillars is by requiring 
aid organizations to address both 
refugees and host communities 
to avoid tension between them. 
According to the Jordan Response 
Information System for the 
Syria Crisis, the registration of 
any project and its obtaining the 
government approval require 
targeting at least 30% vulnerable 
host (Jordanian) communities 
under the refugee component, and 
at least 30% refugees under the 
resilience component (Rosanne & 
Giulia, 2019). 
Finally, with the aim of 
bringing a more regionally coherent 
process that integrate refugee and 
resilience programming, Jordan 
signed the Regional Refugee and 
Resilience Plan (3RP), a jointly-
led plan by the United Nation 
High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the United Nation 
Development Programme (UNDP) 
launched in 2015. It constitutes 
one regional plan, with five 
separate chapters covering Turkey, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq; 
each chapter comprises the national 
response plan for the Syrian crisis, 
in case of Jordan, it comprises the 
Jordan Response Plan. This plan 
aims to achieve strategic regional 
cooperation that could ensure 
protection, humanitarian assistance 
and resilience for refugees and 
their vulnerable host communities 
(United Nations Development 
Program, 2019). 
The final point to be 
mentioned here is that the JRP 
is parallel to another ten years 
national policy Known as Vision 
2025, launched in 2015. Its aims to 
achieve sustainable and inclusive 
growth, with the reflection on 
the government’s strong will to 
turn the Syrian refugee crisis into 
a development opportunity. An 
essential element of this vision 
is the establishment of almost 18 
special economic zones to facilitate 
exporting goods to markets in 
the EU under relaxed rules of 
origin, thus creating employment 
opportunities for Syrians and 
Jordanians as agreed on the 2016 
Jordan-EU compact, as will be 
illustrated in the following section 
(Briefing European Parliamentary 
Research Service, 2017).
After illustrating how 
building resilience became a 
strategic priority for both the EU 
and Jordan and how it contributed 
to preserve Jordan’s stability, the 
following section highlights the 
EU empirical approach and its role 
in building resilience in Jordan as 
an international donor to highlight 
some of its most important 
instruments and its role in Jordan.
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III�3�7� The EU building 
resilience in Jordan
The EU has always looked to 
consolidate its role in Jordan. This 
was emphasized with the review 
of 2015 ENP and the partnership 
priorities. In the context of building 
resilience, the EU aimed, and still 
does, to integrate its instruments 
in the national plans, and work 
with a multitude of state and 
non-state actors in implementing 
projects addressing directly issues 
of livelihoods, economic growth, 
protection and conflict resolution 
(FaKhouRy, t. 2019).
After the London 2016 
conference, Supporting Syria and 
the Region that brought together 
the world leaders, NGOS, and 
private sectors to address the 
Syria crisis, the international 
communities emphasized the need 
,not only to raise funding to tackle 
this issue, but more importantly, 
to set ambition plans to integrate 
humanitarian and sustainable 
development for both the refugees 
and the host communities. Since 
then, the EU approach toward 
building resilience became its 
priority (UNHCR, 2018).
In addition, the EU has 
co-hosted the 2017, 2018, and 
2019 Brussels Conferences for 
Supporting the Future of Syria 
and the Region. From the first 
conference, the EU’s strong 
commitment to building resilience 
was emphasized. First, it has 
designed a financial tracking system 
to confirm that it has delivered on 
its pledges committed through the 
2016 EU-Jordan compact. Second, 
in order to ensure the development 
of host communities, it has funded 
projects that have linked refugee 
aid to the establishment of new 
local institutions, for instance, the 
implementation of an Election 
Observation mission in Jordan 
(Briefing European Parliamentary 
Research Service, 2017).
As for the financial assistance, 
since the beginning of the Syrian 
crisis, the European Union is a 
leading donor for supporting Jordan 
to deal with the impact of the 
Syrian crisis .It has pledged since 
then almost €2.1 billion through 
bilateral assistance (€812 million), 
humanitarian aid (€360 million) and 
resilience assistance (€959 million). 
These were directed through 
different instruments to address 
the refugees-resilience pillars. The 
humanitarian aid provides services 
such as healthcare, food and basic 
needs assistance, support during the 
winter months, shelter, water and 
sanitation for both the refugees, at 
the camps and other urban areas, 
and also includes vulnerable 
Jordanian families (Figure 10).
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Figure 10: EU Financial Support to Jordan in Response for the Crisis since 2011 in 
millions €
Source: Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2019i
Other instruments like the 
Regional Trust Fund in Response 
to the Syrian Crisis the ‘MADAD 
Fund’ was established in 2014. 
It mainly tackles longer term 
resilience and recovery needs 
(economic, educational, social and 
psycho-social) of Syrian refugees 
in neighboring countries such as 
Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. 
Its support also extends to the host 
communities.
Through this fund, the EU 
has committed €300 million as 
resilience support for Jordan in line 
with The Jordan Response Plan 
(Press and inforamtion team of the 
Delegation to Jordan, 2019). The 
aim of this fund by focusing on 
education, livelihood, water and 
sanitation, and health is helping in 
achieving humanitarian security 
for the refugees and the vulnerable 
Jordanian families so that they can 
live in dignity as much as possible.
In the field of education, for 
instance, this fund has contributed 
with over €380 million till 2018 
making the EU the largest donor 
to deal with the Syria crisis in that 
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respect. The fund aims to support the 
education sector as a whole, through 
its cooperation with the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Labor 
to improve training and skills to 
facilitate access to the labor market 
(European Commission, 2019). 
Other instruments like the 
Macro- Financial Assistance (MFA) 
aims to support Jordan’s economic 
recovery and its economic reforms. 
The EU signed the first MFA in 
March 2014 in a programme of €180 
million, the MFA II was renewed 
in September 2017 to pledge 
additional €200 million and finally 
the Commission proposed MFA III 
programme worth €500 million in 
September 2019. The programme is 
provided in a form of low-interest, 
long term loans that aim to support 
the country’s economic growth 
and create more jobs (European 
Commission, 2019).
Above all, the 2016 EU-
Jordan compact represents a great 
shift in the EU-Jordan thinking 
about building resilience and 
how they seize to instrumentalize 
the refugees as a development 
opportunity and economic asset for 
Jordan. This compact was signed in 
February 2016, it aims at integrating 
humanitarian and development 
funding through multi-year grants 
and concessional loans; $700 
million to be pledged through annual 
grant loans for three years, and 
concessional loans of $1.9 billion. 
In turn, Jordan is required to meet 
certain targets. One of these targets 
is linked to formal labor market 
access. Jordan has to issue 200,000 
work permits for Syrian refugees 
in specified sectors in return for 
the EU commitment to relaxing 
trade regulations. In addition, 
Jordan must employ certain 
quotas for the Syrian refugees 
in different businesses, improve 
the investment environment, and 
legitimize Syrian businesses in 
the country. The objective of this 
is to improve exports from 18 
designated economic zones and 
areas, stimulate economic growth 
and Jobs creation in Jordan. Finally, 
Jordan commits to provide school 
places to all Syrian children, and 
some work training opportunities 
(BaRBelet, v. et al. 2018).
The significance of this 
framework lies in different 
issues. first, it brings together the 
humanitarian and development 
sectors to create a more effective 
response to the refugee crisis. It 
shifts the nature of the response to 
the crisis from the humanitarian 
into the development pillar by 
extending the access of refugees 
into the labor market (Rosanne, 
a. – giulia, s. 2019), this in turn, 
contributes to their humanitarian 
security and the development of the 
host communities.
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Second, linking trade to 
refugees, by simplifying rules of 
origin, aims to enable Jordanian 
companies in the manufacturing 
sector to diversify their products 
and to create incentives for new 
and decent jobs for Jordanians and 
Syrians. As a result, according to 
the EU delegation in Jordan, 15 
companies have applied to gain 
benefits from the agreement, 13 
have been authorized to export to 
the EU, with 6 exporting a value 
of €19.26 million since July 2016 
(Delegation of the European Union 
to Jordan, 2019).
Third, the compact has 
achieved a considerable progress in 
education and labor market access 
for the Syrian refugees. When it 
comes to education, even prior to 
the compact, the government has 
been working to provide the Syrian 
refugees their right of education by 
expanding the use of double shift 
schools, with the first morning 
shift for the Jordanian student, 
and the afternoon shift attended 
mainly by the Syrian refugees’ 
children. However, According to 
the compact, Jordan pledged that 
every Syrian refugee child would 
be in school by 2016– 17, alongside 
a promised investment of $97.6 
million to open an additional 102 
double shift schools (BaRBelet, 
v. et al. 2018). For this reason, in 
2019/2020 school year, a total of 
136,437 Syrians aged 5-17 were 
enrolled in public schools from the 
232,127 constituting 59% of the 
whole (Education Sector Working 
Group in response to the Syria 
crisis, 2019).
It might indicate that 
Jordan does not compile with its 
commitment, yet it does not seem 
the case. According to the 2015 
Education Sector Working Group, 
less than 45% of Syrian children 
(43,791 girls and 41,740 boys) 
were in schools (BaRBelet, v. et 
al. 2018). This means that Jordan 
has made a considerable progress 
despite of all its challenges and it 
is trying to fulfill its commitment. 
Moreover, there are different 
challenges for the children that 
cannot be addressed easily. The 
strict administrative procedures 
make their enrollment very 
difficult, in addition, the increase 
of the Syrian family dependency 
on children to earn money force 
them to drop school to support their 
parents (younes, m. – moRRice, l. 
2019).
As for the labor sector, 
the compact can be seen as a 
considerable progress towards 
the Syrian refugees. Prior to the 
compact, Syrian refugees had to 
apply for the same work permits 
as labor migrants, who pay almost 
€ 900 annually for a work permit. 
The high fees and administration 
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procedures, including the missing 
official documentation for those 
refugees, meant that only around 
3,000 permits were issued to 
Syrians before (BaRBelet, v. et al. 
2018).
By the compact, the 
government committed to facilitate 
the regulations and reduce the high 
fees. Syrians are recently required to 
pay only JD10 (12 €) administration 
fees. Moreover, as of July 2018, the 
government had taken the needed 
steps to open formal employment 
opportunities for Syrians. While 
In 2017 46,000 work permits were 
granted in sectors approved for 
foreign workers, in July 2018, a 
total of 105,000 work permits were 
issued to Syrian refugees and the 
total became 179,445 as of January 
2020 (The United Nations Refugee 
Agenecy, 2020). Syrians have also 
been formally allowed to work 
outside the camps for almost one 
month before coming to renew 
their work permits (Rasheed, a. – 
Beaujouan, j. 2020).
However, there are many 
barriers which remain in front of 
those refugees. There are restrictions 
over the economic sectors since 
they are not authorized to work in 
all sectors and sometimes those 
do not correspond with the typical 
skills profile of Syrian refugees. 
For instance, tertiary-educated 
Syrians cannot get permits in 
their occupation. Moreover, the 
informality of Jordan’s economy, 
the slow growth rates, the poor 
foreign investment climate and the 
high unemployment rates, have 
increased the difficulty in front of 
the creation of formal jobs (huang, 
c. – gough, K. 2019).
By no means, it cannot be said 
that the compact is flawless or it is 
the best solution possible. Yet, there 
are some advantages too. First, 
the government is always taking 
more steps to make it workable, 
as the 2018 review indicates, more 
work permits were issued (huang, 
c. – gough, K. 2019). More 
importantly, this compact is the 
first inclusive response to tackle 
the refugees crisis in Jordan, it’s a 
more sustainable and a longer-term 
solution (BaRBelet, v. et al. 2018).
The claim is never to argue 
that nothing is expected from 
Jordan now, on the contrary, this 
compact, its positive and limited 
progress show the government’s 
commitment to the refugee-
resilience pillars, yet , more is 
expected on that turn to help those 
refugees and to address their basic 
needs to be less dependent on the 
humanitarian aids.
The final section of this paper 
will address the significance of 
building resilience to address the 
Syrian refugee crisis for both of the 
EU and Jordan.
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III�3�8� The Significance 
of building resilience to 
address the Syrian crisis for 
the EU and Jordan
The significance of building 
resilience for both the EU and 
Jordan stems from different reasons. 
When it comes to Jordan, the 
already heavy -burdened country 
with its own problems, finds itself 
dealing with an enormous pressure 
to respond to the refugee’s basic 
needs. This tremendous sudden 
increase in the population means 
more demand and competition for 
access to public services, schooling, 
health services, infrastructure and 
jobs. The unforeseeable resolution 
for the Syrian crisis accompanied 
with fears of those to return 
home. According to UNHCR 
Jordan spokesperson Lily Carlisle, 
only 20,000 Syrian refugees 
have returned to Syria after the 
borders reopening in October2018 
(tuRnBull, e. 2019). meaning that 
a better solution is needed. 
In addition, the escalation 
of tension between the host 
communities and refugees, the 
dissatisfaction among the Jordanian 
Public, and fears of refugees to be 
politicized or instrumentalized to 
destabilize the country as in the 
light of the 2018 mass protests 
when refugees were linked to the 
government decision for cutting 
bread subsidies (alougili, m. a. 
2019) makes building resilience a 
better strategy to tackle the issue. 
Through the compact, for instance, 
it aims to decrease a greater 
competition between the Jordanian 
and Syrian through a certain 
quota for the refugees in certain 
sectors and special economic 
zones. This contributes to preserve 
social cohesion and avoidance of 
politicizing the refugees.
Moreover, a less restricted 
administrative procedures for 
those refugees in camps allows 
them to rely on themselves , run 
their own shops, get benefit from 
the educational programs run by 
different organizations in the camp, 
they can even be seen as an example 
of humanitarian innovation as in the 
case of Zaatari camp, for instance, 
where it is partially powered 
using renewable solar energy 
(pasha, s. 2019). For this reason, 
building resilience for Jordan is a 
pragmatic policy that contributes 
with a limited but a positive impact 
for those refugees and their host 
communities.
As for the EU, supporting 
Jordan is also important and this 
stems from different logic and 
reasoning. First of all, the EU’s 
approach to Syrian refugees in 
Jordan-as in the Arab Region- is 
webbed within a broader crisis 
governance. By 2015, the arrival 
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of more than one million refugees 
to the European Union (EU), with 
the highest share of those to the 
Syrian refugees, led to an intra-
EU governance crisis on matters 
of refugee resettlement and asylum 
policymaking. It also triggered a 
big wave of securitization in which 
the EU tightened border controls 
(FaKhouRy, t. 2019).
The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ 
narrative was in full swing and 
refugees were framed as a threat 
and a source of vulnerability 
(castañeda, h. – holmes, s. m. 
2016). The European Agenda of 
Migration 2015 was adopted back 
then. It emphasizes the importance 
of formulating more efficient 
border control policies, and It also 
highlights the significance of greater 
cooperation with third countries, and 
supporting the countries bearing the 
burden of displaced refugees. This 
makes building resilience an ideal 
solution. In the Jordanian case, it 
usually concentrates on addressing 
the pressure on the limited capacity 
and resources to address the needs 
of this huge number of refugees 
(BadaRin, e. – schumacheR, t. 
2020). In other words, EU building 
resilience in Jordan through 
the 2016 compact, its funding, 
integrating the refugees into the 
labor market, and easing rules of 
regulation to encourage trade, all 
come within the EU strategy to 
secure its southern borders and 
increase those refugees’ capacities 
to prevent them from leaving into 
Europe. 
As Geddes and Scholten 
assert that the EU attempts to 
keep people in their place through 
working on non-migration policies, 
through empowering the adaptive 
capacity of those refugees to remain 
where they are instead of leaving 
(geddes, a. – scholten, p. 2016). 
Also, Bourbeau suggests that such 
stability at home needs a strong 
focus on requirements for change in 
third countries through resilience, 
which goes parallel to the European 
states’ sovereignty and security of 
their national and common borders 
(BouRBeau, p. 2013). To spell it out 
differently, the EU new approach 
represents a refugee containment 
strategy that aims not only to 
provide humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and host populations but 
also falls within a broader politics 
of stabilization, development and 
improvement of local asylum 
regimes that aspires to contain 
the refugee movement as close as 
possible to Syria (FaKhouRy, t. 
2019).
Moreover, adopting resilience 
comes along a more pragmatic 
and realistic approach of the EU 
towards Jordan, within its southern 
borders.EU realizes the importance 
role of Jordan as a peaceful partner, 
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and a corner stone for the stability 
in the region. Hence, building its 
resilience, through supporting 
its economy, is crucial to avoid a 
new crisis that might lead to a new 
wave of refugees (Rosanne, a. – 
giulia, s. 2019). At the same time, 
this new strategy helps to improve 
the EU’s image, after it has been 
criticized for its strict policy in 
dealing with the refugees amid the 
2015 immigrant crisis, as the UN 
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon 
expressed in front of Australian 
Parliament in April, 2016 that 
EU policies negatively affect the 
obligation of member states under 
international humanitarian law and 
European law (Kingsley. p. 2016). 
In that respect, building resilience 
shows a pragmatic approach toward 
the crisis without endangering its 
national security and receiving 
more refugees.
III�3�9� Conclusion
In a time of a prolonged 
crisis, with no foreseeable solution 
in the near future, it might be 
unsurprising that the EU, as a donor, 
and Jordan, as one of the largest 
hosting countries of those refugees, 
turn to resilience: a concept that 
embedded effiectiveness, efficiency, 
and sustainable reduction of needs. 
In this article, I have argued that 
securitizing the Syrian refugee 
crisis by the EU and Jordan make 
resilience a pragmatic approach 
and a strategic security to preserve 
their national security. The Key 
characteristics of the EU resilience 
thinking including ׃ empowering the 
humanitarian-development nexus, 
responsibilizing local governments 
of crisis-affiected countries, and 
shaping refugees as an economic 
development opportunity lead and 
legitimize EU resilience-building 
effiorts in Jordan. My examples 
about the EU building resilience in 
Jordan illustrate the significance of 
its contribution in that respect and 
its implication for both Jordan and 
the EU. 
Drawing on my analysis, 
one conclusion of this paper is 
that for Jordan building resilience 
in response to the Syrian refugee 
crisis is illustrated as a strategy to 
promote national and humanitarian 
security with a positive but limited 
impact. Building on Buzan, 
Waever and Wilde ,categorizing 
sectors of security, (BuZan, B. et 
al. 1997), building resilience in 
Jordan preserves essential sectors 
of national security including 
political, economic, social and 
environmental sectors.
By integrating the refugee-
resilience pillars, the kingdom 
managed to prevent politicizing 
and instrumentalizing refugees 
as a mean for destabilization, 
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decreased the public dissatisfaction 
with the influx of the refugees 
and preserved its social cohesion 
through integrating the refugees 
into the labor market with a specific 
quota and in specific sectors to 
reduce competition with Jordanians 
.On the economic level, increasing 
the access of resources, organizing 
it, and decreasing the demand on 
the basic needs for the refugees 
and most vulnerable Jordanian 
families proves its positive impact. 
The EU contribution in this respect 
is crucial, in particular in sectors 
like education, water, solid waste 
management, where the EU has 
the largest share in addressing the 
needs in these sectors which in turn, 
contributes to Jordan’s national 
stability and security.
As for the humanitarian 
security for those refugees, many 
instruments prove its positive but 
limited impact. Of these instruments 
is the EU Jordan compact that 
pledges the government to issue 200 
000 work permits for the refugees. 
Although only 172000 had been 
issued by 2019, and not all of those 
Syrians are working, but this cannot 
be seen other than a means to help 
those refugees to be more self-
reliant since prior to this compact, 
strict -local policies prevent those 
refugees from access to the labor 
market. Now some of those refugees 
are running their own shops in their 
camps as in Zaatari. In addition, 
this compact and other EU financial 
instruments like the EU regional 
trust fund contribute to address 
the basic needs for those refugees 
in line with the Regional Refugees 
and Response Plan. The positive 
impact of these instruments in the 
educational sector proves to be of 
great influence. The enrollment 
of 136 000 Syrian Children in the 
2019-2020 year in comparison with 
43000 in 2015 is a clear evidence 
here. The access for other services 
like health or water are also in 
progress according to the UNHCR.
As for the EU, building 
resilience may prove to be a 
strategy to contain refugees in the 
region and prevent migration to 
Europe and to protect its national 
security, as migration policies 
experts like Andrew Geddes asserts. 
The decreasing number of the 
Syrian asylum seekers to Europe 
in comparison with the 1000000 
in 2016 can be seen as an indicator 
for its efficiency .However, one of 
the implication of this paper is that 
more empirical research is needed 
in order to understand the exact 
impact and efficiency of building 
resilience for Jordan and the EU. 
In addition, it concludes that the 
current instruments may seem 
effective yet the policy makers 
need to make it more workable and 
address the need of all the refugees 
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not only the registered one.
And finally, building 
resilience may seem workable to 
decrease the negative impacts of the 
Syrian crisis, but this cannot deny 
the fact that we need more efforts 
to achieve a peaceful resolution for 
the on -going war in Syria because 
this is the real help and this is what 
the Syrians are desperate to see to 
end their suffering.
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III.4. the origins of tunisia’s Women’s 
rights Movement: a Social Movement 
theory approach
Xénia sipos47
Abstract
International relations remain state-centric; non-state actors however, also 
contribute to shaping political, economic and social processes of the international order. 
From among these, women’s rights movements in Tunisia are examined in this paper. 
The growing significance of women in all fields of the Tunisian society can be observed 
since the country’s independence from France (1956). The article aims to define the 
elements that played an important role in shaping women’s rights on the macro level, 
the factors that contributed to women’s empowerment on the micro one, and the ways of 
interaction between the two levels. The complexity of the topic requires the application 
of a multidisciplinary approach where the interactions of different actors are taken 
into account on both macro and micro levels. Besides clarifying the basic concepts, 
both qualitative and quantitative analyses are applied to identify the aforementioned 
conditions. The Tunisian case study is analysed on the basis of the top-down ‒ bottom-up 
approach through the application of the social movement theory of Anthony Oberschall, 
according to whom several conditions (discontentment, risks, and political opportunities) 
contribute to the mobilization of social movements. While the process of Tunisian feminism 
is described as a state-controlled process, the research proves that the roots of Tunisian 
feminism have long been present in the Tunisian society.
Keywords: gender equality, Arab Spring, social movement theory, Tunisian 
feminism
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III�4�1� Introduction
The Arab Spring brought 
about an active participation of 
women’s rights activists and 
organizations with the aim of 
achieving total equality in all 
fields, including the same share in 
inheritance, eradicating violence 
committed against women and 
abrogating the law of 1973 
that, in accordance with Islamic 
principles, banned Muslim women 
from marrying non-Muslim men 
(moghadam, v. m. 2018). Moreover, 
as a consequence of the outstanding 
role Tunisian women played in the 
Arab Spring, a widespread debate 
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also started in the post-Arab Spring 
period. The debate had its effect 
mainly on the drafting of Tunisia’s 
new constitution between 2011 
and January 2014, the first draft 
of which intended to bring in the 
‘complementary clause’ of article 
28: “women are complementary 
to men” (complementarity clause) 
(noRBaKK, m. 2016).
In order to better understand 
the current processes and the 
discourse on gender equality as an 
outcome of the events of 2011 it is 
indispensable to retrace the situation 
of Tunisian women from the years 
before the coming to power of 
the first president of independent 
Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba 
(1958‒1987) (BoulaRes, h. 2011), 
until the beginning of the 1960’s. 
The time frame is also restricted 
until the first half of the 1960’s 
as by this period the measures 
of the modernization process of 
Bourguiba had already had their 
effect on Tunisian women. Several 
aspects prove that Tunisia stands 
out from other Muslim countries 
in terms of women’s rights. Above 
all, in 1956 Le Code du Statut 
Personnel (Personal Status Code, 
henceforward referred to as CSP) 
abolished polygamy, provided 
women the right to divorce and to 
child custody, and set a minimum age 
for marriage48. In 1958 Bourguiba 
introduced compulsory education 
for young women and people 
living in rural areas (chaBchouB, 
a. 2014). Moreover, with the 
introduction of family planning in 
the 1960’s and the legalization of 
abortion in 1973 (jomieR, a. 2011) 
Tunisia anticipated France, where 
it was only legalized in 1975.49 
Concerning the political arena, 
the aforementioned achievements 
brought about an outstanding 
number of female representatives 
sitting in the Tunisian parliament. 
According to the ranking of the 
48  Code du Statut Personnel [1956], 
http://observatoire-enfance.tn/
documents/code%20du%20statut%20
personnel_fr.pdf (Retrieved 22 
February, 2020)
49  According to Islam, abortion is only 
allowed if pregnancy poses a serious 
threat to the life of the woman and 
a choice must be made between the 
life of the mother and her baby. The 
legalization of abortion in Tunisia 
was also exceptional if we compare 
Tunisia with other Muslim countries in 
the region. Except for married women 
who can prove that pregnancy carries 
a physical threat to their health, in 
Morocco abortion is strictly prohibited 
by the law and is punished by 
imprisonment or fines (el amRaoui, a. 
‒ Naami, m. 2018).
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Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 
based on information provided by 
national parliaments since 1997, a 
significant increase can be observed 
regarding the proportion of seats 
held by women in the Tunisian 
parliament. Compared with data 
from 1997 when women made 
up only 6.7% of all seats of the 
parliament and Tunisia was only the 
second Arab country in the ranking 
after the Syrian Arab Republic 
(9.6%), in 2004 a significant 
increase took place (the proportion 
of seats held by women increased 
to 22.8% from the ratio of 11.5% of 
the previous years). With regard to 
the up-to-date ranking of IPU (as of 
1 October, 2019), with 78 female 
representatives out of the 217 
places in the National Constituent 
Assembly (NCA), which means 
a 35.9% representation, Tunisia 
occupies the 31st place worldwide 
and ranks the highest among other 
Arab countries50. The proportion of 
seats held by Tunisian women can 
also be regarded as an outstanding 
achievement if we compare it with 
the international standard, i.e. the 
requirements of the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), which 
50  See Women in national parliaments. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
https://data.ipu.org/women-
ranking?month=10&year=2019 
(Retrieved 22 February, 2020)
document determined that 30% 
participation is necessary for the 
interests of women being taken into 
account51.
The paper aims to approach 
the question of Tunisian feminism 
through the application of the 
social movement theory which will 
enable the writer to identify the 
interactions of different actors on 
the level of the political leadership 
and that of the sub-state actors. By 
taking into account the historical, 
political, economic, social and 
even cultural characteristics of 
the North African country at the 
dawn of its independence and by 
applying the social movement 
theory of Anthony Oberschall 
(oBeRschall, a. 2001), the paper 
seeks to analyse the circumstances 
which resulted in encouraging 
women to stand up for their rights 
and which pushed the government 
to dedicate a significant role to 
the empowerment of women in its 
modernization efforts. Concerning 
the contribution of non-state actors 
51  See under The Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and its Optional Protocol 
Handbook for Parliamentarians 
[2003]. Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
https://www.ipu.org/resources/
publications/handbooks/2016-07/
handbook-parliamentarians-
convention-elimination-all-forms-
discrimination-against-women-and-
its-optional (Retrieved 3 April, 2020)
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to shaping political, economic and 
social processes in a still state-
centric international order, it can 
be said that the establishment of 
a strong and dominant position 
of Tunisian women in the society 
resulted in the proliferation of civil 
societies. Among them, the creation 
of l’Union Nationale de la femme 
tunisienne (National Union of 
Tunisian Women) in 1956 can be 
highlighted52 as this organization 
still plays an important role and 
determines the shaping of the 
political and social processes. 
Finally, the paper aims to verify that 
while the empowerment of Tunisian 
women is described as being state-
controlled (state feminism), the 
roots of Tunisian feminism have 
long been present in the Tunisian 
society.
III�4�2� Social movement 
theory: an answer to social 
problems?
In order to be able to analyse 
whether Tunisia disposed of all 
the necessary circumstances that 
enabled it to form a social movement 
with the aim of improving the 
52  See under the official website of 
L’Union Nationale de la femme 
tunisienne (National Union of Tunisian 
Women), http://www.unft.org.tn/
fr/index.php?rub=248&srub=296 
(Retrieved 23 February, 2020)
situation of women at the dawn 
of the country’s independence, 
it is indispensable to give a brief 
overview of the concept of social 
movements and their classification. 
It must be underlined 
that social movements cannot 
be explained under one single 
concept. However, as all definitions 
agree on the main aims of these 
movements, the paper states in 
the conceptual explanation that 
social movements are created to 
find answers to certain problems, 
and usually mobilize large masses 
of people for the sake of achieving 
common benefits or resisting 
against social issues they believe 
would be harmful for the whole 
society. Concerning the feminist 
movement, DeFronzo and Gill 
identified some overlaps between 
different social movements. On the 
one hand, representatives of the 
feminist movement stand up for 
the achievement of equal rights for 
both genders. In order to realize this 
goal they de-construct and rebuild 
the existing stereotypes about the 
position of the disabled group, i.e. 
in this case women. Therefore, 
feminist movements are categorized 
as identity movements. On the other 
hand, feminist movements also 
demonstrate similarities with reform 
movements as representatives of 
both social movements attempt 
to overthrow existing norms with 
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the aim of triggering change they 
believe would beneficial for the 
whole society (DefroNzo, J. ‒ 
gill, j. 2020). Anthony Oberschall 
distinguished the macro and micro 
levels from each other and identified 
those elements that contribute to 
the formation or growth of social 
movements. According to him, 
both social, cultural, organizational 
and political changes can end 
up in the creation of new social 
movements. Concerning the 
macro level, Oberschall identified 
four conditions that can trigger 
the coming into being of new 
movements: dissatisfaction, 
changes in aspirations/values and 
belief in the ability of triggering 
change, increased capacity to 
realize the aim of the movement 
and finally, changes in opportunities 
(e.g. more favourable political 
environment) (oBeRschall, a. 
1997). With regard to the micro 
level, the participation in collective 
actions depends on the deliberation 
of the possible advantages of such 
an act and the probability of the 
fact that the movement will achieve 
its main goals (oBeRschall, a. 
2001). Jenkins further reinforced 
the aforementioned findings 
of Oberschall and stated that 
grievances are constant elements of 
triggering the formation of social 
movements, consequently social 
conflicts of interests, long-term 
changes in the group’s resources 
and/or opportunities as well as 
changes in power relations are seen 
as necessary circumstances that 
result in the rise of collective actions 
(jenKins, j. c. 1983). The paper 
does not work with the traditional 
hierarchical division of macro 
and micro levels as most of the 
circumstances present on the macro 
level can be better understood on 
the level of the sub-state actors 
and thus the two levels merge into 
each other. Instead, it analyses 
the aforementioned necessary 
conditions in general, regardless 
of the given level where these 
conditions seem to appear. It must 
be emphasized that while the social 
movement theory of Oberschall 
provides a great basis for analysing 
the necessary conditions which shed 
light on the origins of the Tunisian 
women’s rights movement, it must 
not be forgotten that the theory is 
a Western understanding of the 
formation of social movements and 
thus has its own limits. In order to 
get a more comprehensive view of 
the activities of Tunisian women, in 
the long run the cultural and special 
historic context of the North African 
country cannot be neglected from 
the research.
As the Tunisian case study 
of the evolution of women’s rights 
movement analyses the evolution 
of women’s rights movements in 
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Tunisia, the question of how gender 
operates in social movements and 
to what extent collective actions 
contribute to the social construction 
of gender must be mentioned, 
too. Since gender hierarchy is 
constructed through organizational 
practices both on the level of 
the political leadership and that 
of the society, it is important to 
approach the evolution of Tunisian 
feminism in the context of early 
representatives of the movement 
and see whether women were the 
first advocates of fostering broader 
rights and opportunities for women.
III�4�3� Circumstances 
leading to the formation 
of social movements ‒ the 
Tunisian example
Dissatisfaction and belief in 
the ability of carrying out 
changes
While Oberschall separately 
mentioned the necessary conditions 
leading to the formation of new 
social movements, the paper 
merges dissatisfaction with belief in 
the ability of carrying out changes 
as well as increased capacity to 
realize the aims with changes in 
opportunities. The logic behind this 
division and the discussion of these 
circumstances under two separate 
subchapters is explained by two 
significant facts that arise out of 
each other. The colonial period went 
hand-in-hand with the adoption 
of certain elements of the Western 
culture, among them an increased 
belief in the ability of carrying out 
changes to improve the conditions 
of women. As a consequence 
of the Western impact and the 
actions taken by the forerunner of 
Tunisian feminists, such as Tahar 
Haddad (1899‒1935), a feeling 
of dissatisfaction infiltrated the 
early representatives of Tunisian 
women’s rights activists.
As it has already been 
highlighted above, contrary to 
Western feminist movements, up 
until gaining independence from 
France in March 1956, Tunisian 
feminism must be understood in 
the context of the colonial past of 
the North African country and its 
struggle for independence. In fact, 
this struggle was also a personal 
rivalry between Bourguiba and 
Salah Ben Youssef on the basis 
of the secular versus religious 
conservative values which further 
had a great impact on the Tunisian 
feminist discourse (Willis, m. j. 
2014). Arfaoui distinguished three 
waves of the Tunisian feminist 
movement and indicated the period 
between the 1920’s and 1956 as 
the birth of Tunisian feminism 
(aRFaoui, K. 2007). In order 
to refer to the colonial context 
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of the North African country, 
it must be mentioned that the 
first wave of Tunisian feminism 
was also interlocked with the 
greater participation of women 
in the nationalist movement for 
independence. Although the social 
activity of women at that time 
highly depended on the support of 
their male relatives, the first wave 
was significant from the point of 
raising women’s awareness for the 
socioeconomic problems that posed 
a serious obstacle to achieving 
equal conditions for women. The 
high rate of illiteracy (nine tenths of 
women were illiterate in the 1920’s) 
is a good example that carrying out 
radical changes was inevitable. 
Starting from the 1920’s, upper-
class women stepped up to demand 
broader opportunities for women 
to receive compulsory education 
and access to teaching jobs as a 
preliminary condition to ensuring 
greater chances for women in 
the labour market, participation 
in political life and in all spheres 
of the society. However, it is also 
indispensable to mention that the 
initial activities of women’s rights 
advocates not only took place with 
the approval of male relatives and 
their encouragement, but were also 
influenced by such great men like 
the reformist Tahar Haddad who 
openly raised his voice against 
the injustices women used to face 
in the colonial period (aRFaoui, 
K. 2007). Similarly to Tunisia, 
the same process took place in 
Morocco where great supporters of 
women’s rights such as the Islamic 
scholar, Allal al-Fassi (1910‒1974) 
denounced the inferior position 
of women and called for general 
reforms that aimed at revising the 
traditional practices (polygamy, the 
obligation of wearing a veil (hijab), 
early marriage, etc.) deeply rooted 
in the religion (gRay, d. h. 2013). 
Based on these facts, it can be said 
that while the traditional social 
patterns established a patriarchal 
society in Tunisia which could 
be seen through all government 
organizations and every aspect of 
life, men as forerunners of women 
empowerment played an important 
role in the reconstruction of gender 
roles in a rather conservative 
society. The general dissatisfaction 
as a result of unequal opportunities 
in education, the labour market 
and political participation raised 
awareness among women and 
resulted in upper-class women 
taking the role for the benefit 
of other female members of the 
society in the hope of achieving 
their emancipation following 
their independence. However, 
the initiatives coming from 
great reformer men proves that 
Tunisian feminism was in fact a 
“masculinized” feminism.
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Increased capacity, changes 
in opportunities
In the forthcoming, the 
characteristics of the Tunisian 
society in light of the state-building 
process as well as the socioeconomic 
challenges following the country’s 
independence will be demonstrated. 
First of all, it must be 
emphasized that in Tunisia, the 
centralization of power brought 
about a strong political leadership 
with President Bourguiba 
taking this role in 1957. Due to 
the poor indicators of human 
development, Bourguiba realized 
that a modernization process was 
inevitable to set the country on the 
path of development. Therefore, the 
ideology of liberation was replaced 
by the idea of state-building which 
compared with the initial aim of 
women’s rights activists, resulted in 
their reduced role (sadiqi, F. 2008).
The process of state-building 
under President Bourguiba and the 
measures that he took to set the 
country on the path of modernization 
cannot be understood without 
having a general knowledge about 
the socioeconomic challenges the 
country had to face following the 
obtainment of its independence 
in 1956. Moreover, these 
socioeconomic challenges also 
raised awareness among women to 
take actions for achieving equality 
in opportunities. Between 1911 and 
1956 the North African country saw 
a duplication of its own population 
under the age of 35. This meant that 
by 1956 the total population reached 
3 782 000 with an approximate 
annual growth of 75 000 people 
(de lemps, a. h. 1958) and while 
between 1911 and 1921 the annual 
growth only reached 8%, this rate 
increased to 25% between 1936 
and 1946 (tlatli, s. e. 1957). As 
a result of this rapid population 
growth, a change took place in the 
structure of the population: 41.8% 
of Tunisians were under the age of 
14 and 9% between the age of 14 
and 19. This also meant that in total 
half of the Tunisian population was 
under the age of 20 in contrast to 
the age group above 60 where this 
rate only reached 6.7% (de lemps, 
a. h. 1958). The rapid population 
growth was closely connected with 
challenges in schooling: the data 
indicates that in 1956 the literacy 
rate only reached 15% and only 
one child in thirty received a high-
school education. Owing to the 
educational reforms Bourguiba 
introduced in 1958, women and 
people living in rural areas could 
also benefit from schooling. 
Thus during the first decade of 
independence the number of those 
pupils who attended primary school 
rose from 15% to 90%. Moreover, 
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the number of university students 
also demonstrated a significant 
growth, from 2000 to 10 000 
students being enrolled in academic 
studies (Tessler, m. a. ‒ Keppel, 
m. e. 1976). However, despite the 
aforementioned socioeconomic 
challenges, the economic growth 
showed a steady increase: the 
GDP reached 2.37% between 
1938‒1950, 3.41% between 
1950‒1960 and further rose to 
6.92% between the period of 1970 
and 1980. This continuous growth 
would only be abated between 1980 
and 1990 with a GDP growth rate 
of 3.56% (avaKov, a. v. 2010). As 
a consequence, the rejuvenation 
of the population posed a serious 
challenge to the economy of the 
newly independent country both 
from the point of view of schooling 
and production. Therefore, only two 
solutions were left for the newly 
independent Tunisia: to rely on 
foreign aid or take immediate steps 
to slow down the rapid population 
growth. 
Bourguiba chose the latter 
option and started an economic 
development program which meant 
that everything, including female 
participation in the labour market, 
was subordinated to the political 
direction of Habib Bourguiba 
who saw female participation as 
compatible with the traditional 
roles of women. One crucial point 
in understanding the formation 
of social movements and the role 
women’s rights activists played 
in ameliorating the situation of 
Tunisian women following its 
independence is through the CSP 
in which President Bourguiba 
abolished polygamy, provided 
women the right to divorce and to 
child custody and set a minimum 
age for marriage. Taking into 
account the low literacy rates at the 
time of Tunisia’s independence and 
the burden that the rapid population 
growth posed on the economic 
growth of the country, it can be 
said that immediate measures were 
necessary to ameliorate the situation 
of the people, namely, achieving 
gender equality which could ensure 
a privileged position for women 
in the society. Referring back to 
the social movement approach 
of Oberschall, it is important to 
highlight that with a president who 
started a modernization process with 
the aim of setting the country on 
the Western model of development, 
the political environment was quite 
favourable for carrying out changes. 
The growing dissatisfaction coming 
from the direction of sub-state actors 
was also present. In this regard, it 
must be seen whether carrying out 
these reforms was the result of the 
pressure from those women’s rights 
activists and reformers who were 
mentioned above, or whether the 
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initiatives of President Bourguiba 
were taken to set an example for 
other Arab countries in the region. 
Jomier argued that there was no 
pressure from women’s rights 
organizations on the government 
to introduce the CSP, therefore this 
decision was a natural outcome of 
the measures of the government to 
improve the situation of women 
in Tunisia and to ensure their 
privileged position in the society 
(jomieR, a. 2011). Charrad also 
reinforced the argument of Jomier 
and pointed out that the CSP was 
introduced right after Tunisia gained 
its independence from France, so at 
that time there were no grassroots 
organizations present who could 
push the government to accept the 
CSP (Tchaicha, J. D. ‒ arfaoui, K. 
2017). While the CSP could be seen 
as a progressive measure from the 
government to abolish inequalities 
between men and women and to 
establish the basis of a secular state, 
Arfaoui concluded that in fact, the 
absence of women in participating 
in the promulgation of the CSP 
demonstrated the weakness of 
women’s rights organizations 
in taking important decisions 
(aRFaoui, K. 2007). Based on these 
findings, the CSP can be seen as 
a crucial point that established a 
dominant role for the government 
in taking unilateral decisions and 
thus determined the limited role 
of women’s rights organizations 
in the future. Even though Tunisia 
disposes of all those elements 
that constitute a convenient 
environment (e.g. heterogeneous 
society, educated youth capable of 
triggering change, absence of the 
intervention of the military in state 
affairs) for the proliferation of civil 
societies, women’s movements 
were deeply affected by the political 
leadership of the country. Therefore, 
the changes following the Arab 
Spring must be understood in the 
context of the political direction 
the previous regimes of the country 
decided to choose. Moreover, the 
aforementioned context is the 
reason the post-Arab Spring period 
is seen as a starting point of a wide 
debate on the gender question and 
an increased role of women’s rights 
organizations in social and political 
affairs, namely, the drafting of the 
new constitution between 2011 and 
2014.
III�4�4� Conclusion
The paper aimed to 
demonstrate the growing 
significance of non-state actors in 
the shaping of economic, social 
and mainly political processes of 
a still state-centric international 
order. The author decided to select 
the Tunisian case for analysis 
as women’s rights organizations 
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also played an important role in 
the events during and following 
the Arab Spring. However, it 
was also found to be important to 
demonstrate that understanding 
the events of the post-Arab Spring 
period and the outstanding role of 
women in Tunisia compared with 
other Arab countries necessitates 
the tracing back of the roots of 
the formation of women’s rights 
movements. Based on the social 
movement theory of Anthony 
Oberschall and the application of 
a new approach, the paper tried to 
elaborate the Tunisian model of 
the formation of social movements 
(Figure 11). Since both the macro 
and micro levels of analysis 
showed some overlaps, the new 
approach also meant the merging of 
both levels. By bringing statistical 
data from the colonial period and 
the first years of the presidency 
of Habib Bourguiba the paper 
illustrated those socioeconomic 
challenges which on the one hand 
triggered dissatisfaction from sub-
state actors and urged activists 
to stand up for demanding a 
wider range of rights for Tunisian 
women. On the other hand, the 
challenges urged the government 
to take necessary measures to rein 
in the rapid population growth and 
reduce the high rates of illiteracy 
and unemployment. The growing 
abilities of sub-state actors to carry 
out changes and the favourable 
political circumstances under 
which the government launched 
its modernization process had its 
effects at the turn of the millennium. 
Compared with the beginning of 
the 1950’s the fertility rate shrank 
from 6.9% to 2%, the net rate of 
primary school enrolment reached 
99%, the ratio of literacy between 
men and women became equal and 
Tunisia scored the highest values 
on the Gender Development Index 
in the Maghreb in 2002 (0.734) 
(avaKov, a. v. 2010). All these 
indicators underpin the conclusion 
that a correlation does exist between 
fertility and education. However, 
it must be mentioned too that the 
research encountered challenges 
during the quest for statistical 
data as most of the data are only 
available from the 1960’s, thus 
the research resulted in a limited 
number of statistical data to work 
with. 
The paper aimed to verify 
that even though Tunisian feminism 
was closely controlled by the state, 
its roots had long been present in 
the society. As the research has 
mentioned, Tunisian feminism 
was rather a “masculinized” 
feminism given impetus by 
great reformers such as Tahar 
Haddad which proves that the 
environment could be favourable 
for women’s rights activists to 
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step up for the common benefit of 
Tunisian women. However, the 
socioeconomic challenges pushed 
the political leadership to introduce 
such measures which would serve 
the common good of the whole 
society. This is the context in 
which the CSP came into being 
and this is the discourse in which 
the empowerment of Tunisian 
women must be understood since 
the very beginning. Women’s 
rights activists have been present 
since the struggle of nationalist 
movements for independence, but 
the state-building process in which 
everything was subordinated to the 
national development overwrote the 
conventional way of the evolution 
of feminism. Therefore, in Tunisia 
the empowerment of women 
reflected a bi-directional process 
and the interactions on the level of 
the political leadership and the sub-
state actors resulted in a reverse 
situation with the state being the 
key player in the formation of the 
social movement.
Figure 11: Demonstration of the main elements of the mobilization of social movements 
on the macro and micro level
Source: Edited by Sipos Xénia based on the social movement theory of oBeRschall, a. 
2001
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III.5. onset analysis of the frozen conflict 
taking place in Eastern-ukraine
oleg tanKovsKy53
Abstract
The paper discusses the background of the ongoing frozen conflict in Eastern-
Ukraine. Within the country groups of the Post-Soviet region, especially among those 
countries which became independent from the Soviet Union directly, this is not the 
first case to experience these kinds of conflicts. Prominent examples are Moldova and 
Georgia for frozen conflicts from the mentioned region. These countries are facing major 
geopolitical challenges since declaring their independence. This paper aims to analyze 
the background of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, to understand the real cause behind 
the breakout of violence. The paper forms the hypothesis that the real driving forces and 
motivations were not ancient hatred or the involvement of the Russian Government, but 
rather the clash of local elites and their promises of opportunities for better living. To 
prove this, the paper uses the scholarly work of Civil War Studies focusing on qualitative 
methods. The paper suggests that although the involvement of the Russian troops was 
proven, the conflict itself cannot only be considered as a hybrid-war between two Eastern-
European countries, as it also shows signs of a classic civil war. The paper will discuss 
all the criteria of a classic civil war, and in the conclusion it will form a clear statement 
regarding this conflict.
Keywords: Ukraine, Donbass, frozen conflict, onset analysis, ethnic conflict
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III�5�1� Introduction
The number of new armed 
conflicts have declined in the past 
seventy years and civil wars in 
recent periods are far more common 
than international wars (singeR, 
j. d. – small, m. 1994). Instead 
of interstate wars a new wave 
of conflicts has started in which 
different kinds of militias and armed 
groups have begun to challenge 
the incumbent government’s 
sovereignty (johnson, c. 2008). 
During the bipolar world order the 
main reason behind this was more 
obvious: the two major actors in 
foreign policy were fighting proxy 
wars against each other. But the 
current case in Ukraine is a vastly 
different situation from past events. 
This topic is highly relevant and 
important, as the conflict is still 
ongoing and the root causes from 
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both sides have not yet been 
analyzed. On the other hand, the 
case of Moldova (KauFman, s. j. 
1996) and Georgia (nodia, g. o. 
1995) are showing very similar 
processes. These kinds of frozen 
conflicts prevent them from joining 
any military alliances, which could 
have an impact on the geopolitical 
and economic challenges they may 
face in the mid- to long-term. 
During the last 5 years since 
the outbreak of the Ukrainian 
conflict, many analyses have 
been published about the Russian 
intervention and the combination 
of various methods used in this 
conflict (allison, R. 2014), that is 
to say, the expression of a hybrid 
war has gained traction among 
scholars. On the other hand, in the 
scientific works of civil war studies, 
the topic of Ukraine has not been 
widely discussed, and an onset 
analysis in the case of this conflict 
has been glaringly missing. The aim 
of this work is to provide a deeper 
understanding of the main reasons 
of the outbreak of the conflict, and 
to present a comprehensive view 
of the conflict, as manipulations 
and fake news are presented on 
both sides. The purpose of this 
study is to create an overview from 
articles written not only by western 
scholars, but also by Russian and 
Ukrainian scholars in order to stay 
authentic and present a balanced 
view. The main goal of this study is 
to analyze the onset of the Ukrainian 
armed conflict, its origins, and how 
this very problematic situation 
could have occurred between these 
two ethnic groups. The paper forms 
the hypothesis that the real driving 
forces and motivations were not 
ancient hatred or the involvement 
of the Russian Government, but 
rather the clash of the local elites 
and the promising of an opportunity 
for better living. Without the 
financial backing and influence 
of these elites, would this conflict 
have started anyway or not? In 
parallel, the dynamics of the East-
Ukrainian conflict will be examined 
and analyzed as well, in order to 
gain an informed understanding 
of these very complex events. 
It is an important and highly 
relevant question to understand 
the real driving forces of the 
conflict, as previously the Russians 
and Ukrainians had a friendly 
relationship over past decades. By 
uncovering the main causes behind 
the deterioration in their relations, a 
similar conflict could be averted in 
the future.
In the first part of the 
study the basic context of the 
armed conflict is presented using 
normative and descriptive methods 
as a facilitating means by which 
the different aspects of the two 
sides can be observed. In this part 
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a brief overview of the historical 
background in Ukrainian - Russian 
relations will be presented, how 
relations developed through the 
centuries, especially during the 
period of the Soviet Union, in order 
to better understand the grievances 
and ancient hatreds between the two 
ethnic groups. It will be highlighted 
how the nationalistic policies 
developed over the past 25 years 
since Ukraine became independent. 
The roles that these nationalistic 
policies played in the everyday 
lives of Ukrainian citizens will be 
listed, and also how these policies 
changed after the revolution. A 
short overview will be given on 
how the language laws changed in 
the past thirty years, as this will help 
us in understanding the motives and 
perceptions of the rebel side. 
In the second part of the 
case study the real motives and 
driving forces will be analyzed in 
order to understand the onset of 
the conflict. In this part qualitative 
research methods would be more 
suitable, as this part will focus 
primarily on exploratory aspects, 
provide insights into the problem, 
uncover trends and dive deeper. 
Qualitative methodology deals with 
high flexibility and applicability: a 
textual record exists for almost every 
major international event in modern 
world history. It also delivers 
impressive explanatory insight, 
rigor, and reliability (moRavcsiK 
a. 2014), which will be useful in 
analyzing the onset of the armed 
conflict. In this section the concepts 
of security dilemma, opportunism, 
humanitarian intervention and the 
dichotomy of greed vs grievance 
will be used to analyze the 
conflict. The motivation behind the 
rebellion will be examined on the 
basis of these aspects, and on the 
other hand an explanation will be 
provided as to how this opportunity 
occurred for the revolting groups. 
The preferences and perceptions 
of the eastern Ukrainian ethnic 
Russians will be listed, along with 
the motives and driving forces of 
the Ukrainian government as well.
Lastly, the end of the conflict 
and how it might continue or 
be solved in the near future will 
be presented in parallel with 
a geopolitical outlook on the 
conflicts in the region. At the end 
of the study the findings and results 
of the study will be stated with 
a conclusion regarding the main 
research question.
III�5�2� The main context of 
the armed conflict
Literature review – civil or 
hybrid war?
After Russia’s actions (or 
reactions) in the Ukrainian conflict 
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the expression “hybrid war” has 
been widely used. At the same time, 
it has also become a threatening 
expression in the Baltic States, 
Poland or even Kazakhstan as the 
fear from a similar intervention 
using conventional or irregular 
armed forces, financing anti-
establishment protests or very 
effective Russian language based 
misinformation campaign has been 
rising. Therefore, it is worthwhile 
discussing the question, whether 
the frozen conflict in Eastern-
Ukraine can be considered a 
hybrid war rather than a civil 
war. Hybrid war is a blending of 
conventional and non-traditional 
tactics to achieve political–military 
objectives (hoFFman, F. g. 2007). 
Based on another definition, hybrid 
warfare is a military strategy 
which employs political warfare 
and blends conventional warfare, 
irregular warfare and cyberwarfare 
with other influencing methods, 
such as fake news, diplomacy, 
lawfare and foreign electoral 
intervention (standish, R. 2018). In 
my understanding, the expression 
“war” itself is misused. It is correct 
to state that conventional, irregular, 
political and information tools have 
been used in the described conflict 
in a combined way. However, it 
is also important to note that this 
is not a new method of modern 
warfare, since it turns out that 
already in ancient times most 
wars consisted of these multiple 
aspects. Therefore, warfare can 
be considered as a hybrid method 
of the armed conflict, but the war 
itself does not have any new or 
unconventional aspects. 
The only new thing that 
emerged with this conflict is the 
efficiency of the informational 
warfare from the Russian side. For 
example, during the 2004-05 Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine, or the 2008 
Russia-Georgia War, Russia was 
already using information warfare 
tools, but they were much less 
effective (KoFman, m. – RojansKy, 
m. 2015). According to a recent 
poll, the number of pro-Russia 
voters among the Russian speaking 
population of Ukraine jumped 
significantly due to television-fed 
perceptions that ethnic Russians 
would become second-class citizens 
in Ukraine. On the other hand, 
these manipulations could be much 
stronger among the population of 
Crimea as their majority (85%) 
do not perceive themselves as 
European (o’loughlin, j. – toal, 
g. 2015). In fact, non-linear or non-
traditional warfare, as it is described 
in Russian Military Doctrine 
(2010), is simply the attempt to 
catch up to the level of the United 
States’ methodology of global war 
on terrorism which has already 
been used in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
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elsewhere (geRasimov, v. 2013).
On the other hand, armed 
conflicts are considered as civil 
wars if there are more than 
1,000 deaths, if there is effective 
resistance from the rebel side, 
and the national government’s 
involvement is also required 
(collieR, p. – hoeFFleR, a. 2007). 
According to Sambanis, a civil war 
is any armed conflict that involves 
military action internal to the 
metropole, the active participation 
of the national government and 
effective resistance by both sides 
(samBanis, n. 2004). There is 
another definition by Kalyvas: civil 
war is an armed combat within 
the boundaries of a recognized 
sovereign entity between parties’ 
subject to a common authority at 
the outset of hostilities (Kalyvas, 
s. 2003). According to the most 
commonly used and also measurable 
definition, civil wars are those 
internal conflicts that count more 
than 1,000 battle deaths in a single 
year, and also include cases with 
at least twenty-five battles within 
a year (Blattman, c. – miguel, e. 
2010).
Based on these definitions, 
can the armed conflict in Ukraine 
be considered as a civil war? 
Predominantly, the country has two 
different identities with two major 
groups using a different language, 
and even in the previous centuries 
there were some clashes between 
them. Regarding the aspects of the 
theoretical definition, the fights 
were internal, the resistance was 
effective on both sides, and the 
number of deaths were far more 
than 1,000 in the year of 2014. 
This means that the armed conflict 
that happened in Eastern-Ukraine 
meets all the criteria of a civil war. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact 
that recently Ukrainian officials 
often refer to the conflict as a war 
between Ukraine and Russia, in 
the beginning of the conflict it was 
termed as Anti-terrorist operations 
(sutyagin, i. 2015), which also 
refers more to a civil war than an 
interstate war. It is also important 
to note that the involvement of 
irregular Russian troops, which was 
a supportive intervention on the 
side of the rebels, has been proved 
and confirmed (KoFman, m. et al. 
2017). But this is more a reference 
to the means of the warfare and not 
to the war itself, since without the 
original motive of the rebels there 
would not have been any fights nor 
any need for these involvements. 
In my understanding, the 
usage of the expression ‘hybrid-
war’ due to the external support of 
Russia on the side of the rebels is not 
appropriate, as with this approach 
most of the civil wars in the 20th 
century could be considered hybrid 
wars because an external world 
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power could always be found in 
the background as a supporter. I 
reckon that this is not the right 
interpretation. On the other hand, the 
scholarly works of civil war studies 
provide a better understanding of 
the whole standoff. Nevertheless, to 
be as precise as possible, the case 
of the Ukrainian armed conflict is 
a very unique one. Similarities can 
be found to the cases of Moldova 
and Georgia, but there are major 
differences as well.
Historical overview
The current population of 
Ukraine is divided based on the 
spoken language and we can 
allocate them to exact territories. 
This is highly important as over 
the centuries it changed the local 
population’s dialect and identity 
for the long term, which has led to 
the highly divided country that we 
are facing today. The first event 
of Ukrainian nationalism was the 
Khmelnitsky led Cossack uprising 
(suBtelny, o. 1988). However, the 
uprising was against the Polish – 
Lithuanian Empire, and as a result 
of the fights Cossack Ukrainians 
became part of the Russian Tsar’s 
Empire but they did not receive 
their autonomy, which they were 
expecting. During the 19th century 
there were some major migration 
movements; Russians migrating to 
Ukraine, Ukrainians migrating to 
other parts of Russia, but there were 
no conflicts recorded between them. 
In the First World War 3.5 million 
Ukrainians were fighting for the 
Russian Tsar, but ethnic atrocities 
were recorded only between Polish 
and Ukrainian groups (seRhienKo, 
y. g. – smoliy, a. B. 1994).
Between the two world wars 
the situation was already more 
problematic. Right after WWI there 
were three different Ukrainian 
revolutionary movements and 
the country was totally divided. 
It was a very chaotic situation in 
which practically everyone was 
fighting against everyone. The end 
result was that western Ukrainians 
became citizens of the newly 
emerged Polish Republic, and the 
central and southern Ukrainians 
became citizens of the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialistic Republic (smele, 
j. 2015). In the first couple of 
years during which extremely 
nationalistic leadership was in 
power in Ukraine, many changes 
came about such as an elevated 
importance of the Ukrainian 
language, culture, history, and 
literature. Then during the 1930’s 
these policies changed after Stalin 
came to power and new approaches 
were implemented. Every nation 
was equal, it was a golden age for 
each ethnic group living in the 
territory of Ukraine (dumitRu d. 
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– johnson, c. 2011). However, 
there was an important event in 
this period, namely, the Holodomor 
or known as the great famine. 
Scholars do not agree whether this 
famine was genocide or not, but 
the Ukrainian parliament recently 
declared that it was (Kasianov, 
h. 2014). Even to this day, the 
Ukrainian population has bad 
memories about this famine and 
blame the Russians for it. During 
the Second World War under the 
Nazi regime Ukrainian nationalistic 
movements were rising again, but 
without any significant result. As 
a result of the Second World War 
multi-ethnic territories became part 
of Ukraine such as Ruthenia and 
areas previously ruled by Poland, 
such as Romania. There was another 
territorial change later, when in 
1954 Khrushchev transferred 
Crimea from the Russian SFSR to 
the Ukrainian SSR (KuBijovyc, v. 
2016).
The language question 
since the independence of 
the country
From the 1990’s after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union 
huge changes came in Ukraine. 
The national language became 
massively important again, while 
Russian was a state language 
too. The new governments had a 
more nationalistic view than the 
communist leaders had, which 
affected all the minorities living in 
the territory of Ukraine in a negative 
way. There are many statistics 
about how the number of minorities 
changed in the past 25 years, and 
how they declined as a result of 
nationalistic policies (sidoR, d. 
2005). Recently, the country has 
been quite divided in the use of 
language. Even in Kiev, 50% of 
the population speaks Russian as 
their first language. Until 2012, 
the previous language law dating 
from the Soviet times was in force, 
which did not really regulate the 
use of language at all. Then during 
the reign of Yanukovych, a new 
modernized bill was accepted by 
the parliament: any language other 
than Ukrainian would be considered 
a regional minority language if 
it was used by more than 10% of 
the local population. As a result 
minority languages could be used 
in courts, schools and government 
institutions in these regions. After 
the revolution, on the first day of 
the interim government this bill 
was repealed. The first decision of 
the new government was to dismiss 
the use of the Russian language 
as a regional language all across 
Ukraine (BBC, 2014). Following 
this, many Russian speaking 
Ukrainian citizens felt that this was 
not their country anymore, nor did 
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they feel safe. Of late there have 
been many discussions and ongoing 
debates regarding the new language 
law accepted in May of 2019, which 
has banned the use of Russian 
language in cultural products, 
movies, books, songs, etc., not to 
mention banning the official use 
of the language. The language 
law has been highly criticized and 
described as ill-defined, illegal, 
and unconstitutional. Currently, 
it is being reviewed by the Venice 
Commission and has also been 
discussed at the UN’s Security 
Council (brought up by the 
Russians).
It also worth noting how the 
country was divided by the election 
results. In the western and central 
territories pro-EU powers always 
led in the polls, whereas in the 
eastern and southern territories 
which are dominated by Russian 
speakers, most of the time pro-
Russian powers were elected. 
But this divide never caused any 
ethnic atrocities in the country 
before. Thanks to their common 
history and culture, people always 
believed that they were the closest 
relative nations in the world. My 
conclusion would be that there was 
no significant hatred between the 
two sides before the Euromaidan 
revolution, until 2014 when the 
new nationalistic government came 
into power. Although the number of 
nationalistic Ukrainians increased 
in the past five years, their influence 
is still insignificant for the overall 
population of the country.
III�5�3� Onset analysis
The main background 
and driving motives of the 
conflict
The huge country of forty-two 
million people has been struggling 
with its identity questions already 
for 25 years, ever since it became 
independent from the Soviet Union. 
None of the Ukrainian governments 
could resolve the internal divisions 
or build strong political institutions, 
implement economic reforms, 
overcome corruption and reduce 
the influence of powerful oligarchs. 
All the presidents have allowed 
oligarchs to gain increasing control 
over the economy, which is how the 
country found itself in the situation 
by 2010 in which Ukraine’s fifty 
richest people controlled nearly 
half of the country’s gross domestic 
product (Wilson, a. 2013). 
According to these numbers it’s 
not even a question that elites are 
dominating not only the economic 
life of Ukraine but the political 
life too. In each region or county, 
we can easily allocate an oligarch 
who controls the region. Why is 
this important? Because without 
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their support the chance for a 
violent conflict would be relatively 
small. In order to understand the 
onset of the Ukrainian conflict, we 
need to examine this question in 
detail: what was the main driving 
force of the whole process, greed 
or grievances? This is a classic 
question in every civil war case 
study and both greed and grievance 
can be a right assumption. 
In favour of understanding the 
onset of the conflict the perceptions 
of the parties need to be examined. 
The pro-European nationalistic 
Ukrainians consider Ukraine as a 
regional power. According to the 
country’s resources it could even 
be true. Unfortunately, as a result 
of non-consistent governance in 
the past 25 years, it was never 
true. While in most cases Ukraine 
could act as an independent 
actor in world politics, Ukraine 
always had a strong and close 
cooperation with Russia (Rose, 
W. 2000). The security dilemma 
was never a major question for 
the Ukrainians, in spite of the fact 
that in the Budapest Memorandum 
they received assurances from 
the world’s great powers for their 
safety and integrity. Nevertheless, 
some western Ukrainian oligarchs 
decided to lead the country towards 
the EU and NATO. And that was 
the time when the real security 
dilemma occurred, especially in the 
eastern part of the country. 
Posen already in 1993 came 
up with this theory regarding the 
real security dilemma, and he 
warned the political leaders that this 
kind of approach in Ukraine could 
lead to a conflict later. According to 
Posen, a security dilemma is when 
offensive and defensive military 
forces are more or less identical 
(posen, B. 1993). If offensive 
operations are more effective than 
defensive operations, actors will 
choose the offensive options if 
they wish to survive. In case of 
Ukraine this theory is correct in 
two aspects. Firstly, there was the 
occupation of Crimea by Russian 
forces. They had superiority on the 
peninsula, and the political crisis 
in Kiev was still not resolved. That 
was an unexpected opportunity 
for Moscow (maRXsen, c. 2014). 
But after these events, Russian 
speaking eastern Ukrainians 
wanted to have a similar process, 
that’s why eastern oligarchs started 
to fund and financially support 
local militias to revolt against Kiev. 
After the violent regime change 
led by the far right nationalists, 
the local population of Eastern 
Ukraine started to fear them, which 
was another important reason that 
led to the conflict. From another 
perspective, Ukrainian leaders have 
always faced the security dilemma, 
as their big brother Russia was 
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much stronger and they had always 
been dependent on them. For this 
reason they had to act in accordance 
with Russian interests. 
Among civil war scholars, 
the question of humanitarian 
intervention also plays an important 
role. In this case it is less important, 
but still worth providing a brief 
overview of this question too. 
According to Evans and Sahnoun, 
humanitarian interventions are 
highly important in case of a civil 
war, in order to protect innocent 
civilians. Based on that, these kinds 
of operations are rather described 
as the responsibility to protect the 
people than as an intervention by a 
third party (evans, g. – sahnoun, 
m. 2002). In their opinion a 
stronger third party always has 
the right to protect civilians, and 
this is more important than the 
sovereignty of a state. On the other 
hand, Luttwak argues against this 
statement. According to him we 
should never make interventions; 
rather he argues that countries have 
to “make war to make peace” as in 
the long term this is a more peaceful 
solution of the conflict. Hatred 
between ethnic groups will be less 
relevant after the conflict has been 
solved internally, and the peace can 
stay for longer than in case of an 
intervention (luttWaK, e. 1999).
In Donbass, some 
humanitarian aid was sent by 
the Red Cross and also by the 
Russian government, but regarding 
humanitarian intervention the 
events in Crimea were more 
significant. As the peninsula 
is mostly inhabited by ethnic 
Russians, and there was a threat by 
the far right nationalistic groups, 
Moscow had the opportunity to 
intervene. It could be analysed in 
another case study whether it was 
legal, not to mention the geopolitical 
background. Ultimately, according 
to official statements made by the 
Russian Government, the most 
important factor for intervening was 
that they wanted to protect the local 
Russian population, as they were 
afraid of an attack by the far right 
thugs against Crimea. Based on 
my readings and knowledge of the 
topic, the main reason for Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea was the 
opportunity and chaos left behind 
after the unexpected regime change 
in Kiev. It can even be claimed that 
the invasion was Russia’s reaction 
or answer to the revolt that took 
place in the Ukrainian capital in 
late February 2014.
This question of greed or 
grievance plays an important role 
in civil war literature as well. Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoefflers provide 
us with an influential scheme of 
analysis. They have introduced 
a conceptual dichotomy in the 
literature: greed vs. grievance. 
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The greed argument refers to self-
interested, even selfish behaviour 
as the main motivation behind 
civil wars, whereas the grievance 
approach identifies discontent 
and frustration as the primary 
motivation for political action 
(collieR, p. et al. 2005). Later 
Collier and Hoeffler modified their 
original concept and changed it into 
a broader meaning as opportunity. 
As greed is an important motivating 
factor for any side, without having 
a good opportunity itself it doesn’t 
amount to anything – Ukraine 
being a good case in point. All the 
political leaders were led by greed 
in past decades, but this was not 
enough to start a war; they were not 
even interested in it. But when a 
political standoff occurred between 
the two identities of Ukraine it was 
the perfect time to drive the country 
into a violent conflict. We can see 
great examples for this theory in the 
Ukrainian case. 
According to another 
explanation weak states and weak 
governance always create an 
opportunity for frustration that 
motivates insurgency. According to 
Levi a strong state is representative 
and accountable to its people, and 
able to protect the population from 
violence (levi m. 2006). In the 
case of Ukraine neither conditions 
were met. The Poroshenko 
government was not representative, 
as it represented only the western 
regions of the country. It was not 
accountable either, as the level 
of corruption was still one of the 
highest in the world; only in a few 
Central-African countries was the 
situation worse. And if we have a 
look at whether the government 
was able to protect its citizens or 
not, then we can state that it wasn’t 
in their capabilities either. After 
the regime change pro-Russian 
militias could rise up against the 
central government in the eastern 
territories. Had there been strong 
leadership, not to mention the 
government’s legitimacy, this could 
not have happened, at least not on 
such a large scale.
It can be clearly stated that the 
pro-European more nationalistic 
oligarchs had the opportunity to start 
an uprising based on Yanukovych’s 
decision in late 2013 not to sign the 
commercial treaty on the Deep and 
Comprehensive Cooperation with 
the EU. But after the regime change 
in Kiev, the pro-Russian elite had 
the same chance, however their case 
was even more problematic since 
recruiting soldiers to fight against 
their own government is never 
easy. The decision of an individual 
to participate in a rebellion always 
depends on potential costs and 
benefits. Insurgents will join an 
uprising only if the expected 
benefits are higher than what is 
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offered by the current status quo 
(mulleR, e. n. – opp, K.-d. 1986). 
This is why most of the opportunity 
theorists do not perceive domestic 
violence as an emotional reaction to 
grievances but rather as a rational 
response to the circumstances. 
On the other hand, among 
the most important driving forces 
of a civil war we can usually find 
not only the opportunity, but the 
motivation as well (Zeynep, t. et. 
al. 2011). As the Ukrainian society 
has always been relatively divided, 
the motivation for an uprising 
was hiding in the dark waiting for 
an opportunity. The nationalistic 
pro-western elites always wanted 
to get closer to Europe and 
break up with the Russians, but 
they could never recruit enough 
supporters for this idea. On the 
other hand, pro-Russian elites 
always believed in the country’s 
integrity and in its Russian based 
identity. Minor clashes between 
the two perspectives had already 
been registered during the last 15 
years, but in most cases economic 
interests played the most important 
role. As long as both parties could 
realize their major incomes from 
the country, there was no need of 
any armed conflict. But as a result 
of the revolution, this stable status 
quo changed, and the economic 
stability of the Eastern part of the 
country was threatened. All in all, 
it can be claimed that the main 
driving force of the violence both in 
Kiev and Eastern Ukraine, were not 
the grievances or ancient hatreds, 
but rather the influence of their 
nationalistic and greedy leaders. 
To summarize the beginning 
of the violence, the onset and 
the main driving force of the 
conflict, we can state that the 
most important ingredient was the 
opportunity presenting itself on 
both sides. On its own, however, 
this opportunity would never have 
led to a violent conflict, but it was 
definitely the spark which had been 
missing previously. Regarding 
the motivations of the parties, 
the security dilemma played an 
important role as well, which led 
to fear later. Compared to other 
similar conflicts, we can maintain 
that ethnic differences did not play 
an important role, as only some 
far right nationalistic Ukrainians 
shared this approach. These 
nationalists were always in the 
minority; they never had any major 
support from the population. In spite 
of being a divided country having 
two different identities – in fact 
there are no significant differences 
between them either culturally or 
historically – this has never been 
a real problem in Ukraine. The 
other important driving force of the 
armed conflict was the political and 
ideological differences between 
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the elites, who could successfully 
influence their population in a 
nationalistic way. Without the help 
and support of the elites, violence 
would never have started either in 
Kiev or Eastern Ukraine. The crisis 
occurred because of many reasons, 
such as the more than twenty years 
of weak governance, a corrupt 
economy dominated by oligarchs, 
heavy reliance on Russia, and sharp 
differences between Ukraine’s 
linguistically, religiously, and 
ethnically distinct eastern and 
western halves (mcmahon, R. 
2014).
End of the Conflict
After the escalation of the 
fights in January 2015 the European 
leaders organized a second summit 
in Minsk in order to negotiate a 
ceasefire as soon possible. As a 
result, on the 12th of February 
the Minsk II treaty was signed by 
the parties. Leaders of Belarus, 
Russia, Germany, France, Ukraine, 
DPR and LNR participated in the 
negotiations. Following the 16 
hours of overnight discussions 
the parties agreed to a package 
of peace-making measures. The 
negotiations were observed by the 
OSCE as well (OSCE, 2015). They 
agreed on the withdrawal of heavy 
weapons from the front line, the 
release of prisoners of war, and on 
constitutional reform in Ukraine. 
From this point we are talking about 
a frozen conflict, as the ceasefire 
is still in power, but there was no 
peace treaty signed. Both sides 
withdrew their heavy weapons 
sooner or later, they successfully 
exchanged their prisoners, but the 
central government still couldn’t 
regain its control over the Russia-
Ukrainian border, and they didn’t 
introduce any constitutional 
reforms (BentZen, n. 2016).
The DPR and LNR territories 
are integrated into the Russian 
economy, and both territories use 
the ruble as their currency. Nobody 
knows what will happen in the 
near future in Eastern Ukraine. 
Some fights are still being recorded 
between the sides, but they are not 
significant and the front lines have 
not changed since the signing of 
the treaty. The election of the new 
president has also not resulted 
in any change in the conflict yet. 
Basically, this is a very similar 
situation to that which was noted 
in Transnistria, Abbhazia or South-
Osetia. According to international 
law, the central governments of 
Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia do not 
have the right to join any military 
cooperation (such as NATO) until 
they reach their total territorial 
integrity. For this reason, the current 
status quo is very much in favour of 
the Russian government. How long 
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these frozen conflicts can survive, is 
the crucial question – and anyone’s 
guess. Until a long term agreement 
is reached concerning the status of 
these territories, the situation will 
probably stay the same.
III�5�4� Conclusion
At the beginning of the study 
the historical background between 
the Russians and Ukrainians was 
discussed. Following that, the real 
driving forces of the violent conflict 
were defined. Based on the findings, 
the most important components in 
the conflict were the motivations 
and perceptions of the oligarchs 
and the local elites. The cultural 
divisions and identity differences 
would have never led to a conflict 
in this case, as the Ukrainians 
and Russians have much more 
in common with each other than 
they have differences. According 
to Posen this cautious situation 
was always present in Ukraine; the 
elites just had to wait for the perfect 
opportunity. 
Based on the analysis, the 
main reason behind the dynamics 
of the fights were the wrong 
measures carried out by the newly 
formed government. Had they 
begun to negotiate with the eastern 
militias, no fights would have been 
necessary. This would have led to 
a more federal country, which was 
obviously not in their interests. The 
question of the security dilemma 
played an important role on both 
sides as well. It can be claimed 
that the unexpected happenings 
and the reactions of these events 
is what ultimately led to this 
violent conflict. We examined the 
motivations and perceptions of both 
sides. There were no significant 
ancient hatreds between the parties; 
animosity did not play an important 
role in the shared Russian-
Ukrainian history during the last 
centuries. Nationalistic aspirations 
were neither prevalent nor popular 
in Ukraine; the Poroshenko 
administration, however, took 
major steps in that direction. 
In essence, the general 
population never really supported 
the government’s operations 
against the rebels. The question 
of humanitarian intervention has 
also been discussed, as the eastern 
Ukrainian Russians started to revolt 
against Kiev after the process took 
place in Crimea and they were 
expecting a similar outcome in their 
case as well. On the other hand, for 
the eastern oligarchs the situation in 
Kiev was not sustainable at all due 
to the ban of the Russian language 
in schools and in the media. This 
conflict was a nightmare for every 
participant, except for the far right 
radicals; tragically, these kinds of 
violent people always show up 
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when they have the opportunity 
to fight. My answer to the main 
question is that the conflict would 
not have occurred without the help 
of the local Russian elites. What is 
also important to note is that if the 
Ukrainian government’s reaction 
to the revolts in the Eastern part 
of the country had been peaceful, 
the whole situation would never 
have flared up, or at least not in 
the immediate future. Without the 
support of the elites on both sides 
the conflict could not have escalated 
to the extent that it did, which is 
why the elites must be mostly held 
responsible. 
To conclude, based on the 
events and outcomes, we can claim 
that the hybrid war against Ukraine 
appears instead to be an unplanned 
series of actions and reactions 
rather than a consciously planned 
chain of events on both sides. 
The intervention of the Russian 
conventional and irregular forces 
in Ukraine should be analyzed in a 
much more flexible way. It has also 
been suggested that the expression 
“hybrid-war” itself is a misused 
term. Basically, it describes the 
employment of every possible 
tool to intervene in the interests 
of the local ethnic Russians, their 
political, economic, military and 
national interests. As far as is 
known from other conflicts, this 
is a methodology for spreading 
influence based on power which 
would have been familiar to other 
military powers as well. The 
paper’s aim was to provide a clear 
understanding of the interests and 
motives in case of each participant. 
As a result, it can be claimed that 
the Ukrainian case is a very unique 
one and cannot be particularly 
compared to other similar conflicts 
in the Post-Soviet region, as the role 
of the local elites was significantly 
higher than in any other case.
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III.6. Inequality and marginalisation 
as boosters of violence: Studying latin 
america from a neo-institutionalist 
perspective
liZeth vanessa ayala castiBlanco54
Abstract
The origin and persistence of violence in the less developed regions have been a 
highly debated topic, in which the case of Latin America is yet to be resolved. This region 
is one of the most violent ones in the world even though there are no ongoing armed 
conflicts between states. In this context, the question of what the main drivers of violence 
in Latin America are arises. The complexity of this phenomenon requires explanations 
that consider both political and economic factors to provide a deeper understanding of 
the situation. This paper addresses this question by following the neo-institutionalist 
approach of North, Wallis and Weingast, who argue that there is a so-called “limited 
access order” in which participation in organisations and benefits is restricted, triggering 
violence and social unrest. The study analyses two main boosters of violence in Latin 
America: limited access to land ownership as the main expression of inequality, and the 
prevalence of clientelism and corruption as typical operating schemes of the dominant 
coalitions in the region. It gives rise to a complex assessment of the so-called limited 
access order and its particular characteristics in Latin America, in which both inequality 
and marginalisation have had an impact on the development of violence in the region. 
The research contributes to the study of violence from a neo-institutionalist perspective 
and implies ways to better understand other limited access order regions in the world.
Keywords: Latin America, neo-institutionalism, violence, inequality, 
clientelism
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III�6�1� Introduction
Violence is one of the most 
important problems in human 
societies. The problems people 
have coexisting peacefully have 
persisted throughout human history. 
All societies face this problem to 
a greater or lesser extent. While it 
has not been possible to eliminate 
violence completely, some societies 
have managed to contain and 
diminish it. However, the control 
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of violence has not been achieved 
in many parts of the world yet. 
Nowadays, this problem, with 
some exceptions, is more prevalent 
in less developed regions.
From the economic neo-
institutionalist perspective, some 
proposals have shed light on the 
problem, enabling an understanding 
of the phenomenon of violence. 
In this sense, North, Wallis and 
Weingast provided a valuable 
contribution to the field (noRth, 
d. et al. 2009). They proposed 
the existence of different social 
orders, each distinguished by their 
mechanisms to deal with violence. 
Social orders are patterns of human 
organisation in which societies 
create rules that give individuals 
control over resources and social 
functions. According to these 
authors, there are two main social 
orders in the modern world: limited 
access order and open access order.
Limited access order is 
a kind of order in which there 
is a dominant coalition whose 
members have special benefits. 
The dominant coalition is made 
up of elites that agree to respect 
each other’s privileges including 
access to resources and creation of 
organisations. By limiting access 
to these privileges to members of 
the dominant coalition, elites create 
incentives to cooperate rather 
than fight among themselves. The 
privileges and rents (economic 
assets) of the elites in the dominant 
coalition depend on the limited 
entry to the coalition, and this is 
enforced by the continued existence 
of a certain political regime 
controlled by them. In this social 
order, violence should be controlled 
and contained by the dominant 
coalition.
On the contrary, open access 
order exists when a large number of 
individuals have the right to access 
resources and form organisations 
that can engage in a wide variety 
of economic and political activities 
in a society. The right to have 
access to these benefits is defined 
impersonally. Impersonality means 
that all the sectors of society are 
treated equally. Impersonality 
makes equality possible. The 
particular identity of individuals is 
not taken into account; thus, there 
is no room for dominant coalitions 
or nepotistic relations. This forms 
the basis for civil society, with 
many groups capable of becoming 
politically active when their 
interests are threatened.
Based on the proposal of 
North, Wallis and Weingast, it is 
possible to state that limited access 
order, also called natural states order, 
is the dominant social organisation 
in Latin America (noRth, d. et al. 
2009). None of the countries of this 
region exhibit the characteristics of 
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open access societies. This means 
that, in each of these countries, there 
is a dominant coalition that limits 
access to valuable resources and 
maintains a set of privileges, thereby 
preventing violence among the 
participant actors of the coalition. 
Latin America’s colonial past has 
been an important precedent in this 
sense. Many of the elite groups who 
defeated the foreign conquerors 
clung to power, perpetuating an 
environment of inequality and 
marginalisation in which they have 
had exclusive access to resources 
and the opportunity to create their 
organisations.
In limited access societies, 
as in Latin America, the existing 
dominant coalition manipulates 
the economy to create rents by 
limiting access to organisational 
membership and valuable 
resources. This situation holds 
the coalition together, enables 
elite groups to make credible 
commitments to support the regime 
and, most importantly, refrain from 
violence. However, the control of 
violence also depends upon many 
other factors, particularly in the 
case of Latin America. Therefore, 
as will be explained, the system 
imposed by dominant coalitions 
in this region has not been able to 
control the violence but has instead 
increased it due to the negative 
externalities that it has created.
Following the proposal of 
North, Wallis and Weingast, two 
main particularities of limited 
access order in Latin America 
were identified. The first one is the 
restricted access to land ownership as 
the main form of inequality in Latin 
American societies. Considering 
the important economic role of 
land, the rents created by its use 
have strengthened the elite groups 
and have maintained a dynamic of 
poverty and inequality in the rest 
of society. The second aspect is 
the prevalence of clientelism and 
corruption as typical operating 
schemes of the dominant coalition 
in Latin American countries, a 
situation which has triggered 
widespread social marginalization, 
which has in its turn led to strong 
social unrest. These two key factors 
have had a crucial impact on the 
emergence of different forms of 
violence that the elites have not 
been able to fully control yet. This 
is a paradox because dominant 
coalitions seek to reduce violence 
in the societies where they function 
instead of increasing it, but this has 
not been the case in Latin America.
The neo-institutionalist 
approach proposed by North and 
others allows an understanding of 
the logic behind the social orders; 
in this case, limited access order 
as the prevalent pattern of social 
organisation in Latin America 
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(noRth, d. et al. 2009). At this 
point, it should be noted that Latin 
America is a very heterogeneous 
region, which means that the 
limited access order is present at a 
different stage of development in 
each country. Nevertheless, the aim 
of this paper is to highlight the role 
of inequality and marginalisation 
as boosters of violence, regardless 
of the differences in state structure 
and the sophistication of the 
organisations the elites are able to 
maintain.
III�6�2� Land ownership and 
inequality in Latin America
Latin America is a region in 
which countries’ economies are still 
very dependent on the land. They 
are still agrarian societies to a large 
extent, which can be explained by 
the fact that they are very rich in 
natural resources. Actually, this 
region has the largest arable land 
reserves in the world (un 2014). 
However, the distribution of land 
ownership is one of the most unequal 
in the world. This condition is a 
very serious and unsolved problem 
in the region (gueReña, a. 2016).
It is important to highlight 
that, according to classical 
economic theories, land is one of 
the main factors of production for 
the economy, together with capital 
and labour. Unfortunately, the 
availability of land in the world 
has decreased gradually in the last 
few decades (KasWamila, a. 2016). 
One of the major causes of land 
loss is deforestation through human 
intervention, which has intensified 
since the time of the Neolithic 
Revolution, and especially 
during the Industrial Revolution 
– precisely, the two revolutions 
considered as boosters of new 
social orders by North and others 
(noRth, d. et al. 2014).
Considering the importance 
of this resource, one of the main 
rent sources for the elites in Latin 
America has been the oligopoly of 
land, as the access of the peasant 
population to land ownership has 
been restricted for a long time. As a 
result, inequality in the distribution 
of land in Latin America is a very 
serious problem. According to the 
data of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (2017), in terms of 
the Gini coefficient applied to land 
distribution, Latin America reaches 
0.79. A very high number compared 
with Africa and Asia that reach 0.56 
and 0.55 respectively. 
Dispossession of land in 
Latin America is an issue with very 
deep roots. Since independence, 
land distribution was openly 
inequitable. The leaders and 
groups that defeated the Spaniard 
conquerors retained their upper-
class privileges, perpetuating a 
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legacy of inequality in broad sectors 
of society. From that time until now, 
the struggle for land ownership 
has caused numerous conflicts in 
Latin America. The dispossession 
of peasants is a common pattern in 
many countries – states seize their 
lands and force them to leave – 
triggering violent revolutions, some 
of them with terrible consequences. 
The „Landless Workers Movement” 
in Brazil, the Colombian internal 
conflict due to the lack of agrarian 
reform, and, in general, the violent 
eviction of peasants in all Latin 
American countries are some 
examples of this phenomenon 
(gueReña, a. 2016).
Land plays a crucial role in 
Latin American economies since 
it is not only the main factor of 
production but also one of the 
most important sources of wealth. 
Therefore, social status and power 
relations are determined, to a great 
extent, by the structure of land 
tenure (vogelgesang, F. 1996). In 
Latin America, 48.6% of people 
that live in rural areas are poor 
(Fao 2018). This is explained by 
the fact that, once the land is taken 
away from peasants, elite groups 
give it to large national and foreign 
companies to exploit. Generally, 
landless peasants have just two 
options: work for low wages for 
large landowners, or move to the 
cities, where it is difficult for them 
to find an appropriate place to 
work and live. This situation has 
perpetuated social inequality and, 
in many cases, has encouraged 
the creation of guerrilla groups or 
criminal gangs, which are recurrent 
perpetrators of violence in Latin 
America. In particular, guerrilla 
groups emerged during the Cold 
War backed by leftist ideologies – 
after this period some of them laid 
down their arms and continued their 
efforts as political parties.
Through the accumulation of 
land, the Latin American elites limit 
access to valuable resources and the 
activities derived from them. They 
use their power to influence political 
and regulatory decisions that may 
affect their interests around land, 
ensuring the distribution of benefits 
in their favour (gueReña, a. 
2016). Moreover, the rents created 
by the use of land strengthen 
the dominant coalitions in these 
countries. Thus, there is an urgent 
need for a reorganisation of landed 
property in Latin America that 
allows for an opening of economic 
and political competition for land 
ownership and the subsequent 
integration of marginalised 
communities, decreasing violence 
in these societies. More access 
to land ownership for peasants is 
crucial in order to reduce persistent 
inequality and social unrest in the 
region. Likewise, it is necessary 
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to establish an institutional control 
based on impersonal rules that 
guarantee property rights to all 
people in these societies.
Moreover, a better distribution 
of land ownership may improve 
the economic performance of 
these countries. It has been shown, 
for example, how the extreme 
concentration of land ownership 
slows long-term economic growth 
(deiningeR, K. – squiRe, l. 1998). 
In effect, redistribution leads to 
greater agricultural productivity, 
favuoring improvement in rural 
incomes and economic growth in 
general (vollRath, d. 2007). In 
connection with this, it is important 
to note that, for most Latin American 
countries, commodities are their 
main export products. However, the 
strong dependence on the export 
of raw materials has made these 
countries vulnerable to external 
shocks, which is a very common 
pattern of the economy in countries 
with limited access order. In this 
sense, remaining in an economic 
model based on extractivism is 
also a hallmark of significant 
backwardness that prevents these 
societies from progressing towards 
a more advanced pattern of social 
organisation.
III�6�3� Corruption and 
clientelism: Dynamics of 
marginalization
Personal relations are 
fundamental to accessing 
organisations and exclusive 
privileges in Latin America. This 
is one of the main characteristics of 
limited access orders and, indeed, 
this region is a very good example 
of it. “Personalisation” is a very 
important factor, not only within 
the elite groups but also when 
external actors want to interact with 
them. This condition has turned 
the region into a fertile ground 
for phenomena such as corruption 
and clientelism. The analysis of 
these two dynamics is crucial 
to understand the relationship 
between the elite groups and the 
rest of society in Latin American 
countries. In both cases, the 
dominant coalition takes advantage 
of its position and privileges to 
establish power relations with 
other actors. This results in the 
perpetuation of a highly personified 
system of social relations. As 
North and others pointed out 
“non-elites are not masses of 
undifferentiated individuals who 
are treated impersonally (noRth, d. 
et al. 2009). Protection is extended 
through patronage or clientage 
networks” (p. 35).
The existence of these 
dynamics in Latin America is 
related to the historical legacy of 
the colonisation times – as in the 
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case of land distribution exposed 
above. The colonial system 
imposed an economic and social 
model called “hacienda” in which 
large tracts of land were controlled 
by a few landowners. This model 
was based on the concentration of 
land ownership and the monopoly 
of the labour force in the hands 
of the landowner. Thereby, the 
landowner was the most important 
and powerful actor, and the 
establishment of relations with 
him went through the exchange 
of favours at his convenience. 
Thus, these societies were based 
on hierarchical power, loyalty 
and submission by establishing 
relationships of exchange. Over 
time, the ‘hacienda model’ became 
the fundamental basis of economic 
production, political system, and 
social relations in Latin American 
countries. Although this model 
formally disappeared, it was the 
origin of phenomena such as 
clientelism and corruption.
The concept of clientelism, 
according to Gordin, is referred 
to an asymmetric relationship of 
power that involves a particularistic 
transaction associated with the 
distribution of public goods in 
exchange for favours (goRdin, 
j. 2006). Clientelism establishes 
informal relations of power that 
facilitate the mutual exchange of 
services and goods between two 
socially unequal persons or groups 
(schRoteR, B. 2010). This results 
in the development of personal 
networks of exchange in the 
context of negotiated relationships 
between the dominant coalition 
and the rest of society. In Latin 
America, clientelism is observed 
when politicians or bureaucrats 
create laws or modify the existing 
ones to generate privileged rents 
for specific individuals with state 
backing (pRitZl, R. 2000). In this 
way, clientelism turns the political 
system in a negotiated relations 
network devoid of impersonality.
Likewise, there is a serious 
problem of corruption in Latin 
America. According to Treisman, 
corruption is defined as the misuse 
of public goods for personal gain 
(tReisman, d. 2000). Corruption 
occurs more frequently in scenarios 
of low alternation in power, 
where political actors are strongly 
embedded in institutional structures 
(moRales, m. 2009). Limited 
political competition increases the 
chances of the government elite 
to commit acts of corruption. In 
the case of Latin America, a big 
percentage of politicians have been 
involved in the theft of public funds. 
Currently, the corruption in this 
region has reached unprecedented 
levels. As a consequence, social 
unrest has resulted in higher levels 
of violence.
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The phenomenon of 
corruption networks in Latin 
America could be also analysed 
from the perspective of interest 
groups, as was proposed by Mancur 
Olson (olson, m. 1965). According 
to this approach, corruption emerges 
in the context of interest groups. 
An interest group is the formal or 
informal union of individuals that 
are grouped around homogeneous 
interests. These groups arise when 
it comes to defending or imposing 
their particular interests through 
the political process. In this sense, 
every group strives to obtain a 
better collective position amid the 
competition or take ownership of 
the rent revenues generated by 
the state interventions. However, 
this necessarily implies the 
marginalisation of certain sectors 
of society. These sectors promote 
violence due to their exclusion from 
the social dynamics of personalist 
privileges.
Corruption has become 
an inherent condition of Latin 
American countries. In fact, the 
generalisation of this practice 
has gradually established it as a 
social norm (mishRa, a. 2006). Its 
systematic and planned nature has 
established corruption as a new 
way of rent-seeking. Moreover, it 
is a determining factor in the levels 
of inefficiency and injustice in 
the distribution of income (Rose-
acKeRman, s. 2001). The recent 
discovery of big corruption scandals 
in Latin America has resulted in 
a lack of credibility among the 
institutions and has triggered a tide 
of distrust in traditional politicians 
and in democracy in general, 
which has been reflected in the last 
elections of several Latin American 
countries.
To sum up, in limited access 
societies, like the Latin American 
ones, there is no reinforcement of 
the rules by impersonal means, as 
happens in open access societies. 
On the contrary, who you are and 
what your position is are important 
issues when it comes to obtaining 
rights and having access to 
organisations and resources. This 
access is limited because personal 
relations are important not only 
within the dominant coalition but 
also when external actors interact 
with it. It is important to note 
that, in the last couple of decades, 
political changes in some Latin 
American countries have allowed 
members of the excluded groups to 
reach the highest offices, as in the 
cases of Evo Morales in Bolivia 
and José Mujica in Uruguay, 
opening the possibility of a social 
transformation. However, this 
is still a fledgling phenomenon 
since the dynamics of exclusion 
perpetuated by traditional elites 
remain the most prevalent pattern 
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in Latin American societies today.
III�6�4� The failure in 
controlling violence: The 
effects of inequality and 
marginalization
Despite being a region that 
does not have ongoing armed 
conflicts between states, Latin 
America has the highest rates of 
violent deaths, which makes it 
one of the most dangerous places 
in the world. Central America and 
South America have 25.9 and 24.2 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 
respectively, compared to 13.0 in 
Africa, 5.1 in North America, 3.0 
in Europe, 2.8 in Oceania and 2.3 
in Asia (un oFFice on dRugs and 
cRime 2019). The reality behind 
these figures is very complex. 
Many analyses of violence in 
Latin America tend to focus on 
superficial criteria; however, this 
situation is a result of deeply rooted 
problems (solis, j. – ceRna, s. 
2014). Dynamics of inequality 
and marginalisation that persist 
in Latin American countries are 
an important part of the unsolved 
problems that have to be taken into 
account in any new approximation 
of this phenomenon.
In this sense, persistent 
violence in this region could 
be explained mainly by two 
causes. One of them is the lack of 
opportunities as a result of the high 
levels of poverty and inequality in 
the society. The land, as the main 
production factor in Latin America, 
and its unequal distribution is one 
of the most important drivers of 
this phenomenon. This kind of 
marginalisation makes excluded 
people try to find other ways to live, 
in many cases criminal activities. 
The other cause of violence is 
social unrest. Popular indignation 
at the increasing clientelism and 
corruption dynamics is an incentive 
for creation of illegal groups that 
fight against the elite groups in 
order to take away their privileges 
or remove them from power.
The fact that access to 
organizations and resources is 
limited and there are exclusive 
privileges for certain groups 
generates a strong social discontent 
that leads to high levels of violence 
in Latin America. Since several 
groups find illegal ways to have 
access to the arms market, the 
monopoly of violence by the state 
is not a fulfilled condition in the 
region. Thus, the use of violence 
is not exclusive to the dominant 
coalition. This is a very serious 
threat for the elite groups in the 
region. A violent environment is 
detrimental to the interests of elites 
because they could lose their rents.
Consequently, elite groups 
are able to avoid conflicts among 
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themselves, but not conflicts 
caused by other actors in society. 
This means that, although violence 
among the dominant coalition 
members is controlled through 
the incentives of maintaining their 
negotiated privileges, violence that 
results from inequality and social 
unrest is difficult to control. This 
condition has implied, in fact, the 
loss of rents. Colombia is a clear 
example of this situation in the 
region. This country had an internal 
conflict of more than fifty years 
because of the lack of agrarian 
reform which was prevented by 
elite groups in order to maintain the 
unequal distribution of land. This 
prolonged conflict caused a great 
loss of rents because of the illegal 
occupation of large extensions of 
territory, the extortion practices 
carried out by rebels, the loss of 
economic resources and, in general, 
the cost of the war (clavijo, s. 
1998; RestRepo, j. – aponte, d. 
2009).
It is important to highlight 
that in some countries, elites tried 
to control violence in certain parts 
of the territory by giving arms 
to some groups of the society 
aiming to restrict the activities of 
criminal gangs. Examples of this 
kind of policy were programmes 
such as the surveillance and 
security cooperatives “Convivir” 
and “Soldados de mi pueblo” in 
Colombia, “Rondas campesinas” in 
Peru, and “Colectivos Chavistas” in 
Venezuela. However, the results of 
these programmes were mixed and 
frequently controversial as some of 
the groups exceeded their functions 
and began paramilitary actions 
generating even more violence than 
before their creation (Koessl, m. 
2015; moya sáncheZ, t. 2018).
III�6�5� Conclusion
Throughout the analysis, it 
was possible to observe that the 
colonial era left an important legacy 
in Latin America, which is reflected 
in the unequal land distribution 
and the perpetuation of clientelist 
relations in this region nowadays. 
These two factors are crucial to 
understanding the origin and the 
persistence of violence based on 
the dynamics of inequality and 
marginalisation. In the first place, 
the problem of land distribution 
in Latin America is quite serious. 
Land ownership has been a key rent 
source for the elites. The hoarding of 
land by a handful of elites has been 
one of the main reasons for the high 
levels of poverty and inequality that 
affect mostly peasants and rural 
people. Consequently, many social 
conflicts have arisen provoking an 
increasing level of violence in Latin 
American countries.
Furthermore, the economic 
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and political dynamic of the elite 
groups revolves around corruption 
and clientelism. On the one hand, 
corruption, in the form of the 
abuse of power to obtain personal 
benefits, has perpetuated the misuse 
of public resources. Moreover, the 
way to interact with the dominant 
coalition is, in most of the cases, 
through bribes and exchanged 
favours. On the other hand, the 
predominance of economic and 
political relationships organised 
along the lines of nepotistic 
personal networks guarantees that 
access to key resources remains 
restricted to a certain group of 
people. The continuation of the 
colonial asymmetric relations 
based on power hierarchies is a 
pattern replicated under the current 
clientelism mechanisms. These 
dynamics created a system of 
interactions characterised by highly 
personified relationships in which 
only certain persons have access 
to organisations and resources, 
a situation which prevents their 
democratisation. The consequence 
is the marginalisation of many 
sectors of society and, overall, the 
increase of social unrest which 
results in the massive replication of 
violence in these societies.
To sum up, limited access 
order in Latin America has prevented 
violence among the coalitions in 
power but it has created negative 
externalities such as inequality 
and marginalisation, the main 
consequence of which has been the 
emergence of violence. To solve this 
problem, Latin American countries 
have to provide to all the sectors 
of society equal opportunities for 
participation both at the economic 
and the political levels, as open 
access societies have done. In this 
sense, reforms that encourage a 
more equal land distribution must 
be promoted. Clientelism and 
corruption must be banished from 
the political sphere. Unfortunately, 
the dominant coalitions of Latin 
American countries do not seem 
to have an interest in changing the 
situation and may be willing to 
continue dealing with the violent 
environment as long as they keep 
their privileges.
Finally, on a side note, 
another interesting issue to consider 
when analysing the inequality and 
marginalisation in Latin America is 
the role of religion in legitimising 
the social order but remaining as a 
factor that has been unable to prevent 
violence. Since independence and 
for a long time, the Catholic Church 
was a very powerful and privileged 
institution in the Latin American 
countries. Despite the fact that it 
has lost influence in recent decades, 
its legacy is still present in many 
ways in the region. It had an impact 
on the formation of elites and the 
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maintenance of the status quo. 
The importance of submission 
and the exaltation of poverty can 
be considered as teachings of the 
Catholic Church that helped control 
certain demands of the population 
and fostered existing inequities 
in society. However, although 
the Catholic Church managed to 
promote a certain social order, it 
has been unable to help control 
the violence in the region. This 
paradoxical role of religion in Latin 
America is an underexplored but 
thought-provoking topic for further 
research in this area.
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Iv.1. traditions, Institutions, and Growth: 
the Case of hungary
elena cossu55 – giovanna maRia BoRges aguiaR56
Abstract
Institutions are an organized group of people with a particular purpose. Therefore, 
if we want to understand institutions, we need to understand the people that are part of it. 
In this context, this work aims at understanding the role of traditions and trust in Hungary 
in order to understand its institutions, its societal order, and its economic performance. 
Traditions and trust are here identified in the institutional economics framework. The 
approach comes from the observation that, during the years 1987-2015, Hungary has 
been particularly puzzling in showing both economic growth and order based on smaller 
communities and personalistic relations. We use data from the European Social Survey to 
map the beliefs connected to this definition, such as level of trust, importance of traditions. 
We will therefore consider ‘beliefs’ as the independent variable, and ‘GDP growth’ as the 
dependent variable. We find that both in Europe and in Hungary more specifically, a 
more closed and conservative society go hand in hand with higher GDP growth rates 
for the year 2002-2018. The work aims at proving that we can find both in Europe and 
Hungary a new middle ground between a limited and an open-access order defined in the 
institutional economics framework.
Keywords: institutional economics, traditions, Europe, convergence, economic 
performance
55  Assistant Research Fellow, PhD Student – CUB IR Doctoral School, elena.cossu@
uni-corvinus.hu
56  PhD Candidate – CUB IR Doctoral School, giovannamba@gmail.com
IV�1�1� Introduction
This work is inspired by the 
works of Douglass North and by the 
institutional economics framework. 
It is in particular inspired by what 
the author identifies as the “central 
puzzle of human history” (noRth, 
d. 1990), which accounts for 
the systemic reasons that further 
explain economic divergence. In 
this context, this works aims at 
identifying what makes Hungary 
different in terms of its economic 
environment. It does so by first 
focusing on the reasons proposed 
by North, excluding the irrelevant 
ones, and then integrating them 
with ideas of other authors that help 
us operationalize them (noRth, d. 
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et al. 2009).
This work is, in general, 
more of a part of the literature that 
tries to understand how political 
and economic regimes affect 
each other. The general goal is to 
position Hungary on a value map 
based on North’s framework and 
to understand in this way how the 
country’s institutions traditionally 
perform. As a consequence, the first 
part of the paper will discuss the 
different institutional economics 
approaches and we will conclude 
this section by saying that the 
approach that can account for the 
differences among societies more 
in detail is the one that focuses on 
cognition, beliefs, and experience. 
In the second part, we will describe 
more in detail how these elements 
can be used to elaborate a specific 
methodology based on descriptive 
statistics and fact-finding analysis, 
and how to perform a macro-analysis 
with individual characteristics.
IV�1�2� Literature Review
The goal of this section is 
to understand the relationship 
between culture and institutions 
and its different approaches. In the 
first part, we will review North’s 
main contributions to the field. 
Next, we will review how the 
relevant concepts apply to Hungary, 
especially through the work of 
other scholars. Finally, we will 
review possible future directions 
for the field and pose the research 
question.
The New Institutional 
Economics and Hungary
Douglass North is mainly 
known for being one of the 
major representatives of the new 
institutional economics discipline. 
The primary contribution of this 
field is the challenge it poses 
to neoclassical economics. The 
“mainstream” of economics 
postulates that people have rational 
preferences, their goal is profit 
maximisation, and that they act 
based on rational information. 
However, North always questioned 
if we can truly see these assumptions 
unfolding through time. According 
to him, humans do act intentionally, 
but through the lenses of cognition, 
culture, and experience (Wallis, j. 
2015).
For this reason, it is 
fundamental to differentiate between 
“rules of the game” (institutions) 
and the actors that play the game 
(organisations). Institutions change 
slowly, but they are what determine 
the structure of, and possible 
changes in, an economy. In fact, 
if we focus only on the individual 
level as in neoclassical economics, 
it is impossible to see how these 
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bigger dynamics unfold. The case is 
made clear in one of North’s main 
books, which is called “Institutions 
Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance” (noRth, d. 1990). 
The book is in a way a continuation 
of “Structure and Change in 
Economic History” (noRth, d. 
1982). In the earlier book, the author 
had already explored the concept of 
beliefs and ideologies. The former, 
together with norms and culture, 
are defined as “the cumulative 
experience of society passed down 
through culture and formed through 
repeated interactions of many 
people through norms of behaviour” 
(Wallis, j. 2015). Beliefs are the 
continuous and marginal change 
that actors cannot manipulate. They 
are a function of what happened in 
the past and can impede change in 
the present. In a similar way, they 
can be a way to understand why a 
society structures itself in a certain 
way instead of another. Also, why 
a society goes down a certain path 
instead of another one. 
North states that institutions 
are the rules of the game and 
that these rules include formal 
rules, informal rules, and norms 
of behaviours. More precisely, 
institutions are “the humanly 
devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (noRth, d. 1990 
p. 3). For this reason, institutions 
shape the system of incentives. 
They also reduce uncertainty 
by shaping everyday life. The 
scope of institutions is to create a 
stable but not necessarily efficient 
human interaction. In this sense, 
institutions are as well the natural 
outcome of human interaction 
based on the natural limits to human 
capacities for cognition and culture. 
Seeing how cognition and culture 
shape economic performance 
becomes a fundamental problem in 
establishing a framework for how 
institutions influence a particular 
place and time.
The real question is to 
understand if a society is limited 
access order (based on personal 
relations) or open access order 
(based on unpersonal relations). 
The open and limited access 
orders are in fact characterised by 
almost polarised patterns. In the 
open access order, we can witness 
social and economic development, 
contained or almost no negative 
economic growth, rich and vibrant 
civil societies, and bigger and more 
decentralised governments. On the 
other hand, in limited access order 
societies we can find slow-growing 
economies, polities without consent 
of the governed, a relatively small 
number of organisations, smaller 
and centralised governments, 
and a predominance of personal 
relations. This distinction creates a 
rigid dynamic: if you want a more 
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prosperous society, you need to 
have better institutions. If you want 
better institutions, you need better 
rule of law, perpetually living 
organisations and consolidated 
political control of the military.
But how to have better 
institutions? According to this 
paper we should look at the 
relationships between cognition, 
culture, and experience on one 
side; and economic performance 
on the other. We should look at 
institutions as a projection of the 
values of the society they represent. 
Once we do this, we can link the 
values to economic performance to 
categorise societies as open access 
order, limited access order, or a 
combination of the two.
Which beliefs and which 
economic performance 
in Central and Eastern 
Europe?
Central and Eastern Europe 
shows attributes of the open and 
limited access orders. We can 
see sustained economic growth, 
polities with the consent of the 
governed, a relatively small number 
of organisations, and a declining 
civil society. As an external 
observer, it is unclear whether 
personal or impersonal relations 
are predominant. The paper aims 
at looking at this through its 
analysis of cognition, beliefs, and 
culture. This uncertainty is given 
as well by the fact that the focus on 
institutional economics and Eastern 
Europe has so far been focused 
on the transition from planned to 
capitalist economy (neuBeR, a. 
1993; gehlBach, s. – malesKy, 
e. j. 2012). As a consequence, 
is Central and Eastern Europe a 
limited or open access order? Or in 
between?
Other works already tried to 
measure the impact of institutions 
on economic performance 
(TABELLINI 2010). However, the 
difference of this work stands in 
doing it specifically for Hungary 
and by connecting the North 
framework. Hungary is chosen as 
a representative country of Central 
and Eastern Europe. When in fact 
people think about Central and 
Eastern Europe, the idea is more 
about its “convergence towards the 
West” rather than understanding 
its intrinsic characteristics. In 
other words, in a world in which 
neoliberalism hold sway, there 
is no space for the fundamental 
question that should drive social 
sciences: how do we explain the 
political and economic differences 
between countries? And in a way 
influenced by North: can economic 
prosperity and poverty be viewed as 
a consequence of specific cultural 
patterns? And how can we create 
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effective economic institutions?
Economics and Beliefs
The question then becomes: 
how do cognition, culture and 
experience shape economic 
performance? This question is 
much more complicated than it 
looks. It puts together different 
fields, from institutional economics 
to behavioural economics. It takes 
into account microeconomics, 
as it deals with how individuals 
make their choices. On a broader 
sense, economics is the science 
of how individuals organise their 
resources. But do individuals think 
the same when taken singularly and 
in a group? And do they really act 
“rationally based on all available 
information” anyway? 
According to North (noRth, 
d. et al. 2009), a society is the 
aggregate number of individuals 
collectively dealing with a range 
of individual decisions in such 
a way to produce common and 
shared beliefs about choices, 
consequences, and outcomes. This 
is shaped by a fundamental causal 
belief: that there is a connection 
between actions and the world 
around us. 
According to the other main 
authors on the topic (RoBinson, j. 
– acemoglu, d. 2006), individuals 
have indeed well-defined 
preferences over outcomes or the 
consequences of their actions. 
In fact, „They evaluate different 
options, including democracy and 
non-democracy, according to their 
assessment of their (economic and 
social) consequences” (RoBinson, 
j. – acemoglu, d. 2006). However, 
according to the authors, individuals 
act strategically and for this same 
reason, they use game theory as 
a main theoretical framework. In 
contrast, in this work, we assume 
that choices do matter, as in North’s 
framework.
Some of these gaps have 
already been filled. For example, 
Zak (ZaK, p. – KnacK, s. 2005) 
states that „cheating is more likely 
(and trust is, therefore, lower) when 
the social distance between agents 
is larger, formal institutions are 
weaker, social sanctions against 
cheating are ineffective, the amount 
invested is higher, and the investors’ 
wages are lower. (...) when formal 
institutions are weaker, adversely 
impacting income growth”. Other 
contributions are given on the 
impact of size family on economic 
growth (gReiF, a. 2020), and social 
capital and trustworthiness on 
institutions and growth (KeeFeR, p. 
– KnacK, s. 2004).
On a level more connected 
to institutional economics, some 
work has already been done to 
understand the Hungarian case in 
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terms of values and institutions. In 
his paper “Hungary on the world 
value map”, Keller (KelleR t. 
2010) uses the work of Inglehart 
(inglehaRt, R. 1997) to understand 
which characteristics of Hungary 
are outside the other trends and 
peculiar of this specific nation. The 
author maps fifty societies in terms 
of closed-open minded, secular-
rational, and traditional-religious 
approaches. These values are 
selected according to Inglehart’s 
value theory (inglehaRt, R. 1997), 
which categorises the history of all 
human societies into two macro-
phases: modernisation, which 
makes some societies evolve from 
religious to rational beliefs, and 
post-modernisation, which make 
some societies evolve from rational 
to performance-innovation beliefs. 
Inglehart proves this passage 
by analysing more than twenty 
variables. Keller, on the other hand, 
uses three specific dimensions 
extrapolated from this theory and 
from the available European Social 
Survey variables. The author finds 
that, even if adjusted by GDP 
growth, age and education level, 
Hungary comes out at the extremes 
of both “Western” and “orthodox” 
cultures. It also comes out as 
especially closed, based on values 
of self-expression, and rational, as 
based on secular-rational values. 
All of this especially if compared to 
other countries with a similar level 
of economic development, as for 
the year 2009.
IV�1�3� Methodology and 
Variables
As mentioned before, the goal 
is now to map Hungarian values 
and to link them to the economic 
performance. Hungary is once 
again chosen as a representative 
example. This, however, poses 
a number of questions. First and 
foremost, we need to clarify what 
we mean by values. According to 
North, societies change in response 
to random events and according to 
slow but constant dimensions which 
he identifies in cognition, culture, 
and experience. We will here focus 
on tradition and trust, as the main 
elements that characterise the 
difference between a limited access 
and open society. We also imply 
that such a set of shared beliefs 
implies shared ideas about choices, 
consequences, and outcomes. 
We do not focus right now on 
cognition and experience, even if 
we might do that in later works, 
for two different reasons. For what 
concerns the former, it depends on 
the fact that the field itself is still 
at an embryonic stage for what 
concerns macroeconomics. Also, 
the dimension that would be useful 
in terms of institutional economics, 
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which are the social dimensions 
of behavioural economics, can be 
analysed in terms of values and 
beliefs (loeWenstein, g. et al. 2014). 
The social dimensions include trust, 
dishonesty, reciprocity, and social 
norms. For what concerns the latter, 
further work about Hungarian 
culture needs to be explored. 
If we then decide to analyse 
the traditions and trust according to 
North’s framework, we will need 
to select which variables are both 
available in data terms and can be 
linked to the open and limited access 
orders. Such variables ca be found 
in the European Social Survey57. For 
what concerns GDP, this work uses 
the GDP (constant 2010 US$) from 
the World Bank Open Database. 
The percentage variations are also 
calculated using these values. We 
select some countries58 based on the 
57  More specifically the variables are: 
imptrad (Importance of traditions), 
trstep (trust in the European 
parliament), trstplc (trust in the 
police), trstprt (trust in your country’s 
parties), ppltrst (trust in people), trstlgl 
(trust in the legal system), trstplt (trust 
in the politicians).
58  The countries are: Austria (AUT or 
AT), Belgium (BEL or BE), the Czech 
Republic (CZ or CZE), Finland (FIN 
or FI), France (FRA or FR), Germany 
(DEU or DE), Hungary (HUN or 
HU), Ireland (IRL or IE), Italy (ITA 
or IT), the Netherlands (NLD or NL), 
Norway (NOR or NO), Poland (POL 
or PL), Portugal, Switzerland (CH or 
CHE), and the United Kingdom (GBR 
data availability for the longest time 
span possible, which is between 
2002 and 2018. In other words, 
countries are selected on whether 
the data is available for both the first 
and last European Social Survey 
round available. 
We choose the variables that 
better represent the divide between 
a personalistic versus an impersonal 
society. For this reason, we choose 
to look at the level of trust in people, 
in the country’s own parliament, in 
the legal system, in the police, in 
politicians, in political parties, and 
in the European parties. We choose 
such variables because we assume 
that a limited access society would 
have low trust level in supranational 
institutions. We map the variables 
for Hungary and for the year 2018, 
which is the most recent available. 
We also map the importance of 
following customs and traditions as 
it is very representative for what we 
are looking for. 
In the second part we take this 
same variable, the importance of 
following customs and traditions, 
and we calculate the average for 
different countries in Europe and 
across different European Social 
Survey Rounds (from 2002 to 2018). 
We also calculate the average GDP 
growth for the same period, and we 
put the countries on a graph. On the 
vertical axis we have the change 
or BG).
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in the importance of traditions and 
customs, while on the horizontal 
axis we have the variation in gross 
domestic product. We compare the 
average of these variables to other 
countries in Europe to see if there is 
any unusual trend or outlier. Finally, 
we repeat the same exercise, but 
we input the single available years 
for Hungary instead of different 
countries. We have the variation 
of the importance of traditions on 
the vertical axis and the variation 
in gross domestic product on the 
horizontal one.
IV�1�4� Mapping the 
Relevant Beliefs in Hungary 
and Europe
We chart different relevant 
variable according to the institutional 
framework (Figure 12–13). We 
find that Hungary has a normal 
distribution for all variables, but it 
has a high trust level for the police 
and the legal system. On the other 
hand, the country values very much 
traditions and customs.
Figure 12: Levels of Trust and Importance of Traditions in Hungary
Source: Edited by Elena Cossu based on the data of ESS Round 9: European Social 
Survey Round 9 Data (2018). Data file edition 1.2.
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Figure 13: Levels of Trust in Hungary
Source: Edited by Elena Cossu based on the data of ESS Round 9: European Social 
Survey Round 9 Data (2018). Data file edition 1.2.
These figures show us that the 
perception of Hungary as a limited 
access society based on personal 
relations rather than impersonal 
ones is fundamentally wrong 
(Figure 12–13). The country, even 
if the figures are not perfectly 
distributed, shows moderate level 
of trust across all variables.
We calculate the average of 
all the previously shown variables 
(Figure 14) and we put them next to 
each other in reference to different 
countries in Europe.
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Figure 14: Averages of the Levels of Trust and Importance of Traditions in Hungary and 
Other European Countries
Source: Edited by Elena Cossu based on the data of ESS Round 9: European Social 
Survey Round 9 Data (2018). Data file edition 1.2.
Here we see that even 
compared to other countries 
Hungary does not appear as an 
outlier. Also, we can intuitively see 
that on average European countries 
trust the police more than the other 
institutions.
IV�1�5� Change in 
Conservatism and GDP 
Growth in Hungary and 
Europe
Figure 15 shows the most 
interesting result. When we look 
at the change in importance of 
traditions, the more we go right 
the more the country in question 
incremented the level it believed 
traditions were important. For 
example, the fact that Ireland, 
Poland, and Hungary are in 
the right side of the scatterplot 
showed that these three societies 
became increasingly more prone 
to give relevance to traditions 
between the years 2002-2018. 
The GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
variation shows as well that there 
is a correlation between this and 
the importance of traditions. The 
correlation, of course, does not 
imply causation. There are many 
intervening variables that could 
explain the existence of this 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
230
relation, including “the catch-
up” with other economies during 
these years due to historical and 
technical reasons. Nevertheless, 
the institutional economic theory 
would predict that the opening of 
a society towards more impersonal 
relations and more economic 
prosperity go hand in hand. With 
this analysis, we prove that at least 
for what concerns Europe such 
assumption does not hold.
Figure 15: Change in importance of traditions Versus Change in GDP (constant 2010 
US$), 2002-2018
Source: Edited by Elena Cossu based on the data of ESS Round 9: European Social 
Survey Round 9 Data (2018) Data file edition 1.2., and the World Development 
Indicators, The World Bank (2020)
We now want to look at 
one case more specifically to 
undercover the dynamics in this 
process. We take Hungary as one 
major example of becoming less 
democratic while economically 
growing over the years (topliseK, 
a. 2019). We find that except for 
the recent years, and 2018 more 
specifically, Hungary did prove the 
paradigm of impersonal relations 
and economic growth correct 
(Figure 16). However, in recent 
years, the tendency has turned 
with higher relevance of traditions 
and sustained economic growth. 
The reasons for such turn could be 
multiple and go beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, they show 
a new model worth exploring in the 
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future.
Figure 16: Average in importance of traditions Versus GDP (constant 2010 US$) for 
Hungary, selected years
Source: Edited by Elena Cossu based on the data of ESS Round 9: European Social 
Survey Round 9 Data (2018) Data file edition 1.2., and the World Development 
Indicators, The World Bank (2020)
IV�1�6� Conclusion
The analysis of the level of 
trust and the importance of traditions 
in relation to the gross domestic 
product variations showed that the 
institutional economics paradigm is 
not reflected in the data concerning 
Europe for the years 2002-2018. 
The overmentioned paradigm is one 
that states that the more impersonal 
societies and economic prosperity 
go hand in hand. In reality, what we 
see is that an increase in preferences 
toward customs and tradition goes 
hand in hand with more gross 
domestic product growth. This 
implies multiple things. First, it 
suggests that countries that have 
grown in the last two decades have 
a different pattern compared to the 
ones that developed their potential 
in previous times. However, it 
also shows the Hungary is a prime 
example of something in between a 
limited and an open access society, 
or more specifically a system 
both tending to conservatism and 
economic prosperity.
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Iv.2. Companies in Different States: the 
common logic of free trade agreements and 
transfer pricing
esZteR Kovács59
Abstract
This paper explores the strategic decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
selling their products to related parties in international markets. In order to minimize cost 
and maximize profit, companies manipulate their intrafirm activities: they set the transfer 
price (TP), change the location of their operations (by production displacement, providing 
services etc.), or create artificial transactions. These patterns guide the formulation of 
some theory and the development of a microeconomic model. The optimal choices firms 
make depend heavily on three considerations: where the competitive advantages are at a 
higher level, where lower tax and tariff rates are paid, and where to produce at a lower 
level of cost. Firms’ reactions to a given import tariff or corporate income tax (CIT) 
are illustrated by game theory. We identify companies and countries as common actors 
in economies and examine interactions between them with a scenario analysis of the 
8-way interaction. We concentrate on an MNE perspective and evaluate the cooperating 
behavior of inter-companies which take actions to reach higher profit levels in our game. 
The game is continued and free trade agreements (FTAs) appear. Profit still retains its 
centrally important role to multinational enterprises well beyond other political interests. 
The results suggest that a situation where the lower tax rates combined with eliminated 
tariff rates generate greater profitability to MNEs.
Keywords: free trade agreements, multinational enterprises, transfer pricing, 
game theory
59  Corvinus University of Budapest, PhD student, eszterkovacs.hun@gmail.com
IV�2�1� Introduction and 
relationship to the literature
Tariff and tax policies have 
frequently been analyzed, since 
free trade agreements have spread 
all over the world. However, 
modelling the interactions between 
intra-group firms and their 
operating environment (depending 
on tariffs, taxes, and regulations) 
through game theory has not been 
probed by many papers. Global 
trade trends have changed, since 
modern free trade agreements 
may result not just in free trade, 
but in the elimination of non-
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tariff barriers. This phenomenon 
creates increased intra-firm trade 
between related companies which 
are determined to transfer prices 
to maximize their profits. Some 
researchers have provided evidence 
of this. For example, Blouin and 
others argued that transfer prices 
are used for corporate tax and tariff 
savings (Blouin, j. et al. 2018). 
The application possibility of 
game theory offers another view, 
since compared to usual economic 
models the actors’ decisions can 
also be modelled. Modelling of 
economic situations with the help 
of game theory has been adopted 
by researchers and economists. 
The mainstream decision-making 
evaluation approaches introduce 
different actors in a trade policy who 
contribute to the desired outcomes. 
The strategic interdependence 
among countries’ tariff-setting 
decisions was first illustrated by 
Harry Johnson (johnson, h. 1953). 
He regarded tariffs as the outcome 
of a static game, where the rules 
are the following: there are two 
countries – two goods, and the 
players are welfare-maximizing 
governments. Gowa and Mansfield 
report an application of the 
prisoner’s dilemma which is the 
standard optimal tariff game (goWa, 
j. – mansField, e. d. 1993). In a 
multinational enterprise context, 
several researches have focused on 
the context of country-firm relations. 
Rosenthal studies the problem of 
setting transfer prices in a vertically 
integrated supply chain with a 
cooperative game (Rosenthal, e. 
2008). Pogorelova examines the 
complex nature of transfer pricing 
with the determination of strategic 
considerations of organizations 
guiding the application of game 
theoretic models (pogoRelova, l. 
2015). Sung and others study the 
impact of rule of origin (ROO) 
requirements, accompanied by 
free trade agreements (FTAs), on 
a multinational firm’s production 
decisions (sung, h. l. et al. 2016). 
Zissimos identifies a new terms-
of-trade externality related tariff 
setting (Zissimos, B. 2009).
While prior literature finds 
evidence that corporate income 
taxes or tariff rates separately 
influence on MNEs’ transfer pricing 
behavior, the literature has not 
addressed the two considerations 
together from a game theoretical 
perspective.
In this paper, we develop 
a model and investigate a game 
involving the introduction of 
strategies, and the selection of 
the best strategy for a corporate 
group. It could be a new, newly 
approach in the literature. Our 
goal in developing the model is to 
provide a simple rationale for the 
MNEs’ behaviour. Choosing the 
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best option means the highest profit 
for players. Determining what is 
optimal is based on the responses to 
several questions: What prices are 
set by related parties? Is it known 
how much the firms should pay via 
tariffs or taxes to a certain country? 
How will a parent company and its 
affiliates react to a given set of tariff 
or tax rate changes? As a result, 
theoretical results are obtained.
IV�2�2� Boundaries have 
disappeared, players have 
become interconnected
The appearance of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
and the creation of free trade 
agreements around the world has 
continued to increase for over half 
a century. These processes have 
opened the borders of national 
economies, in both economic 
and physical terms. MNEs have 
integrated their processes, while 
countries have chosen a certain form 
of interaction. In the early years, the 
major principle was liberalization 
under non–discrimination; since 
then this trend has shifted to the 
creation of free trade agreements. 
With the “modernization” of 
these agreements, the concept 
has changed; now FTAs mean the 
elimination of tariff-, and non-
tariff barriers (GEP 2015). The 
importance of access to mutual 
benefits has drawn attention to the 
fact that there is a need for close 
cooperation among economic 
actors. As Freund and Ornelas 
highlight (FReund, c. – oRnelas, 
e. 2010), the most popular form of 
reciprocal trade liberalization in the 
past 15 years has been the regional 
trade agreement (RTA). On 9 March 
2020, 304 RTAs were in effect 
(homepage of Wto dataBase).
The Cobden–Chevalier 
Treaty was the first modern bilateral 
trade agreement between Britain 
and France. It was concluded in 
1860 when France eliminated 
import barriers to British 
manufactured goods. Britain in turn 
removed import prohibitions from 
French commodities. Each country 
reduced its tariffs and granted 
the other most-favored-nation 
(MFN) consideration. After the 
1944 Bretton Woods conference, 
intergovernmental economic 
relations and interactions emerged. 
In 1948, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
became the first multilateral trade 
agreement, with 23 signatories. 
It included more than 45,000 
tariff concessions. The Uruguay 
Round negotiated between 1986 
and 1994 created the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995 with 
the signatures of the contracting 
parties. The WTO extended 
reductions in duty to services, 
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created the dispute settlement 
procedure and negotiated 
intellectual property rules for the 
first time. Regional trade agreements 
created under the first wave of 
regionalism are inactive today, due 
to political and economic changes. 
In the 1990s, increased economic 
interdependence prompted the 
creation of new organizations; 
thus the second wave was more 
successful (Kutasi g. 2014).
Several different types of 
interactions are possible, inter 
alia, extending through a gradual 
deepening of interactions in 
four stages: 1. competition, 2. 
coordination, 3. cooperation, and 
4. integration. Economic relations 
begin with a mutual understanding 
that brings participants together. 
In the world economy global 
conditions have changed and 
interdependency has intensified as 
international collaborations have 
emerged in the last fifty years 
(palánKai t. et al. 2014). There is 
an impressive amount of literature 
that examines trade relations, 
their aspects, features and effects; 
however, many theories tend to 
increase the confusion, rather than 
aid understanding. Interactions are 
analyzed from many points of view. 
In this paper, I refrain from 
analyzing international economic 
relations in terms of distinctions 
among competition, coordination, 
cooperation and integration, but I 
introduce intra-group transactions 
as a necessary part of global free 
trade. Therefore, I argue that any 
type of interaction may be preferred. 
Competition refers to conflicting 
parties who are involved in a 
game to gain certain advantages. 
Coordination assumes a kind of 
commitment, a willingness to 
displacement towards the other 
party. Commitment is not certain 
in this case. Cooperation means 
compliance with rules which are 
derived from commitment. In this 
situation, the commitment is certain, 
and parties only decide on the 
degree of interaction. Integration 
occurs when parties choose a form 
of commitment, and determine 
the degree of dependence. Table 4 
shows these strategic options, with 
darker tones indicating stronger 
characteristics (Feldstein, m. s. 
1988).
willingness to 
commitment interaction interdependency
competition
coordination
cooperation
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willingness to 
commitment interaction interdependency
integration
Table 4: Types of integrations by the gradual deepening of their characteristics
Source: Edition of the author
These concepts introduce the 
optional strategy of players from 
a game theoretical perspective. 
In game theory, coordination is 
the harmonization of individual 
interests, while cooperation occurs 
when the individual’s actions are 
directed to a common purpose 
that does not necessarily coincide 
with the individual’s own interests 
(KócZy á. l. 2006). In this research, 
I deal with only the cooperation of 
corporate group members.
In the global economy, all 
participants’ common cooperation 
is better placed to achieve higher 
global growth, while individual 
instances of cooperation by actors 
does/do not necessarily generate 
higher utility. That is why we have 
to differentiate between utility, 
profit, and the welfare level. On the 
microeconomic level, customers 
may cooperate or compete in 
order to acquire greater utility. 
Global companies, in general, 
compete with each other to 
maximize utility, while intragroup 
cooperation creates increased profit 
for members, and cooperation 
between nations generates higher 
welfare for countries. Frieden and 
others  highlight the importance 
of international cooperation, since 
uncoordinated national policies 
have caused global crises (FRieden, 
j. et al. 2012). However, this study 
only shows the generally accepted 
view and does not deal with extreme 
opinions.
A number of empirical 
research studies have demonstrated 
that free trade agreements appear 
to have a relatively large positive 
effect on the behavior of a 
multinational firm within a free 
trade area. Antrás and Foley pointed 
out that increased multinational 
firm activity in a regional free trade 
area is likely to generate benefits 
within the region, as multinationals 
typically exhibit high levels of 
productivity, pay high wages, and 
create positive spillovers for other 
firms (antRás, p. – Foley, F. 2009). 
CHEN (2009) highlighted that an 
increasing number of multinational 
firms move their production inside 
an integrated zone, and benefits 
are generated by lower costs and 
better access to markets; thus free 
trade agreements are dedicated to 
achieving global economic growth. 
International trade transactions 
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involve complex issues, and thus 
must be examined jointly. 
Before making a decision on 
a transfer price, firms must consider 
the possible revenue, the costs 
of their activities, and preferable 
taxation and tariff assumptions, 
particularly when corporate group 
members operate in a broad 
international network and their 
activities are highly integrated. 
Many examinations have analyzed 
optimal MNE strategies (hyde, 
c. e. – choe, c. 2005; düRR, o. 
m. – gÖX, R. F. 2011). Different 
countries may prescribe different 
administrative requirements that 
may create additional options to 
maximize profit. Global firms need 
to comply with tax and tariff laws, 
while countries tax their profits.
Modern free trade 
agreements
The general trend is that 
modern trade agreements consist 
of eliminating tariff and nontariff 
barriers (free movement of capital 
flows), protecting intellectual 
property rights (patents, copyright), 
operating investor-state dispute 
settlements (ISDS), and rule of 
origin (ROO) regulations, and 
harmonizing regulatory standards 
(lauRsen, F. 2003; gnangnon, s. 
K. 2018; RodRiK, d. 2018). When 
a government’s economic policy 
is carried out concerning trade 
and the enhancement of welfare, 
it essentially creates winners 
and losers in the economy. This 
situation provides a context to 
investigate which scenario brings 
greater economic benefits to various 
players.
It is especially important 
to note the rule of origin, which 
determines product requirements 
regarding the “made in” label. 
FTA members export to other 
member countries without tariffs, 
but the regulation requires that the 
exported product should originate 
from a member country. Most FTAs 
(CETA, NAFTA, EU – Mexico 
FTA, etc.) apply the ROO in several 
product categories.
Main characteristics of a 
corporate group
A general presentation of 
MNEs helps to understand the 
optimal strategy of these firms, 
which is profit maximization. 
MNEs’ core activity describes the 
participants’ contributions to value 
creation and highlights the main 
functions, risks and assets used by 
members within the group. Their 
business activity helps to understand 
how the profit is allocated between 
subsidiaries. A corporate group 
divides its activities into divisions 
(such as procurement, production, 
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wholesale, services, marketing, 
logistics etc.) and places them in 
the relevant markets (yao, l. – 
yinZheng, s. 2016).
Firms and transfer prices
The operation of MNEs 
includes several intercompany 
transactions between related 
parties. To price these transactions, 
companies use a transfer price (TP) 
that could be below, above or equal 
to the real market price. “Transfer 
prices are the prices at which an 
enterprise transfers physical goods 
and intangible property or provides 
services to associated enterprises.” 
(OECD, 2017 p. 17.) 
The taxable profit of entities 
is based on the transfer prices that 
have been used among parties. 
Normally, TP would alter the 
calculated profit before tax of 
entities but this does not affect how 
that combined profit is split between 
the related parties. Consequently, 
this means that profit will shift from 
one country to another. If those 
entities are taxpayers in different 
countries, transfer pricing therefore 
affects the share of that combined 
profit taxable by each country.
Pricing in line with the 
“arm’s length principle”
According to international 
standards, all participants in a 
corporate group must be taxed on 
the basis that they act following 
the arm’s length principle in their 
transactions. The OECD (2017) 
highlights the importance of real 
pricing and determines the arm’s 
length principle in Article 9 (1) 
of the OECD Tax Convention: 
„[When] conditions are made or 
imposed between ... two [associated] 
enterprises in their commercial 
or financial relations which differ 
from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, 
then any profits which would, but 
for those conditions, have accrued 
to one of the enterprises, but, by 
reason of those conditions, have 
not so accrued, may be included 
in the profits of that enterprise and 
taxed accordingly.” The principle is 
a comparison between dependent 
and independent parties.
IV�2�3� Model
In this section, we develop a 
simple extension of microeconomic 
profit model and set up a game 
to define and analyze players’ 
possibilities concerning profit 
maximization. For this experiment, 
we use a 3 player – 3 country game, 
and determine the combinations 
of these factors, thus the model 
contains 8 strategies (Figure 17). 
Under perfect information 
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conditions, players will select an 
option that is the best strategy for 
profit maximizing.
Three basic elements are 
required and established to create 
and use a game theoretic model: 
the players, the laws of a game 
(strategies), and the consequences 
of the players’ choices (payoff). 
The object of the game is to find 
the winning strategy, or strategies 
(aXelRod, R. – hamilton, W. d. 
1981; KócZy á. l. 2006; colman, 
a. m. – gold, n. 2017).
players N = {3}
strategies S = {Scenarios}
payoffs π = {Profit of a player}
Table 5: Basic elements of the game
Source: Edition of the author
To set up a game, it is 
necessary to set axioms. According 
to Neumann and Morgenstein 
(neumann j. – moRgenstein, o. 
1944), utility theorem rational 
behavior operates under axioms, 
which are completeness, transitivity, 
continuity, and independence. 
An individual who has to decide 
when faced with the probabilistic 
consequences of different choices 
is to behave as if the players were 
maximizing the expected value 
of some function. In future, this 
is defined in terms of the possible 
outcomes at some specified point. 
Axiom 1. Completeness: either M 
is preferred, L is preferred, or the 
individual is indifferent. L < M, M 
< L, L ~ M; 
Axiom 2. Transitivity: assumes that 
preferences are consistent across 
any three options. If L < M and M < 
L, then L < N, and similarly for ~; 
Axiom 3. Continuity: if L ≤ M ≤ N, 
then there exists a probability p ϵ 
[0,1], such that pL + (1 – p) N ~ M; 
Axiom 4. Independence: if L ≤ M, 
then for any N and p ϵ [0,1], pL + 
(1 – p) N ≤ pM + (1 – p) N.
Assumptions: The players are 
interconnected, they are parts of a 
corporate group and cooperate with 
each other: the producer subsidiary 
(P) procures the materials from 
its input provider company (I), 
manufactures final goods in 
country B and sells the products 
to its other related party, who is a 
Distributor (D). Company P has 
two options for procuring input 
materials, and two options for 
selling: from inside, or outside of 
country B. Country B and Country 
C are potential FTA members, 
while Country C is outside the 
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agreements (Figure 17). Country 
A has both a location advantage 
relating to inputs and a corporate 
income tax advantage, while 
country B has low factor skills. The 
governments apply a variant CIT 
rate (t) on reported profit. Without 
a free trade agreement, if two of the 
three countries (namely countries 
B and C) interact, a specific tariff 
rate (T) is applied on import goods, 
according to ROO. Country B does 
not impose tariffs on raw materials 
imported from country A. Firm I 
provides all the input materials to 
Company P, while P sells all its 
products to Company D. Products 
are homogenous. Finally, we 
assume that t^C>t^B> t^A. Given 
these assumptions, we expect the 
three players to seek greater benefit 
in their strategies.
Figure 17: (a) (b): Model
Source: Edition of the author
For the sake of simplicity, 
the research does not address the 
allocation of costs to certain types 
of costs, except in situations where 
this may be explicitly necessary for 
the analysis of the corporate income 
taxes and tariff examined, as the 
division of revenues is not intended 
to be discussed; therefore, we use a 
simple variant of general equation 
of profit used in microeconomics.
The players’ decisions are 
not centralized, but they can make 
decisions together; thus their 
choices depend on the decisions 
made by states. Although states 
are actors in our game, in this 
research study, we analyze only the 
MNEs’ perspectives and reactions 
to a certain settlement made by a 
government.
In our transfer pricing 
problem, we formulate a 
cooperative game with total profit 
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sharing. In cooperative games, 
parties are allowed to formulate 
coalitions in order to reach higher 
profits. It can happen that a player 
creates significant advantages for 
the others at his/her own expense 
(aXelRod, R. – hamilton, W. d. 
1981).
The structure of this game 
needs to be generalized according to 
game theoretic settings. Supposed 
that the three players are presented 
with their options.
With three intra-group firms 
and three countries in the model, 
we are able to define the following 
strategies from the producer’s point 
of view.
Figure 18: Decision-tree for companies’ profit analysis
Source: Edition of the author
To construct a payoff matrix 
for the model, we obtain the profits 
for all companies and scenarios. Let 
the set of total revenue include the 
price and quantity of products sold 
to the other related party. Let the 
set of total costs include the cost of 
materials and goods sold to relevant 
companies, and operating as well as 
other costs.
In our model, we use the 
following abbreviations.
i: index (I; P; D) to represent the companies, respectively
xi: product quantity
pi: price applied by company i
ci: company i’s costs
TRi: company i’s total revenue
TCi: company i’s total costs
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πi: company i’s profit according to strategic options
t: tax rate (different in country A, B, and C)
τ: tariff rate applied by country C
ri: raw material price appearing in companies I, P and D
fi: final goods production price relating to companies P and D
m: margin applied by company D
oi: operating expenses appearing in company i
ei: Other costs appearing in Company i
ρ: rule of origin value (0< ρ >1)
Table 6: List of mathematical symbols used in determining profit
Source: Edition of the author
Option 1 When all members of a corporate group operate in country 
B, tariff payment obligation cannot be interpreted. Regarding tax payments, 
the three companies are obliged to pay the same CIT rate (t^B). Therefore, 
Company I’s profit is:
on condition that the three firms’ costs and product prices are as 
follows:
The corporate group’s total profit is:
Option 2 The corporate group decides to appear in foreign markets, 
so the producer exports the products to its related party D, to country C. 
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In this situation, the distributor firm faces a tariff rate (τ) and a higher CIT 
rate (t^C) compared to option 1. Companies I and P’s profits are as in eqs. 
(1). In country C, as the government imposes a tariff rate on import goods, 
and determines a CIT rate, its profit is:
with full corporate group profits as in eqs. (2).
Option 3 The headquarters of the MNE is obliged to reallocate its 
profits to a lower CIT rate country, thus one part of the value chain is 
moved to another country. Since the corporate tax rate is the lowest in 
country A, the materials have been imported and shipped from country A, 
and the final products have been sold to D, operating in country B. The 
manufacturer and the wholesaler MNEs’ profit is determined as in eqs. (1); 
Company I’ s profit is given by:
The full corporate group profit is derived from eqs. (2).
Option 4 When the corporate group locates its input production in 
country A and exports the final product to its distributor, a related party 
operating in country C, it faces a lower tax rate, and a tariff rate compared 
to option 1. The lower level of CIT increases, while the tariff rate reduces 
the total corporate profit. I’s profit is as in eqs. (4), P’s profit as in egs. (1), 
and D’s profit as in eqs. (3).
Option 5 All corporate group members operate in country B, thus 
tariff elimination has no influence on the members’ profit levels.
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Option 6 Company P procures its input goods in country B, and sells 
the final goods in country C. Firm D decides to comply with ROO to make 
tariff-tree transactions, which is why it produces inputs within the free 
trade agreement. 
Option 7 Company I (located in country A) provides its input 
materials to Company P (located in country B), which produces and sells 
the final goods in country B. For tax optimization, all members of the 
company group are able to manipulate transfer prices.
Option 8 The procurement process occurs from country A, while 
final goods are sold to country C. In this situation, the corporate group is 
forced to make a choice. On the one hand, if it manipulates the transfer 
prices to save profits in country A, where the lowest tax is, it will only be 
able to obtain its raw materials at a high price. 
On the other hand, if it intends to exploit the benefits of a free 
trade agreement, the company is not able to manipulate transfer prices to 
precisely the point where:
IV�2�4� Analysis of results
In a game theoretic model, 
rational players must select the best 
strategy among all alternatives in 
order to maximize their rewards 
(CHEN 2008), which, at the same 
time, is the purpose of the game. 
 If all players operate in 
country B, they will all reach a 
different level of profit. At the 
group level, the corporate group’s 
payoff is B, which means a certain 
profit level is included in tax rate 
(see options 1 and 5).
In option 2, since it is 
necessary to pay tariffs, and the 
CIT rate is the highest in country C, 
it is certain that the total profit level 
is lower than in option 1, thus the 
payoff is worse than in country B. 
Let this payoff be E.
Regarding options 3 and 7, we 
face the lowest tax rate in country A, 
and as the corporate group allocates 
its profits to country A, this is the 
most profitable of all the options. 
Let this scenario’s payoff be A.
Options 4 and 6 suggest a 
complicated structure, which is 
why it is hard to define the payoff; 
however, we can be certain that it is 
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worse than B, although it is better 
than in option 2. Let this payoff be 
C or D.
Finally, concerning option 
8, if the MNEs are committed to 
comply with ROO, they cannot 
move their profits; at least, not as 
much as they can in options 3 and 
7. In that case, where the value 
added to a product created within 
a free trade agreement is less than 
the ROO value, the distributor 
company has to pay customs duties, 
but is able to manipulate its transfer 
prices. Therefore, the payoff of this 
option is worse than A, but better 
than D.
The predicted strategies of the 
game are presented as a solution:
Table 7: Payoff matrix for Companies I, P, and D
Source: Edition of the author
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
248
and to be a game, in the strong 
sense, the following conditions 
must hold for the payoffs:
A > B>C>D>E
With these options 
determined, we showed why three 
rational players might cooperate, 
even if it appears that it is in their 
individual interest not to do so. 
We conclude that rule 
of origin and transfer pricing 
are essential parts of analyzing 
multinational enterprises and 
free trade agreements, since they 
influence the players’ strategies on 
both sides: on the corporate and the 
government side.
Reviewing these options, we 
assume trade liberalization usually 
lowers import prices, benefitting 
the importer country. However, 
rules of origin affect exporter 
companies’ decisions regarding raw 
material procurement or production 
location.
MNE’s profit allocation 
activity across countries is more 
likely when the tax gap is large. 
When exporting within the FTA, 
firms have to give up profit 
shifting, at least to ensure value 
added criteria can be preserved. It 
should be noticed that even though 
companies sell products without 
tariffs, it does not mean they 
benefit from free trade, even if they 
manipulate their transfer prices. 
Our model can explain this fact.
IV�2�5� Conclusion
Model based analysis with 
game theory offers a relatively 
broad introduction to multinational 
enterprises’ strategic decisions 
concerning profit maximization. 
The main objective of this paper 
was to determine and characterize 
the optimal decisions of players. 
Our theoretical analyses focused 
on the behavior of multinational 
enterprises. We used a game 
theoretic model to analyze how 
firms react to different corporate 
taxes. In addition to our work, we 
presented the effects of nontariff 
rates. The relationship between 
tariffs and taxes created different 
strategies which are applicable to 
large corporations.
Our main findings are 
the following: Firstly, a firm’s 
strategy necessarily changes when 
the additional tariff disappears 
compared to the original sets. A 
free trade agreement increases 
the profits after tax of an MNE. 
Secondly, raising the tax rate 
encourages the company to shift its 
profits to another country where tax 
rates are lower. Thirdly, reciprocal 
tariff elimination – ceteris paribus 
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– affects the company’s decisions 
relating transfer pricing. These 
findings are in line with the general 
economic view and are in close 
accord with the real corporate 
decisions, and might describe the 
main characteristics of a corporate 
group concerning its profit 
maximizing activities.
As a final note, analyzing 
FTAs with ROO, we conclude 
ROO has a positive and negative 
effect at the same time; it can be 
a good tool for tax authorities to 
prevent profit allocation, but also a 
poor tool, since firms stop utilizing 
tariff concessions to relocate their 
activities in order to save profits.
We have introduced an MNE 
perspective, but there remains room 
for further research. It is intriguing 
to investigate how states react to 
MNEs’ decisions: i.e. What is the 
degree of the concessions? What 
are parties willing to advance to 
each other in terms of optimal 
tariffs and tax rates set.
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Iv.3. the Institutional Economics approach 
to Populism: Precising the theoretical-
Methodological framework
máté mátyás60
Abstract
This work follows up on Zoltán Ádám’s similarly titled article presented and 
published at the International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth of the 
Corvinus University of Budapest. It undertakes the same effort of investigating the question 
of what populism is and how it may be conceptualised in the institutional economics 
context. However, this work arrives at rather different findings. It brings in a broader 
range of literature on populism studies and connects them through electoral behaviour 
to institutional economics. For more contrast, it also applies the same case study method 
Ádám uses focusing on post-communist Hungary. As a result, with identical transaction 
cost considerations, this paper makes the case that instead of a “a form of government that 
reduces political uncertainties inherently present in liberal democracies”, more feasibly, 
populism is a political behaviour – a strategy utilised by political actors aimed at reducing 
political and economic competition. The work demonstrates how this conceptualisation 
makes more precise operationalisation and analysis possible by re-interpreting Ádám’s 
analysis of Hungary’s post-transition political economy; and concludes with proposing 
novel considerations of populism as a universal, global political economic phenomenon.
Keywords: populism, institutional economy, political economy, political 
economic transition
60  PhD Student – CUB IR Doctoral School, mmatyas@usc.edu
IV�3�1� Introduction: 
populism as stable 
governance?
In a pioneering contribution 
to the understanding of populism, 
Ádám writes that institutional 
economics stands to contribute 
to the understanding of a widely 
contested, infamously slippery 
phenomenon. (ádám Z. 2018) 
Very similar in its structure and 
goal to (ZanKina, e. 2016), the two 
studies choose somewhat different 
strategies to define populism and 
demonstrate its mechanisms – 
yet arrive at similarly alarming 
conclusions. Both claim that 
populism is about reducing 
transaction costs, therefore, it is a 
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rational choice of the electorate. 
But they caution how populism 
“hollows out” democracy and the 
rule of law61. Going one step further, 
Ádám sees little room for limiting 
such anti-democratic tendencies 
because as he argues, populism 
may be seen as the coveted stability 
by many62.
Therefore, getting the 
“stability aspect” of populism right 
is crucial. Indeed, Ádám himself 
cautions from characterising 
populism fully stable63. The present 
61  “…I argue that populist parties 
create a democratic and institutional 
deficit and contribute to a shift 
from representative to procedural 
democracy. Although the ‘soft’ 
populists do not contest the principles 
of democratic governance, their 
increased use of informal power 
coupled with procedural but value-
empty adherence to democracy 
threatens the very foundation of 
democratic rule which is a priori 
value-driven.” (ZanKina, e. 2016 p. 
195.)
62  “…more predictable and hence 
eliminates a considerable amount of 
uncertainties surrounding political 
exchange is the survival of the regime 
with its patterns of redistribution 
and allocation of power. In societies 
characterized by a limited capacity 
of people to hold their government 
accountable and impose checks on 
power, such political stability appears 
attractive as opposed to its alternative, 
which is essentially anarchy.” (ádám 
Z. 2018 p. 95.)
63  “this is not to say that predictability 
of political actions increases from the 
study directs the attention to this 
paradox. Agreeing with the goals 
set out by the said analyses64, this 
study aims to give a contrasting 
account of populism’s definition 
and consequences by arguing 
that populism, in essence, does 
not “reduce transactional costs” 
(ZanKina, e. 2016 p. 182.) equally 
for every relevant actor (or groups 
thereof). Rather, populism is a 
political strategy which aims to 
create differentiated transaction 
costs. While it cuts transaction 
costs for some, it raises for others; 
and the repeated, intentional 
application of this strategy – rather 
than utilising a specific ideology – 
is what essentially makes an actor 
populist. The strategic selection of 
whose transaction costs decrease – 
who get included in the populists’ 
alliance – as opposed to whose 
transaction costs increase, will get 
excluded is the essence of populist 
political strategy.
To support this point, the 
paper adopts a strategy in three 
point of view of individual political or 
business actors.” (ibid.)
64  “…to understand what makes 
populism a rational choice for an 
increasing number of people in an 
increasing number of people in an 
increasing number of countries. I 
assume the underlying reasons have to 
do with the terms of political exchange 
in democracies (…) with political 
transaction costs” (ádám Z. 2018 p. 
63.)
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major sections. First, it reviews and 
compares the literature on which 
both Ádám and Zankina build. 
This entails the brief overview of 
the transaction cost concept-related 
institutional economics scholarship 
and how it is related to populism 
studies in both authors’ work. It finds 
that additional strands of populism 
conceptualisations need to be added 
– and the explicit link between the 
sustained support for populism is 
missing in both works. Hence the 
literature basis is augmented with 
a brief consideration of electoral 
behaviour. This motivates the 
theoretical choices in the second 
section, the case study analysis. 
In it, after justifying the analytical 
strategy and the case selection, 
the paper investigates the political 
economy of mass media in post-
communist Hungary 1989–2020 
qualitatively. The third main 
section re-contextualises the 
findings: the conclusion that 
populism is a political strategy of 
imposing differentiated transaction 
costs and offers new ways of 
researching the phenomenon. A 
summary concludes. The study 
implies that there is a narrow path 
for more optimistic evaluations of 
the chances of non-populist politics 
in eastern Europe. Populism is not 
found to be as stable as the already 
existing accounts suggest, some 
of the possible pain points – as 
argued, primarily in the media – are 
identifiable.
IV�3�2� Comparative 
literature review: linking 
institutional economics 
and populism scholarships 
through electoral behaviour
Institutional economics: 
transaction costs
It is curious that in spite of 
the fact transaction costs are central 
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to both Zankina’s and Ádám’s 
accounts, neither of them clearly 
define the concept in their texts65. 
The most explicit and detailed 
description in their cited literature 
is found in (FuRuBotn, e. g. – 
RichteR, R. 2005 p. 48.)66. This 
terminology merits closer attention 
because focusing on it leads to 
analytical choices that are different 
from the Bulgarian and Hungarian 
case studies of populisms. Namely, 
since transaction costs pertain 
to the functioning of different 
institutions, they are likely to be 
different for different institutions 
– and are born by diverse sets of 
decision-makers in diverse ways. 
Although they are rarely quantified 
65  However, they both refer to the same 
body of institutional economics when 
evoking the term. They include the 
seminal works of Coase, Williamson, 
Douglass-North, Olson, etc. in both 
accounts.
66  “…transaction costs include the costs 
of resources utilized for the creation, 
maintenance, use, change, and so on 
of institutions and organizations (…) 
transaction costs consist of the costs of 
defining and measuring resources or 
claims, plus the costs of utilizing and 
enforcing the rights specified. Applied 
to the transfer of existing property 
rights and the establishment or transfer 
of contract rights between individuals 
(or legal entities), transaction costs 
include the costs of information, 
negotiation, and enforcement.” 
(FuRuBotn, e. g. – RichteR, R. 2005 
p. 48.)
(Williamson, o. e. 1985), distinct 
interests (and interest groups) 
may very well arise67 based on the 
differentiated effects of transaction 
cost increases and reductions. 
This diversity blunts the uniform 
analysis of “social costs”: one 
cannot suppose a uniform effect of 
the same transaction cost change 
on different actors and groups 
thereof. These diverse effects 
require a differentiated treatment 
of transaction cost analysis with 
a keen attention as to who is the 
subject of transaction cost changes; 
67  That transaction costs are specific to 
certain individual organisations and 
institutions is in line with most of 
the literature, not only deduced from 
(FuRuBotn, e. g. – RichteR, R. 2005 
p. 48.). e.g. Dahlman analyses them 
“...assuming the existence of some 
side effects, namely, a difference 
between social and private costs...” 
(dahlman, c. j. 1979 p. 144.) As 
this study has been conducted from 
a constructionist point of view (akin 
to that of the selectorate theory 
(mesquita de, B. B. et al. 2003), 
relational sociology (donati, p. 
ed. 2011; dépelteau, F. – poWell, 
c. j. eds.), agent-centric historical 
institutionalism (schaRpF, F. W. 1997; 
Büthe, t. 2016), it also points out that 
“social costs” are also born by specific 
individuals (or groups thereof) which 
may also have further distinct political 
and economic implications – not to be 
treated uniform across the board when 
understanding social and political 
economic macrophenomena (mayntZ, 
R. – schaRpF, F. W. eds. 1995 p. 44.).
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which stakeholder, interest group, 
network is impacted by what kind 
of change and how it affects their 
perceptions of interests and political 
economic outlook.
 Moreover, such a detailed 
definition also helps to establish 
different categories of the 
concepts. Williamson creates a 
three-fold categorisation: search 
and information costs, bargaining 
and decision costs, policing and 
enforcement costs68 (Williamson, 
o. e. 1985). What complicates 
the transaction cost analysis of 
populism is the above referenced 
inevitable diversity of a massive 
macro-phenomenon: different sorts 
of actors undertaking different sorts 
of transactions. As emphasised by 
Ádám, there are formal and informal 
transactions – in the author’s 
judgement, institutions – at play; 
but perhaps even more importantly, 
private–private economic (on 
the market), government–private 
economic (legal-regulatory) 
and political (voting) exchanges 
complicating transaction cost 
considerations. The three 
categories of transaction costs may 
have different weights in different 
contexts. Due to populism being the 
central concept of this investigation, 
68  In his revised version of the paper 
published a year later (ádám Z. 
2019), Ádám also introduces these 
distinctions – as also discussed later.
this study elects to focus mostly on 
government–private exchanges. 
To better understand the links and 
applicability of transaction costs 
in the populism context, the next 
subchapter turns to the scholarship 
of the concept of populism.
The concept of populism
In both case studies of 
Bulgaria and Hungary, the authors 
resort to somewhat dissimilar 
conceptualisations of populism – 
and draw conclusions from those. 
In the comprehensive overview of 
populism scholarship (gidRon, n. 
– BoniKoWsKi, B. 2013), the vast 
array of populism definitions can be 
divided into three major groups: the 
ideational (e.g. mudde, c. 2017), 
discursive stylistic (moFFitt, B. 
2016), and the political mobilisation 
(termed political strategic here)69 
traditions (Weyland, K. 2001; 
2017). Perhaps the biggest 
weakness in Ádám’s account is 
that it discounts the entire strategic 
school of thought to the point of 
not mentioning it70. Nevertheless, 
arguably, the strategic approach 
69  This is also based on, and compatible 
with the structure of the authoritative 
handbook on populism. (KaltWasseR, 
c. R. et al. eds. 2017)
70  Although the work refers to 
(Weyland, K. 2001; pappas, t. s. 
2014; mülleR, j.-W. 2016), but their 
core findings are not utilised.
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is the most compatible with the 
conceptual and methodological 
toolkit of institutional economics. 
This is because to link ideological 
and discursive stylistic 
understandings of populism with 
institutional economic outcomes, 
one must suppose that policymaking 
is based on policymakers’ 
ideological considerations or what 
they explicitly express. However, 
especially in the context of 
populism, this approach may be 
very misleading71.
This study therefore holds 
that ideational and discursive 
stylistic approaches, while suitable 
for different kinds of analyses such 
as legal and political sciences, are 
ill-equipped to serve as conceptual 
grounds for economic – also 
71  Additionally, the authoritative 
ideational definition of populism 
promulgated by Mudde defines it as 
a “thin-centred ideology” (mudde, 
c. 2004). Beyond the theoretical 
problem how ideology, a concept 
takes a physical property so much as 
to have a thin “centre” and how such 
a thin “centre” may be consequential 
and operationalised for political 
economic analysis, as Gidron and 
Bonikowski observe that “Thin-
centred ideologies are those that do 
not provide answers to all the major 
socio-political questions…” (gidRon, 
n. – BoniKoWsKi, B. 2013 p. 6.) 
Moreover, Aslanidis also points out 
similar weaknesses, even though he 
puts forward a discursive approach. 
(aslanidis, p. 2016)
institutional economic – studies. 
But political strategic definitions 
suit the purposes of institutional 
economic analysis as they directly 
reference institutions. As early 
as 1985, Mouzelis writes that 
“Any failure to take into serious 
account the organisational aspects 
of populism not only results in the 
populist phenomenon results in the 
populist phenomenon appearing as 
a set of disembodied ideological 
themes, it also tends to dilute 
the specificity of a concept that 
could otherwise be very useful…” 
(mouZelis, n. 1985 p. 341.) 
This is the basis on which Kurt 
Weyland developed perhaps the 
most influential political strategic 
definition of populism: “populism 
is best defined as a political strategy 
through which a personalistic leader 
seeks or exercises government 
power based on direct, unmediated, 
institutionalised support from large 
numbers of mostly unorganized 
followers.” (Weyland, K. 2001 p. 
14.)72
72  Notice how directly these 
conceptualisations reference 
organisations and institutions in 
relations to seeking or exercising 
government power – policymaking. 
However, while policymaking 
and sustained government power 
rests on “direct, unmediated, 
uninstitutionalised” mass support, 
the linkage between the two is not 
explicit.
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political ideology political style political strategy
definition 
of 
populism
a set of interrelated 
ideas about the 
nature of politics and 
society
a way of making 
claims about politics; 
characteristics of 
discourse
a form of 
mobilization and 
organization
unit of 
analysis
parties and party 
leaders
texts, speeches, 
public discourse 
about politics
parties (with a focus 
on structures), social 
movements, leaders
relevant 
methods
qualitative or 
automated texts 
analysis, mostly of 
partisan literature
tinterpretive textual 
analysis
comparative 
historical analysis, 
case studies
exemplars Mudde, Kaltwasser Kazin, Laclau, Panizza
Roberts, Weyland, 
Jansen
Table 8: Characteristics of the three approaches to populism
Source: gidRon, n. – BoniKoWsKi, B. 2013 p. 17
This study argues73 that while 
policymaking in a democratic 
polity74 rests on elaborate 
institutional designs with a plethora 
of actors participating, the primary 
logical linkage between mass 
support and government power are 
elections (and their institutional 
foundations). As Gidron and 
Bonikowski immediately add in their 
review of the populism scholarship 
73  This is deduced from the selectorate 
theory (mesquita de, B. B. et al. 2003)
74  Definitions of polity abound in 
political science. For sake of brevity, 
this study uses it in a sense similar 
to “political class”, “political elite” – 
referring to individual actors who have 
immediate opportunities or are (close 
to) to substantially influence top-level 
political decisionmaking regardless of 
ideology, membership, or identity.
after introducing Weylands’s 
definition: “What matters here 
then is not the content of policies 
or the style of discourse employed 
by political actors, but rather the 
relationship of those actors toward 
their constituents.” (Weyland, 
K. 2001 p. 11.) Depending on the 
sets of actors supporting populists 
– indeed, the intricate, interrelated 
networks of interests –, incentives 
to draft policies in one certain way 
or another may be very different 
from what “social” transaction costs 
would prima facie predict. As it has 
been argued mass electoral support 
is a vital component in sustained, 
effective populist politics. Hence in 
this literature review it is necessary 
to include electoral behaviour 
considerations into its transaction 
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costs-centred investigations.
Electoral behaviour and 
institutions
(Dalton and Klingemann 
2007) recounts several different 
approaches to examining electoral 
support. They include classical 
theories of social position (e.g. 
class and religious divisions 
explaining outcomes of party 
competition); partisanship and 
party identification (which draws 
on the previous school’s insights 
and aims to explain the growing 
personalisation and issue voting 
tendencies in contemporary politics 
by changing socioeconomic 
settings), economic voting (a well-
known enterprise researching the 
interaction between economic 
developments and voters’ choices 
as rational utility maximisation), 
and political communication 
(semetKo, h. a. 2007).
Accordingly, “the rise 
of populism” has been widely 
researched from the corresponding 
plethora of viewpoints. These 
attempts have produced a mixed 
record. There are impressive 
accounts claiming that globalisation 
– e.g. Chinese import penetration 
(autoR, d. et al. 2016) –, trade 
openness and regional economic 
integration and the ensuing 
socioeconomic structural changes, 
such as economic inequality 
are positively associated with 
voting for populist candidates 
(for example RodRiK, d. 2018). 
However, there are studies 
contesting the economic sources 
of populist electoral support75 
(inglehaRt, R. – noRRis, p. 2016), 
instead favours a socio-cultural, 
demographic factors to explain 
the support for the phenomenon. 
These accounts vary widely, too 
(for example (BustiKova, l. 2019; 
santana, a. et al. 2020) in terms 
of their focus, conceptualisations, 
methods, explanatory power, and 
conclusions. The often-emphasised 
personalisation, leadership and 
charisma elements (also emphasised 
75  “…the economic anxiety, discontent, 
loss of legitimacy, fairness concerns 
that are generated as a by-product 
of globalization rarely come 
with obvious solutions or policy 
perspectives. They tend to be inchoate 
and need to be channelled in a 
particular programmatic direction 
through narratives that provide 
meaning and explanation to the groups 
in question.” (RodRiK d. 2018 p. 23.) 
Or “The evidence (…) suggests that 
the rise of populist parties reflects, 
above all, a reaction against a wide 
range of rapid cultural changes (…). 
It is not an either/or story, for the 
two sets of changes may reinforce 
each other in part – but the evidence 
in this study suggests that it would 
be a mistake to attribute the rise 
of populism directly to economic 
inequality alone.” (inglehaRt, R. – 
noRRis, p. 2016 p. 30.)
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by (ádám Z. 2019) can also be 
contested in their definitions, 
mechanisms, and effects. What 
seems to correlate in a certain case 
study at one point in time regarding 
the same populist phenomenon 
seems to be completely off at 
a different date. There is also 
research analysing the international 
background of these changes on the 
international relations aspects of 
populism (for example KRouWel, 
a. – aBts, K. 2007) – whether 
it is “authoritarian diffusion” or 
“integration maturity” (in the EU 
context (eNDrőDi-Kovács v. 2013). 
Indeed, the turbulent changes 
since the end of the Cold War 
bipolar international system have 
reconfigured much of the global 
political economy, and roots of 
populism can be discovered in these 
trends. Nevertheless, 1989 and 
2004 (in case of eastern Europe’s 
European integration) seems to be 
rather far from directly explaining 
the “populist explosion” (judis, j. 
B. 2016) of the 2010s, especially 
the latter half of it; and mostly 
intertwined with the globalisation 
arguments.
However, this paper offers 
to integrate the positive elements 
of previous scholarship in a 
communicational perspective. The 
implicit supposition behind this 
theoretical choice (made explicit 
here) is that the political economy 
of mass communication, media 
economics have changed drastically 
due to the infocommunicational 
revolution of the 1990s and 2000s 
with the advent of the internet 
and social media. A strong, but 
often neglected line of populism 
scholarship theorises (see for 
example (maZZoleni, g. 2003; 
2008; 2014; aalBeRg, t. et al. eds. 
2017; WaisBoRd, s. 2011; 2018) 
and offers evidence (e.g. muRphy, 
j. – devine, d. 2018) on the link 
between the changes in the mass 
media and the rise of populism. 
Therefore, this study applies 
the logic that – as much of the 
political communication literature 
attests – voters base their electoral 
choices not on perfect information 
and rational cost-benefit analysis 
(hucKFeldt, R. 2007 p. 113.)76, 
but on the availability – supply 
– of information (schmitt-
BecK, R. 2004). That may be 
tainted by organised interest 
groups, democratically elected 
governments themselves: “…the 
systematic attempts by government 
officials and policy elites, as well 
as by pressure and single-cause 
groups, to gain access to and 
manage the media for the purpose 
of enhancing respective interests 
76  This bounded rationality approach 
is also in line with the epistemic 
foundations of institutional economics 
(Williamson, o. e. 1985; FuRuBotn, 
e. g. – RichteR, R. 1994).
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or to damage antagonists (…), 
neo-populist leaders and parties 
would engage in different forms of 
‘communication strategies’ (…). 
‘For their different reasons, the 
media and the movement needed 
each other. The media needed 
stories, preferring the dramatic; 
the movement needed publicity 
for recruitment, for support, and 
for political effect. Each could 
be useful to each other: each had 
effects, intended and unintended, 
on the other.’” (maZZoleni, g. 2003 
p. 17., quoted by gitlin, t. 2003 p. 
24.) Hence, the role of the political 
economy of information supply, the 
transaction cost analysis thereof 
is at the centre of this current 
investigation.
IV�3�3� Case study: politics 
and mass media in post-
communist Hungary
The case study method and 
selecting the case of post-
communist Hungary
Based on the above review and 
arguments, the interaction among 
political parties and media outlets 
are compared to electoral outcomes 
with media coverage serving as 
the direct channel of information 
which shapes voters’ electoral 
choices because “Depending on 
the degree of integration of the 
media systems with the dominant 
political elites of a country, the 
established news media reflect the 
values and views of the elites to 
which they themselves belong.” 
(maZZoleni, g. 2003 p. 16.) This 
degree of polity–media integration 
– in terms of institutions, coalitions 
and alliances, political economic 
interdependencies – is investigated 
in the single case study context 
of post-communist Hungary. 
Hungary has been chosen because 
it has travelled perhaps the most 
remarkable political economic 
trajectory in eastern Europe as 
authoritative political scientists 
Levitsky and Way observed: “The 
clearest case of this new pattern 
of competitive authoritarianism 
is Hungary” (levitsKy, s. – 
Way, l. 2020 p. 60.). Indeed, 
the reconstitutionalisation of 
the country’s legal, political and 
party system, drastic changes in 
its economy even in comparison 
with other populist regimes77 
77  Both the lack of meaningful, large-
scale sanctions and sustained 
constitutional supermajorities have 
not co-existed in similar contemporary 
political economic regimes (such in 
Bulgaria, Israel, Russia, or Turkey). 
Indeed, by the end of the current 
term, PM Orbán is set to become the 
longest-serving head of government 
of Hungary since 1848. In Europe, his 
time in office has only been rivalled 
by Chancellor Merkel of Germany 
(whose CDU/CSU party has not 
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justifies the scrutiny. (ibid.) The 
transaction cost perspective 
is augmented with an agent-
centric historical institutionalist78 
analytical toolkit here, focusing 
on the main stakeholders79 and 
attained legislative majority in general 
elections). In similar dominant party 
systems in Malta and Bulgaria, the 
largest political parties also failed to 
achieve supermajorities.
78  See footnote 11.
79  “An agent-centric historical 
institutionalist analysis requires the 
analyst to identify the key stakeholders 
and determine the interests that such 
potential actors are likely to pursue, 
then theorize how those actors, their 
prioritising the political economic 
exchanges among them: the polity 
(political parties) and media actors 
(and different media outlets, 
organisations) as well as the 
electorate (voters)80.
interests, and the way in which they 
pursue those interests will be affected 
by the opportunities and constraints of 
the broader institutional configuration 
and by institutional feedback.” 
(Büthe, t. 2016 p. 489.)
80  Although not specifically analysed 
here, operationalisation may be quite 
precise using party’s vote counts, 
opinion poll support, and media 
audience sizes. See also footnote 25.
Figure 19: The simplified logical scheme of political economic exchange relationships 
(interactions). The inner group of boxes show interaction flows anti-clockwise; the outer 
boxes characterise interaction flows clockwise.
Source: the author’s own edit
These are the political and economic exchange relationships, 
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interactions based on which 
transaction costs of each stakeholder 
group and network are considered. 
For this reason, the history of these 
exchanges is reviewed in post-
communist Hungary (1989–2020), 
briefly describing the pre-2010 era 
and then turning to the ongoing 
populist political economy of the 
mass media under populist Fidesz 
rule.
Analysing the political 
economy of the mass 
media in post-communist 
Hungary
The notion that the 
relationship among actors in the 
polity and media is a complicated, 
interrelated one is well established 
in Hungarian academia. Unlike 
many other post-communist 
eastern European countries, during 
the transition, the legal regulation 
of Hungarian media had been 
unresolved (paál v. (ed.) 2013). 
Neither the weakening remnants 
of the state communist party, nor 
the divided democratic opposition 
actors amongst themselves were 
able to compromise on transitioning 
the media system81 from communist 
state media to democratic, market-
based free media. (ibid.) The 
“frequencies moratorium” was 
not introduced until a democratic 
resolution could be reached by 
democratic political means. This 
froze in the media governance 
and market structures inherited 
from state communism. The 
monopoly of public television and 
radio broadcasters (often reaching 
multiple millions of viewers and 
listeners)82 were in place until 
1997 (gáliK m. 2004), and many 
of the newspapers went through 
“spontaneous privatisation”83 – 
81  The term is borrowed from the 
seminal work (hallin, d. c. – 
mancini, p. 2004).
82  The evening news of the public 
service programme may have reached 
as many as four million people in the 
1990s (Kollega taRsoly i. ed. 2000). 
Also available at https://mek.oszk.
hu/02100/02185/html/516.html
83  Influential newspapers often ended 
up in foreign owners’ portfolios who 
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usually a highly opaque process 
managed by the communist 
successor party MSZP (paál v. ed. 
2013).
As soon as the first free, 
democratic elections in 1990, the 
“media war”84 had begun among 
members of leading right-wing 
and liberal parties. The stakes 
were high: ending the “frequencies 
moratorium”, regulating the 
Hungarian media system – and 
thereby also controlling key 
media outlets’ content output. 
Introducing a media law would 
have required a qualified majority, 
were either party allies or indifferent 
towards intervening in Hungarian 
domestic politics. Sipos also recounts 
right-wing MDF attempts at gaining 
control over privatised newspapers, 
but their attempts failed either 
politically or economically (sipos B. 
2010). The largest daily Hungarian 
newspaper (1990 until 2016), 
Népszabadság, had direct MSZP party 
foundation stakes in its ownership 
structure. (gáliK m.2004) For more 
on foreign ownership in Hungarian 
media, see also (galamBos m. 2008).
84  The sequence of these political 
events were publicly named as 
such and termed identically by 
academia, too. See for example 
(BáRány a. 1998; Bajomi-láZáR 
p. 2001; Rovó a. 2019). Relatedly, 
the concepts of “media balance” or 
“media imbalance” (médiaegyensúly, 
médiaegyensúlytalanság) and “media 
dominance” (médiafölény) had also 
been introduced in Hungarian public 
life (sipos B. 2010).
but the governing right-wing 
entailing MDF (1,214,359)85 and 
its junior coalition partners did not 
manage to secure that86. Moreover, 
the first freely elected governing 
majority could not entirely control 
the monopolistic public service 
broadcasters over the course of the 
“media war”, either (paál v. ed. 
2013).
Their opposition won a 
massive electoral victory in 1994: 
MSZP (1,780,009) alone had 
obtained the majority of seats in 
the National Assembly. However, 
they chose to form a coalition 
government with the second biggest 
liberal party SZDSZ (1,064,788) to 
command a supermajority in the 
parliament87. Some observers claim 
85  Hungary’s mixed electoral system 
consisted of two rounds of elections 
effectively until 2014. The reported 
numbers throughout this analysis 
are the number of votes each party’s 
national list had received in the first 
round of elections (before 2014); 
their source is the National Elections 
Bureau’s (Nemzeti Választási Iroda) 
website. It is also important to note 
that the turnout fluctuated somewhat 
between 56.26% (1998) and 70,22% 
(2018); and the population have 
slightly fallen under 10 million in this 
era.
86  FKgP (576,315), KDNP (317,278)); 
against its liberal (SZDSZ (1,050,799), 
FIDESZ (439,649)) and left-wing 
(MSZP (535,064)
87  Opposition parties: MDF (633,157), 
FKgP (476,127), KDNP (379,322), 
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that one of the main reasons for this 
decision had been to legislate a new 
media law and secure domination 
over the Hungarian media system 
(paál v. ed. 2013)88. The uneasy 
left-liberal coalition’s infighting 
constituted the second phase of 
the “media war” which ultimately 
resulted in a compromise Media 
Law of 1996 (effective from 1997) 
(cseh g. – süKÖsd m. 2001). The 
tremendous change, introducing 
commercial competition in thus far 
monopolistic electronic national 
media and new regulation and 
oversight institutions89, however, 
also happened under dubious 
circumstances. The two major 
national commercial TV channels’ 
(TV2 and RTL Klub) tenders were 
not selected and implemented 
transparently – incomplete offers 
illegally (as ruled by a Hungarian 
court) approved; and an entirely 
viable and legal application was 
Fidesz (378,678)
88  Outgoing right-wing MDF PM 
Boross is quoted to have said: “I am 
convinced that (…) free democrats 
[SZDSZ] joined the coalition 
primarily (…) to grab the media 
world. I believe that it is obvious in 
the television and radio, too, how 
they are executing mid-level personel 
changes.” (paál v. ed. 2013)
89  Of course, the Media Law of 1996 
also established a novel regulatory 
framework – with rules convenient to 
the governing parties.
rejected90 (gáliK m. 2004).
However, in 1998, the Fidesz 
party (1,340,826) managed to form 
a right-wing majority coalition – 
after transforming itself from the 
junior liberal, anti-communist party 
to a right-wing catch-all party and 
despite finishing only second to the 
ruling left-wing MSZP (1,497,231) 
hit hard by corruption scandals. 
(juhásZ g. 1999; paál v. ed. 2013) 
From the 1998 general election, 
Hungary’s party system started 
to transform from a multipolar 
one to a clear-cut bipolar party 
system (FRicZ t. 1999; hoRváth, 
a. – soós, g. 2015). This featured 
competition between the left-
liberal parties91 and the right92. 
90  While the author describes the two 
major national commercial TV 
channels as neutral towards politics 
(gáliK m. 2004; BátoRFy, a. – uRBán 
á. 2020 p. 49.), other commentators 
have also pointed to certain biases in 
their coverage. Altogether, Gálik’s 
observation that infotainment rather 
than focused political coverage 
became more and more dominant with 
the advent of commercial television 
in Hungary is apparent. ((anonymous 
Member of Parliament 2002))
91  With the ever-dwindling support for 
liberal SZDSZ (344,352), and the 
massively popular left-wing MSZP.
92  With Fidesz gradually winning over 
other parties’ – MDF (127,118), 
FKgP (597,820), KDNP (did not get 
into parliament) – supporter base. 
However, the extremist right-wing 
(MIÉP) also entered parliament in 
1998 and remained a potent “force” 
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Thus, changes in the polity, the 
party system and the media system 
coincided – even though right-
wing attempts to create a friendly 
media “ecosystem” largely failed93. 
With PM Orbán’s Fidesz and its 
junior coalition partners in charge, 
however, the third phase of the 
“media war” ensued: the previously 
multi-party decision-making boards 
of public broadcasting media and 
national mass media oversight 
institutions became increasingly 
less diverse – to the point of Fidesz 
unilaterally controlling them94. 
Nevertheless, Fidesz holding sway 
over the fast decreasing public 
service broadcasters95 (vásáRhelyi 
in Hungarian politics as the “Jobbik 
phenomenon” (Róna d. 2016) later 
attests.
93  Already the first freely elected 
National Assembly’s right-wing 
parties had tried to establish and 
acquire their own media outlets (e.g. 
Napi Magyarország, Magyar Nemzet, 
etc.); nevertheless, it was late in the 
2000s when right-wing media truly 
managed to become a “force” to 
reckon with. (Bajomi-láZáR p. 2001; 
paál v. ed. 2013)
94  Commonly called as the “maimed 
curatoria” (csonka kuratóriumok) after 
the media oversight and governance 
bodies’ and boards’ “missing” 
opposition members. (political 
capital 2003; paál v. ed. 2013)
95  The public service TV channels that 
once enjoyed a monopoly, suffered 
a huge loss of audiences: “Between 
1999 and 2002, i.e. under the first 
Fidesz government, there were no 
m. 1999; political capital 2002; 
uRBán á. 2004) was hardly a 
serious challenge to the booming 
commercial media – although, 
finally, the right-wing could 
establish smaller media outlets 
promoting messages favourable 
to the governing parties (sipos B. 
2010).
Ultimately, the 2002 
elections brought about a slight, 
but consequential defeat for PM 
Orbán’s Fidesz (2,306,763)96 amid a 
opposition delegates on the boards. 
The repeated failure over several 
months to elect presidents to lead 
the broadcast providers typifies the 
operational disorders that plagued the 
system. Viewer ratings for public-
television channels began to drop 
immediately after the launch of 
commercial channels, a trend that 
continued in the years that followed. 
In 2008 the largest public channel 
was watched by 11% of Hungarian 
viewers; by 2012 the percentage 
had dropped to 9.2%.” (polyáK g. 
2015 p. 282.) Not even today is the 
transformed public service media a 
major player on the market.
96  Fidesz achieved this on a party 
list joined with MDF. This may be 
interpreted as an increase in its vote 
share, but other smaller right-wing 
parties were annihilated (neither FKgP 
or KDNP could enter parliament on 
its own right anymore). It is widely 
believed that “…Fidesz and Viktor 
Orbán concluded that they had 
not been radical enough, and they 
attributed their electoral defeat to the 
presumed persistence of the ‘left-
liberal media dominance’ and their 
Contemporary Global Challenges in Geopolitics, Security Policy and World Economy
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
267
sharpening divide between the left-
liberal and right-wing camps. The 
MSZP–SZDSZ coalition (2,361,997 
and 313,084, respectively) coalition 
reclaimed their positions in media 
and information authorities; and 
sustained a coalition government 
until 2010. The “media war” lost its 
saliency as an immediate political 
issue – but attempts to gain control 
and exert influence by other means97, 
establishing commercial mass 
media outlets remained in practice 
(sipos B. 2010). Additionally, while 
Hungary’s EU accession had a 
profound impact on the country’s 
political economy, its implications 
for the Hungarian media system 
have been far more modest. The 
international factors, such as 
“integration maturity” (eNDrőDi-
Kovács v. 2013) cannot be seen 
as bearing strong influence on the 
political economy of the Hungarian 
media. Some authors show nuanced 
difference in regulatory affairs and 
content output of the Hungarian 
media before and after the country’s 
EU integration (gáliK m. – nagy 
anti-government coverage.” (BátoRFy, 
a. – uRBán á. 2020 p. 49.)
97  For example, civil society organisation 
had been another way of mobilising 
mass support – but, ultimately, 
(gResKovits B. 2017a; 2017b; 2020) 
find that despite their important role 
in consolidating Fidesz mass support, 
they were unable to be the “winning 
solution” against the left-liberal camp.
K. 2010), but previous trends on the 
market did not change98. Indeed, 
the EU does not have a strong, 
independent media policy, the 
regulatory and governance powers 
are mostly left at the member states’ 
discretion. (European Parliament 
2018)
Over the course of the “media 
war”, it remained constant that 
governing parties heavily controlled 
the “money taps”99 (BátoRFy, a. 
– uRBán á. 2020). However, this 
started to prove insufficient (and 
increasingly unsustainable after 
the 2008 financial crisis) for the 
left-liberal parties in the more and 
more competitive media system. 
During the left-liberal MSZP-
SZDSZ coalition’s eight years, 
massive changes – exogenous to 
polity-media networks – upended 
power relations on the media 
markets and in their political ties. 
98  For example, there are no decipherable 
signs of trend reversals on the market 
of dailies and weeklies. (MATESZ 
1993)
99  Bátorfy and Urbán evaluate the 
pre-2010 era’s government media 
spending as “relatively balanced” 
(BátoRFy, a. – uRBán á. 2020 p. 
49.). That is, in comparison to the 
post-2010 trends; governments 
and administrations of both sides 
effectively boosted “friendly” media 
outlets’ revenues by direct government 
or state-owned enterprise advertising 
or by directing party-connected 
businesses advertising to them.
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With the advent of popular access 
to broadband internet, online 
mass media gained increasing 
audiences100. Also, fringe news and 
opinion websites, communities, and 
social media became influential101. 
These processes started to level the 
mass media landscape somewhat 
– divided between the left-liberal 
and right-wing political parties. 
Left-liberal politics has also 
become more and more fraught 
with large-scale corruption and 
mass political scandals from 2006 
onwards. Under these conditions, 
even left-liberal leaning media 
outlets turned out to be less loyal 
and more critical to the government 
(BátoRFy a. 2017)102 at a time when 
100  In 2000, Origo.hu became 
the most widely read online news 
outlet according to the company’s 
website. (homepage of neW Wave 
media gRoup). Its readership has 
soon reached 1 million, and by 2018, 
it grew above 2.7 millions monthly 
(BátoRFy, a. – uRBán á. 2020)
101  With regards to one of the major 
party system changes, the emergence 
of the right extremist Jobbik party, 
(Róna d. 2016) emphasises the role of 
Facebook as well as its partisan online 
media outlets (e.g. Kurucinfó, Barikád 
(later renamed Alfahír)) building on 
a vivid nationalist subculture which 
goes back to the 1990s.
102  The notion of “loyal journalism” 
appeared soon after the democratic 
transition (Bajomi-láZáR p. 2001 
pp. 149–151.) in the highly partisan 
Hungarian media system. Paál 
mentions the tendency of liberal 
the 2008 global financial crisis hit 
the population and the state budget 
tangibly. This also played a role in 
right-wing opposition media and 
communication networks’ influence 
and popularity. In 2008, foreign 
mass media investors decreased 
their portfolios all across eastern 
Europe’s tight markets – making it 
easier for domestic actors to shore 
up stakes. (BátoRFy a. 2017) These 
processes played out at a time when 
traditional mass media outlets 
suffered from the double crisis of 
falling advertising revenues and 
the increased competition with 
new, online media103. With Fidesz 
news outlets to criticise even their 
“own side” (paál v. ed. 2013); while 
regarding the campaign leading up 
to the 2010 general elections which 
granted Fidesz its first legislative 
supermajority, analysts point to 
an overwhelming negative news 
agenda which “…Fidesz did not 
become ‘more balanced’ in the eyes 
of the voters, but the agenda – in 
line with priming theory – re-tuned 
the competition to be about issues 
unfavourable to MSZP.” (BecK l. et 
al. (szerk.) 2011 p. 213.)
103  “Advertising revenue has been 
shrinking in almost all segments of the 
market. In the Hungarian television 
market it dropped by 42% between 
2008 and 2013; print media saw a 
48% decline.156 Though digital 
media (internet and mobile) registered 
a 95% surge in advertising revenue 
during this period, most of this growth 
benefited global intermediaries 
(primarily Google) rather than 
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– and also the right-wing extremist 
Jobbik (Róna d. 2016 – building 
up an increasingly potent media 
and communication network, the 
2010 elections brought about a 
drastic change in the party system 
and competition therein.
Most of Hungarian media 
scholars agree that with the first one-
party populist Fidesz (2,706,292) 
two-thirds supermajority in the 
National Assembly obtained in 
2010,104 the media system went 
under a systematic capture (see for 
example Bajomi-láZáR p. 2013). 
As PM Orbán’s party re-constituted 
the post-communist state, the media 
system also had to conform to the 
new political reality. The toolkit 
of the populist transformation of 
the Hungarian media system was 
not so much exceptional105, rather 
Hungarian content providers. In 
the small Hungarian media market, 
the recent policies that I have been 
discussing have destabilized the 
economic situation of the entire media 
market, thereby making the media 
substantially more susceptible to 
outside influence.” (polyáK g. 2015 p. 
308.)
104  MSZP (990,428), Jobbik 
(855,436), and for the first time, the 
green party LMP (383,876) entered 
the parliament. Their combined vote 
count of 2,229,740 falls significantly 
behind Fidesz vote count.
105  Indeed, in his revised 2019 
article, Ádám makes a similar 
observation regarding Fidesz strategy 
for transforming the political economy 
than rapid. The Media Law of 
2011 transformed the industry’s 
regulation and oversight bodies 
(BayeR j. 2011) – stacking them 
with Fidesz political actors and 
loyalists. The public media also 
went through a similar, drastic 
Fidesz-led reform with astonishing 
additional budget resources which 
affected its content, too – most of 
the observers characterise it as a 
government mouthpiece ever since. 
Perhaps a more novel development 
was the introduction of taxes in a 
manner that disproportionately 
affected companies106 and media 
outlets (polyáK g. 2015 pp. 
298–301.) strategically important 
for the Fidesz party. As usual for 
previous governments, too, Fidesz 
has re-routed the government 
advertisement expenditures in an 
even more strategic manner – on 
a larger scale than ever before 
(BátoRFy, a. – uRBán á. 2020). 
Interestingly, at first, the strategy 
did not prove to be an unwavering 
success if one considers Fidesz 
of Hungary: “When Orbán took over 
with a two-thirds majority in 2010, 
he did not have to invent a political 
system based on centrally controlled, 
hierarchical power structures and 
vertical political exchange. All he 
had to do was further centralize the 
control over political and economic 
resources.” (ádám Z. 2019)
106  See for example the investigative 
journalism piece by (eRdélyi p. – 
magyaRi p. – planKó g. 2014).
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electoral support. Even though 
in 2014, Fidesz won its second 
two-thirds national legislative 
supermajority, this was due to the 
electoral reform they introduced 
previously and tailored to their own 
electoral needs (ádám Z. 2019): in 
fact, Fidesz vote count was lower 
than in 2006 (2,264,780) when PM 
Gyurcsány’s MSZP had defeated 
them107, but still translated into two-
thirds of the seats in the parliament.
The next year, 2015 marked a 
major shift in media policy. A rather 
public fallout between one of the 
richest businessmen in the country 
(often characterised as an oligarch), 
Lajos Simicska108 and PM Orbán 
rippled through the entire media 
market. Simicska had to give up 
its manifold stakes in media and 
communications from mass media 
outlets to advertising companies. 
(polyáK g. 2015) Not unrelated, 
Fidesz-linked investments in mass 
107  This is at rather similar turnout 
levels (2006: 67,83%; 2014: 61.84%).
108  It is widely known that the 
former college roommate of PM 
Orbán,“…Lajos Simicska, the owner 
of companies that operate numerous 
media outlets, is one of Fidesz’s 
founders. He served as the party’s 
financial director between 1993 and 
1998 and as the president of the tax 
authority in 1998 and 1999” (polyáK 
g. 2015 p. 54.) went on to become an 
influential businessman winning large 
government procurements until his 
fallout with the PM.
media outlets soared. This time 
even the largest players in several 
types of media, such as the leading 
online news outlet, Origo.hu or the 
second largest national commercial 
television stations, TV2 – had been 
acquired by Fidesz-friendly business 
actors. (ibid.) Related companies 
(e.g. audience measurements, PR 
and communication agencies, 
publishing houses), too got 
purchased by the Fidesz network 
actors. (ibid.) “As of 2017, the 
Fidesz media juggernaut included all 
of Hungary’s regional newspapers; 
its second-largest commercial 
television company and second 
most popular news website; its sole 
national commercial radio network; 
its only sports daily; its only news 
agency; and a large number of 
papers that purvey what can only be 
called yellow journalism.” (KReKó 
p. – enyedi Zs. 2018 p. 46.) In the 
general elections of 2018, Fidesz 
(2,824,551) achieved its third 
supermajority electoral landslide 
in the National Assembly with its 
highest vote count ever109. A couple 
of months after the elections, in an 
unprecedented move, several media 
owners donated their multibillion 
stakes to a single, centralised 
foundation Central European Press 
109  Opposition parliamentary parties: 
Jobbik (1,092,806); MSZP (682,701); 
LMP (404,429); and for the first time, 
former MSZP PM Gyurcsány’s left-
liberal DK party (308,161).
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and Media Foundation (Közép-
Európai Sajtó– és Médiaalapítvány, 
KESMA) which had been 
made exempt from competition 
authority scrutiny by the PM’s 
order (magyaR KÖZlÖny 2018), 
and now effectively controls the 
vast majority of Hungarian media 
market, some studies estimate as 
many as 78% percent of it (méRtéK 
méDiaelemző műhely 2019). 
With that, the populist Fidesz-led 
centralisation and concentration 
of the Hungarian media system 
seems to be complete – with dire 
consequences to plurality and the 
quality of democracy in Hungary110. 
Politically, there seem to be no 
potent challenger in sight111.
110  The risk levels of media 
pluralism is one of the lowest in 
the EU (Bognar et al. 2019), and 
according to evaluations from the 
Freedom House, Hungary’s quality of 
democracy ranks the lowest being the 
only “partly free” country in the block. 
(FReedom house 2019)
111  In the local elections in October 
2019 Fidesz lost the Budapest mayoral 
elections alongside with a few other 
bigger towns. This, nevertheless, 
is still a far cry from an opposition 
capable of potently challenging its 
IV�3�4� Discussion and final 
remarks: contextualising 
the results and outlook
The above analysis shows co-
movements among developments 
in the party system and the 
media system. However, the 
conclusion that these phenomena 
are interrelated especially in 
the context of populism needs 
further corroboration from several 
methodological viewpoints 
(comparative case studies, 
quantitative analyses, etc.). For 
that, conceptualisations focusing 
on notions other than transaction 
costs, i.e. audience costs (for 
example FeaRon, j. d.; schultZ, K. 
a. 2001; slantchev, B. l. 2006), 
party system institutionalisation 
(e.g. enyedi Zs. 2016; enyedi Zs. – 
BéRtoa, F. c. 2018), etc. may not 
only be valid, but necessary to be 
utilised. But for the purposes of this 
paper, the following transaction 
costs considerations may be 
deducted.
populist hegemony; the latest opinion 
polls still show an overwhelming lead 
in Fidesz electoral support.
electorate, 
voters
Fidesz opposition Fidesz opposition
-related media -related socioeconomic actors
search & 
information costs – – + – –
bargaining costs – – – – –
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electorate, 
voters
Fidesz opposition Fidesz opposition
-related media -related socioeconomic actors
policing and 
monitoring costs + – + – +
Table 9: The findings of the study. + signs indicate increases in transaction costs, – signs 
indicate decreases
Source: the author’s own edit
Different kinds of transaction 
costs exert differentiated effects 
depending on an actor’s position 
within the political economy 
and stakeholder networks. For 
opposition parties and their allies, 
most transaction costs have 
drastically soared, with perhaps, the 
exception of bargaining costs. This 
is because there is only one relevant 
actor who remains to be bargained 
with, and that is the central, Fidesz-
led network. However, that actor is 
more difficult to deal with due to 
its monopolistic position and anti-
pluralistic, non-consensual populist 
strategy112.
As for the Fidesz party-led 
networks – in not only the media, 
but the wider economy –, their 
transactional costs have been 
112  This is unless one believes in 
collusion among members of the 
opposition and the governing party 
as some of the influential cartel 
party literature suggests (KatZ, R. 
s. – maiR, p. 2009). The existence 
of such trends in post-2010 Hungary 
have been claimed time and again, but 
without sufficient proof.
reduced immensely. The party 
and its allies have certainly been 
making it easier for their members 
to access information, negotiate 
new deals, and carry them out on 
a more personalised, individual, 
private discretionary basis113. This 
is especially true for Fidesz-linked 
media actors: information is the 
currency of mass media – and not 
only that, but also revenues from 
government and government-
linked advertising have exploded 
(polyáK g. 2015; BátoRFy a. 
2017; BátoRFy, a. – uRBán á. 
2020). Opposition and independent 
media have been starved from 
this, significant outlets are having 
financial difficulties, even going 
bankrupt (such as leading daily 
newspaper Népszabadság in 
2016). Additionally, their access to 
government information has been 
113  Ádám presupposes horizontal 
and vertical political exchanges 
and a sort of populist incorporation 
and de-institutionalisation which 
centralises power (ádám Z. 2019). In 
consequence, this study finds similar 
trends.
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made more difficult.
The key stakeholder is, 
however, the electorate, individual 
voters as they are not only the 
consumers of mass media, but also 
determine the political support 
for government actors who gain 
the power to manage most of the 
transaction cost scheme. While 
it is difficult to characterise such 
a big group uniformly, most of 
them can certainly feel that search 
and information costs have gone 
down regarding political exchange. 
KESMA media outlets dominating 
an overwhelming majority of 
the Hungarian media landscape 
(mérTéK méDiaelemző műhely 
2019) – and therefore, political 
information – supply a unified, 
unison message – sparing the 
electorate the cognitive burden of 
comparing contested arguments and 
facts, cognitive dissonance which 
emerges in a pluralistic information 
environment. Bargaining costs 
can also be considered to have 
decreased because with Fidesz’s 
10-years dominance, the number 
of actors whose consent one 
needs to win to implement any 
agreement have been reduced. 
Although this can be argued to give 
Fidesz actors an upper hand in any 
negotiation with the electorate, it 
is certainly true that the populist 
polity still depends on the votes of 
the wider public. Therefore, this 
interdependency still mitigates 
Fidesz power, thus altogether, the 
electorate’s bargaining costs can be 
considered to have decreased since 
2010. Policing costs borne by the 
electorate, lastly however, might be 
argued to have increased. Without 
external watchdogs, checks and 
balances, the monolithic Fidesz 
network alone monitors and verifies 
the implementation of any political 
exchange. Corruption diverts 
massive resources from their original 
purposes, the efficiency of public 
services deteriorates. Nevertheless, 
taken together over the ten years of 
Fidesz governance, the increase in 
policing costs does not offset the – 
perception of – “benefits” resulting 
from the electorate’s search and 
information as well as bargaining 
costs reductions. Therefore, the 
strategically important stakeholder 
group, the electorate’s transaction 
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cost considerations play well into 
the Fidesz party political strategy, 
and may explain its sustained 
electoral support.
These findings may be seen 
as somewhat already reflected 
upon in Ádám’s revised paper in 
2019.114 However, as the present 
paper argues, understanding the 
network positionality of actors 
and their groups (whether they 
are included in Fidesz and its 
media, business, political, social 
“winning coalition”115) – rather 
than presupposing “vertical” and 
“horizontal” exchanges among them 
– is crucial for properly appraising 
the transaction costs consequences. 
Ádám draws important – modified 
– conclusions which the present 
analysis also supports116, and 
himself revises the “populist 
stability” argument by reflecting 
on how certain transaction costs 
114  “As decisions are centralized 
and more concentrated, bargaining 
and enforcement costs are reduced. 
However, other types of political 
transaction costs may increase at the 
same time.” (ádám Z. 2019 p. 389.)
115  The term is borrowed from 
(mesquita de, B. B. et al. 2003) and 
utilised in the same manner.
116  “…through extensive clientele 
building, distorted elections, and 
skilfully engineered redistributive 
policies, Orbán was able to keep a 
sufficient part of the electorate on 
board to attain two more two-thirds 
victories at elections in 2014 and 
2018.” (ádám Z. 2019 p. 397.)
may rise117. This paper, by offering 
a differentiated analysis, puts the 
media as a collection of political 
economic actors who channel – 
and mediate (hence the name) – 
among the electorate and the polity 
into the focus of transaction cost 
investigation of populism. The 
media-centric political strategy 
analysis of populism is also 
consistent with the informational 
autocracy (guRiev, s. – tReisman, 
d. 2019) concept.
The analysis shows that 
political actors’ rhetoric and policies 
are important, but it is possible 
and even necessary to understand 
populism as a political strategy for 
engineering mass support. In fact, 
as a political strategy, it can be 
devoid of ideological, policy, and 
discursive-stylistic considerations, 
yet still be a meaningful 
(behavioural) analytical category. 
This suggests that going beyond the 
median voter paradigm, populists 
do not behave to appeal to the 
“centrist” voter anymore rather than 
to increase polarisation, mobilise, 
and expand their supporter base 
while denying opponents the 
chance to legitimately organise. 
Thus, it is a political behaviour 
primarily, rather than an ideational 
or stylistic phenomenon118. When 
117  See footnote 53.
118  This is not to deny the analytical 
usefulness of the ideational and 
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applied systematically by an actor 
– the populist; or a stable alliance 
of populist actors such as a party, 
coalition, junta, etc. – it leads to 
autocratisation (lühRmann, a. – 
lindBeRg, s. i. 2019) due to the 
anti-pluralistic, centralising logic 
of the populist political behaviour. 
Populism is the political strategy, 
behaviour which, when applied 
consistently, is capable of degrading 
a democracy into autocracy, and 
even further, to dictatorship. If 
multiple, non-aligned political 
actors systematically apply the 
strategy, it leads to increased 
polarisation. This is in line with 
Ádám and Zankina and much of 
the literature on populism’s impact 
on democratic quality (Gidron, N. 
– Bonikowski, B. 2013). However, 
depending on who (what kind of 
collection, networks of actors) and 
to what extent applies populism, it 
may also lead to the breakdown of 
stylistic-discursive approaches, but 
to specify and nuance their field 
of application. The ideational and 
discursive-stylistic conceptualisations 
may be very useful for understanding 
(and perhaps forecasting) campaign 
communicational or elite coordination 
strategies. However, for understanding 
economic policymaking, they are 
much less potent. It is, however, 
possible to combine them to create an 
even more precise understanding of 
real-life political economic processes. 
Such as (mouZelis, n. 1985) 
envisages.
previously monopolistic political 
economic structures – introducing 
political economic competition into 
a previously non-competitive field. 
If populism is further applied in this 
context, to re-monopolise the polity 
and economy, it only changes the 
nature of autocracy. But if it is 
abandoned for accommodating 
pluralistic interests, it can be 
regarded as the political strategy 
of democratisation119. To what 
extent one or the other processes 
arising from populist behaviour 
and strategy (or the combined 
applications thereof) actually 
ensues, what are the real-world 
examples and implications, is up 
for debate and further research.
Such a perspective questions 
the stability of populist politics. 
Indeed, in his revised study, 
Ádám identifies several potential 
weaknesses of it. The current 
study suggests another addition 
– of primary importance – to 
these with regards to the media 
119  This feeds back into (ádám 
Z. 2019 p. 387.) arguing against the 
established viewpoint that populism 
can be a democratising “force” 
(mudde, c. – KaltWasseR, c. R. 
2017). This study finds that applying 
populist strategies may introduce more 
democratic features into a political 
system, but logically speaking, the 
more systematically applied populism 
is, the more likely it is that populism 
will decrease pluralism and turn out to 
be anti-democratic.
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system. Hungary’s example may 
be interpreted that populist actors 
can hold onto power only as long as 
they control mass media.
IV�3�5� Summary
This study has revisited the 
transaction cost analysis of the key 
case of populism, Hungary after 
2010 with the aim of nuancing and 
re-focusing previous attempts at 
understanding the phenomenon. 
After reviewing seminal works on 
the subject, it has showed the need 
of adding additional strands of 
populism and electoral behaviour 
research to the investigation which 
tilted the analysis towards the 
political economy of the media. 
Therefore, this study aimed to 
showcase parallel developments 
in the party system and the media 
system. Due to spatial constraints, 
the analysis cannot be complete; 
but the above description of 
the political economy of the 
Hungarian mass media suggests 
profound co-movements in polity–
media networks’ properties (size, 
resources, cohesion, etc.) and 
parties’ electoral performance. 
The tentative conclusion is offered 
that an electoral behavioural, 
mass communications approach 
to populism as a political strategy 
is superior to the dominant 
ideological or discursive-stylistic 
conceptualisations in political 
economic research.
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Iv.4. how robotisation is Changing 
Production-related Decisions
Roland guRály120
Abstract
In this paper I examine the effect of robotisation on the decision of firms regarding 
where to place their factories. The main research question is whether, due to technology 
developments, the place of production will flow back to capital intensive states and regions, 
or whether instead labour intensive regions will be able to maintain their current share of 
production? To answer this question, I outline a methodology framework which considers 
both quantitative and qualitative factors, e.g. labour, the level of robotisation, capital, 
geography and investment related decision making. To understand the relationships 
among the quantitative factors, different versions of the production function have been 
studied, while for the qualitative part, some FDI analytic methods have been used. In 
the comparative analysis section, the level of robotisation is compared with the level of 
economic development in key selected states and the current FDI trends are examined.
After researching the issues, I found that in the examined period probably there 
will not be an overall definite shift from the current production sites as labour costs are 
in most cases no longer the deciding factor in the majority of investment decisions today.
Keywords: robotisation, production function, trend analysis, FDI decision 
making
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IV�4�1� Introduction
Automation is a global trend 
which attracts more and more 
attention nowadays. Researchers 
from different disciplines 
(engineers, economists, social 
scientists, etc.) are trying to 
understand its impact on many 
issues: technological efficiency, 
economic efficiency, our current 
and future life standards and the 
labour market. One of the main 
problems researchers face when 
analysing the effects of automation 
is that there is no widely accepted 
definition for what kind of activities 
should be considered and what the 
timeframe should be.
Another problem is that there 
are relatively few well-established 
economic studies in the field. In 
terms of scientific work, automation 
and robotisation are still mostly 
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technical science related issues, 
and most of the related papers and 
analyses are from this domain, 
notably the research discussions 
that are currently taking place in 
the IT discipline. In the social, 
political, and economic context 
the topic is still less dominant. 
Obviously, there are a lot of 
discussions – sometimes even with 
the involvement of scientists – on 
certain new elements of automation 
and with particular emphasis on the 
wider impact of digitalisation: such 
as the effect of mobile phones on 
our lives, how self-driving cars will 
reshape our future, etc., but in terms 
of establishing new frameworks, 
or theories for the likely impacts, 
there is still a lot to be done. What 
is generally in focus is the possible 
disappearance of certain jobs and/
or job categories. Some estimations 
project that one-quarter or even half 
of today’s jobs might be endangered 
in the medium-term (FoRd, m. 
2015).
The analysis seldom goes 
deeper: e.g. what will the effect 
of automation/robotisation on the 
principles of economics, since 
labour is a cornerstone of many 
theories? Moreover, the analysis 
usually does not go further to 
answer questions like: what will be 
the spill-over effects of changing 
(at least partially) from human 
workers to robots, and how will it 
affect the economic shape of certain 
organisations, sectors, regions, 
countries and even continents?
The above-mentioned high-
level questions are very complex 
and a fully adequate answer to them 
is indisputably beyond the limits of 
the current paper. In this paper I 
have therefore narrowed down the 
investigated subject to areas where 
the effects are better demonstrable.
In terms of the examined area, 
I distinguish between automation 
and robotization. Automation 
in my understanding is a wider 
process that impacts basically 
everything: manufacturing 
industry, the transport industry, 
the service sector, households 
and the IT industry in general 
(clouds, software maintenance, 
AI, etc.). It is also crucial to note 
that automation, as it is understood 
in most cases, is a new process 
going through a growth curve, it 
is happening now, and even the 
framework within which it could 
be investigated is still forming. It 
is inevitably difficult to analyse the 
effects of a process which is very 
wide in its scope and has little or (in 
some cases) no history.
Consequently, in this paper 
I concentrate on robotisation only. 
Under the term “robotisation” I 
mean physical robots in the wider 
sense (not only humanoids), 
whose tasks are automatically 
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to execute physical actions. One 
of the related definitions is: “a 
device that automatically performs 
complicated, often repetitive tasks 
(as in an industrial assembly line)” 
(Merriam Webster dictionary)
Narrowing the investigated 
area still further, I concentrate only 
on robotisation in manufacturing 
industry. The reason is that in this 
sector, robotisation is not a new 
phenomenon since the first industrial 
robot, Unimate, was produced 
in 1961 and installed in GM’s 
factory for die casting handling 
and spot welding. As robotisation 
became widespread in the 70s, 
there is already approximately half-
century’s worth of data available on 
the efficiency gains, the costs and 
benefits. However, in order to make 
the analysis more traceable (when 
and where possible), I focus only 
on two decades: the last decade 
for data inputs and the decade to 
come for forecasting the likely 
tendencies. This should ensure that 
only grounded future development 
scenarios are investigated. This 
timeline is in line with a recent 
report from PwC, titled: “Will 
robots really still our jobs?” 
(haWKsWoRth, j – BeRRiman, R. 
2018). They differentiate three 
“waves” of the current industrial 
revolution (Table 10):
Wave 1:
Algorithmic wave
to early 2020s
Automation of simple computational tasks and analysis of 
structured data, affecting data-driven sectors such as financial 
services.
Wave 2:
Augmentation wave 
to late 2020s
Dynamic interaction with technology for clerical support 
and decision making. Also includes robotic tasks in semi-
controlled environments such as moving objects in warehouse.
Wave 3: 
Autonomous wave 
to mid-2030s
Automation of physical labour and manual dexterity, and 
problem solving in dynamic real-world situations that require 
responsive actions, such as in transport and construction.
Table 10: Automation waves, description and impact
Source: haWKsWoRth, j – BeRRiman, R. 2018 p. 2.
Regarding the economic 
dimension, as mentioned, many 
studies focus on the potential 
job losses within an economy 
or in different sectors. One of 
the important conclusions of the 
above-mentioned PwC report 
is that automation will affect 
different sectors quite differently. 
In terms of potential job losses, the 
manufacturing sector is the second 
most impacted after transportation 
and storage. According to their 
calculations, in manufacturing 
industry during the second wave 
approximately 20% of the jobs can 
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be lost and in the third wave another 
20% (haWKsWoRth, j – BeRRiman, 
R. 2018) In this paper I have chosen a 
different path: I concentrate on how 
robotisation affects the decisions of 
firms (mostly larger multinational 
organizations) concerning FDI 
today and how this decision making 
mechanism might be altered in the 
examined period. I also investigate 
what kind of geographic effects 
these changes might cause.
In terms of methodology 
used, first, I will consider the 
production function: in which form 
it is adequate to the new situation 
and can it help us answer the main 
research question of the paper? I 
will then investigate how the level 
of robotisation can be measured, 
and what indicators can be used 
for that. Finally, to understand the 
decision mechanism of firms, some 
FDI principles will be interpreted.
In the comparative analysis 
part, I show the level of robotisation 
in different states and how it 
correlates with their development 
level. I will show that the more 
developed a state is the higher the 
chance that the level of robotisation 
is higher. Then I convert this finding 
to the level of firms, to show what 
is the factor-mix for firms making 
investment decisions, and to what 
extent robotisation might impact 
this. Macro level conclusions are 
then derived from the micro level 
institutional changes. With the 
help of these methodologies I will 
try to answer the main research 
question: in the light of technology 
developments, will the place of 
production flow back to capital 
intensive states and regions, or will 
labour intensive regions be able to 
maintain their current production 
share?
The novelty of the paper is 
first that it attempts an analysis of 
robotisation from many angles; and 
second, that it links different type 
of methods to it, both quantitative 
(like the production function) and 
qualitative (like the FDI related 
theories) and examines different 
dimensions: it considers both micro 
and macro levels, while addressing 
an economic issue with growing 
significance.
IV�4�2� Methodological 
framework and literature 
review
As mentioned in the 
introduction, the current discussion 
on automation and focuses on the 
increase in efficiency versus the 
possible loss of jobs generally, 
e.g. some researchers focus on 
the positive effects of technology 
development (toadeR, e. et al. 
2018) and say the automation 
will continue to create more jobs 
as it has happened during every 
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industrial development waves from 
the first industrial revolution and it 
will continue to bring great benefits 
to our life (autoR, h. d. 2015). 
Others say that this time it might be 
different as the jobs lost might not 
be substituted with the same amount 
of new jobs (FoRd, m. 2015) or 
they focus on the possible wage 
inequality increase due to the higher 
level of automation (acemoglu, 
d. – RestRepo, p. 2018). More 
balanced analysis says that “About 
half of all workers will confront 
the need to significantly adapt to 
the new workplace environment” 
(oecd 2018). The debate usually 
focuses on the pluses and minuses, 
but all more or less agree that the 
effects will be large: many experts 
forecast significant changes due to 
automation (manyiKa, j – sneadeR, 
j. 2018).
There is also more or less 
agreement that the developments 
will be unevenly spread 
geographically, e.g. that developed 
economies and especially the higher 
industrial ones will benefit more 
than most of the developing ones. 
Michael Spence and his co-authors 
argue that the developed world will 
be the ultimate winner of the current 
changes. “All these trends play to the 
strengths of developed countries, 
where skilled work forces, large 
quantities of capital, huge customer 
bases, and dense clusters of high-
tech companies combine to power 
modern economies.” (lund, s. et 
al. 2019). They mention that some 
middle-income countries, such as 
China and Mexico might catch up 
in the new era of globalisation, 
but many developing countries 
will face significant difficulties 
if they are not able to change 
from their cheaper labour driven 
economic contribution. The same 
conclusion is made by executing 
a different methodology: capital 
is overwhelmingly important, 
and this has been proved via 
an extended multiple-cone HO 
analysis that was used to compare 
the different development path of 
two countries with similar roots: 
Singapore and Malaysia. The 
related conclusion is: “capital 
accumulation is the key driver 
determining countries’ industrial 
development and differences in 
production technology employed in 
each country” (suZuKi, K. – doi, y. 
2019). Automation experts are also 
convinced about it: “Improvements 
in automation technology such 
as robotics are poised to bring 
more automated manufacturing 
production work to developed 
countries, rather than offshore it to 
lower-wage countries” (atKinson, 
R. d. 2019). If even the supporters 
of automation think that the gains 
will be unevenly distributed 
geographically, then it worth 
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analysing deeper what are the 
driving forces behind new possible 
investments in a more robotised 
world.
To answer the research 
question, I first gathered the set of 
factors to be investigated:
⊕	Labour: this indicator 
provides information about 
the availability of labour 
(number and skills) and the 
general cost of manufacturing 
workers (and their managers) 
in a state or region.
⊕	Level of robotisation: is 
expressed by an indicator 
showing the relative level of 
robotisation in a certain state.
⊕	Capitalisation: indicates what 
is the relative availability of 
budget for investments into 
robots for example.
⊕	Geography: shows the 
characteristics both the state/
region where the investor is 
located and both the state/
region where the investment 
is to be made.
⊕	Decision making 
mechanisms: manifest what 
are the driving forces for 
making an investment.
To provide a part of the 
analytic framework, the production 
function is a useful method as it 
integrates a lot of the factors that 
are interesting for the analysis, 
particularly labour, capital and (in 
the extended versions) technology.
The production function is 
the relation between the inputs 
(quantities of physical inputs) and 
the outputs (quantities of goods) 
of a production firm. The term 
can be expressed with reference 
to the service sector as well, but 
as my investigation focuses on the 
manufacturing industry, the above 
mentioned one suits the current 
purpose.
The function in its simplistic 
form is formulated as (manKiv, n. 
g. 2009):
Y=F(K,L)
Where,
Y: is the output of goods
K: is capital
L: is labor
The function therefore says 
that output can be increased if a 
firm decides to increase capital 
(investment) or labour (number of 
employees) or both. The function 
can be considered in an extended 
manner, e.g. the Cobb-Douglas 
production function where other 
factors are considered, e.g.: 
F(K,L) A K^α L^(1-α)
Where:
α: measures the share of 
capital in income
A: if its greater than zero it 
measures the productivity of the 
available technology (manKiv, n. 
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g. 2009).
Also, the production function 
can be analysed at different levels. 
It can be at an organisation level 
as mentioned above, but also a 
generic, industry wide one can 
be formulated: “..the production 
function sets the highest possible 
limit on the output which a firm 
can hope to obtain with a certain 
combination of factors at the 
given state of technical knowledge 
during the production period. This 
maximum output …holds for all 
other firms in the same industry.” 
(aigneR, d. j. – chu, s. F. 1968) 
Besides, the aggregate production 
function is also formulated by 
Solow as follows:
Q=F(K,L,t)
t represents time here, but 
in the context of making technical 
change possible: “I am using the 
phrase „technical change” as a 
shorthand expression for any kind 
of shift in the production function. 
Thus slowdowns, speedups, 
improvements in the education of 
the labour force, and all sorts of 
things..” (soloW, R. m. 1957)
Obviously, the production 
function has newer updates, 
e.g. the New Keynesian Model 
developed by Calvo (calvo, g. a. 
1983), its extension as a Simple 
New Keynesian Model (sims, e. 
2010) or for example a model on 
exogenous growth (BaRRo, R. j. 
1990). However, it is not necessary 
to go into a deep understanding 
of the production function, as for 
the current analysis only its basic 
characteristics are necessary. The 
ultimate goal of the firms is not 
production volume, but to generate 
profit. It can be calculated with 
embedding the production function 
into it as:
Profit=PF(K,L)-WL-RK
where
WL: is labour cost
RK: is capital cost
(Mankiw, 2009)
To summarise, the factors 
that can increase profit are:
⊕	Larger workforce
⊕	Larger capital
⊕	Better technology (e.g. Cobb-
Douglass)
⊕	Lower labour cost
⊕	Lower capital cost
⊕	Lower technology cost 
(Combining the Cobb-
Douglass production function 
with the Mankiw profit 
function)
If capital and its cost is 
considered as constant for the 
sake of simplicity, what can be 
observed is that the labour and 
technology improvement are in 
competition with each other both 
in terms volume and in terms of 
costs. In terms of volume: a firm 
can increase its output either by 
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employing more workers or by 
investing in better technology. In 
terms of costs: a firm can choose 
to invest where the labour costs are 
less or can choose to upgrade the 
production capabilities its present 
firm by improving technology. 
Normally the two intentions are 
executed in parallel. But their ratio 
to each other is still interesting as 
it reveals to what extent labour and 
technology cost count.
To answer that I consider 
other factors as mentioned at the 
beginning of the section.
The first one to be answered 
is the level of robotisation. Above, 
in the Cobb-Douglass version of 
the production function, technology 
development was already involved, 
but here – in line with the new wave 
of automation as mentioned in the 
introduction – I would like to show 
some quantification for robotisation. 
This is not a straightforward task 
as there is not a clear definition 
of what robotisation is and it is 
even harder to calculate it. On the 
other hand, there are organisations 
dealing with this issue and as I am 
dealing with robotisation in relative 
terms and not in absolute ones, it 
is appropriate to choose a study of 
one organisation in the field and use 
their data.
The Information Technology 
and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) 
is one of the possible sources. One 
of their reports shows the number 
of robots implemented. More 
importantly it shows the number of 
robots relative to the manufacturing 
workers, so this statistic fits my 
exercise quite well. Figure 20 
shows the ranking of the most 
robotised states in the world.
Figure 20: Number of robots used in 2017/10,000 workers
Source: on the bases of ITIF data atKinson, R. d. 2019 p. 5.
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This ITIF statistics gives 
valuable input not only in terms 
of the level of robotisation but 
it can also serve as a geographic 
indicator at the same time. In terms 
of geography the other component 
needed to make comparisons is the 
availability of capital, as besides 
labour and the level of robotization 
this was the other important factor 
from the production function. 
Again, as the current analysis does 
not aim to make precise calculations 
on absolute values and only relative 
tendencies are important here, I 
use the GDP/capita as a simplified 
indicator for that. This indicator is 
not necessarily the best fitting one 
to represent K in the production 
function, but the correlation is 
obvious: the more developed states, 
with a higher GDP/capita, have 
more money to spend generally 
and it is also generally valid for the 
companies located in developed 
states. Figure 21 shows the GDP/
capita order of the selected states.
Figure 21: GDP/capita in USD in 2018
Source: WoRldBanK (for Taiwan imF datamappeR data for 2019 is cited)
The last items for the 
methodological framework is the 
most complex one: the decision-
making mechanism behind a 
foreign direct investment (FDI) 
decision. It is not only complex but 
also quite different from the others 
as it relates to human behaviour and 
strategies in different situations and 
consequently, it is more a qualitative 
approach. There are several FDI 
theories in existence, with a large 
literature. Here I introduce only 
the most relevant ones as the aim is 
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to arrive to a comparative analysis 
where the FDI related decision 
making is only one element.
Firms consider a wide range of 
factors (although at different levels) 
when deciding for an OFDI decision. 
Probably the most cited framework 
is established by Dunning and it is 
called the OLI paradigm (dunning, 
j. h. 1979). The OLI paradigm 
divides the factors that impact 
the decision making of firms into 
three categories: Ownership, 
Localization and Internalization 
advantages. Ownership means: 
the investing company has special 
human capital, and knowledge 
(e.g. skills, know-how, patents, 
etc.) that is transferable to another 
location to create additional value 
there. Localization: the firm invests 
into another firm or establishes 
a greenfield location in order to 
get closer to customers, save on 
transport costs, obtaining cheap 
inputs, avoiding trade restrictions, 
etc. Internalization: the firm chose 
to own a certain external site as it 
can gain better control as compared 
to licensing/subcontracting the 
production for example.
Another important 
classification is to categorise the 
factors as push and pull factors. 
Push factors are the internal or 
domestic factors that enable and/
or force the organisation to pursue 
investment outside its home 
country, pull factors are those 
which make a certain firm/location/
country attractive for the investor. 
One of the key principles affecting 
this categorisation is the motives 
of the investor: the decision can be 
based on market-seeking, resource 
seeking, efficiency seeking, asset 
seeking. Within the categories many 
factors can be found, for example 
market size, market growth, access 
to regional markets, country specific 
consumer structures, etc. (dunning, 
j. h. 2004). Also, location factors 
can be split into quantitative 
(transportation, labor, material 
cost, taxes, etc.) and qualitative 
ones (land characteristics, labour 
market, infrastructure, etc.) 
(clodnitchi, R. 2018). To show 
the positive effect of pull factors, 
Singapore can be mentioned: their 
road to success was paved by an 
intensive economic policy which 
focused on education, research 
and development, and by creating 
a well-established institutional 
framework which contributed to 
the success of the local sites of 
transnational companies and their 
subcontractors and enabled them to 
move upwards in the global supply 
chain (magasháZi a. 2018).
IV�4�3� Comparative macro 
level analysis
Referring back to the 
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methodological section, the factors 
to be analysed together are labour, 
capital, level of robotisation, 
geography and the decision-making 
mechanism for investments. As 
mentioned in the methodological 
section, the current paper focuses 
on identifying general correlations 
and drawing some high-level 
conclusions; deeper analysis of 
certain factors will be done in 
subsequent work. Therefore, the 
different factors are presented in 
the following manner:
Labour: Labour is represented 
as a relative share, e.g. number of 
workers and their wages, to the 
level of robotisation, e.g. number of 
robots on the basis of ITIF numbers.
Robotisation level is also 
represented as a relative share to the 
number of workers and their wages 
in a certain state (ITIF numbers).
Capital: following the 
reasoning in the methodological 
section, GDP/capita will represent 
the relative (possible) share of 
capitalisation.
Geography: The presentation 
of the three factors above in 
different states on the basis of ITIF 
and IMF data.
Decision making: as 
mentioned in the methodologies 
part this factor is quite different 
from the other four, therefore it is 
analysed separately.
Regarding the above, my 
analysis focuses on the first four 
factors. Mixing the two figures 
from the methodologies section, 
I represent the relative share of 
robotisation (to labour) in selected 
key states and at the same time the 
relative maturity level of the certain 
state (GDP/capita). (Figure 22)
Figure 22: Number of robots used in 2017/10,000 workers
Source: on the bases of ITIF data atKinson, R. d. 2019 p. 5. and GDP/capita in USD in 
2018, WoRldBanK (for Taiwan imF datamappeR data for 2019 is cited)
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
296
Figure 22 has two main 
messages. First of all, it indicates that 
the difference in robotisation is very 
large, and the most robotised state 
in relative terms, Korea has more 
than seven times more robots than 
the world average. Other important 
economies such as Brazil, India or 
Russia have an almost negligible 
level of robotisation. In actual 
fact, the difference in order might 
not indicate the real picture, as in 
nominal terms the gap is widening 
as robotisation is growing. The 
growth rate is quite incremental: 
ITIF numbers (atKinson, R. d. 
2019) show that there is a heavy 
growth in robotisation, the rate 
has risen from 66 robots/10,000 
workers (in 2015) to 85 (in 2017), 
an almost 30% increase in only 2 
years.
Second, the GDP/capita level 
ranking of a certain state does not 
necessarily correlate to the level of 
robotisation, as the straight orange 
line shows large differences. 
The fact that certain states over- 
or underperform their expected 
robotisation rate when wages are 
also considered is also discernible 
(Figure 23).
Figure 23: relative ratio of robotization compared to wages
Source: based on ITIF findings atKinson, R. d. 2019 p. 5.
Wages are worth taking into 
account as the payback period for 
investing in a robot is different in 
an economy where the wages are 
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high than in an economy where 
the wages are low. The outcome 
of the scaling nevertheless shows 
significant differences. For some 
economies, a clear justification can 
be easily found: for example, China 
is a production focused economy, 
so it makes obvious sense to 
invest more in robots, probably 
for manufacturing reasons. 
Switzerland on the other hand is 
quite strong in the banking sector, 
where robotisation (in the sense of 
hardware robots as defined earlier) 
is not yet present. 
Despite the differences 
between certain states, as in this 
paper I focus on general trends, 
the question here is, is there is 
a correlation between levels of 
robotisation and the economic 
prosperity of a given state? 
Following an update of the data used 
in Figure 22 with trend analysis the 
results are presented (Figure 24):
Figure 24: Number of robots used in 2017/10,000 workers with trend analysis
Source: on the bases of ITIF data atKinson, R. d. 2019 p. 5. and GDP/capita in USD in 
2018, WoRldBanK (for Taiwan imF datamappeR data for 2019 is cited)
The trend clearly shows that a 
generally higher level of economic 
development means a higher level 
of robotisation. In other words, 
the more developed states are 
investing more in robotisation and, 
as mentioned above, the process of 
robotisation is accelerating. This 
might imply that the technology 
gap could increase in the future. 
This, in turn, raises the theoretical 
possibility that certain investments 
will not mature as firms located 
in the developed economies with 
a high level of robotisation (e.g. 
being on the left side of Figure 24) 
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in the future might not make some 
investments in a developing state, 
as they would ensure the required 
production is achieved with a 
higher level of robotisation instead. 
However, to understand if this is 
really likely to happen as a general 
trend, I also consider some of the 
FDI related principles mentioned in 
the methodological section.
Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) essentially proceeds since the 
start of international trade in mass 
levels. The immediate high level 
assumption often associated to FDI 
investments in the manufacturing 
sector by following the logic of the 
production function is that a large 
organisation from a developed 
country, where the labour costs 
are high, looks for efficiency 
improvement and therefore 
outsources part of its production to 
a developing country, where labour 
costs are low. If this assumption 
is mostly true, robotisation as 
a possible substitute for cheap 
manufacturing labour will likely 
to change the motives of firms. 
Therefore, it is inevitable to take a 
look at current FDI statistics and to 
assess the motives and factors for 
FDI decisions.
Originally the obvious path 
was that the investment went from 
the more developed parts of the 
world (e.g. first Europe and after the 
second world war from USA also) 
to developing continents, countries. 
However, recently the direction of 
the flow became quite mixed and 
the share of IFDI in developing 
countries outstripped developed 
countries (2018). (UNCTAD: 
WIR, 2019.) Recent statistics show 
that for example the outward FDI 
(OFDI) of China (what is considered 
as the main “production-hub” of the 
world) exceeds inward FDI (IFDI) 
(UNCTAD: WIR, 2019) This result 
runs counter to the assumption 
from a statistical point of view, 
e.g. as mentioned the new era of 
robotisation is already underway, 
so why is it not perceptible in the 
data?
Without going deeper in the 
FDI related theories, an outcome 
to be observed that labour is 
mentioned but it is only one factor 
among many other factors. Such 
observations notwithstanding, 
the fact that there are many other 
factors does not necessarily mean 
that the labour factor is not the most 
dominant factor affecting decision 
making. To investigate that, there is 
a need to see the weight attached to 
the various different factors behind 
FDI decisions. Undoubtedly, it 
is not an easy task to accomplish. 
On one hand these decisions are 
usually made at an organization 
level and they are mostly acting in a 
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globally competitive environment. 
Therefore, their business decisions 
and motives are usually not shared 
publicly, or when they are shared, 
we cannot know if the shared facts 
completely cover the real motives. 
For example, investors seldom label 
an investment openly as market 
seeking, or as a step to use cheaper 
labour. Besides, the decisions are 
often made by only a few persons 
(in some extreme cases by only one 
ultimate owner) and they might be 
unaware of their full set of motives 
and the weightings attached to them 
in making the final decision.
Despite this, there are some 
quantified outcomes. An example 
for that used the data of 35,000 
cross border investment projects in 
the European Investment Monitor 
database (data assessed from 1997 
till 2010) and found that in the 
EU-15 investments were mainly 
resource seeking ones, whereas 
in the EU-12 investors were 
dominantly looking for markets 
(seRWicKa, e. et al. 2014). So 
what is surprising that efficiency 
seeking, within which labour cost 
is classified, is not the primary aim 
when targeting the economically 
two very different (especially in the 
observation period) parts of Europe.
When looking outside Europe 
and considering Asian FDI policies, 
the motives can be different again. 
It is quite clear that most of the 
Chinese OFDI decisions are not 
efficiency – seeking, they are often 
resource – seeking (e.g. the ones in 
Africa) or market-seeking (in the 
developed countries) (Kamal, m. 
et al. 2019).
This means that the 
assumption that OFDI decisions are 
dominated by the search for cheaper 
labour costs than exist in the home 
country, is not valid. Therefore, 
the answer to the part of the initial 
research question that asks whether 
due to the robotization the place of 
production will flow back to capital 
intensive states and regions, is no, 
it is quite unlikely to happen this 
way in the examined period for 
the examined sector. On the other 
hand, the answer for the second 
part of the research question, e.g. 
that labour intensive regions will be 
able to maintain their current share 
of production, still needs some 
consideration.
There are lot of changes in the 
global economy and robotisation 
is only one them. Here I am not 
only thinking of crises, effects of 
war, pandemics, but also other 
developments mainly arising due to 
globalization, which is changing the 
motives and nature of investments 
as well. One of them is that the 
“labour intensiveness” label on 
a state or region becomes quite 
relative, as first of all the relative 
ratio towards the investor is likely 
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to alter over time, and besides that, 
the same region can be as attractive 
or non-attractive in terms of its 
market, while there can also be 
a range of other factors, cultural, 
language commonalities, etc. that 
are emerging or shrinking or else 
valid on a case by case basis.
In the case of Tesla for 
example, the factories are highly 
robotised. The company has 
already two factories (called 
Gigafactories) in the USA and it 
will open two more in China and 
Germany (homepage121 of Tesla). If 
the company had strictly followed 
the initial conclusions of the macro 
analysis of this paper, it would have 
extended its USA based factories 
or built new ones there. However, 
there are a lot of other factors that 
might play a role, and the market-
seeking explanation is an obvious 
interpretation for such plans. 
Also, Tesla is positioned as an 
environmentally friendly company, 
so lowering greenhouse emissions 
due to transportation might also 
be a factor in their decisions over 
where to produce their cars.
So to answer the second 
part of the question, the countries, 
regions that were previously chosen 
due to their relatively cheaper 
labour costs (or more precisely, 
they were labelled to be chosen 
121  https://www.tesla.com/
gigafactory-berlin – 2020. 06. 09.
due to this factor dominantly) 
are currently in a changing 
environment and therefore in the 
future they can attract their current 
and future investors due to changes 
in the factor mix for FDI decisions. 
Labour costs will still play a role in 
many cases, but this factor will be 
less of a dominant consideration and 
this is not only due to robotisation. 
How these developments affect 
decisions that are likely to happen 
and what role robotisation will 
play within them still needs to be 
studied. The initial conclusion is 
that in the new environment during 
the examined period, most regions 
and/or countries labelled as labour 
intensive are likely to keep the 
investors in their manufacturing 
industry and even attract some 
more, but this attraction will be less 
based on labour cost than assumed 
by the initial research question.
IV�4�4� Conclusion
When analysing how 
robotisation might affect the 
decision of firms regarding where 
to place their factories, I set up a 
methodology framework where 
I considered factors like labour, 
capital, level of robotisation, 
geography and decision-making 
mechanisms. To understand the 
correlation among the first four, 
different versions of the production 
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function was studied, while for the 
decision-making part, some FDI 
principles were presented.
In the comparative analysis 
section first, current statistics were 
analysed e.g. the level of robotisation 
versus the manufacturing workers in 
key states, and also the correlation 
of robotisation to the GDP level of 
a particular state. The trend is that 
more developed states generally 
employ a higher number of robots, 
so in theory the possibility to divert/
eliminate FDI away from labour 
intensive states or regions is open.
However, when looking at 
the FDI statistics and motives the 
result was the opposite. Developing 
states are increasing their share in 
incoming FDI and also the majority 
of the FDI related decisions are not 
aiming for pure efficiency increase, 
so labour cost is not the dominant 
factor nowadays in investment 
decisions.
With the analysis I could 
give an answer to the initial 
research question: will the place 
of production flow back to capital 
intensive states and regions, or will 
labour intensive regions be able to 
maintain their current production 
share? The answer is that in the 
examined period it is not likely to 
have a reverse flow of FDI from the 
developing states to the developed 
states, although there are some 
indications that the developed 
states might gain more due to the 
current trends in globalisation, 
including automation. In addition, 
less developed regions and states 
might maintain their current 
investors and even may attract 
more, but this process is less likely 
to happen due to their cheap labour 
but more because of other emerging 
positive factors that might turn to 
be attractive for the investors.
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Iv.5. How does digitalisation influence 
financial inclusion in the emerging 
countries? – a cross-country comparison
gáBoR sZtanó122
Abstract
This research paper examines the impact of financial technologies in the 
emerging countries, with a special focus on cross-country heterogeneity in terms of 
financial inclusion. Although the level of financial digitalisation and access to financial 
services are diverse in the emerging countries most of them experienced the recent 
trend of digitalization in the past decade. Financial inclusion has improved globally 
in recent years, but with large heterogeneity among regions, and sometimes within the 
same country as well. In order to assess the level of inclusion, two new indices have 
been developed: one for the traditional dimensions of financial inclusion, and one for 
digital advancements. The empirical contribution of the paper shows that improvement 
in digital financial solutions are significant primarily in countries where the traditional 
financial inclusion is better. Some countries, such as Kenya, Uganda, Iran and Mongolia 
outperform their peers, while other countries still have room for further expansion in 
financial technology.
Keywords: financial inclusion, financial development, emerging countries, 
Findex survey
122  PhD student, International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, World 
Economy Subprogram, Corvinus University of Budapest, gabor.sztano@uni-
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IV�5�1� Introduction
In previous decades, the 
financial sector was characterised 
by technological innovations that 
made transactions faster, cheaper, 
and more convenient. In the last 10 
years, this change has continued 
more rapidly, although in a slightly 
different way. According to recent 
academic findings at least three 
processes have influenced these 
recent trends. 
The first one is the group of 
innovations that were delivered by 
non-banking firms, the so-called 
‘fintech industry’, which has gained 
substantial importance all over the 
world, besides the innovations 
coming from traditional banks. 
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The second influence is based on 
the digital innovations that reached 
the B2C sector, as average people 
have become the primary users 
of these new technologies. Third, 
digital financial solutions shaped 
the way that we should regard 
financial inclusion and financial 
literacy, as more people are able 
to use financial services, including 
many of those who were unserved, 
or underserved in the emerging 
countries. Fintech solutions are 
cheaper than traditional banks, 
therefore they can provide services 
in less profitable business segments, 
and furthermore, they may be 
influential in emerging regions, 
where the entry-costs are too high 
for traditional banks. 
The main causes and results 
of this rapid development is an 
element of professional debates. 
On one hand, it is a valid argument 
that the new wave of digitalisation, 
the third industrial revolution, hit 
the financial sector as one of the 
sectors that just mildly adapted 
new technologies. As Arner and 
others noted, emerging platforms, 
companies and technological 
solutions simply became ‘too large 
to ignore’, for policymakers and 
thereby they became an integrant 
part of the economic ecosystem 
(aRneR, d. W. et al. 2015). 
However, in a way this is a similar 
argument to that of Ansart and 
Monvoisin, who emphasised the 
importance of a crisis experience 
in the emergence of new financial 
approaches. The new megatrend 
was born after the global financial 
crisis, but the development is still 
ongoing and follows a different 
path in various countries and 
regions. I am going to show the 
most important differences, while 
analysing data retrieved from the 
World Bank and highlighting some 
positive examples of fintech success 
stories (ansaRt, s. – monvoisin, v. 
2017).
This paper is organised 
as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
a literature review on financial 
inclusion and development, 
and the problems related to 
their measurement. Chapter 3 
summarises the current experiences 
based on the World Bank’s Fintech 
survey, while in Chapter 4 I am 
going to present a new methodology 
to assess the financial advancement 
of a given country, with specific 
regard to digital financial issues. 
Chapter V.5.5. concludes.
IV�5�2� Financial 
development and inclusion
Financial development 
is defined by the World Bank 
as the development of the 
countries’ financial system, the 
measurement of which consists 
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mainly of macro-level indicators. 
The four dimensions of financial 
developments are depth, access, 
efficiency and stability, and are 
measured by several indicators. 
For example, the depth of financial 
system is regarded as a proportion 
of credit compared to the GDP, or 
similarly the size of stock market 
capitalization and the amount 
of marketable government debt. 
Efficiency is regarded as the size of 
interest margins in case of credits, 
and among others, turnover in case 
of exchanged stocks. Stability is 
connected to the performance of 
the financial sector, as compared 
to others; therefore, it is described 
with indicators such as liquidity 
ratios, volatility or sensitivity to 
external shocks. The accessibility 
dimension of financial development 
is quite natural, and closer to a 
microeconomic approach. In case 
of financial institutions, the number 
of people that use financial services 
daily is the most important one, 
but similarly the number of ATM 
machines and commercial bank 
branches could be measured as well. 
This latter dimension comes closest 
to the concept of financial inclusion. 
At the same time the World Bank 
defines the following: ‘Financial 
inclusion means that individuals 
and businesses have access to useful 
and affordable financial products 
and services that meet their needs 
– transactions, payments, savings, 
credit and insurance – delivered in 
a responsible and sustainable way’ 
(peaRce, d. – oRtega, c. R. 2012).
Financial development and 
inclusion are two different concepts 
but they definitely have an impact 
on each other. Financial inclusion is 
more user-oriented, though: policy 
goals usually state that more and 
more people should be involved, 
and not merely be provided with the 
possibility of financial inclusion. 
As the financial services offered 
by institutions could be regarded 
as supply, financial inclusion is 
the demand that can be defined 
on a micro-level. In the literature 
financial services usage is mostly 
connected to end-users such as the 
household, and in many cases also 
to micro, small, and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
As many authors argue, a 
financially more inclusive society 
could reduce poverty and decrease 
inequality (for examples demiRgüc-
Kunt, a. et al. 2018; oZili, p. 2018). 
Increasing financial inclusion 
globally, and therefore providing 
access to financial services to more 
people around the world, is also one 
of the Sustainable Development 
Goals adopted by the United 
Nations. 
Although financial inclusion 
is mostly measured in terms of 
accessibility to formal financial 
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services like bank deposits, loans 
or ATMs, or the number of bank 
accounts / debit cards per 1000 
persons, digital financial services 
may open new horizons in 
financial inclusion and in financial 
development. 
The IMF categorises digital 
financial services based upon 
the user needs it fulfils, and 
differentiates solutions connected 
to payment, saving, borrowing, 
risk management and advising 
areas (imF 2019). The most visible 
and so far, most developed area of 
financial services is the payment 
infrastructure. Increase in mobile 
payments and P2P payments have 
rapidly grown recently, sometimes 
in line with the development of the 
classical bank services, sometimes 
autonomously. Virtual currencies 
are highly debated not only within 
professional circles, but among 
users as well. While many virtual 
currencies like Bitcoin, Ethereum, 
etc., are regarded as risky 
investments, the technology has 
advantages nonetheless, therefore 
many central banks are planning to 
introduce their own, legal, virtual 
currency, often called ‘CBDC’. 
So, both in terms of payments 
and savings, traditional banking 
services are developing together 
with new fintech solutions, causing 
uncertainty at times. However, 
although the technology might 
be similar in terms of various 
solutions, the business model and 
the legal position can largely differ, 
not only country-by-country, but 
also on the same market. As virtual 
currencies are highly volatile and 
difficult to regulate users are often 
discouraged from using them, but 
innovative payment systems are 
largely encouraged, especially if it 
shows a bank-like business model. 
Fintech solutions in borrowing are 
mostly used in credit evaluation 
by traditional banks, while in 
some regions issuing microcredit 
has grown in popularity over the 
past decade and shows a potential 
way forward for less-developed 
regions as well. Risk management 
and advising are areas that may 
have potential expansion both for 
traditional banks and new financial 
service providers too.
Ozili argues that there are 
five channels of digital financial 
improvement that may help to 
increase financial inclusion (oZili, 
p. 2018).
1. Fintech services are cheaper 
and more affordable for 
poorer people.
2. As they are not burdened 
by as many regulations as 
banks, fintechs can focus on 
improving technology and 
security.
3. Fintech companies may help 
regular banks become more 
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sustainable and help them in 
data-driven processes.
4. Because of less regulation, it 
is easier for fintechs to access 
emerging funds.
5. Being location-free fintechs 
are not only convenient 
but enable people to access 
financial services anywhere.
From the viewpoint of 
fintech companies, developing and 
emerging countries are suitable 
places to expand market share, 
and for gaining new customers. 
Additionally, the regulative 
environment is usually supportive 
– or at least not as restrictive since 
these countries have less experience 
in regulating financial services.
At the same time, it must 
be added that these innovations 
are not free of risk or concerns 
for regulators of all kinds. As 
mentioned earlier these companies 
are not regulated like other banks, 
and since they provide mostly 
cross-border services this makes it 
more difficult to protect consumer 
rights. Regarding issues related 
to cyber security the landscape is 
quite unclear: although banks are 
obliged to protect their systems, 
fintech companies ‘cannot make 
mistakes’. In the event that a fintech 
company loses its credibility in 
protecting data and being resilient, 
their customers are more likely to 
react by refraining from using their 
services.
The connection between 
financial innovation and financial 
inclusion, and in general the impact 
of financial inclusion has become 
one of the most dynamically growing 
fields in development economics. 
Regarding the respective literature, 
theoretical discussions on the topic 
mostly concluded that financial 
technology has a positive impact 
on emerging markets, offsetting the 
possible risks.
Among others, Philippon 
argues that financial technologies 
make financial services cheaper 
and therefore more affordable, 
meanwhile the usage of big 
data may enable the financial 
sector to reach a broader range 
of users. In his contribution he 
highlighted the usage of big data 
by robo-advisors that may help to 
overcome prejudices, but the fact 
that financial advice is provided 
by non-humans poses a challenge 
to regulators (philippon, t. 2020). 
This argument is close to those put 
forward by Thomason and others. 
They argued that the technology, 
and specifically the blockchain 
technology may provide an 
affordable digital identity for less 
creditworthy customers, thereby 
helping to overcome the current 
barriers (thomason, j. et al. 2018).
Looking at the empirical 
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findings of the respective literature 
it is hard to find evidence on the 
net impact of such technologies, 
for several reasons. Firstly, these 
trends are still ongoing and in most 
cases, they have not been fully 
developed; therefore we cannot 
be certain of the medium or long-
term impact. Secondly, as has been 
shown, there is large heterogeneity 
among countries and many other 
factors also coexist at the same 
time. Thirdly, digital finance is not 
a stand-alone phenomenon; we also 
need to consider changes in the 
institutional, legal and economic 
environment.
On the other hand, many 
papers argue that technology may 
indeed have impacted parts of 
the financial sector. For example, 
Bayero found that awareness of 
technology, customer value, and 
infrastructure are associated with 
financial inclusion in a cohort of 
Nigerian adults. In his paper he 
used a survey-based approach, 
arguing that the business model of 
service providers is not significant, 
but that the customer approach 
toward technology and availability 
is indeed significant (BayeRo, m. a. 
2015).
Using a quantitative 
general equilibrium model Beck 
and others found that mobile 
money has a positive impact 
on growth and macroeconomic 
development. After building the 
model with market frictions, 
such as enforcement constraints, 
information asymmetries and 
theft, they calibrated the model 
for the Kenyan economy and used 
a firm-level survey showing that 
companies benefited from mobile 
money solutions (BecK, t. et al. 
2018).
 Regarding the reactions of 
the households I found two similar 
papers, with interesting contrasts. 
Using survey-data Jünger and 
Mietzner explained the factors that 
make it more likely for German 
households to use Fintech solutions, 
while Li, Wu and Xiao did the 
same for Chinese households. 
The first paper found that German 
households with a higher education 
and financially more literate were 
more sensitive to Fintech. In China, 
households with a lower income 
and less financial literacy gained 
more from using digital financial 
services (jüngeR, m. – mietZneR, 
m. 2019; li, j. et al. 2019).
IV�5�3� Recent trends in 
financial inclusion
Regarding country-level data, 
the digitalisation of the financial 
sector is far from complete, but 
the rapid progress is worth further 
consideration. As mentioned earlier, 
the first level we can analyse is 
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rather the accessibility of financial 
services than financial inclusion. 
In this chapter I am going to use 
two databases that were published 
by the World Bank. In the Global 
Financial Development Database 
many variables are collected in 
connection with financial services 
and financial development. Nearly 
half of them are statistical data on 
the respective economy, or on the 
local financial markets; the other 
half are survey-based, connected to 
the Findex database, which is the 
other database I am going to use. 
This latter is a cross-country survey-
based database that quantifies the 
level of financial inclusion of the 
respective countries at a given time. 
Participants in the Findex survey 
are asked to answer questions 
concerning how they use financial 
services, if they do. In the case that 
they do not use financial services 
– e.g. they do not have an account 
– the causes of being unserved are 
also investigated. 
Although there are several 
good proxies for measuring the 
accessibility to conventional 
financial services, it is challenging 
to find suitable measures for the 
advancement in digital financial 
services. The fact that someone has 
a bank account is the basic indicator 
in measuring financial accessibility. 
Those who do not have access 
are called financially unserved or 
underserved, and their integration 
into the financial system – either 
via traditional banks or other digital 
solutions – is an identified goal of 
many policymakers. Bank account 
ownership is quite similar to the 
approach of counting those people 
whose wages are transferred to 
their bank accounts. Therefore, the 
ratio of the people who have an 
account in a financial institution 
(among those older than 15-years-
old), and the ratio of working 
people receiving their wage by 
transfer to a bank account are two 
indicators that show the general, 
classical approach to financial 
services. Regarding digital financial 
services, the ratio of people who 
made or received digital payments 
seems to be logical, and is therefore 
used. The ratio of people who 
use their mobile phones or the 
internet to access their accounts is 
considered to be a proxy of digital 
financial literacy, even though 
this accessibility belongs to the 
holding of a normal bank account, 
maintained at a financial institution. 
In the database there is an indicator, 
namely, the ratio of people who 
claimed to have a mobile money 
account, nevertheless these 
innovations are not widespread 
enough to draw meaningful cross-
country conclusions. 
Regarding global numbers, 
the majority of people already have 
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access to financial services: nearly 
69 percent of the responding adult-
age people said that he/she has 
an account at a financial market 
institution. This figure is a notable 
increase in the last decade as the 
same ratio was 51 percent in 2011, 
and 62 percent in 2014. Similar 
to earlier years there is some 
heterogeneity in the accessibility 
regarding users’ gender and age. In 
2017, 72 percent of male responders 
said they had a bank account, while 
65 percent of the women responders 
did so. Older adults (above age 25) 
with a higher income and living in 
urban areas, had greater financial 
accessibility.
Beyond account ownership it 
is worth looking at the results from 
survey questions related to wages 
– whether the wage was received 
in an account via the use of mobile 
banking and mobile payment. 
Account ownership and usage may 
be regarded as traditional proxies 
of financial inclusion, while usage 
of mobile banking and mobile 
payment capture the importance 
of the new, technology-driven 
digital involvement. There is 
heterogeneity among the regions in 
terms of the popularity of banking 
services (Figure 25). Those who 
have a bank account mostly use it 
to receive wages. Except for Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia the 
majority of people with an account 
receive their wages via their 
account. Many people who qualify 
for a governmental subsidy have 
opened an account because it was 
required for receiving state funds.
Figure 25: Regional differences in using different types of financial services
Source: Global Findex Database, own calculation
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In recent years traditional 
banks started to develop online 
banking applications, and the 
Findex survey has undertaken 
to investigate their popularity. 
Although a mobile phone and 
internet connection is required to 
access online banking platforms, it 
is closely connected to traditional 
banking services as they build on 
a normal bank account, therefore 
having a traditional account in a 
financial institution is a prerequisite. 
This is in line with survey results 
showing that in regions with high 
incomes the popularity of online 
banking is greater. Digital solutions 
such as digital wallets in Sub-
Saharan Africa, or innovative digital 
payment systems in East Asia, 
are independent from traditional 
services, and they represent the 
new wave of fintech services. 
The popularity of digital 
solutions might be proxied mostly 
by the usage of digital payments. 
A small majority of people used 
digital payments in 2016, but also 
with a large heterogeneity among 
regions. In poorer regions, digital 
payment usage is also smaller, but 
a more detailed analysis would 
be needed in order to assess the 
difference between emerging and 
advanced countries. 
In general, we may say that 
classical banking solutions may 
largely correlate with modern 
financial ones, but there are some 
results worth noting. In East Asia 
& the Pacific region it appears that 
the difference in usage between 
traditional and new financial 
solutions is smaller, but in regions 
like Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia it is still large.
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Figure 26: Change in popularity of chosen financial services in various countries
Source: Global Findex Database, own calculation
Regarding trends there 
are many countries that made a 
significant improvement between 
2014 and 2017 (Figure 26). In 
most cases the improvement was 
a jump from a very low base – 
in Tajikistan, Armenia, Senegal 
neither traditional banking – proxied 
by bank account usage, nor the 
more innovative digital solutions 
were very popular in 2014, but an 
improvement was visible in the 
abovementioned 3 years. In some 
countries, and these cases are the 
more important, the change was 
smaller in absolute terms but the 
outcome is more visible. In China 
in 2014, 42 people of 100 said 
that they used digital solutions 
for payment purposes compared 
to 2017 when it increased to 68 
people. Similarly, in Mongolia, the 
usage of digital payments rose from 
61 percent to 82 percent in 3 years 
(for further remarks on the Findex 
survey demiRgüc-Kunt, a. et al. 
2018).
As noted by the IMF in their 
policy paper world regions differ 
from each other in the advancement 
and level of technological adoption. 
In Africa, mobile payment gained 
considerable ground and markedly 
enhanced the level of financial 
inclusion. On average the level of 
financial development and inclusion 
improved significantly in the last 
decade in Asia. However, this 
coexists with a large heterogeneity: 
intra-regional differences are more 
pronounced as highly developed 
countries compete with emerging 
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regions; differences within 
countries are also substantial. 
In Europe financial inclusion is 
relatively large, with differences, 
although Fintech startups still have 
room for further growth alongside 
traditional banking services. In 
Latin-America many central banks 
are considering the adoption of 
CDBC, but at the same time the 
regulatory environment differs 
widely. Mobile money services are 
under-developed compared to the 
penetration of the internet and the 
number of mobile phones in the 
region (imF – WoRldBanK gRoup 
2019).
In the empirical part I am 
going to further elaborate on this 
heterogeneity by trying to provide 
a robust methodology to assess 
financial development in the 
light of new financial solutions, 
and by providing a comparative 
assessment based on the Findex 
Survey prepared by the World Bank 
Group in 2017.
IV�5�4� Measuring 
traditional and digital 
inclusion
In the empirical part of the 
paper I am going to quantify the 
level of financial inclusion in the 
wide range of countries based on 
the last update of the World Bank’s 
Findex survey conducted in 2017. 
First, I am going to create two 
composite indices to capture the 
level of financial inclusion based 
on the question responses in the 
survey. Out of the two indices one 
tries to capture the development 
of conventional banking in the 
respective country, the other reflects 
the popularity of digital financial 
solutions. As we mentioned, the 
latter is more challenging but still 
possible to estimate. These numbers 
will be compared to the scores in the 
peer-group, and to the development 
of the respective economy, proxied 
by GDP per capita.
In the survey many questions 
were asked about banking habits 
and most of the results reported 
are presented as percentage points 
of the responders who answered 
positively for the binary questions 
(yes/no). In order to create the two 
composite indices three variables 
for each index were selected 
from the survey to represent the 
most important characteristics of 
traditional and digital financial use. 
In order to make them comparable, 
answers from each country 
were converted into scores: the 
respective countries’ survey results 
were divided by the result of the 
country that reached the highest 
score. Therefore, the scale became 
relative and comparable by saying 
that the survey results had been 
translated to a development level 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
316
that was compared to a theoretical 
best result. The received scores 
have been simply averaged and 
multiplied by 100 in order of 
convenience, so both indices vary 
from 0 to 100, where the most 
financially inclusive country scores 
the highest, but not necessarily 100 
points. 
The indicators that were 
selected for use were those that 
corresponded with general habits, 
related to financial services, and 
measured in the entire population 
of the respective country. Although 
survey-based indicators usually 
have several disadvantages, the 
nature of the topic and the carefully 
conducted sampling clear doubts 
about systematic distortion (for the 
methodological annex demiRgüc-
Kunt, a. et al. 2018).
max. value max. value
people who have a 
financial account (% age 
15+)
Denmark 
(97.3%)
people received digital 
payments in the past year 
(% age 15+)
Norway
(89.8%)
debit card ownership (% 
age 15+) 
Netherlands 
(98.8%)
people made digital 
payments in the past year 
(% age 15+)
Norway
(98.8%)
people who borrowed from 
a financial institution (% 
age 15+)
Norway 
(39.5%)
people who used the 
internet to buy something 
online in the past year (% 
age 15+)
Denmark 
(81.4%)
traditional inclusion
Norway 
(99.7 
points)
digital inclusion
Norway 
(99.16 
points)
Table 11: Indicators used in composing the inclusion indices
Source: Findex survey, own calculation
Having the composite 
indices for the traditional and 
digital inclusion, it is possible to 
compare the level of inclusion 
in different regions and in the 
different income groups. Using the 
country categorisation of the IMF, 
peer groups have been constructed, 
therefore countries in the same 
region, with a similar level of 
general development (income) will 
be compared in a further analysis. 
As we may have predicted, high 
income economies performed 
pretty well, and regions where 
financial inclusion is known to be 
widespread scored at the top. These 
results suggest that composite 
indices are robust enough, and they 
capture the level of development 
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in an appropriate manner. Regions 
in high-income countries of Latin 
America & Caribbean, and in 
the Middle East & North Africa 
reached a relatively weak score, 
and each country achieved lower 
scores in digital inclusion. In 
Europe & Central Asia, and in East 
Asia high income countries reached 
a higher score than in traditional 
inclusion. In the upper-middle 
income category it seems that the 
difference between traditional 
and digital inclusion is larger 
than in the high-income group. In 
this income category, East Asia 
performed relatively well, while 
Sub-Saharan Africa outperformed 
the Middle East & North Africa. In 
the lower middle-income group, the 
gap between traditional and digital 
inclusion widened further. Europe 
& Central Asia reached better scores 
in both dimensions, while East- and 
South Asia had better scores in the 
traditional dimension only. In low 
income countries the Sub-Saharan 
region is interesting: they have the 
best score in the digital dimension, 
with relatively small differences 
compared to the traditional 
dimension. The financially less 
inclusive region is South Asia, in 
both dimensions. Based on peer 
group average scores it is possible to 
conclude that countries with higher 
income scored relatively better 
in both dimensions. Therefore, 
the financially historically well-
developed high-income countries, 
especially in Europe and in North 
America have digitalised their 
financial system, and people have 
become highly acclimatised to 
this. In Asia, countries are very 
heterogeneous, while in Africa 
digital inclusion has been relatively 
more successful in poorer countries 
than other regions. Despite the 
closeness to the USA and the 
general level of development, 
people in Latin-America seem to be 
underserved by financial services, 
both in traditional and digital terms.
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
318
income 
group region
traditional 
inclusion
digital 
inclusion
high 
income
East Asia & Pacific 74 77
Europe & Central Asia 75 78
Latin America & Caribbean 61 44
Middle East & North Africa 69 61
North America 87 87
upper 
middle 
income
East Asia & Pacific 61 47
Europe & Central Asia 49 39
Latin America & Caribbean 42 27
Middle East & North Africa 39 26
Sub-Saharan Africa 46 38
lower 
middle 
income
East Asia & Pacific 38 18
Europe & Central Asia 39 28
Latin America & Caribbean 30 17
Middle East & North Africa 27 12
South Asia 33 15
Sub-Saharan Africa 28 23
low 
income
Latin America & Caribbean 24 15
South Asia 19 7
Sub-Saharan Africa 20 16
Table 12: Group average scores in traditional and digital inclusion
Source: Findex survey, own calculation
Although averaging of 
the scores showed the regional 
differences, it is an interesting 
finding to observe how traditional 
and technology-driven inclusion 
progresses: in most of the countries 
better traditional inclusion occurs 
with better digital service, and 
among the regions, most of the time 
the region that is developed in one 
area also performed relatively well 
in the other, except in a few cases. 
In high income countries it is quite 
intuitive; although digital financial 
services developed, traditional 
banking did not become any worse. 
On the graph below, we may 
visually identify those countries 
that differ from their peers, in any 
dimension. After filtering the high-
income countries, deducting the 
peer average from the score and 
using a scatter-plot diagram we 
can classify the countries into four 
groups. 
Countries marked with II 
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seem to perform better in both 
scores, while group III scored lower 
than their peers. Group I has better 
digital financial inclusion than their 
peers, while group IV has better 
traditional inclusion, but worse 
digital services when compared to 
their peers.
Figure 27: Difference of individual country scores from the group average
Source: Findex survey, own calculations
As most of the countries are in 
either Group II or Group III we may 
conclude that based on the indices 
constructed, the traditional and 
digital inclusion usually comove. 
To assess the relative 
development compared to the GDP 
the following regression was used:
lg(GDPcap)=a+b*INCL+ ε 
Using linear regression, the 
following parameters have been 
regressed:
For the traditional index:
lg(GDPcap)=-70.75+13.64*INCL 
For the digital inclusion 
index:
lg(GDPcap)=-95.63+15.68*INCL
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Figure 28: Emerging countries that stand out in financial inclusion compared to its own 
level of development
Source: Findex survey, own calculations
Based on the equation above, 
the estimated level of financial 
inclusion has been calculated based 
on one single factor: the level of 
GDP per capita in the respective 
country. Those countries that 
scored better than their GDP would 
predict have gained relatively more 
financial inclusion compared to 
itself, while those who did not meet 
the theoretical score lagged behind 
somewhat. 
As this equation (and all 
the regressions) is estimated to 
have the minimum distance from 
the observations on average, 
the majority of the values are 
distributed around the curve. 
Therefore we shall define that those 
countries stand out whose scores 
differ from the predicted line with 
at least one standard deviation. In 
case of traditional inclusion, it is 
16; in case of the digital inclusion 
it is 14-point deviation from the 
regressed line. 
Therefore, we found that 
a significant difference from the 
estimated level comoves together: 
four countries, namely Kenya, Iran, 
Mongolia and Uganda perform 
better in both traditional and digital 
dimensions, while countries such 
as Congo, Argentina, Iraq, Mexico 
underperformed. In the latter 
countries there is a potential space 
for further expansion of digital 
financial solutions. 
Limitations are at least 
twofold. Firstly, the data was 
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constructed based on a survey, 
which is typically limited in terms 
of errors, willingness to answer 
and coverage. Secondly, the 
design of the survey primarily asks 
questions about traditional bank 
services; very few questions deal 
with digital solutions. Additionally, 
it is impossible to differentiate 
responders that used digital 
services connected to a traditional 
bank account from those who used 
Fintech solutions solely.
IV�5�5� Conclusion
Financial development and 
inclusion are two different concepts 
but they definitely have an impact 
on each other. Financial inclusion 
is more user-oriented, though; 
policy goals usually state that 
increasingly more people should be 
involved, and not only be provided 
with opportunities for financial 
inclusion. Ozili argues that there 
are five channels of digital financial 
improvement that may help to 
increase financial inclusion (oZili, 
p. 2018).
Regarding global numbers, 
the majority of people already 
have access to financial services: 
nearly 69 percent of the responding 
adult-age people said that he/
she has an account at a financial 
market institution. This is a notable 
increase over the last decade as the 
same ratio was 51 percent in 2011, 
and 62 percent in 2014.
Concluding the empirical 
part of the paper it has been found 
that traditional and digital financial 
inclusion mostly comove: in 
peer group analysis most of the 
countries either outperform or 
underperform in both dimensions 
at the same time, while compared 
to general development only 
a few countries outperformed 
significantly, and those which did, 
also differed in the same direction. 
The financial inclusion of four 
countries (Mongolia, Kenya, Iran 
and Uganda) offers a good example 
to the other emerging countries 
and may be interesting to discuss 
further.
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Iv.6. Comparative Study on Sovereignty in 
oil Dependent States
navid saeedi saKha123
Abstract
Currently, states with economies relatively dependent on oil have serious issues 
with managing their economies. By way of illustration, their fiscal policies, wealth 
distribution, and foreign policies depend on the oil income. Hence, the oil revenue affects 
interests, opportunities, and threats of a state. Consequently, sovereignty of these states is 
profoundly under the influence of the existence of oil and the global oil market. Although 
there is a similar impact on their economies and policies, their basic characteristics force 
them to take different attitudes toward managing the oil revenue. For example, arable 
land traditionally affects how much an oil state is relied upon, and its agriculture is an 
important factor in the managing of the oil revenues. This article introduces factors in 
order to better understand the differences and similarities of oil dependent states.
Keywords: oil dependent states, comparative analysis, sovereignty, state 
formation
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IV�6�1� Introduction
Sovereignty is discussed 
in many oil exporting countries 
(ostRoWsKi, W. 2008; 2011; 
phillips, j. et al. 2016). Oil revenue 
impacts sovereignty in different 
ways. The issue has baffled the 
economy and politics of exporting 
countries for many years. Each 
country has been trying to reduce 
its dependency on this revenue. 
Although some countries have 
been successful in diversifying 
their economies, others are still 
struggling with this matter. Hedging 
the economic and political risks of 
the ‘resource curse’ highly depends 
on country context as implementing 
the same policies would not be 
a hundred percent successful if 
implementing is possible at all.
Though countries are unique 
in how they gained influence from 
natural resources, they can be 
defined by factors explaining their 
differences and similarities. Even 
though national oil companies 
manage oil reserves in many 
countries, the governance of 
the companies is very different 
(maRcel, v. 2006). Their culture, 
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strategy, relations with foreign 
companies, other states, and internal 
ethnic and economic parties are 
also different.
Oil revenue provides 
political parties with a favorable 
resource in order to seize power 
in different territories. Territories 
are geographic spaces that are 
occupied by certain institutes. 
Consequently, geographic factors 
must be considered in comparing 
the sovereignty of the oil dependent 
states. In this article geographical 
and historical factors will be 
discussed that are important when 
comparing the oil dependent 
countries.
IV�6�2� Selecting Countries
Twenty countries have been 
chosen for comparative analysis 
of economies of oil dependent 
states. The countries were chosen 
based on the higher than ten value 
of their oil rent indicator presented 
by the World Bank (Table 13). 
Venezuela, Syria and Yemen have 
been excluded because of their high 
instability in the recent decade. 
Ten years average of oil rent is 
calculated because the measure has 
been increasing and decreasing due 
to price variation.
country name oil rent (% of GDP) – ten year average (2007–2017)
population 
(2018)
Kuwait 48,46005240 4 137 309
Libya 45,59870515 6 678 567
Iraq 43,36415544 38 433 600
Congo, Rep. 39,37753117 5 244 363
Saudi Arabia 38,25646494 33 699 947
East Timor 35,76729506 1 267 972
Oman 33,56869215 4 829 483
Angola 30,61964888 30 809 762
Equatorial Guinea 30,00982555 1 308 974
Gabon 26,67060754 2 119 275
Azerbaijan 24,90845195 9 942 334
Qatar 24,06470271 2 781 677
Algeria 21,47362910 42 228 429
United Arab Emirates 21,19306067 9 630 959
Iran 20,47091576 81 800 269
Chad 19,45659262 15 477 751
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country name oil rent (% of GDP) – ten year average (2007–2017)
population 
(2018)
Brunei 17,75970428 428 962
Kazakhstan 14,49420048 18 276 499
Turkmenistan 11,13579151 5 850 908
Nigeria 10,38545983 195 874 740
Table 13: Oil rent and population
Source: World Bank
IV�6�3� Sovereignty
Sovereignty is about 
establishing an autonomous state 
and independently making and 
implementing regulations, laws 
and policies (BRoWn, W. 2011). A 
sovereign state can enforce laws 
and regulations that are respected 
by external and obeyed voluntarily 
by most of the domestic interest 
groups (KRasneR, s. d. 2007). Other 
states respect the sovereign state’s 
autonomy and cooperate with it 
based on mutual agreement. Also a 
sovereign state gives its citizens a 
framework to undertake economic 
activities and pursue their goals.
The separation of the 
sovereignty to domestic and 
foreign aspects which is inferred 
to as a “territorial trap” (agneW, 
j. 1994) can be misleading. 
A state’s sovereignty does not 
simply separate world to “us” and 
“them”. Space does not introduce 
a boundary to a state’s society, 
economy, and politics. Ethnics 
expand on both sides of borders. 
Provinces in the vicinity have more 
economic structures and relations. 
Regions and provinces share the 
same environmental challenges and 
characteristics.
Territory, sovereignty, and 
power are three concepts closely 
linked together (paasi, a. 2003). 
Territoriality is an effective 
instrument to reify power. State 
institutions seek to maintain their 
power in their territory. Besides, 
territoriality gives states the base to 
construct state-society relations.
Borders and territories 
are built on societies that are 
not discrete. Territories are not 
historically fixed. Territories of 
modern states are built on areas that 
had a previously different social, 
economic, and political order. 
In formation of modern states, 
capitalism and global division 
of labour has played a key role 
(paasi, a. 2003). Countries can 
have diverse economic patterns 
in different provinces. However, 
policies do not compensate for this 
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diversity. States’ major goal is to 
secure their sovereignty through 
maintaining power. Economic 
distribution and securing economic 
resources can play a vital role in 
preserving power. In this matter 
geographic factors can play vital 
role.
Oil wealth has various effects 
on oil dependent states. Some 
examples of the effects are civil 
wars, regime durability, power 
balance, and state institutions 
(smith, B. 2004; BjoRvatn, K. et 
al. 2012). However, the effects are 
not fixed in all countries. There 
are similarities and differences in 
both economic and institutional 
implications. Although national 
oil companies (NOCs) are formed 
in nearly all countries, they have 
different sovereignty implications 
for their countries (maRcel, 
v. 2006). NOCs have different 
strategy, culture, and governance.
States differ in their 
geographic characteristics. As 
a matter of fact, each of them is 
unique. However, there are some 
political and economic geographic 
variables that can help to compare 
sovereignty of oil exporting 
countries. In this article five 
variables are considered in order 
to compare the oil states: distance 
from power poles, trade routes, 
state formation, arable lands, and 
social fractions.
IV�6�4� Distance from Major 
Powers
Distance plays a crucial role 
in conflicts and rivalries (tiR, j. 
– diehl, p. F. 2002). Contiguous 
states have a higher probability 
of conflict and enduring rivalries. 
States have always been under 
the influence of major powers that 
are closer to them. This situation 
has been modelled in geopolitics 
by gravity theory and entropy-
maximization models (o’sullivan, 
p. 1995). Regional and global 
military and economic powers have 
a great influence on the economy 
and politics of states. Economic 
relations are highly influenced 
by distance while economically 
powerful countries have a wider 
sphere of influence. Hence 
geographic distances combined 
with historic relations can highly 
influence the state economies, 
policies, and sovereignty.
Oil dependent states are 
in different regions and parts of 
the world. However, they can 
be categorized by their regions 
(Table 14). North African Countries 
are near Europe and have always 
been in close contact with Europe. 
Sub-Saharan African Countries 
were under European states’ sphere 
of influence. However, due to their 
more distance and lack of access 
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to the Mediterranean Sea, these 
countries have a rather historical 
impact from Europe.
The former Soviet Countries 
were a part of the Soviet Union. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, these countries remained 
under Russia’s influence. They are 
all landlocked. Kazakhstan has a 
land border with both Russia and 
China. Turkmenistan has only a 
sea border with Russia and is of 
almost similar distance from both 
Russia and China. Azerbaijan has 
a land border with Russia and is 
close to Turkey and the Black Sea. 
Kazakhstan has been mostly under 
the influence of Russia, but it is 
changing due to China’s growing 
trade and investment in the country. 
In addition, Russia has the military 
upper hand in Kazakhstan, though 
Azerbaijan has tighter relations 
with the EU.
Persian Gulf Countries are 
far from other global powers. Many 
of them were under the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire for a while. After 
World War 1, European countries 
were involved in the region. 
However, due to their distance 
their influence was limited. The 
most influential force in this region 
appeared through economic and 
sea power. Iran is slightly different 
from other countries. Iran was 
an autonomous country and was 
not under Ottoman rule, whereas 
southern parts of the country were 
heavily under the influence of the 
UK, and the northern part of the 
country was under the influence 
of the Soviet Union. Due to the 
advantage of sea power in this 
region, the United States became 
the main influential power after the 
United Kingdom. Middle Eastern 
Countries have more economic 
relations with the EU. However, 
they are mostly under the influence 
of the US.
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region cou
distance import origin (2017) (%) f c 
s
f m 
bRU CN DE US RU CN EU US
former- 
Soviet 
country
KZ 1759 2070 2484 6475 38,00 17,00 21,00 3,90 RU RU
TM 2476 2440 2493 6966 10,00 11,00 30,00 2,10 RU nm
AZ 2800 3052 1927 6630 17,00 9,70 26,00 3,30 RU US
Persian 
Gulf 
country
IR 3034 2872 2530 7258 2,60 37,00 23,00 0,24 – nm
IQ 3312 3400 2079 6934 0,86 28,00 12,00 2,10 UK US
KW 3413 3294 2430 7280 1,70 16,00 22,00 11,00 – US
QA 3529 3201 2784 7629 0,23 7,70 36,00 3,80 UK UK US
AE 3564 3112 2994 7822 0,78 16,00 23,00 4,90 UK
UK 
US 
FR
SA 3810 3589 2632 7525 0,79 19,00 34,00 8,00 – US
OM 3618 3060 3180 7998 0,38 6,30 13,00 4,00 – US
North 
Africa
DZ 4965 5753 2672 5460 4,40 17,00 45,00 3,50 FR US
LY 4579 5029 1750 6274 1,70 13,00 45,00 1,40 IT US
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
TD 5175 5356 2504 6854 0,21 24,00 37,00 3,50 FR FR
NG 5887 6164 2901 6624 1,90 28,00 32,00 6,00 UK US FR
GA 6388 6400 3579 7207 0,05 15,00 43,00 2,70 FR FR
CG 6214 6139 5718 7410 0,62 9,00 31,00 2,70 FR nm
AO 6808 6467 4317 7982 1,10 21,00 39,00 3,10 PT nm
GQ 6285 6376 3410 7030 0,07 22,00 45,50 9,70 UK nm
South 
East 
Asia
BN 3959 2257 6590 8965 0,02 21,00 9,00 8,30 UK UK
TL 4974 3382 7782 9204 17,00 6,00 1,20 PT nm
Table 14: Country distance from economic and military poles and its implications
cou = country, f c s = former colonial status, f m b = foreign military base, nm = none 
major, AE = United Arab Emitares, AO = Angola, AZ = Azerbaijan, BN = Brunei, CG 
= Congo Rep., CN = China, DE = Germany, DZ = Algeria, EU = European Union, FR 
= France, GA = Gabon, GQ = Equatorial Guinea, IQ = Iraq, IR = Iran, IT = Italy, KW 
= Kuwait, KZ = Kazakhstan, LY = Libya, NG = Nigeria, OM = Oman, PT = Portugal, 
QA = Qatar, RU = Russia, SA = Saudi Arabia, TD = Chad, TL = East Timor, TM = 
Turkmenistan, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States of America
Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity, Britannica Dictionary, The World 
Factbook (CIA)–
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Access to South East Asian 
oil dependent countries is mostly 
by sea powers. Brunei Darussalam 
can be accessed through the 
South China Sea. It was under the 
influence of China, Japan, and the 
United Kingdom. Timor-Leste was 
under Portuguese sovereignty, and 
it remained that way for a long time. 
Both countries have wide economic 
relations with Asian countries 
especially Indonesia and China.
African countries have 
more economic relations with 
the EU. European countries had a 
vast presence in the region in the 
colonial era and the continent is 
now of great importance for the EU. 
It should also be noted that there are 
US military bases in North African 
countries. Furthermore, China is 
increasing its economic relations 
with Sub-Saharan countries.
IV�6�5� Trade Routes
Trade routes are very 
important for states in order to secure 
their economy and sovereignty. 
Landlocked countries depend on 
their neighbor’s infrastructure, 
peace, and politics (Faye, m. l. 
et al. 2004). Landlocked states 
often have trouble accessing 
global markets and lag behind in 
their economic development from 
their neighbors that have access to 
sea routes. Sea routes often have 
international security implications. 
Choke points such as the Hormuz 
Strait and the Malacca Strait create 
specific security implications for 
the countries that depend on the 
routes for trade.
Oil dependent countries rely 
on trade routes not only because 
of the energy transport and trade 
but also for their overall economic 
and political activities. The routes 
are significant not only due to 
exporters’ policies but also because 
of world energy security. Since any 
disruption in the energy supply can 
affect the importer state’s economy, 
it usually takes part in policies 
regarding energy routes for example 
by financing and interfering in the 
security of surrounding regions of 
the trade routes.
The Hormuz Strait is a 
gateway for trade of the Persian 
Gulf Countries. In 2018, twenty 
one million barrels per day flew 
through the Hormuz Strait, that 
equals to 21% percent of global 
petroleum liquids consumption. 
Since it is the only trade route for 
most of the region’s countries, their 
relations have been affected by this 
geographic phenomenon (jaFaRi, 
v. a. 2012). Controlling three 
islands, which are important for the 
geopolitics of the strait, has been 
under dispute between Iran and the 
UAE for a long time (caldWell, d. 
1996).
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Since the importance of the 
Hormuz Strait for global energy 
security, regional countries such 
as Iran can threaten to shut the 
strait as a means of power balance 
in international disputes. On the 
other hand, the United States has 
measures in order to secure the route 
(talmadge, c. 2008; KatZman, 
K. et al. 2012). All states of the 
region have reacted to this matter 
since they have no other option for 
their trade. Saudi Arabia is the only 
one in the region which has a sea 
route other than the Persian Gulf. 
However, transporting all the oil 
production to the Red Sea ports by 
Saudi Arabia is a great challenge.
Landlocked countries of 
the former Soviet states have 
a different situation. They rely 
heavily on infrastructure provided 
by their neighbors in order to export 
and import different products. 
Most energy routes going out of 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 
were through Russia and their 
main export targets were European 
countries. Hence, they relied on 
Russia in their economic and foreign 
policies. However, in recent years 
China expanded its infrastructure to 
these two countries. Azerbaijan had 
a similar situation to other former 
Soviet states. However, Azerbaijan 
expanded its energy export routes 
to the Mediterranean Sea through 
Georgia and Turkey to Ceyhan port. 
Diversifying the trade routes is a 
great challenge for these countries 
since this matter heavily relies on 
their neighbors’ foreign policies 
(Faye, m. l. et al. 2004).
The neighbors of landlocked 
states try to benefit from the needs 
of diversifying trade routes. The 
Caspian region and Iran relations 
are affected greatly by energy 
dynamics of the region (miles, c. 
1999; atai, F. – aZiZi, h. 2012). 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
proposed pipelines that would go 
through Iran to reach international 
sea routes. The United States has 
hindered both plans in order to 
prevent Iran from playing a major 
role in the region’s geopolitics. 
Azerbaijan’s pipeline went through 
Georgia and Turkey with higher 
costs. For Turkmenistan another 
pipeline route had been proposed 
that went through Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and India which has not 
been executed since because of the 
regional relations (maini, t. s. – 
vaid, m. 2013).
Sub-Saharan Countries 
mostly face the Gulf of Guinea and 
the South Atlantic Ocean. Hence, 
they have better accessibility for 
foreign states and companies. There 
are many diverse destinations 
for the export of these countries 
based on contracts of these states. 
However, North African states 
remained mostly under European 
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influence due to their vicinity to the 
Mediterranean Sea. Most of the oil 
and gas of Algeria and Libya goes 
to European countries.
South East Asian oil states 
face a different situation. Brunei is 
close to the South China Sea and is 
a great source of energy for China 
in order to bypass the Malacca 
strait to China. Since there are 
many energy consuming countries 
in the region, energy security has 
a great implication for relations 
of the states in the region (hong, 
Z. 2010). Timor-Leste and Brunei 
Darussalam export most of their oil 
to countries in the region. Hence, 
these countries as energy exporters 
play a significant role in forming 
relations of the region. Timor 
exports most of its oil to Singapore 
so Timor is not susceptible to 
Malacca Strait security. However, 
Brunei exports its oil to other 
regions especially India. Hence, 
its oil must pass through the strait 
and any conflict in the region can 
damage its exports significantly.
IV�6�6� State Formation
State formation in rentier 
states is influenced by oil revenue 
which is in contrast with the 
European model of state formation 
(schWaRZ, R. 2008). Rentier states 
rely less on domestic taxation 
revenue. Consequently, they are 
less accountable than other states. 
Oil revenue gives politicians direct 
means to seize power without 
concerning other domestic sources 
in the state formation process. 
However, there is difference in 
context of the countries that prevent 
us from radical and firm conclusion 
(mooRe, m. 2004). The history of 
states explains the differences of 
state formation among different oil 
dependent states and forms of state 
apparatuses relations with citizens. 
State formation processes have 
an impact on state’s approach in 
building institutions.
Most of the oil dependent 
countries had regime transformation 
after the discovery and export 
of oil in commercial quantities. 
Furthermore, oil revenue had a 
great role in the formation of many 
of the states such as Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait or the UAE. Although the 
regime transformation differed in 
each country, oil revenue gave each 
of the states an opportunity to seize 
power regardless of their domestic 
economic structure. Subsequently, 
sovereignty has a different relation 
with state legitimacy comparing 
to resource poor countries. Oil 
dependent countries mostly rely 
on authority in order to enforce 
sovereignty in the countries.
Table 15 shows some of the 
state fragility index and the year 
constitution of countries drafted. 
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Middle Eastern Arab countries 
have the best situation on the list. 
After those, the former Soviet 
states come on the list that are least 
fragile. The state legitimacy and 
human rights index are in a bad 
situation in all countries. Other than 
these two indexes, Middle Eastern 
Arab countries are doing well in 
other state fragility measures such 
as economic inequality.
Since state’s revenue and 
fiscal policies are very important 
determinants of state formation 
and governance, oil revenue which 
consists of a significant portion of 
the oil dependent states’ revenues 
had a profound impact on state 
formation (mooRe, m. 2004). The 
Constitution which is the base for 
the legal system and formation of 
a modern state can be considered 
when the nation-state relation 
has been formed. Most of the 
countries drafted their constitutions 
after the oil in their countries had 
been exploited Furthermore, the 
countries which drafted their 
constitution before exploiting oil 
revenue amended it profoundly. As 
a matter of fact, most of the Middle 
Eastern countries formed after oil 
had been discovered in the region 
and oil revenue played an important 
role in their formation such as Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar. The countries in 
other regions are not exceptions.
region cou human rights
state 
legitimacy
economic 
inequality
public 
service
first modern 
constitution 
drafted year
former- 
Soviet 
country
KZ 7,3 7,3 3,9 2,0 1995
TM 8,9 9,7 6,4 5,0 1992
AZ 8,3 9,0 5,5 4,8 1995
Persian 
Gulf 
country
IR 8,1 8,9 6,7 8,7 1906
IQ 6,7 8,5 3,6 3,4 1970
KW 9,1 9,7 5,3 6,4 1962
QA 9,3 8,4 4,7 3,2 1972
AE 7,6 6,6 2,8 1,6 1971
SA 4,7 6,1 6,8 7,9 1992
OM 6,4 6,4 4,6 1,3 1996
North 
Africa
DZ 6,6 7,4 6,0 5,4 1989
LY 8,3 8,0 8,1 8,9 1951
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region cou human rights
state 
legitimacy
economic 
inequality
public 
service
first modern 
constitution 
drafted year
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
TD 8,8 9,6 9,0 9,1 1957
NG 7,5 7,0 4,2 2,9 1999
GA 8,9 9,0 5,3 3,9 1961
CG 8,4 9,0 8,1 8,9 2002
AO 6,7 8,0 9,3 8,7 1975
GQ 7,4 7,8 5,9 6,3 1968
South 
East 
Asia
BN 7,1 7,7 7,5 1,5 1959
TL 8,6 9,8 8,1 8,1 2001
Table 15: Fragility index, constitution draft year
cou = country, AE = United Arab Emirates, AO = Angola, AZ = Azerbaijan, BN = 
Brunei, CG = Congo Rep., DZ = Algeria, GA = Gabon, GQ = Equatorial Guinea, 
IQ = Iraq, IR = Iran, KW = Kuwait, KZ = Kazakhstan, LY = Libya, NG = Nigeria, 
OM = Oman, QA = Qatar, SA = Saudi Arabia, TD = Chad, TL = East Timor, TM = 
Turkmenistan
Source: Fund For Peace, Britannica Dictionary, The World Factbook (CIA)
IV�6�7� Arable land
Oil dependent countries with 
the highest GDP per capita tend to 
have low arable lands. Countries 
with higher arable lands didn’t 
succeed in achieving high revenues 
(Figure 29). The agricultural sector 
has been vulnerable in oil economies 
due to different economic effects 
known as ‘Dutch disease’ and 
‘resource curse’ (KatouZian, m. a. 
1978; pollaRd, h. 1985; oKonKWo, 
i. c. 1989). The effect of oil revenue 
on agriculture is both economic and 
political. Fluctuations and shocks of 
oil price affect the prices of tradable 
goods and movements of resources 
in and out of different sectors of an 
economy. On the other hand, oil 
revenue has political and economic 
effects on agricultural, rural, and 
peasantry bases of the country.
Oil dependent states distribute 
oil wealth by various means such as 
tax policies, investing in different 
sectors, and giving resources to 
state owned enterprises. Though 
these means can distribute wealth 
to affect state-society relations and 
bolster their political power, they 
have changed the economic balance 
of countries between sectors and 
regions. This matter profoundly 
affects the agricultural sector. The 
countries with less arable land such 
as Middle Eastern Arab countries 
have fewer problems in managing 
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their economy. However, countries 
with more arable lands and agrarian 
bases are more sensitive to policies 
and regulations.
Figure 29: Arable Land Relation with GDP per Capita
Source: World Bank
IV�6�8� Social Fraction – 
Polarization
Ethnolinguistic and the 
various effects of religious diversity 
have been discussed such as the 
civil war, conflict potential, and 
economic development (montalvo, 
j. g. – Reynal-queRol, m. 2005a; 
2005b). Countries with a higher 
ethnic and religious diversification 
have higher unrests and probability 
of civil war which harms economic 
development. Resources are 
allocated to resist the unrests and 
policies are set more considering 
security instead of economic 
development. State institutions 
have been establishing to address 
this issue.
There are articles opposing 
the view that ethnic and religious 
diversification can affect state 
institutions and economy in a 
meaningful way (Fish, m. s. – 
BRooKs, R. s. 2004). However, 
ethnolinguistic and religious 
polarization measures have been 
introduced to better address the 
matter of ethnics and religions. 
The measure considers the distance 
between ethnic groups in a country. 
The polarization index has been 
introduced to better justify civil 
wars and domestic conflicts that 
the diversity index couldn’t prove 
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(montalvo, j. g. – Reynal-
queRol, m. 2005a). The index’s 
impact has been measured on other 
economic and political measures 
too (BRücKneR, m. – gRadstein, m. 
2015; python, a. et al. 2017).
IV�6�9� Conclusion
Oil dependent countries 
have been acting in different ways. 
However, they have in addition, 
similar behaviors. In order to 
better understand their foreign 
and domestic policies, this article 
suggests various geopolitical 
measures are to be probed. This 
paper gives a theory and suggests 
some measures in order to interpret 
the states’ behavior
Arable land has very important 
economic and political implications 
for countries. Countries with more 
arable land have a bigger agrarian 
social base. Taxing of the agriculture 
base can give revenue for central 
government. On the other hand, 
agrarian society has a specific social 
and economic structure. However, 
oil economics have different social 
and economic criteria. Countries 
with a less agrarian social base 
seem to have fewer problems in 
managing oil economics.
State formation in oil states 
provides information about how 
oil has been building their nation-
state relation. Most of the countries 
have drafted their constitution after 
the exploitation of oil reserves. 
The countries that drafted their 
constitution before the exploitation 
of oil reserves faced difficulty in 
adjusting their political, economic, 
and social structure in order to 
manage oil revenue. An example of 
this situation is Iran which drafted 
its constitution in 1906. But, 
afterwards went through different 
unrests which have been related to 
oil revenue’s effect.
The oil dependent states 
that have difficulty in building 
their nation-state relations have 
difficulty in absorbing different 
ethnic groups under one nation. 
Oil dependent states, as developing 
states, have attempted different 
ways to discipline the different 
ethnic groups in their countries. 
In order to better understand this 
matter, one should, in addition, 
consider the threat of civil war from 
ethnic groups. 
Distance from major powers 
and trade routes give states and 
political parties opportunities and 
threats in managing their territories. 
Different political parties can absorb 
resources and aid from global or 
regional powers which can affect 
domestic politics and sovereignty. 
Distance and trade routes form 
the countries’ relations with their 
neighbors that have similar ethnic 
and religious divisions.
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v.1. rebalancing and Counterbalancing of 
Myanmar between India and China
hnin mya thida124
Abstract
Myanmar is a small country with great geostrategic significance between India 
and China. It is important for Myanmar to maintain good relations with these powers. As 
a small and fragile state struggling with domestic constraints and international pressure, 
Myanmar usually relies on the diplomatic shield of its great neighbors. Myanmar’s 
bilateral relations with these two countries have been an important role for all successive 
Myanmar governments. After 2011, the relations have been remarkable changes in 
Myanmar domestic politics when the first elected government took power into office. 
Then, Myanmar could adjust its foreign relations deviation from the conventional way of 
bandwagoning strategy to China. Under the incumbent government since 2015, Myanmar 
has expanded its international relations in regionally and globally. In a scenario, there 
may be criticism that the improvement of bilateral ties with India can diminish Sino-
Myanmar relations interpreting Myanmar’s defiance to China. This paper will be based 
on the analysis of the past and present situation of Myanmar-India relations. The research 
will attempt to explore the recent progress of Myanmar-India relations and how these 
changes effect Sino-Myanmar relations.
Keywords: balancing strategy, Belt and Road Initiative, China, India, 
Myanmar
124  PhD student – CUB IR Doctoral School, hninmyathida.85@gmail.com
V�1�1� Introduction
Myanmar, a member of 
ASEAN countries (Association 
of South East Asian Nations) is 
situated between India and China. 
Myanmar’s geostrategic location at 
the tri-Juncture of East Asia, South 
Asia and Southeast Asia is essential 
for these two countries. Both 
countries share long border with 
Myanmar and consider this small 
strategic neighbor as its security 
buffer between their intense 
rivalry. Because of these sharing 
borders, most of their frontier 
areas and borderlands have always 
encountered with sensitive issues 
concerning insurgency problems, 
border trade, cross-national 
criminal issues. 
Myanmar and India have 
long standing border of unfenced 
1,640 Km and a long coastline 
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border of 2,276 Km sharing part of 
Bay of Bangel. For India, Myanmar 
is the natural ‘Land-bridge’ and 
the only ASEAN country sharing 
land boundary with India as the 
nexus between India, Southeast 
Asia and East Asia (yhome, K. 
2015). Myanmar stands at the 
center of the India-Southeast 
Asia geography that makes its 
geopolitical significance. Myanmar 
was strategically important for 
India especially in implementing 
its Look East Policy. It is also the 
only one country at the intersection 
of India’s “Neighborhood First” 
policy and “Act East” policy and is 
also essential in practicing India’s 
regional diplomacy in Indo-Pacific 
(atmaKuRi, a. – iZZuddin, m. 
2020).
Figure 30: Myanmar between India and China
Source: The Myanmar Embassy, Tokyo
In the early years of its 
independence, Myanmar had 
adopted and applied non-aligned 
foreign policy with the purpose of 
preserving its sovereignty. Under the 
military government in Myanmar, 
India practiced the negligence 
policy by condemning the regime’s 
brutal act upon democratization 
movements. But, after recognizing 
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Chinese predominance in 
Myanmar since 1988, following 
the government’s suppression of 
1988 students’ uprising and at the 
same time the Tiananmen Square’s 
incident in China, New Delhi 
made readjustment its foreign 
policy toward Myanmar. Another 
reason why India’s ‘constructive 
engagement’ or ‘rapprochement 
to Myanmar’ was its thirst for 
economic development as the result 
of severe economic crisis of 1991 
(gottschlich, p. 2017).
Since that time, bilateral 
relations between the two 
countries have been improving. 
The ‘Look East Policy’ under the 
administration of Prime Minister 
P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991-
1996) tried to reinforce economic 
development focusing on Asian 
markets and an extension of trade 
relations towards Southeast Asia. 
It is the significance of Myanmar 
which is situated the tri-juncture of 
East Asia, South Asia and Southeast 
Asia in order to accomplish India’s 
new foreign policy orientation. 
In recent years, the popularity of 
Belt and Road Initiative which is 
Chinese grand strategy is an impetus 
to India to leverage its multifaceted 
cooperation with Myanmar in all 
sectors as well as aiming at driving 
Myanmar away from Chines sphere 
of influence. 
Myanmar’s bilateral 
relations with these giants are not 
always excellent. Its geostrategic 
significance between these two 
countries and within region always 
entails Myanmar into a struggle 
balancing with or against them. 
Moreover, both of these countries 
are seeking access to Indian 
Ocean, through Myanmar, for the 
development of their landlocked 
provinces in Southwest China and 
Northeast India (Zhao, h. 2008). In 
compared with China, India has not 
taken the serious problems and any 
confrontation with Myanmar. It can 
be said that bilateral relations could 
remain on good terms without any 
confrontation. 
Myanmar’s relations with 
China is more fluctuant than the 
relations with India. Behind the 
‘Pauk-Phaw’ relationship, the 
Myanmar government has been 
recognizing Beijing’s growing 
influence on the country and, at the 
same time, its over-dependence on 
China. Myanmar has attempted to 
mitigate its heavy reliance on China 
but there was no option except to do 
so because of military rule which 
was imposed sanctions by West. 
Myanmar’s regime in 2011, the 
Chinese introduction of Belt and 
Road Initiative and implementation 
of strategic deep-sea ports and 
special economic zones in 
Myanmar has put Myanmar into 
a new enlightenment. There is the 
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permanent truth that a stuck state 
between great powers is always 
balancing its relations in dealing 
with those countries. Based on 
this, this paper will try to analyze 
the improving Myanmar-India 
relations and how it affects on 
Myanmar-China relations.
The remainder of this article 
is structured as follows: first, 
it outlines the brief history of 
Myanmar’s relations between India 
and China. Second, it presents 
growing Myanmar’s significance 
as the geo-economic crux beyond 
its occupied geostrategic focus 
with three sub-topics. Third, it 
discusses the progress of Myanmar-
India relations and the analysis 
of its impacts on Sino-Myanmar 
relations. The fourth is the result 
and discussion part following the 
conclusion section as the last.
V�1�2� Traces of Relations: 
Myanmar between India 
and China
Myanmar and India possessed 
the same historical background of 
being under British colonial rule 
and Myanmar (Burma at that time) 
was the largest part of British India. 
Moreover, their similar religious 
belief has led the two countries to 
closer ties and more understanding 
in bilateral relations. At the early 
years of independence, Myanmar-
India relations were good under 
Prime Minister Nehru from India 
and U Nu from Myanmar and they 
played the leading role in Non-
aligned Movement together. In 
1951, the two countries signed a 
Treaty of Friendship referred to 
as ‘for ever thereafter’. In 1954, 
the five principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence were signed between 
India, China and Myanmar. These 
five principles are the following 
(eeKelen van, W. 2016):
1. mutual respect for each 
other’s territorial integrity 
and sovereignty,
2. mutual non-aggression, 
3. mutual non-interference in 
each other’s internal affairs,
4. equality and mutual benefit 
and
5. peaceful co-existence.
At that time, the bilateral 
relations were like-minded and 
India assisted Myanmar in battling 
with Communist insurgencies by 
providing arms and financial aids 
from Commonwealth countries. 
However, the 1962 military 
coup led by General Ne Win 
in Myanmar strained the well-
established relations. The military 
junta put the country in the 
xenophobic “Burmanization” of 
society and introduced “Burmese 
Way of Socialism” followed 
by nationalization of private 
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businesses and expropriation of 
property without compensation 
as well as the exodus of around 
300,000 people of Indian origin 
(lee, l. 2014). Since that time, 
New Delhi neglected its small 
non- democratic neighbor for long 
time until it started to recognize 
the ascent of China and Chinese 
influence toward Myanmar. In 
1988 the student uprising had been 
brutally suppressed by military, 
India became the first country 
that officially condemned the 
authoritarian Myanmar regime and 
the only one neighbor accepting 
fleeing dissidents. 
In the mid 1990s, India’s 
policy toward Myanmar moved 
from its opposition of military 
rule to a pragmatic approach, non-
interventionist policy. New Delhi 
abandoned its strong support to 
pro-democracy forces in Myanmar 
and chose the engagement with 
ruling military regime because 
the cooperation of Myanmar 
government was essential in order 
to accomplish its geostrategic 
and geo-economic purposes 
(gottschlich, p. 2015). Moreover, 
the achievement of India’ Act 
East Policy, the friendly relations 
with Myanmar was essential 
for India. Under the ‘Act East 
Policy’, Myanmar is the important 
bridge to connect India to other 
Southeast Asian countries. At 
present, Myanmar-India relations is 
dramatically developing under NLD 
government (National League for 
Democracy). Myanmar was one of 
only two Southeast Asian countries 
to attend Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi’s swearing ceremony when 
he won re-election in May 2019. 
On the other side, Myanmar 
and China have possessed long-
standing close relations since 
Myanmar gained its independence 
in 1948. The term ‘Pauk-phaw’ 
or fraternity has been used and 
accepted as diplomatic rhetoric 
to depict Sino-Myanmar relations 
(chan, d. s. W. 2017). But the term 
of ‘Pauk-Phaw’ is debatable when 
China’s overwhelming influence 
in Myanmar has increased time 
by time. The two causes may be 
Myanmar’s longtime domestic 
instability and Chinese hegemonic 
position on its internal affairs 
particularly its control over ethnic 
armed organizations (EAOs) in 
Sino-Myanmar bordering regions. 
Both causes have the prominent 
reasons why these consequences 
are brought about and how they are. 
All successive governments 
took priority to have national 
consolidation and ending the 
armed conflicts between army 
and these EAOs. The incumbent 
NLD government (The National 
League for Democracy), the first 
democratically elected government, 
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has prioritized the national 
reconciliation through peace 
negotiation process in believing that 
only peaceful Myanmar continues 
its economic development. For the 
latter, the most powerful EAOs 
settling at Myanmar-China border, 
are illegally supported by China 
as they are ethnic Chinese origins, 
Han ethnic Chinese as Kokang in 
Myanmar and Jingpo ethnic Chinese 
as Kachin ethnic of Myanmar 
(han, e. 2017). Occasionally, these 
Myanmar ethnics of Chinese origins 
are used to be the tools that can 
enable to threaten the stability of 
Myanmar by Chinese government. 
On the other hand, China plays an 
important role in Myanmar peace 
process as negotiator between 
central government and EAOs. 
The State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) 
(1988-1997) and the State Peace 
and Development Council 
(SPDC) (1997-2010) faced with 
the international isolation and 
sanctions and then had extreme 
dependence on China for economic 
investments and diplomatic 
protection (han, e. 2017). As a 
consequence, China became the 
main consumer of Myanmar’s 
natural resources and main investor 
in all economic sectors. But the 
remarkable geopolitical change 
was materialized in the aftermath 
of Myanmar peaceful democratic 
transition in 2010 in which the first 
elected government held the power. 
The new government conducted its 
foreign policy reorientation to the 
West especially the United States 
that could assume as Myanmar’s 
effort to take away from China. 
Even Myanmar government could 
make a gallant decision to suspend 
the most controversial project 
of Ayeyarwady Myitsone Dam 
construction against China in 2011.
Myanmar relations with India 
and China is always up and down in 
history but the robust one. During 
the 1990s, the relations have been 
changing more pragmatically 
and positively by New Delhi and 
Beijing focusing on their national 
interest. Moreover, Myanmar’s 
democratic transition in 2011 have 
vigorously altered the long-time 
geopolitical structure opening the 
country’s new strategy.
V�1�3� Myanmar as a Geo-
economic Juncture beyond 
its Geostrategic Hub 
between Two Major Power 
Neighbors
India’s Return to 
Myanmar
After passing the deserted 
period to Myanmar, the following 
reasons were traced behind that 
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policy changes by India: the 
economic development of India’s 
Northeast; India’s increased interest 
in trade and investment with 
ASEAN; India’s search for energy 
security; and the growing influence 
of China in Myanmar (Zhao, 
h. 2008). Firstly, Indian armed 
successionist ethnic insurgencies 
have settled along Myanmar 
-Indian border of India’s northeast 
regions. It has been the most 
crucial reality for India to achieve 
strong cooperation with Myanmar 
government in combating these 
insurgencies so as to achieve peace 
and prosperity in these regions. 
Northeast India has always been the 
most formidable problem for New 
Delhi’s policy priority.
Secondly, India’s increased 
interest in trade and investment 
driven by “Look East Policy” 
pushed India towards accelerating 
its integration with ASEAN 
countries. “Look East Policy” was 
initiated in 1991 by the Narasimha 
Rao government with the purpose 
of developing political contacts, 
improving economic integration and 
strengthening security cooperation 
with Southeast Asian countries 
(haoKip, t. 2011). According to 
this, Myanmar is the only one 
country that can connect India with 
Southeast Asia as a ‘land-bridge’. 
Thirdly, the abundance of natural 
resources of Myanmar including 
oil and gas, is attractive for India 
to fulfill its increasing domestic 
demand for oil and gas. The oil 
and gas fields in Myanmar such as 
Shwe, Yadana and Yetagun were 
expected to meet these necessities 
and this could support India to get 
cheaper and more secure routes 
than transporting through pipelines 
from Central Asia that would need 
to cross Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. 
Finally, it was the rise of China 
that India could be stimulated to 
get closer relations with Myanmar 
by analyzing its previous policy 
failure. India and China are long 
time regional rivals. Myanmar is 
strategically situated between them 
as a buffer state and that strategic 
small country might be the risk or 
opportunity for their great power 
status. Myanmar is in vital position 
for the security of both countries as 
well as the back door for both. After 
1988 student uprising, the isolated 
Myanmar military regime, faced 
with strong economic sanction by 
the West, was totally dependent on 
China by exploiting and importing 
all its natural resources. As long 
as China became the only one 
reliant partner for Myanmar, its 
influence on Myanmar was larger 
as well. That was the strong desire 
of India to remove Myanmar from 
the Chinese sphere of influence. 
Moreover, Myanmar is an important 
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member of Bay of Bengal Initiative 
for Multi-Sectoral Technical 
and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC), an organization that 
enable to accomplish New Delhi’s 
aims of increasing bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with 
regional countries.
The Important Interest 
of India and China in 
Myanmar
In 2015, with the changing 
of Myanmar politics through 
democratization, Indian 
government upgraded its policy to 
improve relations toward Myanmar. 
India always recognizes Myanmar 
as its crucial partner because of 
its membership in Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
its critical role in the fight to end 
insurgency in its northeast border 
and its importance in implementing 
Mode’s Act East Policy. New Delhi 
has been investing in ASEAN-wide 
infrastructural projects with the aim 
of bolstering trade in the ASEAN-
India Free Trade Area (atmaKuRi, 
a. – iZZuddin, m. 2020). India also 
affirms Myanmar as a gateway to 
link the rest of Southeast Asia for 
its economic development.
Likewise, some infrastructure 
projects are being implemented such 
as the India-Myanmar-Thailand 
Trilateral Highway and Kaladan 
Multi-Modal Transit Transport 
(KMMTT) that that provides 
connection from Sittwe deep-water 
port to Kolkata. India aims to use 
Sittwe port as a counter balancing 
to China’s BRI in Indo-Pacific 
region. The construction of Sittwe 
port is part of the Kaladan multi-
model transit transport project to 
expand a multi-modal sea, river and 
road transport corridor for shipment 
of cargo from eastern port of India 
to Myanmar through Sittwe port as 
well as north-eastern part of India 
via Myanmar.
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Figure 31: Myanmar’s Economic Corridors
Source: www.beltandroad.news
Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), also known as One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR) is Chinese high 
ambitious grand strategy launched 
by Chinese President Xi Jinping 
aimed at connecting China and the 
rest of the world with a network 
of roads, high-speed rail, power 
lines, ports, pipelines, and other 
infrastructures networks. Under 
BRI, more than 60 countries from 
Asia, the Middle East, Europe and 
Africa, will take part in the project 
based on three key pillars such 
as utilizing industrial capacity, 
nurturing a network of economic 
interdependence, and fostering 
regional stability and prosperity 
(heng, K. – po, s. 2017). Like any 
other ASEAN countries Myanmar 
has launched cooperation with 
China in BRI project. In mainland 
Southeast Asia, Myanmar is the 
important country as the linking 
the southern Chinese province 
of Yunnan with Myanmar’s 
Kyaukphyu port that allows oil 
and gas delivered to China without 
bypassing Malacca straits, i.e., as a 
land corridor to overcome the so-
called Malacca dilemma. Moreover, 
it can provide China to access the 
Indian Ocean that is necessary both 
for trade and security and also from 
military point of view.
Accordingly, it can assume 
that the interests of both India and 
China meet at the same point of 
strategic Western part of Myanmar, 
Rakhine state. India is worried 
about China-Myanmar Economic 
Corridor (CMEC) that is vital for 
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China to reduce its reliance on 
Malacca Straits and access to Bay of 
Bengal and Indian Ocean. There is 
already running oil and gas pipeline 
from Myanmar to China under this 
project. For China, the strategic 
advantages coming from this 
project area are more crucial than oil 
and gas transportation. The CMEC 
involves the Kyaukphyu deep-sea 
port with a special economic zone 
(SEZ), the China-Myanmar border 
economic zone and new Yangon 
urban development project. While 
China is running the Kyaukphyu 
port project with special economic 
zone, India is developing the Sittwe 
port project simultaneously.
The Progress of Myanmar-
India Relations: A Threat 
for China and Hope for 
Myanmar?
In 2017, Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi visited 
Myanmar as his first bilateral visit 
to Myanmar. That was the third 
by an Indian prime minister in 
five years and second by him in 
three years. At the historical visit, 
Prime Minister Modi met with 
State Counsellor Aung San Suu 
Kyi who was strongly criticized 
by international community in 
concerning with the Bengalis issue 
in western part of Myanmar. He 
supported Myanmar’s government 
proper management on that issue 
and fully realized the country’s 
real situation on conflicts between 
ethnic Rakhine people and migrated 
Bengalis people following the 
attack of ARSA (Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army). In his visit, the 
following joint statement was 
released:
‘India condemned the recent 
terrorist attacks in northern Rakhine 
State, where several members of 
the Myanmar security forces lost 
their lives. Both sides agreed that 
terrorism violates human rights 
and there should, therefore, be no 
glorification of terrorist as martyrs’ 
(Roche, e. 2017)
Myanmar stands as one of 
the strategic neighbors of India 
sharing borders with a lot of Indian 
northeastern states including 
militancy-hit Nagaland and 
Manipur states. Many of the tribes 
in India’s Northeastern region are 
ethnically linked to some Myanmar 
tribes and at least five major militant 
groups from India’s Northeast have 
been fighting for their autonomy 
setting up in Sagaing region of 
Myanmar border (Zhao, h. 2008). 
There are a lot of cooperations 
between India and Myanmar to 
fight against the insurgent groups. 
On 16 May 2019, the two countries 
carried out a three-week-long 
military operation to fight several 
militant groups hiding along Indo-
Contemporary Global Challenges in Geopolitics, Security Policy and World Economy
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
353
Myanmar border. In addition, 
they signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on defense 
cooperation aimed at enhancing 
military training, joint surveillance, 
and maritime security (delhi, a. B. 
n. 2019).
In July 2019, Myanmar 
and India signed a defense 
cooperation agreement aiming 
at advancing military-to-military 
cooperation between Indian Armed 
Forces and Tatmadaw (Myanmar 
Army) (panda, a. 2019). It was 
signed after the extensive talk 
between Commander-in-Chief 
of Myanmar’s Defense Services 
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing 
and India’s Minister of State for 
Defense Shripad Yesso Naik 
(delhi, a. B. n. 2019). Indian 
government delivered Myanmar 
navy Advanced light Torpedo 
(TAL) Shyena torpedoes which 
were manufactured by Bharat 
Dynamics Limited (BDL), a public 
sector enterprise under the control 
of India’s Ministry of Defense 
(“Indian Torpedoes Delivered to 
Myanmar Navy,” 2019). Again 
in the same year, Myanmar navy 
acquired a diesel-electric Kilo-
class submarine, INS Sindhuvir, 
which India had modernized after 
purchasing from Russia in the 
1980s (siddiqui, h. 2019).
India has launched military 
engagement with regional countries 
as part of its ‘Act East Policy. For 
Naypyidaw, these military purchase 
assists Myanmar’s maritime 
interests and maritime security, 
especially on the back of its 
neighbors Bangladesh and Thailand 
acquiring submarines from China 
(atmaKuRi, a. – iZZuddin, m. 
2020). Under India’s “Naval 
Diplomacy”, the Indian navy 
initiated CORPAT (Coordinated 
Patrol) with Myanmar since 2003. 
According to CORPAT, India 
has done military exercises with 
other countries like Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and Thailand.
India looks Myanmar as an 
important buffer for its national 
security interests, it provides 
military and also conducts joint 
military exercises with Myanmar 
Army like the India-Myanmar 
Bilateral Military Exercises ( 
IMBAX-2017 and IMBEX 2018–
2019) (atmaKuRi, a. – iZZuddin, m. 
2020). In July 2019, during a visit 
of Commander-in-Chief of General 
Min Aung Hlaing to India, a new 
Memorandum of Understanding 
on defense cooperation was signed 
aiming at advancing military-
to-military cooperation between 
Indian Armed Forces and Tatmadaw 
(Myanmar Army) (panda, a. 2019).
Myanmar army has bought 
most of its military weapons and 
fighter jacks mostly from China 
while facing with arm-embargo 
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imposed by West. But there is 
growing unsatisfaction in Myanmar 
military because of substandard and 
unqualified military weapons as 
well as lack of sufficient technical 
support by China. Some fighter 
pilots from Myanmar Air Force 
often lost their lives in air crush 
accidents. Coincidently, India’s 
“Made in India” arms industry has 
identified Myanmar as a key to 
increasing its military exports and 
then Myanmar bought India’s first 
locally produced anti-submarine 
torpedo, called TAL Shyena in 
2017. “Made in India” initiative 
was launched in September 2014 
with the aim of becoming India as a 
global manufacturing powerhouse 
and production hub and the defense 
industry has regarded as one of the 
government’s key strategic plans 
(RossiteR, a. – cannon, B. j. 2019).
On the one hand, there is an 
incredible change in Myanmar-
China relations. In January 2020, 
President Xi Jinping paid a two-day 
visit to Myanmar on the occasion 
of the 70 years anniversary of Sino-
Myanmar relations. He was the first 
Chinese leader to visit Naypyidaw 
after Jiang Zemin back in 2001. 
During his visit, 33 projects were 
signed for joint projects between 
the countries. The most significant 
fact is that China didn’t ask to start 
Ayeyarwady Myitsone dam project 
that was the most controversial 
and sensitive issue in bilateral 
relations. That may be satisfied 
with Myanmar people’s desire 
and decrease the risk of tensions 
between the two countries. It may 
be China’s trade-off between the 
Mega Dam Project and Kyaukphyu 
port and special economic zone that 
can bring a wide range of interests 
through BRI. The good-well visit 
of President Xi highlights how 
important Myanmar’s role is for 
Beijing.
Most recently, a delegation 
led by President of Myanmar 
visited India according to the 
cordial invitation of the President 
of the Republic of India from 26 
to 29 February 2020. Both sides 
welcomed the synergies between 
Myanmar’s independent, active 
and non-aligned foreign policy and 
India’s Act East and Neighborhood 
First policies (“India-Myanmar 
joint statement during the state 
visit of the Myanmar President 
to India,” 2020). New Delhi also 
revealed its support for the steps 
taken by the Government of 
Myanmar addressing the challenges 
in Northern Rakhine State in which 
the crisis happened between ethnic 
insurgent group and army. 
Furthermore, India 
reiterated its support to Myanmar 
government’s repatriation process 
for displaced persons from Rakhine 
State that was signed an agreement 
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between Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
For Myanmar, the situation of 
Rakhine State, which is located 
in the western part of Myanmar, 
is complex and challenging issue 
that has drawn much attention by 
the international community. On 
25 August 2017, the violence was 
triggered in Rakhine State when the 
extremist group known as Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) 
committed the collective attacks on 
Myanmar security forces (more than 
30 police posts). Later, this terrorist 
groups targeted, attacked and 
threatened innocent civilians in the 
Rakhine state. This was not the first 
time for these violence attack and 
they carried out similar assaults on 
police posts that nine police officers 
had been killed in October 2016 
(RaKhine 2017). Myanmar Army 
planned a military operation to 
fight against these militants in order 
to protect the lives of civilians and 
to maintain the sovereignty of the 
country. The brutal terrorist attacks 
of ARSA led to the escalation of 
violence and the subsequent mass 
displacement of Muslim people flee 
into Bangladesh which has changed 
the entire situation and negatively 
affected the perception and attitude 
of the international community on 
Rakhine issues. The Government 
of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar fully shares the concern 
of the international community 
regarding the displacement and 
suffering of all communities 
affected by this violence, and 
it has made great strides for 
restoration of the rule of law, peace 
and stability and preparation for 
repatriation of displaced people 
from Rakhine State. In order to 
solve this issue, the Governments 
of Myanmar and Bangladesh 
signed the “Arrangement on Return 
of Displaced Persons from Rakhine 
State” on 23 November 2017, the 
Terms of Reference (ToR) for 
the Joint Working Group on the 
repatriation of displaced Myanmar 
residents from Bangladesh 
(Embassy of the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar, Belgrade, 
2019, p.3). As a result, Myanmar 
has been received full support by 
India as New Delhi understands the 
prevailing situation on the ground 
and recognizes Myanmar’s effort 
to accomplish main objectives to 
establish peace, stability, rule of 
law and sustained development 
in Rakhine State, meanwhile 
international community impose 
pressure on Myanmar government 
based on unreliable and one-sided 
narratives and sources which could 
only hinder progress (ibid). So, 
India’s stance on this issue from the 
side of Myanmar means to provide 
the Myanmar government the 
diplomatic shield in international 
arena. Moreover, regarding defense 
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and security cooperation, New 
Delhi agrees to assist Naypyidaw 
in the capacity building of the 
Myanmar Defense Services and 
to enhance maritime cooperation 
by recognizing the importance of 
addressing maritime challenges and 
strengthening maritime security.
V�1�4� Result and Discussion
Although India is regarded as 
the largest democratic state in the 
world, it had never kept exhorting 
Myanmar in its democratic norms 
because it strongly embraces the 
principle of non-interference based 
on the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence” since 1950s. 
Moreover, trade and economic 
linkages were weak compared to 
Myanmar’s economic relations 
with China. The less economic 
connections meant the less risk of 
possible clashes between the two 
sides. In comparison with China, 
India did not deliver the serious 
problems and any confrontation 
with Myanmar. For all of these 
reasons, India could build steady 
relations with Myanmar without 
leading to the terrible bilateral 
relations.
Considering China, Beijing’s 
illegal support of Myanmar EAOs 
with arms and ammunition was 
a cause of being disappointed 
by Myanmar government and 
that was one of the deterrence 
for peace reconciliation process 
of Myanmar. Furthermore, the 
growing concern of Chinese 
influence over Myanmar, the 
mount of antagonism between local 
people’s and Chinese investment 
companies because of social 
discontent and the lack of Myanmar 
government’s specific rules and 
regulations in order to settle the 
disputes have lost the mutual trust 
in bilateral cooperation. In the past, 
although the isolated Myanmar 
was bandwagoning China with no 
option, the new geopolitical shift 
has paved the way for Myanmar 
to achieve more opportunities to 
extend its international relations 
around the world.
In the current situation, 
Myanmar is struggling with 
economic setback, political 
instability and social unrest. Apart 
from these challenges, the country 
has faced with international 
pressures to deal with the 
displaced Myanmar residents from 
Bangladesh. Both India and China 
give full confidence to Myanmar 
effort in solving this issue. As a less 
powerful state with international 
pressure, Myanmar absolutely 
needs the diplomatic support by 
these neighbors. However, as a 
small country between two powerful 
states, Myanmar inevitably faces 
with both threats and opportunities 
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offered by both sides. Myanmar 
should establish friendly relations 
with both giants to take advantages 
of Sino-Indian rivalry using its 
strategic value instead of leaning 
on one power.
Under the NLD government 
led by Aung San Suu Kyi, some 
political analysts surmised that 
Naypyidaw would intimate with 
the West by leaving China behind. 
But in reality, Myanmar is getting 
closer to China than the previous 
time. The incumbent government is 
consciously aware of the fact that it 
will not be beneficial for Myanmar 
to make any confrontation with 
Beijing. The government’s policy 
is to build friendly relations with all 
countries in the world. Currently, 
there are remarkable improvements 
in Myanmar-India relations. The 
permanent truth is Myanmar is 
always an important neighbor 
both for India and China because 
of its geostrategic significance. If 
Myanmar can grasp its role between 
the two powers, it can possibly 
bring its economic development 
and political power.
From the point of view 
of the asymmetrical theory of 
international relations explored by 
Brantly Womack, small countries 
used to choose cooperative 
strategy to great powers instead 
of confrontation or competitive 
means except in one condition in 
which they have no other choice 
of by doing this way in dealing 
with those powers (WomacK, B. 
2006). This is because of the power 
disparity between small and great 
powers. However, despite their 
vulnerability, small countries could 
take a number of measures to reduce 
their vulnerability, such as: the 
strengthening of national defense 
capabilities; entering into defense 
agreements with other states; 
underpinning security through 
economic growth; promoting 
internal cohesion; and adopting 
sound diplomatic policies at both 
bilateral and multilateral levels 
(tan, a. t. h. 2017). By analyzing 
current scenario, it can be assumed 
that Myanmar government can well 
handle its good relations with both 
India and China by strengthening 
economic cooperation in western 
part of Myanmar by utilizing its 
bargaining strength. So, this is 
the interesting point of Myanmar 
government’s strategy in managing 
its relations with these two great 
powers for the sake of its own 
national interest without destroying 
any of those relations.
V�1�5� Conclusion
To sum up, China is the most 
important economic partner for 
Myanmar meanwhile India is also 
the reliable one that can support 
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Naypyidaw to develop its military 
capability and diplomatic support 
in encountering international 
pressure. On the other hand, 
Myanmar inevitably rely on 
Beijing’s diplomatic support and 
protection in United Nations 
Security Council. Under the clever 
and proper management of Aung 
San Suu Kyi, who is a smart leader, 
Myanmar will never allow itself to 
become a foe or competitive one 
with any of those powerful states. 
It is never ever impossible for 
Myanmar to incline one side. It is 
obviously seen that today Myanmar 
has pursued friendly relations with 
all countries with its great effort. 
While Myanmar is escalating its 
relations with India, there is some 
concern that its political shift can 
deteriorate Sino-Myanmar relations 
or that will trigger Beijing’s anger to 
Naypyidaw. In reality, the relations 
between Myanmar and Beijing 
are increasing in parallel with 
the progress of Indian-Myanmar 
bilateral ties. That would be the 
successful proof of Myanmar’s 
balancing strategy paving the way 
of development of Myanmar. The 
better the Myanmar-India relations, 
the lesser Chinese influence in 
Myanmar even if Myanmar cannot 
totally get rid of China’s role in its 
country. In a nutshell, the progress 
of Myanmar-India relations can be 
an impetus for the development 
of Sino-Myanmar relations in any 
way.
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v.2. the role of aSEan on the territorial 
Dispute in the South China Sea
Rosita Widjojo125 – hnin mya thida126
Abstract
The South China Sea (SCS) is known for its significant strategic and economic 
role in the Indo-Pacific. The South China Sea is bordered by Brunei, Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan and Vietnam. It is one 
of the most important commercial trade routes in the region. However, it is simultaneously 
becoming the source of tension between China and other South East Asian nations for 
territorial control. In recent years, China has been asserting greater control, and ASEAN 
has sought to resolve maritime issues in the region. As the SCS is surrounded by mostly 
ASEAN member countries, problems arise when each country, including China, lays 
claim to the land and sea features in the SCS, driven mostly by strategic interests. Being 
members of ASEAN, where member countries need to resolve regional issues to maintain 
regional stability, ASEAN members with a claim in the SCS have their own national 
interests that make conflict resolutions complicated. At the 34th ASEAN Summit (June 
2019), all member states agreed to adopt the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The 
document emphasized ASEAN’s role to strengthen regional commitment by respecting 
international law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). Maritime cooperation is seen as a peaceful settlement to resolve potential 
disputes.
Keywords: ASEAN, South China Sea (SCS), maritime territorial disputes, 
UNCLOS
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V�2�1� Introduction
The South China Sea (SCS) 
has been one of the major issues 
in world geopolitics. Strategic 
interests have placed the South 
China Sea (SCS) as one of the most 
disputed maritime regions, mainly 
in terms of securing access to natural 
resources and trade routes. As the 
SCS contains an abundant source 
of oil and natural gas deposits, as 
well as being a major international 
trade route, the ongoing struggle 
is mainly between China and six 
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ASEAN states (Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, 
Singapore and Indonesia). China 
claims the entire sea as its territory 
(through its controversial nine-dash 
line), creating tension with ASEAN 
and also the United States (US) 
interest in its geopolitical strategy to 
prevent Chinese domination in East 
Asia. The SCS is one of the most 
complex disputes involving many 
countries and has the potential to 
escalate into a great power conflict 
(Kempston, t. – thomas, n. 2013).
According to Severino, 
conflict arises because each country 
surrounding the SCS has a strategic 
interest in the SCS (seveRino, R. 
c. 2010). China fears threats from 
the southeast, while some accuse 
China of exerting dominance in the 
SCS to achieve a certain amount 
of control in the region. Vietnam 
needs to impose control in the 
SCS to avoid being surrounded by 
Chinese power. The Philippines 
feels compelled to extend its zone 
of jurisdiction westwards to the 
SCS, having been invaded by 
Japanese forces at the start of the 
Pacific War. A vast area of the SCS 
separates East Malaysia and West 
Malaysia, but the SCS also serves 
as a connection to both parts. Brunei 
Darussalam wants to ensure its 
claimed exclusive economic zone, 
which overlaps with other claims. 
Severino added that other 
countries, such as Indonesia, 
also have a claim in the SCS, 
although indirectly, to ensure 
that the abundant gas resources 
in the Natuna islands fall under 
Indonesia’s authority for its 
exclusive exploitation (seveRino, 
R. c. 2010). The United States 
(US), although not supporting any 
country’s claims, also seeks to 
ensure that its warships and aircraft 
are free to navigate in or above 
the waters of the SCS, to keep its 
trading links with South East Asia. 
Japan also has interests of securing 
the trading flows and energy imports 
through the SCS. Under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, or UNCLOS, coastal 
states are entitled to an Economic 
Exclusive Zone (EEZ) and beyond 
that are considered the high seas or 
international waters, common to 
all nations. However, each country 
has different strategic interests and 
with China imposing more power 
in the SCS, maintaining peace and 
stability becomes a fragile issue.
This paper would like to 
address concerns regarding the SCS 
issue between China and ASEAN, 
which have persisted for more than 
50 years. On the one hand, China 
is one of the most important trading 
partners of ASEAN, but on the 
other hand, the SCS issue could put 
ASEAN into an increased potential 
confrontation with China. The 
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focus on ASEAN integration and 
community-building has earned 
secondary attention because of the 
energy spent on dealing with SCS 
issues. Countries find themselves 
squeezed over how they should 
define regional interest, how to 
ensure unity and solidarity in 
accordance with the “ASEAN 
Way” – which utilizes compromise, 
consensus, and consultation while 
prioritizing informal decision-
making processes and non-
conflicting ways of addressing 
outstanding issues – and how 
to ensure the mutual trust and 
confidence that have supported 
the ASEAN community thus far 
(asiatimes.com). Therefore, this 
paper’s objective is to provide 
insight into ASEAN and China in the 
SCS conflict, by taking into account 
how ASEAN member countries are 
seeking to settle the issue without 
fragmenting the relationship within 
ASEAN. By using exploratory 
study and supported by secondary 
information from previous studies 
and recent developments in the 
region, the main points in this paper 
are the following: identifying the 
main causes of the dispute; reasons 
why the SCS dispute is threatening 
ASEAN unity; and strategies for 
how ASEAN could overcome this 
dispute.
V�2�2� ASEAN as a Regional 
Organization
The Establishment of 
ASEAN
The Association of South 
East Asian Nations or ASEAN 
was established on August 8, 
1967, in Bangkok, Thailand, 
with the signing of the ASEAN 
Declaration (or Bangkok 
Declaration) by the founding states 
of ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined 
in 1984, followed by Vietnam in 
1995, then Lao PDR and Myanmar 
in 1997. Cambodia joined in 1999, 
and these countries make up the ten 
Member States of ASEAN (www.
asean.org). The map of the region 
and the member states is presented 
(Figure 32).
The aims and purposes of 
ASEAN, as stated in the ASEAN 
declaration, are as follows:
1. To accelerate the economic 
growth, social progress 
and cultural development 
in the region through joint 
endeavors in the spirit of 
equality and partnership 
in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous 
and peaceful community of 
Southeast Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
364
and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the 
rule of law in the relationship 
among countries of the 
region and adherence to 
the principles of the United 
Nations Charter;
3. To promote active 
collaboration and mutual 
assistance on matters of 
common interest in the 
economic, social, cultural, 
technical, scientific and 
administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each 
other in the form of training 
and research facilities in the 
educational, professional, 
technical and administrative 
spheres;
5. To collaborate more 
effectively for the greater 
utilization of their agriculture 
and industries, the expansion 
of their trade, including the 
study of the problems of 
international commodity 
trade, the improvement of 
their transportation and 
communications facilities 
and the raising of the living 
standards of their peoples;
6. To promote Southeast Asian 
studies; and
7. To maintain close and 
beneficial cooperation with 
existing international and 
regional organizations with 
similar aims and purposes, 
and explore all avenues for 
even closer cooperation 
among themselves.
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Figure 32: ASEAN Member States
Source: www.weform.org, 2017
The ASEAN Vision
The ASEAN Vision 2020, 
adopted by the ASEAN leaders on 
the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN, 
agreed on a shared vision of ASEAN 
as a cooperation of Southeast Asian 
nations, outward looking, living 
in peace, stability and prosperity, 
bonded together in partnership 
in dynamic development and in 
a community of caring societies. 
The ASEAN Community was 
established in 2015, which 
comprised three pillars: the ASEAN 
political and security community, 
the ASEAN economic community 
and the ASEAN socio-cultural 
community. 
For the ASEAN political and 
security policy, each member agrees 
to rely exclusively on peaceful 
processes in the settlement of intra-
regional differences and to regard 
their security as fundamentally 
linked to one another and bound 
by geographic location, common 
vision and objectives. It has the 
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following components: political 
development; shaping and sharing 
of norms; conflict prevention; 
conflict resolution; post-conflict 
peace building; and implementing 
mechanisms.
The ASEAN economic 
community formed the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) 
blueprint with a vision for 2025, 
in which it is aimed towards (1) 
A Highly Integrated and Cohesive 
Economy; (2) A Competitive, 
Innovative, and Dynamic ASEAN; 
(3) Enhanced Connectivity 
and Sectoral Cooperation; (4) 
A Resilient, Inclusive, People-
Oriented, and People-Centered 
ASEAN; and (5) A Global ASEAN.
In the ASEAN socio-
cultural community, the ASEAN 
Socio-Cultural Community 
(ASCC) blueprint also formed 
a vision for 2025, committed to 
creating opportunities for human 
development, including culture and 
information, education, youth and 
sports, health, social welfare and 
development, women and gender, 
women and children rights, labor, 
civil service, rural development and 
poverty eradication, environment, 
trans-boundary haze-pollution, 
disaster management and 
humanitarian assistance. Despite 
their distinct cultures, histories and 
languages, the 10 member states of 
ASEAN share a focus on jobs and 
prosperity. Household purchasing 
power is rising, propelling the 
region into the next frontier of 
consumer growth. The region 
must now meet the challenges of 
providing enormous investment in 
infrastructure and human-capital 
development to ensure it realizes its 
full potential (www.weforum.org, 
2017).
Today, ASEAN can be 
regarded as a successful regional 
organization preserving the peace 
and stability in the region, promoting 
cooperation within and outside the 
community. Compared to the EU 
as a regional organization, ASEAN 
has similarities and differences 
with the EU. The main differences 
are the means of settling disputes 
(KOH, T. 2017):
1. The EU has the European 
Parliament with the power 
to legislate, as well as the 
power to veto budgets and 
appointments. ASEAN 
has the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly 
which has the power of moral 
suasion only.
2. The scope of power of the 
secretariat. The European 
Commission acts like a 
government and is entitled 
to enter into treaties. The 
commission has the power 
to put forward proposals 
for legislation. The ASEAN 
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Charter has enhanced the 
power of the secretary-
general. One of his most 
important responsibilities 
is to issue an annual report 
card on each member 
state’s compliance with its 
obligations.
3. The decision-making process, 
in which ASEAN takes all 
its decisions by consensus. 
The EU can decide by taking 
votes. There is a system 
of weighted voting, with 
different countries being 
given different numbers of 
votes. However, in the area of 
common foreign and security 
policy, decisions are based on 
unanimity.
Southeast Asia is a huge 
neighboring region for China, to 
which it is connected by land and 
the South China Sea. As the ASEAN 
becomes a community bringing 
all countries together, China’s 
relations with ASEAN are based on 
two tracks: its bilateral relationship 
with each member, and its collective 
relationship with ASEAN as a 
whole. While handling complex 
bilateral relations with each 
country, China has given priority 
to developing the relationship 
with ASEAN. With rising disputes 
over the South China Sea, China’s 
relationship with ASEAN has been 
negatively affected (Zhang, y. – 
Wang, y. 2019).
V�2�3� Geopolitical Aspects 
in the South China Sea
The geopolitics of the South 
China Sea
The South China Sea is a 
marginal sea that is part of the 
Pacific Ocean and is the center of 
maritime Eurasia. It encompasses 
an area from the Karimata and 
Malacca Straits of Taiwan. The 
South China Sea (SCS) is one of 
the world’s busiest waterways with 
50% of world annual trade passing 
through the region. It is significant 
not only for its essential trade 
route but for its abundant natural 
resources such as gas, oil and its rich 
fish productivity. It is also critical 
because of the world’s important 
linking point at the Malacca Strait, 
which connects the South China 
Sea and, through extension, the 
Pacific Ocean with the Indian 
Ocean. The region is also vital for 
the Northeast Asian countries of 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as 
80 percent of crude oil imports to 
these countries passes through this 
region. According to the United 
Nations’ Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), roughly 
80 percent of global trade by 
volume and 70 percent by value is 
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transported by sea and 60 percent of 
maritime trade passes through Asia 
via the South China Sea (“How 
much trade transits the South China 
Sea?,” 2017). 
In addition, historically 
and geographically, the SCS is 
a key commercial thoroughfare 
connecting Asia with Europe 
and Africa, and its seabed is rich 
with natural resources. One third 
of global shipping, or a total of 
US$3.37 trillion of international 
trade, passes through the SCS. 
About 80 per cent of China’s oil 
imports arrive via the Strait of 
Malacca, in Indonesia, and then sail 
across the South China Sea to reach 
China. The sea is also believed to 
contain major reserves of natural 
resources, such as natural gas and 
oil. The US Energy Information 
Administration estimates the area 
contains at least 11 billion barrels 
of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas. Other estimates are as 
high as 22 billion barrels of oil and 
290 trillion cubic feet of gas. The 
SCS also accounts for 10 per cent 
of the world’s fisheries, making it a 
key source of food for hundreds of 
millions of people.
Therefore, it is important 
not only for claimant states, but 
also for other countries, to secure 
the Sea Lanes of Communication 
(SLOCs). Moreover, the region is 
the subject of more than a dozen 
overlapping and interconnected 
disputes over islands, reefs, shoals 
and rocks scattered throughout the 
SCS and thus, being an important 
waterway, it is essential to have a 
well-recognized international rule 
of law. Nowadays, China’s assertive 
acts of establishing artificial islands 
and the installation of weapons 
over these areas threaten not only 
the sovereignty of claimant states 
but also the maritime security of 
the region. As a strategic point, 
the SCS issue has gone beyond 
the economic aims and become 
important for maritime security, 
peace and stability. Moreover, 
the South China Sea joins the 
Southeast Asian countries with the 
Western Pacific, acting as the throat 
of the global sea route (Kaplan, R. 
d. 2011). Thus, all Southeast Asian 
countries have a great interest in 
establishing peace and stability in 
the region.
Contemporary Global Challenges in Geopolitics, Security Policy and World Economy
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
369
Figure 33: Geographical Positioning of Southeast Asian Countries
Source: www.quora.com, 2018
Figure 33 outlines the 
geographical positioning of 
Southeast Asian countries in the 
South China Sea. The Southeast 
Asian countries are mainly divided 
into two geographic groups: 
Mainland Southeast Asia and 
Maritime Southeast Asia. The 
former part is historically known 
as Indochina, including Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, Peninsular 
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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The Maritime Southeast Asia 
comprises Brunei, East Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Singapore. Among them, the five 
member countries are connected to 
the dispute in claiming land features 
and waters in the South China Sea 
as they have immense strategic 
interests in it. Although the rest 
of the countries are not directly 
involved in the dispute, these 
clashes impact hugely on all of 
the ASEAN countries as this is not 
simply an issue of territorial dispute 
but also indicates the complex 
geopolitical and geo-economic 
problems underpinned by possible 
military threats posed by China in 
terms of building artificial islands 
in the disputed waters.
ASEAN and SCS Dispute
Most of the ASEAN 
countries are small and medium-
sized countries with disparities in 
their economic development and 
diverse political systems. Despite 
their disparity, all Southeast Asian 
countries have clearly recognized 
the changing strategic environment 
such as the regional security, social 
economic development, threat 
spectrum, and norms and rules of 
states at the regional and global 
level. In the region, the structures 
of threats are changing in tandem 
with the situation driven by the 
ideological war of two powerful 
blocs. Current threats have stemmed 
from climate change, pandemics, 
border war and terrorism as well as 
organized crime syndicates. Thus, 
all countries in the region have 
come to realize that they must adopt 
a more collaborative approach to 
address the unconventional form 
of threats (oegRoseno, a. 2016). 
This perspective has influenced 
the process of solving the SCS 
dispute too. On the other hand, 
the territorial and sovereignty 
issues are invariably associated 
with patriotism and nationalism 
which lead to drawbacks in conflict 
resolution. In the SCS dispute, all 
claimant states are less likely to 
settle the issue through adjudication 
or arbitration. Instead they resort 
to various dispute settlement 
mechanisms like negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
regional agencies or arrangements, 
or other peaceful means (ibid).
In the same way, China prefers 
to resolve the issue in a bilateral 
way with each claimant state, but 
it is also the desire of ASEAN 
to settle the dispute through the 
strength of ASEAN as a coherent 
entity. ASEAN centrality plays 
an important role in preventing 
the association from being stuck 
between great power rivalry and in 
protecting its resilience. The SCS 
dispute has resulted in the member 
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countries themselves arriving at a 
common ground of consensus over 
the issue. All member countries 
have close economic relations or 
political cooperation with either or 
both the US or/and China and no 
country wants to incur the anger of 
these two powers. The competition 
between China and the United 
States has strongly impacted on 
ASEAN in which Washington 
impels ASEAN to play a stronger 
leadership role in the conflict, while 
Beijing insists that ASEAN has no 
role to play in its “near seas”, as 
the disputes are of a bilateral nature 
(valencia, m. 2009).
So, it is one of the facts that 
the priority of own national interests 
of each member state entails a 
barrier to settling the dispute. As 
a result, the 45th ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting which was 
held in Cambodia failed to issue a 
joint communiqué. It was Beijing’s 
attempt to put Cambodia as the 
ASEAN Chair to block a joint 
communiqué consisting of China’s 
aggression in SCS (RoBeRts, c. 
B. 2018). The outcome was a 
terrible experience of deteriorating 
ASEAN unity. Beijing also uses 
economic diplomacy towards 
disputants and non-disputant 
countries by capitalizing on these 
countries’ economic dependence 
on it. Although China’s economic 
diplomacy does not directly 
reflect on the issue, the effect on 
stakeholders can influence the 
outcome.
In ASEAN, the ASEAN 
Summit and the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting are the two 
forums for dealing with the SCS 
issue (geRstl, a. 2017). ASEAN 
had made historical success in 
dealing with the SCS - including 
the 1992 ‘ASEAN Declaration 
on the South China Sea’ and its 
united response by revealing 
the photo evidence of Chinese 
assertiveness on Mischief Reef in 
1995. ASEAN aims to establish 
an effective conflict resolution 
framework that is a legally binding 
Code of Conduct (COC), and 
stresses its full implementation in 
all its aspects accordingly. In 2002, 
ASEAN and China were able to 
issue the Declaration of Conduct 
(DOC) on the Parties in South 
China Sea (DECLARATION ON 
THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES IN 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 2012). 
In 2013, the Philippines succeeded 
in the international arbitration 
against China. In 2014, the United 
States and the Philippines signed 
an enhanced defense pact with 
the aim of strengthening bilateral 
relationships.
In April 2018, the 32nd 
ASEAN Summit was held in 
Singapore. At the Summit, two 
important documents were released: 
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the ASEAN leaders Vision for a 
Resilient and Innovative ASEAN 
and the Zero Draft of the Chairman’s 
Statement of the 32nd Summit. 
The former consists of a nine-page 
document divided into a preamble 
and five sections including 37 
points. Point (3) of the preamble 
addresses peace and security in 
general terms and specifically 
focuses on nuclear weapons, on 
noninterference in internal affairs 
of ASEAN member states, and on 
maritime issues. With regard to 
the maritime issues, it states that 
“maritime cooperation are enhanced 
in accordance with internationally-
accepted treaties and principles, 
including the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS)” (thayeR, c. 
2018). In the Zero Draft, it could 
be seen that seven of 37 points 
are devoted to the South China 
Sea issue. In June 2018, the 24th 
ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ 
Consultation welcomed the official 
announcement of COC in the South 
China Sea and underscored the 
need to make progress in dialogue 
and consultation to ensure mutual 
trust and confidence, stressing the 
importance of fully and effectively 
implementing the DOC toward an 
effective COC (ASEAN, China 
reaffirm strategic partnership, 
2018).
The Philippines has 
continuously presented its 
argument that the issue is not a 
matter of ASEAN because these 
are bilateral disputes (thayeR, c. 
2018). Recently, it can be seen that 
bilateral relations between China 
and Cambodia is progressing over 
time. In February 2020, Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen visited 
China and showed Phnom Penh’s 
firm support of Beijing’s fight 
against the coronavirus epidemic. 
The very close ties between China 
and Cambodia may be a worrisome 
sign and could be construed as a 
set-back in solving the South China 
Sea dispute. Indonesia, not included 
as a disputant country, has proposed 
to boost its defense measures near 
the South China Sea, that is, in its 
Natuna islands by building a port 
and military air base runway. This 
is proof of how the SCS issue has 
concerned other countries as well. 
Regardless of the SCS 
dispute, ASEAN-China relations in 
economic and strategic cooperation 
have been steadily developing. 
In June 2008, ASEAN and the 
People’s Republic of China 
reaffirmed the importance of their 
strategic partnership and agreed 
to further strengthen their close 
relations at the 24th ASEAN-China 
Senior Officials’ Consultation 
(ASEAN, China reaffirm 
strategic partnership, 2018). 
Both parties agreed to strengthen 
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their economic relationship, 
including the implementation of 
the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area (ACFTA) and the ACFTA 
Upgrading Protocol. The China-
Indochina Peninsula economic 
corridor (CICPEC) is also one of 
the economic cooperation projects 
between China and ASEAN 
member countries. It was initiated 
in 2010 and incorporated later into 
the Belt and Road Initiative. This 
economic corridor aims to connect 
several cities in Southern China 
with major cities of Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia 
and Singapore with highways and 
railroads (Xinhua Insight: New 
Momentum over China-Singapore 
Economic Corridor/ Shanghai 
Daily, 2014). China said the aim 
of CICPEC is to promote the “co-
construction of the China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area and the Maritime 
Silk Road” bringing regional 
prosperity and benefit to people 
along the route. Thus, the economic 
integration between ASEAN and 
China would be estimated to lessen 
the political tensions in the SCS 
dispute because of their strong 
focus on mutual economic interests.
Conflict Management in 
ASEAN
Like other regional 
organizations, ASEAN has placed 
priority on regional peace and 
security through constructive 
engagement among member 
countries. The 1967 Bangkok 
Declaration, which is the foundation 
of ASEAN, states that regional 
peace and security is one of the 
purposes of the Association. Apart 
from the Bangkok Declaration, 
there are two significant provisions 
of guidance for the mechanism of 
conflict resolution. They are the 
ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC); both 
were signed in 1976. The former 
regards promoting cooperation 
among the member states through 
political, economic, social, 
cultural and security programs. 
The latter highlights the specific 
principles and policies for conflict 
management:(KOH, T. 2017):
1. Mutual respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, 
equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all 
nations;
2. The right of every state to 
lead its national existence free 
from external interference, 
subversion, or coercion;
3. Non-interference in the 
internal affairs of one another;
4. Settlement of differences or 
disputes by peaceful means;
5. Renunciation of the threat or 
use of force; and
6. Effective co-operation among 
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themselves (asKandaR, K. et 
al. 2002).
The Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation has already formulated 
the dispute settlement Mechanism 
in which the regional arrangement 
is a means to resolve the disputes 
as mentioned in Article 33 of the 
United Nations Charter. Regardless 
of the mechanism available to 
reconcile the territorial dispute, the 
most important factor is the political 
courage among the claimant states 
to commit to a settlement of the 
dispute through a third party’s 
involvement (oegRoseno, a. 2016).
The great powers’ competition 
in the region has had an impact on 
the regional geopolitical situation 
especially by means of the contest 
between Beijing and Washington. 
The United States’ strategic goals for 
Asia have been notably emphasized 
since the end of the Cold War and 
have given its Pacific Command the 
task of disseminating the freedom 
of the sea lanes of communication 
(SLOCs). Although Washington 
had recognized the significance 
of Southeast Asia, the region did 
not always play an important 
role in US foreign policy. But the 
situation changed under President 
Obama’s administration (2001-
2008) following the 9/11 attack by 
terrorists, designating Southeast 
Asia as the “second front” of the 
“global war on terror” (simon, s. 
W. 2015). Furthermore, President 
Obama initiated the “Pivot to 
Asia” strategy with the purpose of 
counterbalancing China especially 
deterring Chinese assertiveness in 
the SCS and the growing maritime 
capability of Beijing. The United 
States aimed to contain ‘the rise 
of China’ by integrating and 
establishing closer relations with 
Southeast Asian countries.
Moreover, Washington joined 
the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 
2011. In 2013, the United States had 
identified six strategic partners and 
Singapore probably tops the list, 
although there is no formal defense 
strategy between the two states 
(simon, s. W. 2015). In contrast to 
the Obama administration, Donald 
Trump administration’s “free and 
open Indo-Pacific” framework 
pays less attention to Southeast 
Asia or ASEAN as the secondary 
importance to the US after Northeast 
Asia (stoRey, i. – cooK, m. 2017). 
In 2019, Trump and Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo failed to attend 
the annual ASEAN-United States 
leaders’ summit and other ASEAN-
related meetings as well.
On December 21, 2019, 
however, the U.S. Congress passed 
the State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs Appropriations 
Bill. This legislation contains $2.5 
billion to implement the Gardner-
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Markey Asia Reassurance Initiative 
Act (ARIA) (thayeR, c. 2020). 
In the four provisions of ARIA, 
the first one calls on the Trump 
administration to engage with 
ASEAN as the premier “problem-
solving regional architecture” 
(ibid). Although ARIA’s 
provocations might bring clashes 
with Trump’s policy orientation, it 
can be seen as a glimmer of hope 
for ASEAN to be endorsed by U.S. 
to the region. The role of Southeast 
Asia under Trump’s presidency 
has diminished in comparison 
with former President Obama’s 
administration in three main ways: 
(1) Trump’s intention to dismantle 
the Pivot to Asia strategy initiated 
by Obama; (2) Trump’s withdrawal 
of America from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP); and (3) the 
strong emphasis of Trump’s 
administration on combating ISIS 
in the Middle East at the expense of 
other regions including Asia, much 
less Southeast Asia (stoRey, i. – 
iZZuddin, m. 2017).
The United States is the 
country that has continuously 
claimed freedom of navigation in 
the SCS according to the United 
Nations on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). Among ASEAN 
countries, Singapore has also asked 
for the freedom of navigation 
although it is not a member of the 
disputant countries. For ASEAN, 
it has used the hedging strategy 
in relation with the great powers, 
particularly the regional great 
powers. But the great power rivalry 
between the US and China has 
threatened ASEAN’s unity and its 
efforts to maintain regional peace 
and stability. The two powers have 
been attempting to establish closer 
relations with member states in 
a way that actually exacerbates 
this dispute through Washington’s 
funding of capacity-building 
projects in ASEAN member states, 
while Beijing provides individual 
states with aid (yang, a. h. 2015). 
On the other hand, Beijing’s 
economic diplomacy as a soft power 
has been substantially employed 
in Southeast Asia and ASEAN’s 
excessive economic dependency on 
China has been counterbalanced by 
the US’s military engagement in the 
region. 
The Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) plays a critical role in 
analyzing ASEAN-China relations. 
The Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), also known as One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR) is a highly 
ambitious grand strategy launched 
by Chinese President Xi Jinping 
aimed at connecting China and the 
rest of the world with a network 
of roads, high-speed rail, power 
lines, ports, pipelines, and other 
infrastructure networks. Under the 
BRI, more than 60 countries from 
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Asia, the Middle East, Europe and 
Africa, will take part in the project 
based on three key pillars such 
as utilizing industrial capacity, 
nurturing a network of economic 
interdependence, and fostering 
regional stability and prosperity 
(heng, K. – po, s. 2017). Southeast 
Asia is involved in both the Silk 
Road Economic Belt and the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road of Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) which 
hopes to foster the development of 
participating countries. Each of the 
participating countries is essential 
in successfully implementing 
China’s BRI. 
The holding of the second 
iteration of China’s Belt and 
Road Forum (BRF) in April 2019 
highlighted the important role of 
Southeast Asia, with nine Southeast 
Asian countries except for 
Indonesia attending the Forum. At 
the wider cooperation mechanism 
under the BRI, it concluded 
the Belt and Road Accounting 
Standards Cooperation Mechanism 
(with Vietnam and Laos) and a 
statement of intent for cooperation 
for pesticide quality specification 
setting (with Cambodia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) 
(paRamesWaRan, p. 2019). China 
realizes that the success of the 
BRI depends on the support and 
participation of other countries, 
particularly the neighboring 
Southeast Asian countries (yu, 
h. 2017). Meanwhile regional 
economic integration plays a 
significant role for ASEAN 
countries in minimizing external 
uncertainties and global economic 
vulnerabilities, and the more 
comprehensive attachment to 
ASEAN is of paramount importance 
for China. 
Amid the escalation of US-
China rivalry, Southeast Asian 
countries are well experienced in 
dealing with great powers in the 
region by using the most effective 
strategies and holding the relations 
in balance. The ascent of China and 
the United States’ involvement in 
regional affairs effected changes in 
Southeast Asia from the traditional 
balance of power strategy to the 
balance of influence strategy by 
inviting great powers’ competition 
and their participation in regional 
economic and diplomatic affairs 
in order to develop the stakes in 
the region’s peace and prosperity 
(cioRciaRi, j. d. 2009).
V�2�4� The South China 
Sea (SCS) Dispute and the 
Effect on ASEAN Unity
The SCS Dispute as a 
Threat to ASEAN
Globalization, from the 
positive side, tends to incentivize 
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countries in certain regions to 
form groupings to enhance their 
international status, and to better 
cooperate in terms of economic, 
socio-cultural and political 
considerations. The European 
Union (EU), the Visegrad Four, 
NATO, ACP (Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific) group of states, and ASEAN, 
can be seen as examples of these 
regional groups. However, recent 
developments show that issues and 
conflicts can endanger the group 
with the risk of disintegration, such 
as Brexit and the migrant crisis in 
the EU. Similarly, the SCS dispute 
is a threat to the unity of ASEAN as 
a regional organization.
Figure 34: China’s Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea
Source: www.dw.com, 2015
ASEAN was formed in 
1967 with the support of the 
West, notably the USA and the 
UK. In its early days, ASEAN’s 
function was to act as a buffer 
in the region in the midst of the 
Cold War, to prevent the spread 
of communism, and to enhance 
development in the Southeast Asia 
region. As the Cold War ended in 
the mid-1990s, ASEAN began to 
strengthen relations with China, 
Japan and South Korea in order to 
counterbalance the US influence in 
the Asia-Pacific region. As China 
grew to be a new world power in the 
2000s, China began to have bigger 
ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, 
notably in the SCS, which has long 
served as the busiest international 
sea trade route. China’s maritime 
and air power expansion in the 
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SCS has been driven by attempts 
to establish a zone of supremacy 
with economic activities as the 
main objective (gilley, B. 2019). 
Meanwhile, the US shifted its 
attention to the Middle East. The 
SCS became a vulnerable area 
with many countries occupying 
parts of the sea, and unlike land, 
it is difficult to establish a clear 
border among these countries and 
sometimes the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) of one country overlaps 
with that of another. Figure 35 
shows conflict areas in the SCS. 
As in this case, ASEAN countries 
failed to unify themselves to deal 
with China’s growing power; this 
requires a change in the political 
and sovereignty aspects among 
ASEAN member states.
The SCS dispute is one of the 
most complex and multi-layered 
geopolitical issues in the world. It 
involves territorial and maritime 
claims made by China, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Brunei and Indonesia, and the 
tension centered on the area in 
which China claimed a “nine-dash 
line” in the SCS, encompassing 
approximately 90 percent of the 
waters. The line runs as far as 2,000 
kilometers from mainland China, 
reaching waters close to Indonesia 
and Malaysia, and it is used by 
China as a geographical marker to 
assert its claim. China maintains 
that any land or water in the nine-
dash line belongs to its “historical 
maritime right” (Zhen, l. 2016). 
Only four ASEAN member states 
are claimant states to the SCS, 
namely Brunei, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam. Indonesia 
has maintained the official position 
that it is not a party to territorial 
disputes in the SCS but China’s 
nine-dash line includes “traditional 
fishing grounds” that fall within 
the exclusive economic zone off 
Indonesia’s Natuna Islands (hoang, 
t. h. 2019). For example, China 
claims more than 80 per cent, while 
Vietnam claims sovereignty over 
the Paracel Islands and the Spratly 
Islands (Figure 34). Meanwhile, 
the Philippines claimed ownership 
of the Spratly archipelago and the 
Scarborough Shoal (Figure 34), 
with Malaysia and Brunei claiming 
the southern parts of the SCS. In July 
2016, a ruling by the International 
Tribunal in the Hague determined 
that China had no “historic rights” 
over the sea, and ruled that some 
of the rocky outcrops claimed by 
several countries could not legally 
be used as the basis for territorial 
claims. Beijing rejected the ruling 
and described it has having “no 
binding force”. The South China 
Sea territorial dispute has emerged 
as a challenge to the unity of the 
organization. ASEAN has discussed 
drawing up a code of conduct to 
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be signed with China governing 
disputes in the South China Sea, but 
Beijing is reluctant to sign on to a 
multilateral agreement.
Figure 35: Areas in the SCS Dispute
Source: www.eonomist.com, 2017
How ASEAN Could 
Resolve the SCS Dispute
The South China Sea 
territorial dispute has emerged 
as a challenge to the unity of the 
organization. Southeast Asian 
nations have traditionally rejected 
looking for a bilateral solution with 
China, the region’s main economic 
and military power. Despite this, 
one year after the landmark ruling 
against China’s territorial claims, 
Philippine President Rodrigo 
Duterte agreed to solve the dispute 
with China through bilateral talks. 
Similarly, Vietnam, the most 
outspoken critic of China, has 
softened its stance. In April 2018, 
the government said it would be 
willing to hold talks with China 
to resolve disputes in the area “in 
accordance with international law”. 
However, there are many 
challenges ahead in the quest to 
realize its goals. For example, the 
incredible economic, political, 
religious, cultural, and linguistic 
diversity amongst the ASEAN 
member states creates barriers to 
unity and community building. 
The ‘ASEAN Way’ is anchored 
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on consultation and consensus 
amongst all ASEAN member states 
(Zhang, y. 2019). There are worries 
that ASEAN may not respond 
effectively to meet these challenges 
as the consensus can only be 
based on the ‘lowest common 
denominator’, and each member 
has veto power to oppose, postpone, 
or derail decisions and actions 
on urgent or critical problems 
(moRada, n. 2017). ASEAN will 
continue to ensure its members’ 
sovereign rights and benefits as a 
‘shared identity’, not a governing 
organization, while enhancing the 
role of collective governance. It 
is argued that, despite ASEAN’s 
promises, the ‘internal’ relevance 
of the community to each of its 
members remains largely secondary 
to national politics and policy 
priorities within each of the ASEAN 
member countries (tay, s. s. c. 
2017). The challenge is to be bold 
enough to condition minds to create 
a new and reformed ASEAN by 
agreeing to forge a new consensus 
(FuZi, a. 2017). In the ASEAN 
Charter of 2007 the Member 
States committed themselves 
to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. The Protocol on Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms adopted in 
2010 builds on this commitment. 
The Protocol provides Member 
States with a framework enabling 
recourse in advance to traditional, 
and largely optional, means of 
dispute settlement in the form of 
diplomatic, or non-adjudicative, 
modes, consultation, good offices, 
mediation and conciliation, to the 
quasi-judicial, arbitration, but no 
court (naldi, g. j. 2014).
ASEAN has been working 
with China on an official code 
of conduct to avoid clashes in 
the disputed waters. A binding 
agreement has been discussed 
for years to little avail but in 
August 2018 it was revealed that 
all parties had agreed on a single 
draft negotiating text. ASEAN has 
discussed drawing up a code of 
conduct to be signed with China 
governing disputes in the SCS, but 
Beijing is reluctant to sign on to a 
multilateral agreement. ASEAN is 
also the only multilateral platform 
that China has agreed to engage 
on the SCS issue. This presents 
Beijing with a dilemma in dealing 
with ASEAN as a group and at the 
same time pursuing bilateralism 
with each claimant state (hoang, 
t. h. 2019). China’s aversion to 
ASEAN’s collective approach on 
the SCS issue was well reflected 
during the formulation of the 
DOC Guidelines. The key issue is 
whether ASEAN member states 
should consult among themselves 
first before they consult with 
China. ASEAN members insist 
on such a consensual approach 
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towards China, while the Chinese 
side does not think this is in line 
with the understanding of the DOC. 
The whole issue of the SCS is not 
a matter between ASEAN as an 
organization and China, but among 
the relevant countries (seveRino, R. 
c. 2010). The reasons why China 
prefers bilateralism are self-evident: 
in bilateral contexts, individual 
Southeast Asian claimant states do 
not have the collective bargaining 
power of ASEAN. Dealing with 
each member state separately and 
bilaterally would give China an 
overwhelming leverage to dictate its 
terms, through coercion, co-option 
and/or commercial incentives 
(hoang, t. h. 2019).
Southeast Asia is most 
influential when it works together, 
so multilateralism will continue 
to be critical. ASEAN should 
rely more on support from the 
larger constellation of countries 
committed to freedom of navigation 
and the protection of freedom of 
the seas to avoid being coerced into 
unfair agreements over resource 
development or rules of the road. 
If ASEAN continues to struggle, 
there may be opportunities for a 
subgroup to work mini-laterally to 
put forward solutions. For example, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Brunei, and the Philippines could 
negotiate a consensus view on 
delineating maritime boundaries 
and a maritime Code of Conduct 
(COC) outside of ASEAN and 
adopt that unified position together 
(paRamesWaRan, p. 2016).
V�2�5� Conclusion
With China emerging as a new 
power this has changed its position 
and ambition in the region. Along 
with the withdrawal of the US 
power in the Asia-Pacific, it poses 
a threat to ASEAN’s credibility 
as a regional organization that 
previously managed to secure peace 
and prosperity in the region. ASEAN 
needs to adapt to these changes 
by confronting the challenges of 
regional militarization, economic, 
civilian, and environmental 
security issues. ASEAN itself is 
in a dilemma in regards to SCS 
maritime disputes, although it 
repeatedly defends a rule-based 
regional order and international 
law such as UNCLOS. Practically, 
ASEAN has not taken effective and 
determined action over the issue 
such that it can counterbalance 
Chinese hegemony. Fortunately, 
the SCS issue does not impact on 
the economic cooperation between 
ASEAN and China. Furthermore, 
ASEAN should try to grasp its 
significant position in the BRI 
as a counterbalancing tool to the 
Chinese assertiveness in the South 
China Sea. The most important 
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thing that can overcome the SCS 
dispute is to achieve the unity of 
ASEAN itself. Each country should 
prioritize the common interest 
over its own national interest. One 
way to enhance that is to review 
the ASEAN Charter so that it 
accommodates ASEAN towards 
becoming more functional and 
people-oriented, providing greater 
cla¬rity in the conduct of relations 
between states and in resolving 
issues. It would also allow ASEAN 
to address power projections in the 
region and to adapt more quickly to 
new and emerging challenges.
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v.3. Milestones of Eurasian Integration
BauyRZhan uRaZimBetov127
Abstract
The Eurasian Economic Union is the largest and the most successful integration 
among post-Soviet integrations. Today, five countries are members of the union and four 
countries have free trade agreements with the union. However, like other unions the 
Eurasian integration has faced problems during the process of integration. For example, 
the issue of authoritarianism, corruption, the domination of Russia, the lack of balance 
between national interests and the union’s interests in the decision-making process, 
and the different rates of development among member states are some of the obstacles 
to integration. Such issues in the integration process interfere with the successful 
development of both the union and individual member states. Moreover, core issues 
might derail the development of the state or union by taking it in the wrong direction and 
creating serious systemic problems in the future. 
This article will examine the core issues and milestones of the Eurasian Economic 
Integration by use of a qualitative approach through the content analysis method with 
supporting arguments.
Keywords: Eurasian Economic Union, Russia, Kazakhstan, regional 
integration, economic and political issues, geopolitics
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V�3�1� Novelty and 
Relevance of the Topic
Regional integration is 
an important part of a state’s 
development and in light of modern 
day realities no country is able 
to effectively exist and develop 
without integrating into the world 
economy (doBRovolsKy, a. m. 
2019). From the perspective 
of international relations, the 
term “regional integration” is a 
relatively new phenomenon, the 
usage of which spread after World 
War 2 (sKRiBa, a. s. – altuKhov, 
a. o. 2019). Regional integration 
is a progressive and multi-stage 
economic integration, which 
transfers to the political plane at 
the final stage; the European Union 
(hereinafter EU) or the Eurasian 
Economic Union (hereinafter EEU) 
are two examples of this (sKRiBa, a. 
s. – altuKhov, a. o. 2019). The EU 
is often highlighted as an example 
of being one of the most successful 
and complete realizations of 
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regional integration. Skriba and 
Altukhov claim that other future 
regional integrations as well as 
the EEU, will follow the EU’s 
practice (sKRiBa, a. s. – altuKhov, 
a. o. 2019) in order to minimize 
problems during the integration 
process. The global effect of the 
EU’s economic integration resulted 
in the creating and developing of 
regional integration theories, such 
as regionalism, neo-functionalism, 
federalism, spillover theory, etc 
(sKRiBa, a. s. – altuKhov, a. o. 
2019).
Also it is worth mentioning 
the effect of globalization on 
economic integration. Here it 
is also possible to point to the 
example of the EU where, even 
though globalization brought 
with it enormous advantages and 
opportunities, it simultaneously 
brought growing competition 
in all spheres of services and 
trade (homepage of euRopean 
commission. gloBaliZation 
and the eu economy). The 
European Commission also 
claims that due to globalization, 
EU firms and companies were 
given access to new developing 
markets and financial resources. 
Consumers in turn gained access 
to a huge assortment of goods with 
competitive prices – and this factor, 
along with growing production and 
increased salary rates, illustrates the 
potential and important advantages 
that accompany globalization 
(homepage of euRopean 
commission. gloBaliZation and 
the eu economy). This is just one 
example of many used by the EEU 
in their emulation of the EU.
The process of Eurasian 
integration started right after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
There were several attempts 
at creating a strong and stable 
regional integration such as the 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States, the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization, the Eurasian 
Economic Community and the 
Eurasian Economic Union (ZhuKov, 
s – ReZniKova, o. 2006). Despite 
the willingness of countries within 
the post-Soviet region to achieve 
economic stability and build strong 
economic integration, none of the 
above-mentioned organizations 
or unions have reached that goal 
yet mostly because of flawed 
institutional design. Furthermore, 
the lack of economic resources and 
interstate competition in the post-
Soviet region also interrupted the 
attempts of Central Asian countries 
to create regional economic 
projects (ZhuKov, s – ReZniKova, 
o. 2006). It was precisely because 
of such problems in creating strong 
economic integration, that the 
Eurasian integration (EEU) led by 
Russia borrowed the institutional 
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structure framework of the EU, 
which opened the way to create 
and develop several regional 
projects in the post-Soviet space 
(ZhuKov, s – ReZniKova, o. 2006). 
At the same time, the creation of 
the EEU symbolized the readiness 
of the EEU’s founding countries 
(Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) 
to be transformed into highly 
institutionalized and legalized 
frameworks and to copy the 
European experience in Eurasian 
integration practice (ZhuKov, s – 
ReZniKova, o. 2006).
Therefore, by borrowing the 
elements of the EU project, the 
EEU tried to implement and use 
institutionalized legal regimes with 
binding effect.
Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Russia agreed to establish the 
EEU by using the institutional 
frameworks of the EU, thereby 
expanding the West’s influence 
in Central Asia from the East 
as a counterpart to the rapidly 
developing economies of South 
Korea, Singapore, China, Japan, 
Taiwan and Hong-Kong. Today, 
five years after the establishment 
of the EEU, there are already 
five member states in the union. 
Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia 
are the founding states, thus their 
membership counts from 1st of 
January 2015, with Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan joining on 2nd of 
January 2015 and 12th of August 
2015, respectively. It is also worth 
noting that the land territory of the 
union is over 20 million square 
kilometres, which is around 14 
percent of the world’s entire land 
area, with a total population of 
183.8 million people. Additionally, 
the potential of the EEU in energetic 
and agricultural industries makes 
it a globally significant player 
in the international arena. The 
picture (Figure 36) shows the map 
of the EEU with member states 
(homepage of BaKit ceRtiFication 
and compliance).
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Figure 36: The map and brief information of EEU
Source: homepage of BaKit ceRtiFication and compliance
The map illustration above 
shows how territorially huge 
the EEU is. Even with only five 
countries in its membership, it 
is already playing a significant 
role in the global market due 
to its powerful agricultural and 
production capabilities.
However, along with the 
development of the EEU has also 
come trouble. As was mentioned 
above, before the creation of 
the EEU, post-Soviet regional 
integrations were failures. The 
major debilitating issues related to 
Eurasian integration have political 
and economic roots. For instance, 
dominant political interests 
significantly interrupt the process 
of integration, along with the 
authoritarian regimes of member 
states, highly corrupted systems, 
lack of democracy and transparency, 
and the lack of comprehensive goals 
for all member states (osadchaya, 
g. – vaRtanova, m. 2018).
The goal of the research is 
to examine and analyze the major 
problems of Eurasian integration.
While collecting the 
information the content analysis 
methodology was applied. The 
content analysis methodology, 
the instrument of investigation, 
was used to define specific words, 
topics or definitions by studying 
publications, articles, books and 
other secondary sources in text 
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formats (homepage of columBia 
univeRsity mailman school oF 
puBlic health).
The qualitative method 
approach was implemented in order 
to form a complete picture of the 
problem through a deep and detailed 
analysis of the EEU’s integration 
milestones. The main information 
was taken from secondary sources 
including academic journals, 
newspapers, certain publications 
and articles. The work is intended 
to investigate main milestones 
based on the EEU’s experience. The 
main part of the paper begins with 
the observation of main integration 
issues and milestones.
V�3�2� Global Milestones 
that affect the integration 
process of the EEU
The EEU’s integration 
began with Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan – where all three 
countries were seeking for economic 
advantages and stability. Since the 
collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan 
has aimed to establish economic 
regional integration. Russia and 
Belarus were the first countries 
interested in such integration and 
only in 2015 was the EEU officially 
established (homepage of euRasian 
economic union). Unofficially, the 
leading country was always Russia, 
as it has a much larger population, 
economy, and military capabilities 
than the other two founding states. 
Moreover, after the collapse of 
the USSR, Russia was always 
considered as the successor of the 
Soviet Union, which meant that 
the most of the Soviet authority 
was transferred to the Russian 
Federation.
From the very first steps of 
the integration, the problem of 
authoritarian regimes of member 
states caused issues. Authoritarian 
regimes do not rely on traditional 
means of legitimization, nor do 
they adhere to globally applied 
procedures of government 
formation based on free and open 
elections. Their leaders believe 
that their rule is perpetual and 
does not require the consent of the 
people. Authoritarian governments 
eliminate their competitors so that 
there is no opposition, and control 
all forms of media, believing 
that through such means they 
maintain stability in the country. 
Such thinking is not only deeply 
flawed but also counterproductive 
since it only serves to destabilize 
a country. The Eurasian Economic 
Commission for example has done 
a good job in building a common 
market for goods, services, capital 
and labor within the region. Russia 
on the other hand still puts its 
interests above other countries’ 
interests in the decision-making 
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process. The problem is that the 
decision of the Commission can 
be changed or even vetoed by the 
decisions of Vice-Ministers of 
member states. In this way, the 
Commission, which is actually 
thought to be a supranational body, 
does not have any true power within 
the EEU. Moreover, the judicial 
system of the EEU is also under the 
constraints of member states. For 
example, the Commission cannot 
appeal to the EEU Court to force 
the member states to follow the 
rules and norms of the union. At the 
same time, it would be amiss to say 
that the EEU Court has not made 
any progress in its development. 
It has started to build a doctrine 
of priority of EEU rights and to 
prioritize the rule of law of the EEU 
over the national law (eliseev, a. 
2019). It is also worth mentioning 
the case of a member state’s attack 
on the progressive decisions of 
the Commission of the EEU. 
Russian government and municipal 
authorities regularly announced 
tenders to purchase fabrics for 
the needs of the Russian Ministry 
of Defense, who prescribed 
in advance which Russian 
manufacturers they should buy 
fabrics from. Thus, Belarusian and 
Kazakhstani manufacturers were 
not even included in the tenders, 
which resulted in the Commission 
making the decision in 2015 that 
this was a violation of the EEU’s 
public procurement rules and 
thereby canceled a dozen relevant 
orders of the Russian government. 
Nevertheless, in the end a higher 
standing body vetoed the decision 
of the Commission (eliseev, a. 
2019). Another example of the 
Russian government’s vetoing of the 
Commission’s decision concerns 
price discrimination against 
Kazakh and Belarusian buyers in 
2017. Upon further investigation, 
the EEE court determined that 
the actions of the Novolipetsk 
Metallurgical Combine Plant and 
the Russian company VIZ-Steel 
violated the price policy by adding 
a macroeconomic risk coefficient 
to the final price of their products, 
which overestimated the selling 
price by more than 20% of the base 
price. The Eurasian Commission 
imposed a $3.5 million fine on 
the Russian companies, which 
unfortunately was ineffectual since 
the ruling was overturned (eliseev, 
a. 2019).
Today, countries of the post-
Soviet space generally have the 
same problems as before: poverty, 
high inflation, aggravation of 
environmental problems, social 
inequality, drug addiction, terrorism, 
unemployment, corruption, 
technological backwardness in 
most industries, as well as the 
emigration of specialists, engineers, 
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and scientists to countries of the 
West (nemtsev, i. a. 2017). Most 
of the post-Soviet countries feel the 
pressure of the world market and 
its strong alliances, such as the US, 
Germany, France, Italy and other 
EU member states. The problems 
also include energy security, which 
includes the wear and tear of the 
enterprises of the fuel and energy 
complex, outdated infrastructure 
technologies (power lines, vehicles, 
gas pipelines), and energy and heat 
saving technologies are practically 
not used. The problem can be 
considered the lack of state ideology, 
a goal that could mobilize people 
to solve regional problems. In 
international relations, the problem 
areas are the difference in structural 
transformations in the conditions of 
the formation of a market economy, 
the lack of competitive production, 
and disagreements in the sphere of 
economy and business (nemtsev, 
i. a. 2017). Although post-Soviet 
region was always a plum for 
hegemonic powers.
The post-Soviet space itself 
creates huge geopolitical interests 
towards world powers as a region 
which is territorially located 
between the cultures of East and 
West. The collapse of the USSR 
led to the disintegrational processes 
within the region accompanied 
by color revolutions, interethnic 
and territorial conflicts (including 
armed conflicts and separatism in 
a number of regions, for instance, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Chechnya, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, North and 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and so 
forth) (nemtsev, i. a. 2017). The 
struggle of elites for power, the 
decline in industrial production 
resulting from a reorientation 
towards raw material development, 
which does not lead to an effective 
economy, the deterioration of the 
quality of life of the population 
and the growth of crime were all 
influential in accelerating conflicts 
within the post-Soviet region. 
Moreover, it would be interesting 
to cite A. G. Dugin, Soviet and 
Russian philosopher, political 
scientist, sociologist, translator 
and public figure, who said: “…the 
collapse of the USSR was a social 
and industrial catastrophe, which 
consequently led to the coming 
to power of corrupt, criminal 
elements and agents of influence 
of the United States – all this was 
unprecedented in scale. The 90s of 
the twentieth century for Russia was 
a monstrous geopolitical disaster, 
Russia has turned into a secondary, 
corrupt, decaying third level power 
that is rapidly losing weight in 
the international arena and is on 
the verge of disappearing…” 
Russian President Vladimir Putin 
also stated that the collapse of the 
USSR was the largest geopolitical 
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catastrophe of the century, and that 
many of its current problems are 
the consequences of this process 
(nemtsev, i. a. 2017).
Although there is a presence 
of hegemonic behavior of Russia 
in post-Soviet space, it is important 
to say that the EEU member states 
are more afraid of falling under the 
pressure of Russia and of losing 
their state independences, which in 
turn stops the integration process. 
A particularly strong fear of falling 
under the influence of Russia is 
noticeable in the example of the 
Ukrainian authorities, where (under 
the influence and with the financial 
support of the United States) for 
several years there has been an 
increase in nationalist parties and 
organizations. Russophobia, the 
desire for European integration, is 
prevalent. Events in Ukraine led 
to increased tension in the entire 
Eurasian region, a decrease in 
regional security, which entailed an 
“economic war” between the West 
and Russia and weakened the vector 
of Eurasian integration. Therefore, 
the issues of regional security 
and integration in the Eurasian 
space have become even more 
relevant. It should be understood 
that there is no single concept of 
Eurasian integration: “the Eurasian 
philosophy of integration has so far 
been developed rather weakly and 
fragmentarily. The only thing that 
cannot be doubted: the integration 
processes within these institutions 
are neither based on direct 
territorial expansion of Russia 
(as it was during the period of the 
Russian Empire), nor, obviously, 
based on communist ideology 
(as it was in the Soviet period). 
Therefore, it is logical to assume 
that the philosophy of integration 
of the post-Soviet countries will 
affect the whole of Eurasia - 
based on the cultural, ethnic and 
historical identity of each society, 
re-entering into a single historical 
“large space”. At the same time, 
the integration of the post-Soviet 
space (and later the Eurasian space) 
remains a necessary condition for 
solving the problems of the region.
Furthermore, member 
states of the EEU with their trade 
orientation towards third countries 
with developing economies are 
causing another possible risk to the 
integration process. For all member 
states of the EEU the main export 
goods are natural resources or their 
primary processing products, which 
in turn are more interesting to the 
markets of third countries because 
of their similar demand for natural 
resources and types of goods, 
claims Kuzmina Elena (KuZmina, 
e. 2017). Moreover, Kuzmina, 
Head of Sector of the Center for 
Post-Soviet Studies, IMEMO RAS 
EAT Primakova, identifies four 
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risks which could be identified as 
milestones of EEU integration. For 
instance, the need for specialization 
and enhanced production in these 
countries. The minimum number 
of common production projects 
of member states as well as the 
lack of a detailed program for 
the development of production 
capacities and opportunities, 
results in a slowdown in mutual 
trade within the EEU. The primary 
trade effects from participation in 
the Customs Union are exhausted 
within a few years, not to mention 
the absence of customs duties on 
the majority of goods in the EEU. 
This is what happened in terms of 
trade between the EEU countries. 
During the first three years of 
operation of the Customs Union, 
trade between Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus grew rapidly, but then 
unfortunately it started to decline. 
In order to increase trade again 
within the EEU it is necessary 
to develop new industries and 
increase the range of goods in the 
region. Simultaneously, there is a 
need to develop the specialization 
of countries in the manufacturing 
sector, as Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
the first President of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan has repeatedly 
said, so that we produce only a 
minimal amount identical goods in 
the common market (KuZmina, e. 
2017).
Moreover, the diminished 
ability to import finished goods 
from third countries at the end of 
2014 as a result of the sharp drop 
in world oil prices and foreign 
exchange earnings from energy 
exports, reinforced the need for 
EEU member states to meet 
demand with their own industrial 
products. The substitution of 
imported products from third 
countries is becoming a priority 
area of cooperation within the 
union. However, an assessment of 
the national development programs 
of industries of the EEU member 
states revealed that countries are 
considering a single economic 
space only from the standpoint of 
additional export opportunities 
for national economies. Even 
so, this is supposed to saturate 
their domestic markets only with 
their own products using import 
substitution. The industry priorities 
for the development of industrial 
complexes of the EAEU countries 
have a high degree of coincidence, 
as well as the nomenclature of 
exported industrial goods, which 
leads to their competitiveness rather 
than complementarity.
Another risk revolves around 
the lack of investment in the sphere 
of innovation. Integration mainly 
occurs in traditional sectors of 
the economy that are exhausting 
their potential, in particular, in 
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the field of energy, chemical and 
petrochemical industries, and 
metallurgy. These products have 
low added value. According to the 
UN classification, the cost of a 
similar weight of high-tech products 
is ten times higher than the cost of 
raw materials of the same weight. 
In the context of the new integration 
policy (the implementation of 
measures to form a coordinated 
policy), the development of a 
coordinated industrial policy 
with effective mechanisms for 
building up productive capacity 
is of paramount importance. The 
Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE) has identified the main 
directions of industrial policy. 
This is the aerospace industry 
(including the production of Earth 
remote sensing satellites and the 
helicopter industry), the automotive 
industry, the production of road-
building machinery, machinery 
and equipment for agriculture and 
forestry, and hoisting and transport 
equipment. This also includes the 
production of industrial products 
for railway transport, electrical 
appliances, electronic and optical 
equipment and component 
base, machine tools, and power 
engineering. However, specific 
joint projects have not yet been 
developed. Integration in the 
innovation sphere could increase 
the sustainability of national 
economies, since the pace of 
their economic development will 
depend not so much on resource 
opportunities as on the innovative 
nature of capital, as well as on the 
ability of a business to generate 
knowledge and to market it as 
innovative products. In addition, 
integration in the innovation sphere 
will overcome barriers associated 
with the lack of a common border 
and appropriate transport and 
communication capabilities on the 
path to the formation of a common 
single market. However, the main 
stumbling block is the lack of 
mutual investment in these sectors. 
Countries invest in their national 
industry as far as possible. Perhaps 
the only exception is the Russian-
Kyrgyz Development Fund, which 
allocates funds for production and 
infrastructure projects.
Then, the lack of transport 
infrastructure, the insufficient 
level of logistics and other types of 
infrastructure within the EEU pose 
serious problems for integration. 
Although the development of 
transport infrastructure in all 
countries is proceeding rapidly, the 
unification of national transport 
systems into a single transport 
and logistics space is still a rather 
distant prospect. A big plus in the 
development of this sphere, of 
course, is the participation of EEU 
states in international transport 
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corridors, primarily between China 
and the European Union, as well as 
the North – South corridor. In 2014, 
the United Transport and Logistics 
Company (UTLC) was created in 
the EEU with the participation of 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, 
which is an operator providing 
rail transportation and forwarding 
services. Its aim is to service 
cargo transportation between the 
countries of Southeast Asia and the 
EU countries through the territory 
of the EEU and to reorient container 
traffic from sea to rail. The main 
driver for the development of 
international corridors today has 
been the emergence of standardized 
documents, for example, an invoice 
for transit traffic on the East - 
West routes through Zabaikalsk, 
Erlyan, Dostyk, Khorgos, Suifenhe. 
Another important factor is the 
signing of an agreement between 
the railways of China, Belarus, 
Germany, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, 
Poland and Russia on deepening 
cooperation on the organization of 
container trains in the China-Europe 
service. The main development 
problems are the growing demand 
for rolling stock for transportation 
under the conditions of an 
imbalance in the volume of cargo 
flows, limited throughput of border 
crossings between neighboring 
countries, as well as the limited 
throughput of the Eastern training 
ground of the Russian Railways 
network, which constrains the 
increase in the speed of transit 
container trains. The automotive 
infrastructure has its own problems: 
its underdevelopment, and the 
poor quality of roads, especially 
non-main roads. Specialists see 
the solution to these problems 
in increasing the speed of transit 
container trains, expanding the use 
of information technology both 
in transportation and promoting 
transport services, as well as 
expanding the geography of transit 
container services. These are only 
the main obstacles, each of which 
contain a more detailed gradation 
of the problems connected with the 
development of integration in the 
EAEU (KuZmina, e. 2017).
It is reasonable to conclude 
that the authoritative regimes of 
member states and their differing 
interests in development, in 
particular the lack of a common 
aim of the member states in EEU’s 
development are creating major 
hurdles to success. Furthermore, 
orientation to the market of 
third countries, the need for the 
development of new production 
and specialization, the tendency 
toward competitiveness rather than 
seeking mutual benefit, the lack of 
investment in innovation, and the 
lack of transport infrastructure are 
the milestones which are being faced 
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by all member states of the EEU. 
In order to create opportunities and 
take steps forward from this point, 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
need to change their perception of 
the EEU’s authority that extends to 
all member countries and to make 
this authority supranational.
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v.4. ambiguities in Chinese strategy on the 
South China Sea
viKtóRia lauRa heRcZegh128
Abstract
In this paper, I intend to observe the way my focus case country, The People’s 
Republic of China tries and most often manages to maneuver its international policy in 
a paradoxical way that it would serve its long-time goals. For this case study I rely on 
the South China Sea dispute, which, being the most complex and most relevant territorial 
conflict of the Southeast Asian region, provides source material for identifying patterns 
of ambiguous, contradictive strategies. In my work I describe two incidents concerning 
multilateral agreements where such strategical elements are present and analyze the 
background as well as the possible reasoning behind Chinese strategy. I observe the 
positions of the other active participant states and look into future implications regarding 
the maritime dispute.
Keywords: China, Code of Conduct, power, negitation, arbitration
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V�4�1� Introduction
Inequality between states 
– in the global and the regional 
sense as well - has been shaping 
the development of international 
relations since the beginning 
of history. Inequality exists in 
multiple specific forms, such as 
economic inequality (of which 
worldwide patterns can be scoped), 
or the historical experience of great 
powers that, by their stability and 
might, may guarantee international 
order in a global context or between 
the states of a more specific region 
(ayooB, m. 2002). 
 This paper focuses on the 
regional form of the category. 
Certainly, the existence of 
an – unofficially designated – 
great (leading) power and, as a 
consequence, „lesser” states already 
implies inequal relations, yet when 
a clash of interest emerges in the 
given region, the situation becomes 
considerably more complicated.
 In an ideal case, in any 
sort of conflict between states, 
an acceptable solution could be 
reached by taking already existing 
international rules, regulations and 
agreements into consideration. If 
there is no precept that would be 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
404
applicable to the dispute in question, 
new rules should be created and 
introduced by (or with the close 
assistance of) legal authorities. 
However, as sovereign states may 
choose to not abide by any segment 
of international law, or even break 
a treaty, disputes, especially those 
including multiple states, are 
neither simple nor ever quick to 
resolve. Mentioned violations are 
often followed by coercive actions 
or intervention by other participant 
states.
Aforesaid factors would 
already complicate any international 
conflict situation, especially one 
that includes an already present and 
relevant power-based inequality 
between its actor states.
The South China Sea dispute 
is a case that encompasses all 
traits described above. Most times 
referred to as simply dispute, it 
is in fact a manifold collection 
of bigger and smaller conflicting 
claims within the region, including 
the People’s Republic of China, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Brunei and the Republic 
of China (Taiwan). Those claimant 
states are interested in acquiring the 
rights of exploration and potential 
exploitation of natural gas and 
crude oil, fishing stock, and, most 
importantly, strategic control 
of shipping lanes essential for 
successful global trade. The claims 
mainly include the Spratly Istands, 
the Paracel Islands, Scarborough 
Shoal, various boundaries in the 
Gulf of Tonkin and some further 
maritime features that are not 
regarded as part of the South 
China Sea. The official legal stage 
of the territorial conflict has been 
going on since 2013, when the 
Republic of the Philippines brought 
their claims against The People’s 
Republic of China to court. In 2016, 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
ruled in favor of the Philippines. 
However, since China has rejected 
the ruling, as of yet there is no 
resolution recognized and accepted 
by all affected states (Kim, j. 2015).
This paper aims at discussing 
the ambiguous elements of Chinese 
behavior in the South China Sea 
dispute through two agreements 
of legal nature, with the intention 
to get answers to the following 
questions:
 What are the common 
points of Chinese strategy in issues 
concerning international law, and 
what is China’s overall attitude 
towards international law? What 
are the possible historical reasons 
for such controversial behavior? 
Can China, as a great power, keep 
up its foreign policy based on both 
friendliness and assertivity for 
a long time – and does the East 
Asian superpower even intend to 
do so? Furthermore, to what extent 
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can other participants of the South 
China Sea dispute have influence 
on what the near future holds for 
this hot spot conflict dominated by 
China?
V�4�2� Ambiguities of a great 
power – the Chinese case
Among the active participants 
of the South China Sea dispute, the 
People’s Republic of China wields 
the most power regarding all aspects 
of finance, economy and politics. In 
fact, of course, it has risen to the 
level of being a global superpower, 
yet for this specific research it is 
more effective to take a closer look 
at the regional function of the East 
Asian state. 
The role of implementing 
rules and regulations and making 
sure that each and every state 
adheres to them is something 
that the leading powers of certain 
regions tend to take on. That by 
itself may appear evident and above 
all beneficial to the amicability of 
relations between states. However, 
situations may instantly become 
more ambiguous if one counts with 
the fact that the country wielding 
the most power in the region – thus 
in given conflict able to act the part 
of the main peacekeeper - may not 
always subject itself to the rules it 
guards.
The theory that I introduce in 
my work is that the above described 
behaviour is far from being new 
or uncommon among states in 
regional leading positions (ayooB, 
m. 2002). For this specific paper, 
I intend to observe such patterns 
exhibited by the People’s Republic 
of China in the South China Sea 
dispute, throughout the legal 
process that has been going on for 
almost a decade now. 
The elements of this 
contradictory behavior consists 
of can be effectively indentified 
by tracing concrete events in the 
course of the disputes, with special 
regard to specific proceedings of 
international law and the powerful 
state’s (in this case China’s) 
immediate response to them as 
well as their following attitude and 
actions.
My assumption is that 
by pointing out and describing 
the ambiguous parts of China’s 
behavior in the South China Sea 
dispute, a certain shifting quality 
could be distinguished.
One essential aspect of this 
study is that I intend to observe 
China’s overall conduct in the 
conflict from a defensive realist 
viewpoint. As opposed to offensive 
realism, defensive realism suggests 
that having excessive power does 
not necessarily equal security (in 
this case for a regional leading 
state). On the contrary, via 
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provoking a balancing co-operation 
among other states, it might end up 
with just as much risk as lacking or 
having a limited amount of power 
(Raditio, K. h. 2015). Therefore, 
ambiguous behavior projected 
by leading states in international 
conflict situations can be considered 
as part of a strategy aimed at gaining 
and maintaining a „right amount” 
of power.
V�4�3� The Arbitration
Is the People’s Republic of 
China the kind of hegemon that 
would settle for the right amount 
of power? Undoubtedly, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Tribunal’s judgment in the case of 
Philippines v. China was as grave 
of a humiliation for the People’s 
Republic of China as it was a 
clear win for the Philippines. The 
case, most often referred to as the 
South China Sea Arbitration, was 
brought to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration by the Philippines 
in 2013. It primarily concerned 
the clarification of the legal status 
of some maritime features in 
the area under UNCLOS. The 
Philippines’ main goal was to 
get a legal declaration of the fact 
that the nine-dash line – a line of 
demarcation based on an 1947 map 
that China used to corroborate its 
claims – is invalid as it violates 
UNCLOS agreements of territorial 
seas and exclusive economic zones. 
Also, Manila wished to reaffirm 
their right to access the disputed 
Scarborough Shoal’s fishing 
grounds (mcdoRman, t. l. 2015).
At the very beginning of the 
proceedings, China declared that 
they would not participate in the 
arbitration, explaining their refusal 
more elaborately in a position paper 
(white paper) later, in December 
2014. In 2016, Beijing openly 
referred to the ruling in favor of the 
Philippines’ appeals as „null and 
void”. Chinese reasoning was that 
the tribunal lacked jurisdiction and 
the arbitration itself was completely 
illegitimate, as the Philippines 
should have first chosen the option 
to settle the disputes through 
exclusively bilateral negotiation 
(taFFeR, a. 2015; Rosyidin, m. 
2019).
Such non-compliance is 
something that could be expected 
from the People’s Republic of 
China. After all, a state may choose 
not to abide by the rules and 
regulations of international law, 
especially in a case where those do 
not appear to agree with their claims 
and needs. The Chinese statements’ 
tonality might be assertive, yet 
it does not deviate from the East 
Asian superpower’s overall policy 
of handling disputes.
However, as it often happens 
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in a situation of non-abiding, 
complicating factors may arise. 
Here, the main issue is closely 
connected to the convention that 
the Philippines’ arbitration lawsuit 
and the court’s eventual ruling was 
based on. The People’s Republic 
of China took part in negotiating 
UNCLOS from 1973 to 1982 and 
was among the signing and ratifying 
states in 1996. Although there 
has been some discussion about 
withdrawing from the convention, 
China has not chosen to take that 
step (Raditio, K. h. 2015). 
The fact of Chinese ratification 
still being valid definitely makes the 
situation inconvenient. One may 
pose the question why the People’s 
Republic of China even agreed 
to officially accept the contents 
of this document. The territorial 
claims based on the nine-dash line 
were already present during the 
negotiations and certain provisions 
of UNCLOS go straight against 
those very claims. 
A likely explanation for that 
lies in history. In the early 70s, 
when the negotiations of UNCLOS 
began, China, still in the throes of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
was in need of putting ideology 
before interest. Participating in 
the negotiations and later ratifying 
the convention were actions that 
supported the guidelines given by 
the former leadership: protect the 
national interest, be anti-hegemonic 
and support the Third World. There 
is one particular step China took 
that demonstrates the willingness to 
comply with those guidelines: the 
East Asian state supported a group 
of developing countries from Latin 
America and Africa (Mauritius, 
Algeria, Colombia, Venezuela) in 
their demand for a more extensive, 
50-200 nautical mile (nm) territorial 
sea under full national sovereignity, 
against the United States and 
the USSR, two hegemons with 
intentions to limit weaker states’ 
maritime rights. Even though 
internal discussions in China were 
constant during the negotiations of 
UNCLOS, especially in the final 
stage, the need for acceptance as a 
freshly seated member of the UN 
(15 November 1971, as People’s 
Republic of China) was present. 
China standing with mentioned 
leading developing countries in this 
issue is particularly interesting, as 
some of the Chinese officials taking 
part in the UNCLOS negotiations 
by that time had already realized 
that the requested 200 nm territorial 
sea would not necessarily be of 
Chinese national interest (Rosyidin, 
m. 2019).
At the beginning of or at any 
point during the legal proceedings 
of the Philippines’ arbitration 
lawsuit, China could have 
withdrawn from the convention. 
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It appears, however, that keeping 
the ideology alive and, even more 
importantly, maintaining the role 
of a valuable, contributing member 
of international organizations such 
as the UN still holds more (long-
term) significance than the option 
to withdraw and thus become free 
of UNCLOS regulations, with that 
probably also be able to the course 
of legal proceedings (Weissmann, 
m. 2010). 
Certainly, the choice of 
withdrawal would not have had any 
immediate threat upon the regional 
(and global) position of the People’s 
Republic of China. Nevertheless, 
it would have turned its relations 
more uncertain with the group of 
states negotiating and ratifying 
states (overall 157 signatories). 
Although non-compliance in the 
South China Sea Arbitration and 
declaring the ruling as being „null 
and void” is not an amicable or 
contributing move either, it is 
less of an openly assertive one. In 
the official sense, China is still a 
signatory of UNCLOS, more than 
that, a state that has used some of 
the convention’s contents to aid 
less powerful countries’ claims. It 
is only this one case Beijing does 
not abide by and holds its historical 
claims (based on the nine-dash line) 
unwaveringly.
V�4�4� Paradox strategies
This paradoxical stance 
makes the South China Sea dispute 
even more complex. Double 
standard elements can be identified 
and quite clearly defined here: the 
state wielding the most power – in 
this case the People’s Republic of 
China – has actively participated in 
the negotiation and has officially 
signed the document on which the 
eventual resolution of the dispute 
would be based on, yet refuses to 
comply with its contents in the 
same territorial dispute where the 
outcome would not match their 
national interests. 
Now, Beijing is more free to 
put their national interest before 
ideology: since the 70s, through 
all-round economic reforms and 
the opening-up policy, the East 
Asian state has managed to gain a 
significant degree of recognition 
from the West. With the arrival 
of the 21st century, owing to a 
manifold structural transformation 
of unprecedented pace, the People’s 
Republic of China has risen to the 
status of an economic superpower. 
However, a position like that often 
comes with opposition. 
The East Asian superpower 
has managed to shed the appellation 
Red China – a name with negative 
connotations, referring not only 
to communist-controlled China 
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(1927-49), but to China during the 
Cultural Revolution as well. Even 
though the expression is now almost 
exclusively used for these past 
eras of the state, a new name for a 
similar phenomenon has emerged 
along with the rise of China. China 
threat, first utilized by officials 
of the United States, now often 
appearing in Western press, means 
the imminent danger the enormous 
power of China is believed to pose 
for the US and to the entire Western 
world in not only a political and 
economic sense, but also in the 
military field, taking the newly 
powerful Beijing as a harbinger of 
armed conflict (poWles, m. 2010).
Would China go to war? One 
way to counter the assumption is by 
observing the ambigouous, often 
contradictory elements – some of 
which can be indentified as double 
standard patterns – of Chinese 
strategy in the South China Sea 
dispute. 
Beijing has chosen to stay 
a signatory of the UNCLOS, yet 
would not comply with the ruling 
of the South China Sea Arbitration. 
By complicating the matter this 
way, the possibility of a successful 
resolution is even further from the 
current status of the issue. With 
this, China has not only avoided 
any immediate obligations to give 
up any claimed territories in the 
maritime area in question, but also 
escaped – or at least delayed open 
conflict with the UN or with any of 
the signing nations of UNCLOS. 
In contrast to Western analyses, 
the People’s Republic of China, 
while more politically assertive 
and defiant from an international 
legal point of view, has not become 
more aggressive militarily. China 
could have dislodged any of the 
islands controlled by other smaller 
claimants (Vietnam, Malaysia and 
the Philippines) but they have not 
done so. The patterns explained 
are more characteristic of an often 
confusing strategy of lawfare 
based on retardation rather than 
threatening aggressivity.
V�4�5� The Code of Conduct
In order to identify further 
ambiguities and double standard 
elements in the progress of the 
South China Sea dispute, one has 
to look no further than another 
essential document, one that is 
meant to accelerate the course 
of reaching an agreement in the 
issue. The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) first 
endorsed the idea of a Code of 
Conduct (COC) for the maritime 
area of the South China Sea in 
1996. Negotiations of the possible 
contents of it, however, proved to 
be inconclusive. Thus, in 2002, the 
People’s Republic of China and 
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ASEAN settled for a (nonbinding) 
Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC). The very first draft of 
guidelines for the imprelementation 
of DOC was drawn up in 2005, but 
not adopted for a few years. Despite 
the promising initiatives, tensions 
on the South China Sea were 
present throughout the 2000s and 
have escalated steadily since 2009, 
confirming the need for a powerful 
official agreement between the 
claimant states.
Consequently, following 
more negotiations, in July 2011, the 
set of preliminary guidelines drawn 
up in 2005 was finally adopted. In 
August 2018, after consultations on 
a potential COC, an agreement on 
a single draft negotiating text for 
the COC was officially announced 
(thayeR, c. 2013). 
The 19-page draft is structured 
into three sections: preambular 
provisions, general provisions and 
final clauses. It does not define the 
exact geographic scope of the South 
China Sea. 
A large part of the draft 
is devoted to the prevention, 
management, and settlement of 
disputes in the South China Sea 
among the parties. However, it does 
not contain any specific reference to 
the mechanisms that could lead to 
a successful resolution. A proposal 
made by Vietnam states that the 
settlement of the dispute should 
be conducted through friendly 
negotiations, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation and other means that 
the participants are able to agree on. 
Vietnam concluded that nothing in 
the COC shall prevent the peaceful 
settlement of disputes under Article 
33(1) of the Charter of the United 
Nations. The article lists other 
means such as arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means decided by the 
parties concerned.
In the second section of the 
draft, the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Singapore, Cambodia and China, 
respectively, propose four separate 
options on the duty to cooperate. 
The People’s Republic of China’s 
contribution is partly identical to 
the other options but the detail it 
provides on six areas of cooperation 
is exceptional. The areas are 
the following: conservation of 
fishing resources, maritime 
law and security cooperation, 
navigation and search and rescue, 
maritime scientific research and 
environmental protection, marine 
economy including aquaculture 
and oil and gas cooperation, and 
marine culture. Most significantly, 
China’s suggestion on cooperation 
on the marine economy states that 
cooperation is to be carried out 
by the littoral states and shall not 
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be conducted in cooperation with 
companies from countries outside 
the region.
In a sub-section of the draft 
headed Self-restraint/Promotion, 
China suggests that military 
activities in the region shall be 
conducive to enhancing mutual trust. 
Beijing also calls for exchanges 
between defense and military 
forces as well as undertaking joint 
military exercises among China 
and member states of ASEAN on a 
regular basis. Interestingly, China 
and the Philippines agreeingly 
inserted point six that calls for the 
just and humane treatment of all 
persons who are either in danger or 
in distress in the South China Sea 
(Kang, h. K. 2012).
The draft certainly takes on 
several notable requirements for 
managing the tension surrounding 
the current dispute and possibly for 
achieving and keeping a sustainable 
level of peace between the states 
of the region. However, would the 
COC have the necessary impact in 
action? 
The process, agreed on by 
all ASEAN member states and 
the People’s Republic of China, 
is a well-made tool to remove 
any triggers of the conflict rather 
than a mechanism designed for 
the resolution of the dispute. 
Thus, China participating in the 
negotiations of such a co-operative 
should have no influence on its 
position in any legal proceedings, 
present or future. Still, in nature, 
it is contradictive enough from the 
part of China to actively participate 
in the makings of the COC but to 
be unwilling to comply with the 
arbitration. The pattern is notably 
similar to that of Chinese attitude 
towards UNCLOS: amicable 
contribution in potentially feasible 
official ways to resolve the conflict 
but non-acceptance of the legal 
verdict that would provide a way to 
have a conclusion. 
Certainly, differences 
between the two incidents can be 
observed. The first notable one 
is that the contents of which are 
detailed above is merely a draft, 
the consultations for the COC have 
yet to be concluded, the document 
itself announced and ratified. If the 
process continues at the pace it has 
been moving forward so far, it can 
take several years until the COC 
officially comes into action. This, 
again, fits well with the strategy 
of retardation China seems to have 
adopted for this situation of conflict. 
Second, the draft includes not 
only the states holding territorial 
claims in the South China Sea 
dispute, but all members of ASEAN. 
Thus, it is not ideal for negotiating 
the management of resources in 
areas of overlapping claims. A 
truly effective COC would include 
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additional negotiations among the 
claimants on some of the potential 
triggers for conflict in which the 
observing (non-claimant) ASEAN 
member states have no direct stake. 
Furthermore, a Code of Conduct is 
not exclusively meant for dispute 
management and stability building 
in the South China Sea, but should 
emphasize freedom of navigation 
and human security of the large 
fishery communities in littoral 
ASEAN countries. Thus, ideally, 
besides the existing international 
law and norms, the Code of 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea 
should be an essential part of the 
COC.
In November 2018, an 
agreement was reached to finalize 
the Code of Conduct within 
three years, starting in 2019. A 
carefully negotiated, thoroughly 
worded COC – including the 
additional agreements between 
claimant states - would hold the 
possibility to allow participants 
to adjust their positions without 
violating any element of domestic 
or international law. However, 
negotiation of the COC has proven 
difficult, yielding no significant 
breakthrough so far. Among the 
factors hindering the finalization, 
there is the undefined geographic 
scope of the South China Sea as 
well as disagreement among the 
claimants over dispute settlement 
and conflict management. 
Certainly, some elements 
of the draft are ambitious and 
promising, yet taking all the 
differences among the negotiating 
parties into account, a COC in its 
current form would prove to be 
ineffective. Furthermore, its legal 
status remains undecided, as the 
draft does not include any reference 
to the COC as a treaty under 
international law.
V�4�6� At the negotiating 
table
What does the People’s 
Republic of China expect from the 
Code of Conduct? The currently 
ongoing negotiation period for 
a final and official COC benefits 
China for multiple reasons.
While the talks have been 
going on for a while now with only 
a few points securely agreed on and 
further conflicting views appearing, 
Beijing has been establishing a so-
called new status quo militarizing 
its claimed and occupied maritime 
features, intending to normalize its 
control in the disputed waters. A 
stable, sustainable status quo seems 
to be fitting well with China’s 
current stance as well as their future 
objectives. 
Here, a perceptible similarity 
with the UNCLOS situation 
has to be noted. China, as an 
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active participant of the COC 
negotiations, appears willing to 
reach an agreement that would 
provide resolution for the territorial 
disputes. However, Beijing has 
stated that they would refuse to join 
or ratify a COC of binding quality, 
one that could legally challenge 
Chinese claims. That provides the 
negotiators with a promisingly 
worded yet ineffective draft with 
conflicting elements. Again, this 
sort of contradictive attitute allows 
China to avoid open conflict with 
any of the participants as well as any 
obligation to enter an agreement 
that would risk their claims in 
the area. Also, with the artificial 
island building and militarization 
going on, China could be able to 
redefine the geographic scope of 
the disputed areas and along with 
that, the scope of disputed areas in 
favor of their geopolitical interests 
and aims (Rosyidin, m. 2019).
Consensus between ASEAN 
members is certainly not strong 
enough regarding this specific 
issue. Although there is a perception 
that consensus is key for ASEAN 
to address challenges in conflict 
situations such as the South China 
Sea, a narrow understanding of 
individual members’ national 
interests has undoubtedly 
constrained attempts at developing 
firm cooperation in the region. The 
current decision-making process 
operates in a simple way: If any 
one out of the 10 ASEAN member 
states objects to a proposal, that is 
enough to overrule the others. 
That is exactly what 
happened back in July 2012, when 
a joint ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ 
Communiqué failed to be issued 
due to the fact that Cambodia, 
then the ASEAN chair and a close 
economic partner to China, sought 
to minimize the internationalization 
of the South China Sea dispute, in 
hopes of keeping optimal relations 
with Beijing (thayeR, c. 2013).
V�4�7� Conclusion
The ambiguities can be 
observed in both cases: China’s 
attitude towards UNCLOS (along 
with that, the South China Sea 
Arbitration) and the Code of 
Conduct. Active participation 
in the negotiation process but 
straightforward non-compliance 
with some part of the contents. In the 
meantime, assertive presence and 
activities in the region, resulting in 
frequent minor clashes, tension and 
constant open resentment from the 
US and from active participants of 
the conflict as well as from regional 
observer states, yet none that would 
seriously threaten the current status 
quo. As of now, Chinese strategy, 
based on contradictive actions and 
retardation, seems to be efficient. 
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Of course, politics based on 
a pattern of ambiguities can rarely 
be sustained for a long period of 
time. However, as long as it is in no 
participant’s best interest to wage 
war with the People’s Republic of 
China, the East Asian superpower 
can await – and build towards - a 
better setting of the conflict, one 
in which even an eventual legal 
process may have a more beneficial 
outcome for them (LI 2010). 
It is not certain that a 
considerably better setting will 
come in the future. Nevertheless, 
for China, the current international 
strategy has so far resulted in 
successful retardation. Right 
now, it is a better way of conflict 
management than giving up their 
claims or kickstarting war by 
wielding „too much” assertive 
power without balancing it out with 
amicable actions.
The outcome will greatly 
depend on the strength of the 
consensus between ASEAN states. 
If the Code of Conduct – or any 
similar agreement in the future 
– is negotiated by all members, 
perfect accord cannot be expected, 
taking into account the mere fact 
that claimant states and passive 
observers do not have the same 
interests in the region. Furthermore, 
some of the claimants have solid 
political and economic ties to the 
People’s Republic of China, which 
definitely may alter their stance in 
future discussions. 
If Vietnam as 2020 ASEAN 
Chair considers the factors 
described and works towards 
strengthening ASEAN ties so 
that they can be more durable 
than those of individual member 
states with China, the East Asian 
superpower might reconsider using 
the described ambiguities as part of 
their strategy – or at least, doing it 
as openly as it has been doing in the 
cases of UNCLOS and the COC.
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vI. Institutions and Policies 
of the European union
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vI.1. Creative industries in the economic 
structure of midsize towns in the visegrad 
Countries
Zoltán doRogi129
Abstract
In this study, the creative economy of medium-sized towns with a population of 
between 100,000 and 300,000 in the Visegrad countries was analysed. The selection of 
this group of countries is justified by its diverse composition, colourful economic structure 
and variety of industrial backgrounds. The research focuses on the creative economy 
of the medium-sized towns in the East-Central Europe, and examines it in terms of the 
presence of so-called knowledge-intensive sectors. In this context, we also separate the 
individual economic sectors according to both a narrower and a broader interpretation of 
the creative economy. We found that in the sphere of the creative and knowledge-intensive 
economy, the sectors that are viewed as creative according to a broader interpretation are 
more typical, as opposed to the creative and research and development activities that are 
suggested by the more classical, narrow interpretation.
Keywords: medium-sized towns, East-Central Europe, Visegrad countries, 
creative industries
129  PhD student – CUB IR Doctoral School, zoli.dorogi@gmail.com
VI�1�1� Introduction
The creative economy is an 
increasingly important part of the 
economy, as more and more groups 
of actors have the opportunity 
to become involved in creative 
thinking: in addition to research 
institutes and creative professionals, 
corporations and smaller companies 
have also established creative 
units. In the European Union’s 
economy, the last few decades have 
been characterised by a process 
of tercialisation, which means 
that a strengthened service sector 
can also be seen in the number 
of enterprises and employees. 
Within the tertiary sector, the 
privileged role of the creative 
industries is given in recognition 
of its creativity, its highly added 
value-orientated thinking and its 
approach towards the organisation 
of work, all of which explain why 
creativity is today seen as one of the 
factors underpinning international 
competitiveness. The presence of 
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creative industries in midsize towns 
can add dynamism to the economic 
role of these settlements, which 
can in turn boost their national 
and international role, contributing 
to the wider appreciation of the 
macro-region as a whole. This 
research therefore seeks to answer 
the question of whether the creative 
industries can be regarded as 
success factors contributing to the 
competitiveness of midsize towns 
in the Visegrad Countries. The 
creative industries are so-called soft 
factors, lauded as one of the factors 
influencing competitiveness today. 
This study is a quantitative 
methodological research based 
on secondary data. To examine 
the creative industries, I used the 
topology developed by Eurostat 
(euRostat 2009) and the ACRE 
project for knowledge-intensive 
activities. The data was collected 
from the EMIS - Emerging Markets 
Information Service, which is an 
international economic - financial 
database that has been created to 
support investors. It obtains data 
from the national financial and tax 
registers, ensures the authenticity 
of data that the sources are the 
national bases of annual financial 
and tax reports of companies. The 
filtering system of the database 
allows collecting data at the 
settlement level.
VI�1�2� Differences in the 
definition of the creative 
economy
Richard Florida’s “creative 
class” approach to the creation 
and operation of the knowledge 
economy emphasises the conscious 
collaboration of local actors 
(FloRida, R. 2002). Based on these, 
the facilitator of the knowledge 
economy is the highly qualified 
human resource, plus the group of 
inhabitants who know and utilise 
its talents: for this reason, Florida’s 
analysis supports an increase in 
the number of researchers and 
engineers (Talent). To create and use 
knowledge, it is essential to provide 
the appropriate technological 
background, the institutional and 
infrastructural environment of R&D 
(Technology). However, people’s 
attitude to work is also important, 
i.e. openness to innovations, 
search for answers continuously 
and the socio-cultural, economic, 
and organizational background 
(Tolerance) (hollandeR, h. et al. 
2019). (Figure 37)
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Figure 37: Appearance of creativity and relationship among creative industries
Source: Kea euRopean aFFaiRs 2006 p. 42.
In addition to industry, the 
tertiary sector has become more 
important, based on a higher level 
of application of knowledge, 
because skilled and highly skilled 
workforce is not only capable of 
more efficient work processes, 
but also produces higher added 
value due to increasingly complex 
activities (ságváRi B. 2005; dg 
inteRnal maRKet, industRy, 
entRepReneuRship and smes 
2016). Creativity is defined in the 
literature as one of the key factors 
for competitiveness (hall, t. – 
huBBaRd, p. eds. 1998; FloRida, 
R. 2002). According to them, the 
competitiveness of cities is more and 
more determined by cooperation 
of innovation, creativity and 
public administration. Florida, 
R already basically considers 
today’s economy as a whole to 
be a creative economy, where 
the most important resource is 
knowledge; its proper exploitation 
ensures the development of the 
economy (hollandeR, h. et al. 
2018). Growing number of workers 
participates in creative industries, 
the so-called creative class has been 
formed which is responsible for 
producing knowledge, developing 
newer and newer responses (pecK, 
j. 2005; dg inteRnal maRKet, 
industRy, entRepReneuRship and 
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smes 2016). To understand the 
importance of creativity and the 
creative industry, it is necessary 
to define the phenomenon 
more precisely by placing it in 
context (UNCTAD 2010; 2013). 
Literature of scientific research 
also offers an opportunity for 
this, as it is characterized by a 
broader interpretation instead of 
a uniformly accepted definition. 
Strictly speaking, the interpretation 
approaches creativity from the point 
of view of culture and creative art, 
while the broader one demonstrate 
the aspects of intellectual work, 
so practically any intellectual 
activity is perfectly acceptable (dg 
education and cultuRe 2010). 
(Figure 38)
Figure 38: Outline structure of the creative economy
Source: ságváRi B. – lengyel B. 2009 p. 19.
Creativity and 
competitiveness have become part 
of the definition of knowledge-
based economy, but it is important 
to note that examples of creativity 
cannot be measured and compared 
in isolation, but instead need to be 
evaluated on the basis of the goods 
they produce and their market value 
(ságváRi B. 2005). A study by 
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the European Commission (Kea 
euRopean aFFaiRs 2006) seeks to 
answer the basic questions relating 
to creativity, while the connected 
nomenclature defined by the OECD 
is based on technological standards, 
and defined by factors of production, 
technology and product knowledge 
intensity (OECD 2001). Creativity 
contributes to specialisation, 
involving both the industrial and 
service activities of regions, where 
these actors are able to produce 
the greatest added value, thereby 
gaining a significant competitive 
advantage (dg education and 
cultuRe 2010). This process of 
specialisation in turn points towards 
new, potentially viable economic 
activities and sectors, as well as to 
cooperation opportunities (BoRsi 
B.– visZt e. 2010). Specialisation 
gives rise to new potential sectors 
of the economy, so by recognising 
them, it is possible to encourage 
their activity (sZaKálné Kanó i. 
2012). Among other things, in 
cities demand is growing in the 
service sector for smart solutions in 
the area of healthy lifestyle, sports, 
health, tourism, and culture. The 
creative industries already represent 
a new approach towards both job 
creation and economic activities 
(Kovács Z. et al. 2011). Eurostat’s 
classification of economic 
activities is based on the OECD 
nomenclature; data is also available 
for the long term in respect of 
different territorial breakdowns, 
something which makes spatial 
analysis possible. High-tech, 
medium-high-tech manufacturing 
sectors and knowledge-intensive 
service sectors were nominated 
due to technological standards. 
In the framework of the ACRE 
Project130, activities were separated 
and this classification has become 
generally accepted. The IT sector, 
research and development, creative 
industries, legal-business, financial 
activities and knowledge-intensive 
activities were distinguished in 
the ACRE classification. Eurostat 
adopts the following breakdown: 
medium-high-tech manufacturing, 
high-tech manufacturing, high-
tech knowledge-intensive service, 
other knowledge-intensive service, 
market knowledge-intensive 
service, financial knowledge-
intensive service (jeney l. – vaRga 
á. 2016). The data was collected 
from the EMIS – Emerging Markets 
Information Service, which is an 
international economic – financial 
database created to support 
investors. It obtains data from the 
national financial and tax registers 
and ensures the authenticity of data 
that the sources are the national 
130  ACRE Accommodating Creative 
Knowledge – Competitiveness of 
European Metropolitan Regions 
within the Enlarged Union, ID: 
028270, http://acre.socsci.uva.nl/
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
424
bases of annual financial and tax 
reports of companies. The filtering 
system of the database allows 
collecting data at the settlement 
level. This analysis was prepared 
for 2017, due to the fact that the 
changes generated by the economic 
crisis have already taken place; they 
have been integrated into the urban 
economy. It is possible to choose 
the group of active, operating 
companies by omitting non-
functioning, inactive organisations. 
The areas of activity can be 
selected on the basis of the Eurostat 
classification presented above.
VI�1�3� Creative industries 
of midsize towns in V4 
Countries
The aim of my research is 
to map the creative sectors in the 
midsize towns of the Visegrad 
Countries, which also draws 
attention to the competitiveness 
of this group of settlements and 
the macro-region within the 
European Union (hollandeR, h. 
et al. 2018; 2019). Outsourcing of 
mostly labour-intensive production 
activities can be observed from the 
central regions towards peripheral 
ones, as a result of global economic 
policy trends in the recent years 
(lengyel, B. – ságváRi, B. 2009; 
Kiss é. 2010). In the case of midsize 
towns, the role played by these 
factors is important and influences 
competitiveness, as the economies 
of these towns and their narrower 
areas are more exposed to external 
changes (KResl, p. K. – ietRi, 
d. 2016). Analysing the creative 
economy shows how innovations 
and the knowledge are utilised 
actors in the market, as well as to 
what extent this is a real competitive 
advantage for other actors in the 
economy (pecK, j. 2005; sZiRmai 
v. szerk. 2009). In her monograph, 
Éva Kiss draws direct attention 
(Kiss é. 2010) to the fact that the 
processes restructure the economic 
structure, taking place as a result 
of the economic reorganization 
of the last decades (montalto, 
v. et al. 2018), especially in the 
industrial sector. The use of space 
in developed sectors is more 
moderate due to their smaller space 
requirements, but this does not mean 
a decrease in their significance and 
competitiveness. Specialisations 
appearing in more industrialised 
areas, as well as horizontal-vertical 
collaborations (clusters, supplier 
networks, other forms) increase the 
competitiveness of market actors, 
thus they can play a significant role 
in shaping the spatial structure of 
the narrower and wider area.The 
relationship that exists between 
creativity, the creative environments 
and the competitiveness of regions 
and cities has long been a well-
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known phenomenon. In addition 
to international companies and 
universities, academic research 
institutes, the micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprise sector 
also demand attention in the study 
of the creative economy. Due to 
their resilience, these actors are 
able to react to changes as soon 
as possible, search for solutions, 
apply them and appear on the 
market (hollandeR, h. et al. 2019). 
Furthermore, these organisations 
are at the forefront of specialisation, 
as they perceive market needs as 
early as possible, so they can take 
advantage of their potential. From 
the point of view of the Visegrad 
Countries, progress is made in the 
increase of the proportion of tertiary 
and quaternary activities in the 
economy of this region, the number 
of people employed in creative 
activities, and the expansion of 
investments in this area. (BoRsi B.– 
visZt e. 2010; jeney l. – vaRga 
á. 2016) Despite the outstanding 
nature of the research field, it is 
basically one of the less studied 
areas for midsize towns (jelineK 
cs. et al. 2013; KResl, p. K. – ietRi, 
d. 2016). Midsize towns with a 
population of between 100 and 
300 thousand people are typically 
regional centres, so although they 
play a significant role at the national 
level, they nevertheless receive 
less attention in studies of global 
competition (montalto, v. et al. 
2018). However, their influence 
and their spatial organising power 
extends to their neighbouring area, 
to a region, and they usually have 
the actors and the institutional 
background that together determine 
its economy. Their economic 
and cultural coordinating role is 
enhanced by the universities and 
research institutions located here. 
My study group includes midsize 
towns from all Visegrad Countries: 
3 from the Czech Republic, 28 
from Poland, 8 from Hungary, 
and one from Slovakia (Appendix 
1). According to Eurostat data, 
the population of the Visegrad 
Countries at the 2011 census was 
63.8 million. The selected group of 
midsize towns had a total population 
of 6.14 million, 9.62 percent of the 
group’s population. In the Czech 
Republic, 367 thousand people 
(3.5) lived in midsize towns, in 
Poland 4.37 million people (11.48), 
in Hungary 1.16 million people 
(11.72), in Slovakia 240 thousand 
people (4.4 percent) (Figure 39)
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Figure 39: The population share of midsize towns in the total population in Visegrad 
Countries, 2011.
Source: euRostat
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Figure 40: Geographical distribution of midsize towns in the Visegrad Countries
Source: Edited by Zoltan Dorogi
As a result of the analysis of 
the economic processes and spatial 
structure of the midsize towns in 
the Visegrad Countries (Figure 40), 
it can be stated that in the field 
of creative sectors the activities 
are typical from the perspective 
of the broader interpretation, as 
opposed to the classical, narrow-
interpretation, which restricts the 
group only to creative and research 
and development activities. In 
the field of the creative economy, 
the over-representation of 
background activities and areas 
supporting the economy can be 
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clearly seen (Figure 41): legal and 
business management, business 
management activities (44 
percent), engineering and technical 
services, telecommunications 
and information services (22.7 
percent). Obviously, these activities 
are more strongly connected to 
local-regional enterprises and 
institutions; these ensure their 
daily operation as a background 
environment. In contrast, financial 
activities reached only 0.34 percent 
of the total creative activities. 
As the basis of the creative and 
knowledge economy, the role 
of the manufacturing industry is 
prominent, especially in the field 
of highly added value sectors: 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
machinery and car industry.
Figure 41: Proportion of creative activities in the midsize towns of the Visegrad 
Countries according to the ACRE classification, %, 2017.
Source: EMIS
The share of creative and 
knowledge-intensive sectors in 
the narrow viewpoint is moderate 
among other typically supportive 
areas. Scientific research and 
development and classical creative 
activities (Table 16) account 
for barely 13.74 percent of all 
enterprises.
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Broadcasting Film, video, television program production, sound recording publishing
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
Publishing Industries Gambling Industries
Sports, entertainment and leisure 
activities
Table 16: List of creative activities from the classical, narrow viewpoint.
Source: Compilation of Zoltan Dorogi
Concentration can be observed 
in some activities, but further 
research is needed on industrial 
and economic specialisation at 
settlement level (Figure 42). IT 
technologies are connecting to 
both high-tech manufacturing and 
high-tech knowledge-intensive 
services. High-tech manufacturing 
(4 percent) and medium-high-
tech manufacturing (17.8 percent) 
account for 21.8 percent of all 
businesses, more than one-fifth of 
all activities. This shows a strong 
connection of creative activities 
with the manufacturing industry, so 
on the basis of the manufacturing 
industry the setting up of creative 
activities can also be more efficient. 
Two-thirds (67.4 percent) of high-
tech knowledge-intensive services 
(28.5 percent) were related to IT 
technologies, 25 percent to R&D 
activities, and a further 7.6 percent 
to cultural activities. The share 
of other knowledge-intensive 
services is only 4.6 percent, but 
the creative industries mostly fall 
into this category (99 percent). 
Market-oriented knowledge-
intensive services accounted for 
44.66 percent of all activities, while 
the ratio of financial knowledge-
intensive services was 0.34 percent.
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Figure 42: Proportion of creative activities in the midsize towns of the Visegrad 
Countries according to the EuroStat classification, %, 2017.
Source: EMIS
The concentration in the 
medium-high-tech and high-tech 
manufacturing industries, as well as 
in the field of high-tech knowledge-
intensive services, can be described 
as a kind of specialisation, based on 
existing manufacturing capacities. 
Legal and business matters account 
for almost half of the activities in 
the creative sector, and the data for 
midsize towns, analysed one by one, 
can show the correlations between 
number/ratio of legal and business 
activities and the importance of 
the creative sectors. After that, 
IT, information technology and 
services are highlighted, which 
can be a kind of indicator of 
creative activities in the Visegrad 
Countries. The low figures for the 
financial sector may be connected 
to the fact that in the midsize 
towns these institutions typically 
appear only in one location, while 
their main activities mostly take 
place in the cities. The presence 
of creative activities also provides 
an attractive milieu for knowledge 
capital, a closer connection with 
other stakeholders, for learning 
about and transferring knowledge 
and innovations (lengyel, B. – 
ságváRi, B. 2009; hollandeR, h. et 
al. 2019; montalto, v. et al. 2019). 
Orientations range from Fordist, 
assembly-type work to highly 
skilled activities, and the emergence 
and expansion of new industries 
signals new directions for economic 
actors as a result of investments 
Contemporary Global Challenges in Geopolitics, Security Policy and World Economy
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
431
(luX g. 2009). Specialisation 
makes the new potential sectors 
of the economy clear, and it is 
possible to encourage these sectors 
by recognising them and seeking 
accurately to understand their 
needs, as they contribute both 
to attracting investments and to 
regional economic development.
VI�1�4� Conclusion
According to the research, 
the creative industries also appear 
prominently in the economic 
structure of the midsize towns 
in the Visegrad Countries with a 
population of between 100 and 
300 thousand, which supports the 
modernisation of their economies. 
Thus, the midsize towns take 
part in the global economic 
process that is accompanied by 
the reorganisation of economic 
activities. The strengthening of 
the creative industries is clearly 
linked to the tercialisation of the 
economy, and to the establishment 
of the knowledge industry. By 
establishing links with industry and 
becoming embedded in the local 
environment, developing creative 
industries indicate the strengthening 
of the competitiveness of the 
analysed group of midsize towns. 
Based on the internal proportions 
of creative activities, it can be seen 
that a broader approach to creativity 
clearly prevails, as opposed to 
the classical interpretation of 
creativity. A high proportion of 
activities is related to background 
economic activities, a fact which 
draws attention to the existence 
of a critical mass or cluster of 
economic actors. The distribution 
of activities also confirms that the 
creative sectors are often related to 
the existing, knowledge-intensive 
manufacturing industry, so the 
existence of that industry facilitates 
the establishment of creative 
industries. Due to this, on one hand, 
it can be said that the traditions 
and economic structure of midsize 
towns determines the development 
of the creative industries at the 
settlement level. On the other hand, 
the presence of IT services and 
information technology shows the 
adaptability of the population and 
the economy, a fact which points to 
the growing importance of creative 
workers. Thus, as the midsize towns 
seek new economic ways forward, 
both support for the established 
economic factors and the seizing of 
new opportunities look achievable.
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VI�1�6� Appendix
midsize town cou population 2011 midsize town cou
population 
2011
Bielsko-Biała PL 174534 Olomouc CZ 99527
Bytom/Beuthen PL 176902 Olsztyn PL 174645
Chorzów PL 111692 Opole/Oppeln PL 131867
Częstochowa PL 236796 Pécs HU 156049
Dąbrowa Górnicza PL 125905 Płock PL 124553
Debrecen HU 211320 Plzeň CZ 167648
Elbląg PL 124668 Radom PL 221287
Gdynia PL 249139 Ruda Śląska PL 142510
Gliwice/Gleiwitz PL 187474 Rybnik PL 140924
Gorzów Wielkopolski/ 
Landsberg W. PL 124534 Rzeszów PL 179952
Győr HU 129527 Sosnowiec PL 216420
Kalisz PL 105386 Szeged HU 168048
Kecskemét HU 111411 Székesfehérvár HU 100570
Kielce PL 202196 Tarnów PL 176902
Košice/Kassa SK 240433 Toruń PL 111692
Koszalin/Köslin PL 109248 Tychy PL 236796
Legnica/ Liegnitz PL 103238 Wałbrzych/ Waldenburg PL 125905
Liberec CZ 101607 Włocławek HU 211320
Miskolc HU 167754 Zabrze PL 124668
Nyíregyháza HU 119746 Zielona Góra/ Grünberg PL 249139
Appendix 1: List of midsize towns and number of their population in the Visegrad 
Countries, 2011
Source: compilation of Zoltán Dorogi
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vI.2. a critical analysis of the Eu’s image 
as a model for regionalism: Some lessons 
from the Eurozone crisis
meleK aylin ÖZoFlu131
Abstract
With its sui-generis institutional structure, the European Union (EU) is the most 
successful regional grouping in the world today. Therefore, it is usually referred to as 
a role model for other regional initiatives. In this respect, the mainstream literature 
puts its emphasis on the EU’s exportability to other regions as an example of diffusing 
regionalism. In this context, this research seeks to address how the Eurozone crisis has 
affected the concept of regionalism in Europe. Accordingly, it argues that because of the 
eruption of the crisis within the European political context, the EU’s image as the diffuser 
of regionalism might have been stalemated. This is because it triggered the nationalist 
and sub-nationalist waves along with the sentiments of Euroscepticism and anti-
globalization all around Europe. In this vein, this article will investigate how the concept 
of regionalism is contested by the crisis context of the EU both at the sub-national and 
the supra-national levels.
Keywords: regionalism, new-regionalism, European Union, Eurozone crisis, 
regionalization
131  Corvinus University of Budapest, PhD Candidate, melekaylinzoflu@gmail.
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VI�2�1� Introduction
After the end of the Cold 
War, which would imply the 
transformation of the traditional 
Westphalian nation-state and 
national borders, regionalism 
has gained critical importance in 
the face of the changing power 
distribution in the international 
system. In the multipolar world 
order, the collective regional 
projects mainly driven by functional 
motives such as the access to the 
international markets in the face 
of the fast-growing economic and 
financial globalization process 
have gained a remarkable pace 
(BaRBieRi, g. 2019). European 
integration, having a common 
identity, common goals within a 
specified geographical region is 
described as the most successful and 
important example of supranational 
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regionalism. That is why it is 
usually referred to as the ‘model’ 
for other regional initiatives. In this 
respect, the mainstream literature 
puts its emphasis on the EU’s 
exportability to other regions as the 
model of diffusing regionalism (for 
overviews see Börzel and Risse, 
2009; Lenz, 2015; Risse,2015; 
Haastrup,2013). However, this 
research argues that because of 
the eruption of the Eurozone crisis 
within the European political 
context, the EU’s image as the 
diffuser of regionalism might be 
stalemated. This is because the 
Eurozone crisis has aggravated the 
tension between the supranational 
and subnational regionalism 
along with the sentiments 
of Euroscepticism and anti-
globalization all around Europe. 
Therefore, the well-known phrase 
‘Sovereignty is Back, Integration 
Out’ at the supra-national level 
uttered by Andrés Malamud is 
highly in question (malamud, 
a. 2012). In addition, it has also 
reverberated the tension between 
supranational and subnational 
regionalism within the EU whose 
supranational structure has heavily 
affected the distribution of sovereign 
and representative powers within 
the domestic political context of the 
member states (tostes, a. p. 2013). 
While scholars (Kenichi, o. 1993; 
alesina, a. – spolaoRe, e. 1997; 
hopKins, j. 2007; ellison, d. 2008) 
previously associated the factors 
driving the desire for subnational 
regional autonomy with ethnic 
identity and democratization, 
this paper contributes to the 
existing literature by including the 
repercussions of the crisis which 
threaten the political economy 
interests of the subnational regional 
entities. Therefore, this article aims 
to fill this gap by contributing to the 
relevant regionalism literature.
To this end, this article aims 
to explain how the EU’s image as a 
successful example of regionalism 
has been affected by the Eurozone 
crisis. The hypothetical background 
of this article argues that the 
success of the European integration 
as a diffuser of a certain model of 
regionalism cannot be maintained 
unless the Member States are 
willing to give up their individual 
interest to the collective interest. 
Accordingly, this article will 
first briefly discuss the concept 
of regions and regionalism in 
order to build up a definitional 
standpoint. That would provide a 
basis for the connection between 
regionalism and context of the EU. 
Secondly, it will shift to the EU 
and its integration process within 
the framework of the success of 
regional integration. Then, it will 
deal with the Eurozone crisis as 
triggering the cleavages among the 
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member states. In this way, it will 
question whether repercussions of 
the crisis did put the EU’s image as 
a role model for regionalism into 
danger. After clarifying this inquiry, 
this article will be concluded with 
some findings of the research.
VI�2�2� Regions and 
Regionalism
Despite the widespread 
interest in regionalism, there is a 
lack of consensus on the definition 
of the term within the literature. 
Regionalism is interpreted 
differently by different academic 
fields in different contexts and time-
periods. Therefore, regionalism 
emerges as a contested phenomenon. 
In part, it comes from the fact that 
there is also no consensus on the 
definition of the concept ‘region’ 
itself (mansField, e. d. – solingen, 
e. 2010). In fact, where one region 
ends and the next begins is not 
clear. Moreover, every academic 
discipline has its own definitional 
standpoint to provide a basis for 
the framework of research. Within 
the international relations, there is 
a cleavage between rationalist and 
constructivist interpretations of 
the term. Rationalist explanations 
define regions through using more 
material delineations such as 
economic, institutional and intra- 
and interregional ties between 
the States (Russett 1967). In 
this respect, political, economic 
and cultural factors play in the 
transformation of the regions 
(väyRynen, R. 2003). For example, 
during the Cold War, the regions 
were divided based on political and 
military motives which reinforced 
the establishment of organizations 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). However, 
the fragmentation of the great-
power blocs since the 1980s led to 
the rise of sub-regional and micro-
regional organizations such as the 
Visegrad Four, Shangai group and 
Baltic Council of Ministers.
 On the other hand, a 
constructivist definitional 
standpoint explains the appearance 
of the regions with the redefinition 
of the norms, identities, civic groups 
(väyRynen, R. 2003). The idea of 
what constitutes a region is subject 
to political actors’ perceptions, 
their interpretations, and social 
constructions (KatZenstein, p. j. 
2005). Söderbaum defines that 
values and objectives contribute to 
the creation of a particular region 
or type of world order (sÖdeRBaum, 
F. 2003). Falk in his valuable 
contributions to the existing 
literature explains the contributions 
of regionalism in achieving world 
order values including peace, 
human rights and democracy (FalK, 
R. 2003). Katzenstein argues that 
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“regions are politically made” 
(KatZenstein, p. j. 2005 p. 9.). This 
may be interpreted as that there are 
no natural ‘regions’. Accordingly, 
through social construction, regions 
are formed based on a collective 
perception of identities which leads 
to the creation of culture blocs. 
Actors create the social facts to 
which agentive or non-agentive 
functions are assigned. In this 
sense, constructivism regards the 
construction of the regions as a 
server to the political and economic 
ends.
Hettne argues that 
international relations treat regions 
as “supranational subsystems of 
the international system” (hettne, 
B. 2005 p. 544.). This subsystem 
consists of certain geographical 
proximity within which the states 
having shared perceptions interact 
extensively (thompson, W. R. 
1973). In this sense, high economic 
interdependence between a group 
of countries along with the shared 
political attitudes and values 
emerges (Deutsch 1957). Moreover, 
they are tied by their security 
concerns. That is why considering 
the economic, ecological and 
strategic interdependence, states of 
a given region are counted as being 
the members of the same ‘club’. 
Therefore, Hurrell argues that states 
should prioritize regional interests 
rather than the national egoisms 
for the sake of forming cooperation 
at the regional level (huRRell, a. 
1995). Here, the tension between 
‘full’ sovereignty of the states and 
subordination of the individual 
interest to the collective interest 
emerges. The issue is often in 
question within the context of the 
European integration which has 
necessitated states’ giving up their 
sovereignty in specific areas to the 
supranational competency of the 
EU.
The context and content 
of the regionalism became also 
subject to the transformation 
because of the shifting nature of 
world politics and the recent rise 
of globalization (hettne, B. – 
sÖdeRBaum, F. 1998; sÖdeRBaum, 
F. 2012). Thus, there is a distinction 
between the old and new debates of 
regionalism. Old regionalism refers 
to the limited scope of free trade 
arrangements and security alliances 
within the bipolar world structure 
(sÖdeRBaum, F. 2003). On the other 
hand, new regionalism is used as a 
post-Cold War term when economic 
globalization, which is boosted 
by regional institutionalization 
and regional groupings, has risen 
dramatically (Rumley, d. 2005). 
Moreover, the post-Cold-War era 
implied the increasing importance 
of regionalism in the multipolar 
world which provides a suitable 
ground for the rising powers to exert 
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their influence by strengthening 
their international positions thanks 
to regionalism (hettne, B. 1994). 
In this respect, new regionalism is 
associated with the transformation 
of the global structure towards 
globalization with the change in the 
world order, relative decline of the 
US hegemony, emergence of the 
economic blocs i.e. EU, NAFTA, 
Asia-Pacific, growth of economic 
interdependence, transnationalism 
and increased importance of the 
non-state actors (hettne, B. – 
sÖdeRBaum, F. 1998). Therefore, 
today the regionalism appears as a 
more complex phenomenon.
Accordingly, since there 
are different interpretations of 
the regions, there is no consensus 
on the definition of regionalism 
either. While some theorists define 
regionalism from a state-led 
perspective as a state-led project 
(gamBle, a. – payne, a. 2003), 
others regard regionalism as a 
political project which promotes 
specific type of ideas, identities and 
ideologies within a given regional 
space (Bøås, m. et al. 2003; hettne, 
B. 2003; 2006). In fact, the latter 
definitional standpoint comes from 
the fact that many new regionalism 
theorists incline to go beyond the 
state-centric approach in explaining 
regionalism to which the non-state 
actors are also heavily involved. 
Such an explanation implies the 
transformation of the notion of 
traditional ‘Westphalian” nation-
state in the face of globalization 
(Cooper, Hughes & de Lombaerde 
2008). Moreover, emphasis on the 
weakened capacity of the state in 
state-society complexes brings 
also Polanyian ideas regarding the 
political role of the civil society 
(sÖdeRBaum, F. 2003).
VI�2�3� The European 
Integration and 
Regionalism
Regionalism as an attempt of 
the open-ended process of region 
formation is often associated with the 
institution-building (sÖdeRBaum, 
F. 2012). In fact, there are several 
regional organizations besides the 
EU covering the cooperation of 
states in economic, security and 
political spheres such as the African 
Union (AU) or the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Nevertheless, with its highly 
elaborated institutionalization 
towards becoming a regional 
trading hub (Malamud & Schmitter 
2011), European integration often 
provides the main role model to 
theorize the regional experiments. 
Moreover, while international 
organizations such as ASEAN 
remains a purely intergovernmental 
organization, the EU encompasses 
some degree of supranationalism as 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
442
well (camRouX, d. 2008). 
In order to fully acquire the 
dynamics of regional integration 
initiatives, it is necessary to point 
out the main difference between 
regional cooperation and regional 
integration. In this way, the sui-
generis formation of European 
integration may be uncovered in a 
more systematic way. Accordingly, 
regional cooperation refers to joint 
attempts of neighboring states to 
reach a cooperative solution in 
specific areas (WinteRs, l. a. – 
schiFF, m. 2002). In this respect, 
regional cooperation (especially 
economic) refers to the regional 
phenomenon in the rest of the 
world (chRistiansen, t. 2001). 
However, because of past problems 
and thus lack of trust between 
them, there is a high possibility 
that they end up not reaching any 
cooperative solution. Moreover, 
other constraining factors include 
financial burden-sharing and 
complex decision-making process 
aiming to maximize the interests of 
each state.
On the other side, Haas argues 
that the study of regional integration 
explains the reasons why states give 
up their full sovereignty in specific 
areas (hettne, B. 2006). The 
concept of integration is categorized 
by Joseph Nye as economic 
integration, social integration, and 
political integration (hettne, B. 
2006). In this sense, from a neo-
functionalist perspective, European 
integration is mostly referred to as 
a spillover of a common policy into 
areas of other common policies. 
Therefore, European integration is 
regarded as a form of incremental 
cooperation in economic, social 
and political fields. This form of 
cooperation invoking the idea of 
‘ever closer Union’ was based on 
the calculation that each new step 
towards more integration which 
necessitated short-term sacrifices 
would bring long-term gains to the 
member states (hall, p. a. 2015).
In fact, there are numerous 
other theories explaining 
European integration with 
different perspectives and reasons 
including intergovernmentalism, 
functionalism, neo-functionalism, 
liberal institutionalism or 
constructivism. However, what 
matters most for the main purpose 
of this article is to enlighten 
the underlying reasons for such 
integration. Whatever the approach 
is, the main driving factor in 
promoting regionalism through 
integration has been the preservation 
of sustainable peace and peaceful 
coexistence in the region (Haas, 
1971). European integration was 
achieved through the elimination 
of the rivalry between France and 
Germany and through de facto 
solidarity to prevent the repetition 
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of the two world wars.
To this end, Germany was 
highly ready to adopt a federal 
system which would weaken the 
German nationalism for the sake 
of European integration that would 
overcome its economic and political 
isolation from the rest of Europe. 
In this sense, European integration 
aimed to overcome or abandon the 
mentality of ‘nationalism’ which 
had led to detrimental rivalry 
between European nations (sZul, 
R. 2015). That is why European 
integration emerged as an antidote 
to the Nation States and nationalism 
which would European integration 
and regionalism as two allies. In this 
respect, European integration has 
foreseen weakening of nationalism, 
decentralization of the State power 
both in political and economic 
terms. In fact, the envision to 
preserve the peace did go hand in 
hand with the economic growth in 
the war-torn continental Europe. 
Economic unification marked the 
removal of barriers, curtailing of 
state intervention and preventing 
of distortion of competition and 
the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labor with a 
certain degree of harmonization 
of the legislation at the European 
level (Egan 2010). To this end, 
the stages towards the economic 
integration i.e. Free Trade Area, 
Customs Union, Single Market 
were followed by the member states 
(Egan 2010). With these aspects of 
transborder elimination of the rise 
of the nationalism and economic 
liberalization, EU is seen as the true 
agent of the globalization boosted 
and completed by regionalist 
aspirations. 
The decades of European 
collaboration resulted in the 
establishment of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) which 
appeared as the integral aspect of the 
Union. The institutional design of 
the EMU was based on the uneven 
integration of macroeconomic 
policies encompassing centralized 
monetary policy and decentralized 
fiscal policy (schimmelFennig, F. 
2014). Accordingly, the monetary 
policy is handled at the independent 
level of the European Central 
Bank while the EU has no legal 
competence over the fiscal policy 
of the Member States such as 
taxation, getting into debt or bailing 
out (schimmelFennig, F. 2014). This 
institutional structure has paved 
the way for the aggravation of the 
Eurozone crisis, which appeared 
as an impediment to its image of 
the diffuser of regionalism. The 
structural reforms implemented 
during the crisis will be enlightened 
in the following to provide an 
elaborative analysis of the EU’s 
commitment to its wave of 
regionalism.
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VI�2�4� European 
Integration as Sub-National 
and Supra-National 
Regionalism
This article regards two-
faceted regionalism in Europe 
namely as sub-national and supra-
national. While sub-national 
regionalism is explained as related 
to regions as the part of the nation-
states, supra-national regionalism 
is explained as related to the 
integration of states belonging to 
the same world region (sZul, R. 
2015). Highlighting this difference 
is of critical importance since the 
regional frictions at the sub-national 
level, which was witnessed during 
the Eurozone crisis highly stemmed 
from the divisions between 
central and regional governance. 
This is because Western Europe 
is encompassed of a variety of 
subnational regional structures such 
as federal, constitutional/legislative 
and local government regions as 
clearly outlined (hopKins, j. 2007). 
(Table 17) Accordingly, during 
the crisis, the EU’s supranational 
competency has triggered an 
already existent tension between 
the national governments and sub-
national regional entities that have 
no place at the international table.
federal systems constitutional/legislative regions
local government regions 
(examples)
Germany Spain France
Austria Italy Sweden
Belgium Scotland, Wales & N Ireland (UK) Denmark
Aland (Finland) Poland
Azores and Madeira (Port)
Table 17: Sub-national regional structures in Western Europe
Source: hopKins, j. 2007, p. 23
These frictions were 
aggravated because of the system 
of redistribution of money from 
richer regions to poorer ones 
as in the example of Spain and 
Catalonia or Scotland and the 
United Kingdom (UK) (sZul, R. 
2015). Therefore, from a political 
economy perspective, subnational 
regions economically doing better 
than the other regions are viewed 
as the principal losers (ellison, d. 
2008). Alesina and Spolaore explain 
that integration to the supranational 
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institutions deepening the trade 
relations reduces the dependency on 
the state, which in return triggered 
the aspirations for greater regional 
autonomy (alesina, a. – spolaoRe, 
e. 1997). The demands for self-
determination of the richer regional 
entities came into question. The 
real paradox here is that regional 
entities aspire self-determination 
by becoming independent from the 
national governments however that 
does not necessarily mean that they 
have an anti-Eurosceptic stance. 
The most remarkable example 
representing this paradox is 
Scotland which already organized 
a referendum for independence in 
2014 (schnappeR, p. 2015). EU’s 
role in the Scottish referendum 
campaign is beyond the scope of 
this research. Nevertheless, this 
separatist movement has also 
affected the supranational level 
when the regions have attempted 
to call for a referendum on 
independence in the Member States 
because of the possible domino 
effect in other sub-national regions 
e.g. Catalans, Corsicans, Flanders 
and Basques.
VI�2�5� The Eurozone Crisis 
of 2009
Against the promising 
background of the European 
integration described as often 
ambitious and successful as being 
the most developed model of 
regionalism so far, the integration 
came to the point where massive 
cleavages among the member 
states along with the politicization 
emerged. This is where the 
hypothesis of this article comes 
from as already defined that the 
success of the European integration 
as a diffuser of a certain model of 
regionalism cannot be maintained 
unless the Member States are 
willing to subordinate the individual 
interest to the supranational level 
of collective interest. The crisis 
emerged as the rising of conflicting 
interests and priorities of the 
Member States which triggered 
the drift towards nationalism and 
Euroscepticism within the European 
political context (ÖZoFlu, m. a. 
2017). As a result, the Eurozone 
Crisis has first brought the sense 
of solidarity into question which 
would result that the notion of 
European identity as the facilitator 
of the aspirations of regionalism 
would be contested (ÖZoFlu, m. 
a. – KahRaman, s. 2019). That was 
because of the fact that the reason 
for adopting common currency was 
an ambitious step towards building 
an upper collective identity at the 
European level (galpin, c. a. 
2015). In this sense, that can be 
also interpreted as an ambitious aim 
towards realizing the aspirations of 
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regionalism. Therefore, the crisis 
was interpreted as both an economic 
and an identity crisis. Later, it also 
turned into a political one because 
of the design flaws of the EMU 
(eRgin, n. e. 2013) and because 
of the friction between solvent and 
insolvent States which invoked 
harsh bailout debates (nicoli, F. 
2017). 
 In this sense, the Eurozone 
crisis reactivated the core-
periphery divide or North/South 
split- manifested itself as Germany 
versus Greece or Spain- within 
the EU encountered at the level 
of ‘supranational regionalism’. 
The member states which have 
been unwilling to subordinate 
their individual interests to the 
collective interest have been the 
ones financially doing well such as 
Germany and the Netherlands. The 
tension, especially between Greece 
and Germany, was self-evident 
during the bail-out negotiations. 
Firstly, the ‘conditionality’ which 
was imposed on Greece and other 
debtor member states, was a highly 
repeated term along with a threat of 
‘Grexit’ during each round bailout 
negotiations (theodoRopoulou, 
s. 2016). Germany was 
extremely strict regarding the 
fiscal austerity measures and 
necessary policy changes in Greece 
(theodoRopoulou, s. 2016). 
Austerity measures taken by the 
elites triggered a mass reaction at 
the public level. In their valuable 
contribution Hooghe and Marks 
(hooghe, l. – maRKs, g. 2009) 
argue that the European public 
shifted from ‘permissive consensus’ 
to ‘constraining dissensus’ with 
regard to the EU-level decision-
making mechanism. In this respect, 
Eurozone crisis symbolizes 
the post-functionalist moment 
when the politicization of the 
European integration has increased 
unprecedently (schimmelFennig, F. 
2014). Accordingly, long-standing 
financial crisis has triggered the 
protectionist tendencies at the 
EU-wide level (New Delhi Times 
Bureau 2014). The concrete proof 
of such tendencies was the rise 
of Eurosceptic parties within the 
European political setting. It was 
affirmed by the victory of the Greek 
radical left SYRIZA which adopted 
an anti-austerity stance in January 
2015 (New Delhi Times Bureau 
2014). In a general overview, 
deteriorating economic situation 
that invokes the tendency of 
preserving national priorities limits 
the suitable ground which provides 
regions to act in collaboration in the 
economic sphere.
In this respect, the 
protectionist tendencies are felt 
also at the sub-national level by 
increasing dissatisfaction with the 
interregional distribution of funds 
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in regions. The crisis has triggered 
the calls for independence from 
member countries’ richer regions 
(eRlangeR, s. 2012). This is because 
the richer and more productive 
regions consider themselves as 
being exploited by poorer regions 
within the Member States (New 
Delhi Times Bureau 2014). There 
happened a cleavage between 
them as net givers and net takers. 
That is why the independence 
debates of some regions from the 
member states came to existence. 
The most salient example that can 
be traced for the repercussions of 
the economic crisis on the policy 
on regionalism at the sub-national 
level has been Spain. Accordingly, 
the economic performance and 
austerities along with the revealed 
corruption and political sclerosis 
pushed Catalonia, which is a 
relatively richer region, towards 
independence (mason, p. 2017).
On the other hand, to provide 
an elaborative analysis of the EU 
as an example of regionalism in 
the context of crisis, mentioning 
EU level measures to solve or at 
least manage the crisis is of critical 
importance. In fact, the Eurozone 
crisis has resulted in critical 
initiatives towards more fiscal 
unity and centralized control over 
national banks and budgets. This 
can be described as the ‘functional 
spillover camp’ by the elites who 
were looking for functionally 
efficient and politically feasible 
solutions (hooghe, l. – maRKs, 
g. 2009). Therefore, measures 
were envisaged towards creating 
emergency funds and increasing 
the budgetary discipline in the 
member states (BeuKeRs, t. 2013). 
Moreover, they came in the form of 
intergovernmental treaties to avoid 
both the increase in supranational 
competency of the EMU and 
revision of the major treaties, which 
could have implied the ratification 
by referendum in the Member 
states. The response was based 
on the strengthened cooperation 
of article 136 of Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) which was introduced to 
“(a) to strengthen the coordination 
and surveillance of their budgetary 
discipline…” in order to “…ensure 
the proper functioning of economic 
and monetary union” ( article 
136(1) TFEU).
Accordingly, the first 
important step was taken to 
revise the infamous non-bail out 
clause which had triggered the 
triple sequence of financial crisis, 
sovereign debt crisis and Eurozone 
crisis (schimmelFennig, F. 2014). 
The infamous non-bailout clause 
was replaced by the temporary 
assistance mechanism European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
providing temporarily financial 
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assistance to highly indebted 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal in 
June 2010 (European Commission). 
Afterwards, the permanent 
international financing institution 
European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) was established in 2012 
(European Stability Mechanism). 
By creating €500 million fund, 
the establishment of the ESM was 
aimed to assure markets for long-
term commitment to the single 
currency (glencRoss, a. 2013). 
In addition, the vision for 
prosperous EMU was introduced 
in 2012 by the President of the 
European Council (European 
Council 2012). In this direction, 
the budgetary framework was 
integrated. EU institutions agreed 
to establish a single supervisory 
system (SSM) and single resolution 
mechanism (SRM) for banks as 
the two-pillars of the banking 
union (European Commission). 
Besides, economic governance of 
the EMU was reinforced. European 
Semester was initiated along with 
the legislative packages known 
as the Six-Pack (2011) and Two-
Pack (2013), which were aimed 
to strengthen the discipline of the 
Stability and Growth Pact which 
limited government budget deficits 
to 3 percent and public debt levels 
to 60 percent of gross domestic 
product (KRecKé, e. 2018). With 
the German initiative, the Fiscal 
Compact entered into force in 2013 
to bind national commitments to 
run the balanced budgets towards 
ensuring national fiscal disciplines 
(glencRoss, a. 2013). It is of critical 
importance to highlight that the 
intergovernmental treaties signed 
during the crisis i.e. the ESM treaty 
and the Fiscal Compact did not 
require the unanimous ratification 
of all participating countries 
(KumaR, R. 2014). Therefore, the 
reluctant member states could not 
block the deepening. Accordingly, 
ratification of the Fiscal Compact 
within the specified one-year 
time frame was mandatory for the 
Eurozone Member States.
The mandatory nature of 
the ratification can be interpreted 
as the top-down manner of the 
measures in the face of the crisis. 
Even so, the introduction of the 
new mechanisms to preserve the 
Euro implied the further deepening 
of the EU which appeared as 
unintended consequences of the 
crisis. In this respect, despite the 
massive increase in politicization 
of the European public and the 
rise of the Eurosceptic parties, the 
technocratic level of integration 
which was foreseen by the neo-
functionalist agenda was achieved 
to be realized by the political leaders 
of the member states. Although EU 
level measures did not pave way for 
the establishment of radically new 
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frameworks such as EU treasury or 
post of minister of finance, the new 
mechanisms can play crucial roles 
in the prospective crises.
VI�2�6� Conclusion
This research aimed to find 
out the nexus between European 
integration and its promises as a 
diffuser of regionalism to the other 
regions in the EU’s crisis context. 
Considering the main fundamentals 
of the integration, it is observed that 
the two phenomena; regionalism 
and European integration were 
parallel during the post-war 
period. This was based on the 
diminishing role of the nation-state 
and redefinition of international 
(interstate) relations. It created a 
conviction that regionalism and 
the EU were “natural allies”. 
The Eurozone crisis has initiated 
the disruption of the successful 
continuation of these aspirations 
because of the tendencies towards 
the nationalism at the supra-
national level, and separatism at 
the sub-national level. Accordingly, 
protectionist tendencies due to the 
longstanding financial crisis in the 
EU have led the rise of nationalism 
and Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, 
the EU has managed to introduce 
the new mechanisms in order to save 
the Euro. While the EU’s image as 
a role model for regionalism might 
have been negatively affected 
during the crisis because of the 
politicization and Euroscepticism, 
the technocratic integration was 
still achieved. In this respect, even 
in the context where the Union’s 
raison d’être is shaking, the EU 
showed its political commitment to 
its famous motto better together.
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vI.3. the Copenhagen dilemma and its 
possible solutions in the Council of Europe
adRienn tóth-FeRencZi132
Abstract
Scepticism towards effective multilateralism has been growing in recent years. 
The article has a focus on the particular situation of the Council of Europe and intends 
first to present the enlargement dilemma of the Organisation in the mid-nineties, whether 
to further invite Eastern European countries before their compliance with the requisite 
standards or let them wait for accession until their legal and institutional structures align 
more closely with European standards. The decision on an early invitation determined 
the path for the Organisation in the subsequent decades and besides institutional 
renewal, it led to political and legal challenges. The paper aims to present one political 
and one legal case study to illustrate the crisis of the main bodies of the Council of 
Europe, by using statistical data to support the arguments. Therefore, both qualitative 
and quantitative analysis are conducted to seek an answer to the question: how can the 
Organisation solve its own Copenhagen dilemma? The article also presents an outlook 
for the latest developments, namely the establishment of a new complementary procedure 
for monitoring the “rule of law” as a possible solution to future institutional challenges.
Keywords: multilateralism, Council of Europe, institutional crisis, 
Copenhagen dilemma, rule of law mechanism
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VI�3�1� Introduction
The Council of Europe is 
a classical intergovernmental 
organisation133 (lindseth, p.-l. 
133  A broad range of literature 
is available on the terminology of 
international, intergovernmental 
2014) similar to other regional 
or global cooperation formats. 
It can be regarded as a thematic 
institution focusing on human 
rights, democracy and the rule of 
and supranational organisations, 
distinguishing the key factors and 
functions of the different formats 
(lindseth, p.-l. 2014).
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law standards, a legally binding 
convention system and serious 
monitoring structure developed 
since its foundation. As a result, 
the Council of Europe has become 
a unique multilateral organisation 
of its kind, and is regarded as the 
continent’s leading human rights 
organisation. The Council of Europe 
is often confused with the European 
Council, another institution of the 
European Union responsible for 
planning Union policy. It seems 
that the two organisations are 
comparable but also differ in many 
respects134 (hlavac, m. 2010). In 
light of the recent institutional and 
financial crisis of the Council of 
Europe caused by - among others 
- a concrete, classical geopolitical 
challenge, namely the annexation 
of Crimea, it appears to be justified 
to examine the factors leading to the 
situation which nearly paralyzed 
the Organisation. Will the Council 
of Europe learn its lessons and seek 
for effective guarantees to prevent 
similar circumstances in the future?
134  Some scholars argue that the 
European Union’s supranational 
elements – especially the EU laws’ 
supremacy over the laws of individual 
Member States – distinguish it from 
international organizations. The 
European Union is really a sui generis 
project that has not been attempted 
anywhere else (hlavac, m. 2010).
VI�3�2� ”Go East”, the 
historical enlargement
Pre-enlargement period
This chapter aims at 
giving a general overview of the 
milestone events and documents 
leading to eastern enlargement; 
it will not seek to provide an 
exhaustive, chronological analysis 
of the pre-enlargement period. 
It is a basic principle that both 
statutory organs of the Council 
of Europe135, the Committee of 
Ministers136 and the Parliamentary 
Assembly137 in general closely 
follow the tendencies and events 
of Greater Europe for a timely and 
comprehensive response to all kinds 
of challenges. In the Europe of the 
1980s fundamental changes were 
in the air. The Organisation has 
paid increasing attention to Eastern 
European countries since 1985. The 
Committee of Ministers dedicated a 
special session to relations with the 
Eastern part of Europe in January 
1985 (gaZdag F. – Kovács p. 
1999 p. 15.). In its Declaration 
commemorating the 40th 
anniversary of the Organisation, 
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
of the member states welcomed the 
reform process in some countries 
135  Hereinafter referred to as CoE
136  Hereinafter referred to as CM
137  Hereinafter referred to as PACE
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of Eastern Europe and the possible 
future co-operation to establish 
genuine democracies throughout 
Europe (DECLARATION of the 
84th Session of the Committee 
of Ministers). The Parliamentary 
Assembly decided to “grant 
special guest status for national 
legislative assemblies of European 
non-member countries which have 
shown their interest and which apply 
and implement the Helsinki Final 
Act and the instruments adopted at 
the CSCE138 conferences…” (PACE 
RESOLUTION 917 (1989)). The 
Parliamentary Assembly defined the 
fundamental criteria for accession, 
stressing the importance of full 
implementation of commitments 
agreed in the CSCE framework 
(PACE RECOMMENDATION 
1119 (1990)) and highlighting the 
protection of minorities through 
an urgent appeal to all parties 
concerned to refrain from violence 
and seek peaceful solutions 
138  Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe renamed to 
Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) on 1 
January 1995.
for ethnic problems (PACE 
RECOMMENDATION 1124 
(1990)).
Dilemma of continued 
enlargement
The openness towards 
Eastern European countries and 
coordinated efforts to identify the 
possible fields of cooperation, such 
as a common European cultural 
heritage led to the membership 
of Hungary and Poland in the 
European Cultural Convention, in 
1989. Later Hungary, as the first 
country from the Eastern European 
club, joined the Organisation on 6 
November 1990. 
During the first three years 
of European democratic transition 
nine countries from the former 
Soviet-dominated area acceded 
officially to the Council of Europe: 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Romania (CoE WEBSITE, 47 
members states). This relatively 
rapid transformation generated 
an institutional adaptation to the 
challenges of the new mission. 
New mechanisms and structures 
characterized the face and image of 
International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School, CUB
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
458
the CoE in the last three decades. 
This institutional development 
deserves to be given a separate 
analysis, which this paper will not 
undertake to present. 
However, the invitation to 
join the Council of Europe was 
not an unconditional offer. The 
heads of States and Governments 
of the member states of the Council 
of Europe met in Vienna, on 9 
October 1993. At the First Summit, 
the Vienna Declaration clarified 
the criteria of accession. The 
fundamental requirements were to 
sign and ratify the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, abolition 
of the death penalty as a part of 
it139, compliance of the institutions 
and legal system with the basic 
principle of the Council of Europe, 
free and fair elections on universal 
suffrage, freedom of expression, 
and respect of national minorities 
(VIENNA DECLARATION AND 
ACTION PLAN, CoE Summit, 
Vienna, 1993).
At the First Summit of Heads of 
States and Governments in Vienna, 
the number of members increased 
from 23 to 32. Despite the official 
139  The Council of Europe has 
made abolition of the death penalty 
a precondition for accession. No 
executions have been carried out in 
any of the Organisation’s 47 member 
states since 1997. On Council of 
Europe website/Achievements
commitment of the Organisation 
to eastern enlargement, some 
voices questioned the necessity 
and meaningfulness of a rapid 
enlargement process. Those who 
raised concerns were convinced that 
an accelerated integration would 
lead to the weakening of values 
and principles, and the Council of 
Europe would be sold out (gaZdag 
F. – Kovács p. 1999). This question 
became an issue of the election 
process of the new Secretary 
General in 1994. The Government of 
France submitted the candidature of 
Catherine Lalumière, the Secretary 
general in office in November 
1993, in the hope of her re-election 
for a second term (CM (93)195, 
Confidential140). At the same 
time the Government of Sweden 
submitted the candidature of Daniel 
Tarschys for the post in December 
1993 (CM(93)222, Confidential). 
The Office of Secretary General 
Lalumière prepared a discussion 
paper for the 94th Session of 
140  The Committee of Ministers 
Resolution Res(2001)6 on access 
to Council of Europe documents 
recalls the rules governing access to 
its documents (except those relating 
to “human rights” and “monitoring” 
meetings) since 1 January 2001, 
namely: i. documents classified 
“restricted” are declassified a year 
after being issued, ii. documents 
classified “confidential” are 
declassified ten years after being 
issued.
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Ministers for Foreign Affairs to 
generate a common reflection on the 
development of the Organisation 
and on the implications of 
continued enlargement, particularly 
of the Russian Federation’s 
accession (CoE IN THE NEW 
EUROPE, DISCUSSION PAPER 
1994). The Paper highlighted 
that the Council of Europe had 
become the European institution 
most capable of facilitating the 
democratisation process of Central 
and Eastern Europe, however 
through the enlargement process 
its role and forms of actions had 
also significantly evolved. The 
Reflection paper also pointed out 
that the new role of the Organisation 
is “highly influenced by the renewed 
outbreak of armed conflicts on our 
continent…as well as the emergence 
of new challenges (migration, rise 
of intolerance, social exclusion, 
etc.) and welfare state crisis”. 
The Secretary General concluded 
that the Europe of the Council of 
Europe was less homogeneous 
and more unstable compared to 
the period before 1989. Secretary 
General Lalumière was deeply 
concerned about the prospects 
of future enlargement, especially 
the admission of the Russian 
Federation. She raised the political 
and institutional impact of future 
Russian membership on the activity 
of the Organisation, warning that 
“in the short term this radical pursuit 
of an open-door-policy will…. 
entail increasing heterogenization 
within the Organisation. It may be 
accompanied by risks in the form 
of a lessening of member States’ 
common resolve and a weakening 
of the Organisation. By virtue 
of its size, diversity and great-
power status, Russia also raises 
special problems of integration” 
(DISCUSSION PAPER p. 6). The 
Secretary General in office predicted 
that “the accession of such countries 
as Russia and Ukraine is liable to 
cause an immediate increase in 
the number of applications lodged 
under the European Convention 
on Human Rights” (DISCUSSION 
PAPER p. 10).
By way of comparison, the 
candidate of Sweden for the post 
of Secretary General was deeply 
convinced that the Council of 
Europe should effectively promote 
the democratisation process by 
formulating serious conditions for 
the newcomers. The values and 
principles of the Council of Europe 
were never dealt with so intensively 
and thoroughly as during the 
enlargement. This process gave 
new impetus to the honouring 
of obligations and commitments 
by the member states in both 
organs of the Council of Europe. 
The enlargement process helped 
the Organisation to identify new 
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activity fields, the compilation and 
entry into force of the two legally 
binding instruments on national 
minority protection141 which can be 
considered as a major step forward 
in the regulation of a highly sensitive 
area. The efforts by the Council of 
Europe aiming at promoting the 
development of democracy and 
rule of law mechanisms in Central 
Eastern Europe also contributed to 
the pre-accession strategy of the 
European Union (taRschys, d. 
1999 pp. 21–22.).
The enlargement process of 
the Council of Europe was affected 
by the election of Daniel Tarschys 
as Secretary General in April 1994. 
During his mandate between 1994-
1999, Andorra (1994), Latvia, 
Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, North 
Macedonia (1995), the Russian 
Federation, Croatia (1996) and 
Georgia (1999) were granted 
full membership (COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE WEBSITE, 47 
MEMBER STATES).
VI�3�3� Consequences of 
„early” invitation
From institutional 
renewal to the political 
and legal challenges of the 
141  The Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities 
and the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages
Organisation
The open-door policy of the 
Council of Europe exerted a serious 
impact on the activity and role of 
the Organisation and improved its 
visibility in the cooperation between 
international organisations. The 
new mechanisms of institutional 
reform helped the Council of 
Europe to redefine its mission, but 
the Organisation also faced different 
political and legal challenges 
nearly a decade later. The internal 
and inter-state conflicts of the new 
members determined the political 
agenda after a while, for which 
the human rights organisation 
endeavoured to articulate legal and 
human rights answers. The Council 
of Europe progressively developed, 
improved and strengthened the 
supervision process to help member 
states comply with the norms and 
standards of the Organisation, and 
to uphold the highest democratic 
and human rights standards. Both 
statutory organs established their 
own monitoring procedure through 
convention and non-convention-
based mechanisms. However, the 
legal implications were much more 
tangible and highly visible. One of 
the most recognised achievements of 
the Council of Europe membership 
is the right of individual application 
to the European Court of Human 
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Rights142. The opening up to 
Eastern Europe enlarged this right 
142  Each member State must ratify 
the European Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
when joining the Organisation and 
the Court rules on individual or State 
applications alleging violations of 
the civil and political rights set out in 
the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
to 800 million people throughout 
the Council of Europe area and 
resulted in immense growth in the 
workload of the Court. By the end 
of 2010 the Strasbourg Court was 
faced with 139, 650 applications 
pending before a judicial formation 
(In Annual Report, ECtHR143 2010).
143  European Court of Human 
Rights
Figure 43: Annual report 2010, European Court of Human Rights, p. 147.
Source: Website of the European Court of Human Rights: https://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Annual_report_2010_ENG.pdf
Case studies
As both political and legal 
questions are the focus of this paper, 
the most outstanding examples 
were selected144. The reason behind 
144  Selection based on the author’s 
personal evaluation.
the selection of the case studies was 
to present those events which have 
raised serious questions in recent 
years as regards the credibility, 
operation and functionality of the 
Council of Europe. According to 
the author’s personal experience 
the political case nearly paralyzed 
the Organization in financial terms. 
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As to the implementation debates 
of the legal case, the supremacy of 
the Court was questioned.
Political case study 
– Suspension of 
voting rights of the 
Russian delegation 
in the Parliamentary 
Assembly
The direct event generating 
the institutional and financial crisis 
of the Council of Europe was 
the reaction of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe 
to the Russian annexation of 
Crimea. The Organisation always 
seeks to respond first to the most 
pressing current political events 
and the Assembly immediately 
decided to limit the mandate of the 
Russian parliamentary delegation 
(PACE RESOLUTION1990 
(2014)). In response to this 
decision, the Russian delegation 
left the parliamentary forum, so 
Russian parliamentarians did not 
take part in the activities of the 
Parliamentary Assembly for five 
consecutive years. Given the fact 
that the Assembly suspended their 
rights145, the Russian government 
145  Voting rights, the right to be 
represented in the Bureau of the 
Assembly, the Presidential Committee 
and the Standing Committee, the right 
to participate in election observation 
missions ((PACE RESOLUTION1990 
decided not to implement its 
financial obligation towards the 
Council of Europe. Accordingly, 
Russia has not contributed to the 
ordinary budget of the Organisation 
since 1 July 2017. As the situation 
escalated, the Assembly searched 
for solutions on how the Russian 
Federation could return and the 
Council of Europe could save face. 
The functioning of the Council of 
Europe was at stake in June 2019. 
At that time the Parliamentary 
Assembly adopted a resolution on 10 
April 2019 (PACE RESOLUTION 
2277 (2019)), which called on the 
Russian Federation to appoint a 
delegation to the Assembly and to 
resume obligatory payment of its 
contribution to the Organisation’s 
budget, failure of which could 
lead to the suspension of its 
representation rights in the whole 
Organisation146. This resolution 
clearly shows the deep interest of 
the Council of Europe to preserve 
the platform characteristic of the 
Organisation. In order to keep 
Russia in, the Parliamentary 
(2014) points 15.1, 15.2, 15.3).
146  Article 9 of the Statute of 
the Council of Europe says: “The 
Committee of Ministers may suspend 
the right of representation on the 
Committee and on the Consultative 
Assembly of a member which has 
failed to fulfil its financial obligation 
during such period as the obligation 
remains unfulfilled.”
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Assembly was ready to disregard 
its own criteria formulated only a 
few years earlier. Following serious 
debates in the PACE for years, the 
Russian parliamentary delegation 
finally submitted its credentials and 
the Assembly ratified them on 26 
June 2019 (PACE RESOLUTION 
2292 (2019)).
Legal case study – Non 
implementation of the 
Court’s judgements
Although the issues related 
to the functioning of the Court and 
implementation of its judgements 
seem to be purely legal problems, 
the Court faced more serious 
challenges than the simple increase 
in the workload in recent years. 
In the case of Catan and Others 
versus Moldova and the Russian 
Federation, in 2012 the European 
Court of Human Rights found 
Russia to be in violation of the 
European Convention On Human 
Rights. A series of decisions were 
adopted by the Human Rights 
Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies 
- among others - during the 
March session in 2019 and stated 
that the Russian Federation was 
responsible for the violation of 
education rights (CM DECISION 
CM/Del/Dec(2019)1340/H46-
17). However, Russia is reluctant 
to implement the judgment of the 
Court. The Russian Federation147 
considers the Moldavian Republic 
of Transdniestria as a sovereign 
state and does not wish to interfere 
with the domestic affairs of another 
country. As a response to the ruling 
of the Court, Resolution No. 21-P 
of the Russian Constitutional Court 
was adopted and came into force in 
July 2015. The resolution suggested 
that the legislators should introduce 
a special legal procedure according 
to which the RF Constitutional Court 
can resolve the issue of whether it 
is possible or impossible, based on 
the principles of supremacy of the 
RF Constitution and prevalence 
of the RF Constitution over other 
laws, to enforce a judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights 
with respect to a complaint against 
Russia (ZagoneK, j – Boulatov, 
p. 2016). Both the political and 
legal cases raise the issue of the 
enforcement capability of the 
Council of Europe, but the latter one 
called into question the provision of 
the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms148.
147  Hereinafter referred to as RF.
148  Article 46 on the Binding force 
and the execution of judgments of 
the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.
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VI�3�4� The Copenhagen 
dilemma and efforts to find 
a solution
The term „Copenhagen 
dilemma” is used in the context 
of the European Union and refers 
to the recently detected problem 
when a member State appears not 
to comply with the mandatory 
conditions set before its accession. 
The expression was used by 
Viviane Reding, Vice-President of 
the European Commission in the 
debate of the European Parliament 
on the political situation in 
Romania, on 12 September 2012, 
when she pointed out a general and 
new phenomenon: „...we face a 
Copenhagen dilemma. We are very 
strict on the Copenhagen criteria, 
notably on the rule of law in the 
accession process of a new Member 
State but, once this Member 
State has joined the European 
Union, we appear not to have 
any instrument to see whether the 
rule of law and the independence 
of the judiciary still command 
respect” (Reding, v. 2012). The 
notion became widespread in the 
political discourse of the European 
Union and adequately describes the 
situation that had evolved in the 
Council of Europe by 2017. As the 
latter one was an active part in the 
Euro-Atlantic integration process, 
considered as an ante-room of 
the European Union for many of 
its members states, it seems to be 
justified to borrow the expression 
describing the syndrome so 
perfectly. Of course, the situation 
in the two Organisations is not 
identical. In contrast to the EU, 
the Council of Europe developed 
rigorous monitoring mechanisms as 
one of the achievements of eastern 
enlargement. Still, the detailed 
and theoretically well-functioning 
system has an Achilles heel, namely, 
the Organisation has no real means 
to sanction non-compliance. This 
implies, in practical terms, that the 
respect for human rights and rule of 
law principles on the ground is up 
to the political will and interest of 
State parties149, in cooperation with 
149  Author’s personal opinion 
based on experience gained in the 
Rapporteur Group-Human Rights 
(GR-H), Rapportuer Group-Legal 
Cooperation (GR-J), Rapporteur 
Group-Social and Health Questions 
Contemporary Global Challenges in Geopolitics, Security Policy and World Economy
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
465
the Organisation. Nevertheless, 
the syndrome of not respecting 
the commitments defined by the 
Copenhagen criteria for accession 
to the European Union gradually 
appeared in the Council of Europe 
and nearly led indirectly to the 
inoperability of the Organisation by 
2019.150
The Council of Europe was 
aware of the problem and made 
several attempts to fine-tune the 
supervisory procedure at different 
levels, such as launching awareness 
raising measures, adequately 
defining the obligations with a 
view to clarifying the criteria, 
and increasing transparency. The 
Parliamentary Assembly decided 
to introduce “a periodic overview 
of groups of countries …to 
launch issue-based, cross-country 
monitoring in close co-operation 
with the relevant Assembly 
committees as a complementary 
measure to the country-by-country 
monitoring” (PACE RESOLUTION 
2018 (2014)). Secretary General 
Thorbjørn Jagland151 was pragmatic 
(GR-SOC), Rapporteur Group-
Education, Culture, Sport, Youth and 
Environment (GR-C) as well as in 
Human Rights (DH) meetings of the 
Ministers’ Deputies in the Council of 
Europe between 2011-2016.
150  See the political case study of the 
present paper in Chapter III. 2.1.
151  Former Norwegian Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister 
Thorbjørn Jagland became Secretary 
and committed to regular and open 
dialogue with the political leaders 
on sensitive issues. The Venice 
Commission elaborated the rule of 
law checklist152 to fulfil its main 
objective, to promote the rule of law 
and democracy (RESOLUTION 
RES (2002) 3). 
Since these efforts have 
failed to achieve satisfactory 
results, the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs instructed the Ministers’ 
Deputies in Helsinki, at their 
129th Session of the Committee 
of Ministers on 17 May 2019, “to 
develop – in co-operation with the 
Parliamentary Assembly – a clearly 
defined complementary procedure, 
which could be initiated by either 
the Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Committee of Ministers or the 
Secretary General, and in which all 
three of them would participate”. 
The Ministers “agreed further 
General in 2009. He was re-elected 
in June 2014, he was the first to win 
a second term https://70.coe.int/
home/#160562
152  The checklist intends “to 
provide a tool for assessing the Rule 
of Law in a given country from 
the viewpoint of its constitutional 
and legal structures, the legislation 
in force and the existing case-law. 
The checklist aims at enabling an 
objective, thorough, transparent and 
equal assessment.” (RULE OF LAW 
CHECKLIST, Venice Commission 
2016 https://www.venice.coe.int/
webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
AD(2016)007-e.)
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that such a co-ordinated response 
… encouraging member States, 
through dialogue and co-operation, 
to take all appropriate measures to 
conform with the principles of the 
Statute, …, and may ultimately lead 
to a decision to act under Articles 8 
or 9 of the Statute153, which lies with 
the Committee of Ministers”; (CM 
DECISION OF 129TH SESSION).
Adoption of a rule of law 
mechanism
Following the decision of 
the Helsinki Session, intensive 
consultations started to elaborate 
the framework and content, the 
responsibilities and competences 
of the three main actors, namely 
the Committee of Ministers, the 
Parliamentary Assembly and 
the Secretary General. During 
153  Article 8 Any member of the 
Council of Europe which has seriously 
violated Article 3 may be suspended 
from its rights of representation 
and requested by the Committee of 
Ministers to withdraw under Article 
7. If such member does not comply 
with this request, the Committee 
may decide that it has ceased to be a 
member of the Council as from such 
date as the Committee may determine.
Article 9 The Committee of Ministers 
may suspend the right of 
representation on the Committee and 
on the Consultative Assembly of a 
member which has failed to fulfil its 
financial obligation during such period 
as the obligation remains unfulfilled.
the French Presidency of the 
Committee of Ministers, from May 
to November 2019, efforts were 
made to finalise and adopt the new 
mechanism within a reasonable 
timeframe. The Joint Committee154 
held several meetings to clarify the 
details of competence issues of the 
two organs related to the modalities 
of the new procedure. As a result 
of this co-operation, vivid debates, 
and informal consultations in 
the Committee of Ministers, the 
latter one adopted the decision 
on the complementary procedure 
for the application of Article 8 
of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe, as a consequence of a 
serious violation by a member 
State of fundamental principles 
and values of the Organisation 
under Article 3 of the Statute 
(CM CDECISION CM/DEL/DEC 
(2019)129/2) on 5 February 2020. 
In the appendix to this decision the 
Committee of Ministers defines 
154  The Joint Committee is 
composed of representatives of 
the Committee of Ministers and 
representatives of the Parliamentary 
Assembly. The Secretary General 
of the Council of Europe is entitled 
to attend the meetings of the Joint 
Committee in an advisory capacity. 
The functions of the Joint Committee 
are to examine the problems which 
are common to the Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly. https://assembly.coe.int/nw/
Page-EN.asp?LID=JointCommittee
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the basic principles and practical 
modalities of the new mechanism. 
They highlight that: “The primary 
aim is to bring a member State, 
through constructive dialogue and 
co-operation, to comply with the 
obligations and principles of the 
Organisation, hence as far as possible 
to avoid imposing sanctions. This 
procedure, of an exceptional nature, 
is complementary to existing rules 
and regulations, building upon 
the 1994 Declaration155, and its 
implementation will not require 
any changes to the Statute. It will 
not affect existing procedures and 
mandates arising from statutory or 
conventional control mechanisms.” 
The appendix contains clear 
provisions for the steps, the 
initiators, the indicative timeframe, 
the road map and its implementation, 
as well as for the possible decision, 
including the voting rules on the 
suspension of a member State’s 
right. Although the possibility 
to suspend or exclude a member 
state not being in compliance 
with the basic principles of the 
Council of Europe was always 
incorporated in the Statute, the 
recent decision is a clear message 
that violation of the norms and 
155  Declaration on compliance with 
commitments accepted by member 
states of the Council of Europe 
(Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 10 November 1994 at its 
95th Session) - Decl (10/11/94)
standards, as well as continuous, 
serious disrespect for the principles 
of the Organisation will not be 
further tolerated. However, it is 
important to note that the procedure 
is reversible: „should the member 
state remedy the situation and bring 
it into compliance with the Statute 
the decision can be revoked”. 
Otherwise, “in case of exclusion, 
the State concerned will have to 
reapply for membership” (CM/Del/
Dec (2020)1366/1.7).
VI�3�5� Conclusion
The Council of Europe 
celebrated its 70th anniversary 
in 2019. With the experience of 
seven decades in the protection of 
human rights, guaranteeing the rule 
of law and democratic principles 
this Organisation undoubtedly 
contributed to developing the 
normative basis for the single 
European legal area. Through 
its close cooperation with other 
international organisations, by 
inspiring and mutually strengthening 
each other’s activities, the Council 
of Europe became an active part 
of the European human rights 
architecture. In some fields its role 
and mission go beyond the standard 
setting activity of the United 
Nations or the European Union. 
The legally binding conventions 
on the protection of national 
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minorities and their supervisory 
mechanisms elaborated in the mid-
nineties can be considered unique. 
However, sceptical voices could 
say that any legislation is only as 
good as its enforcement. The policy 
of the Council of Europe is focused 
on dialogue, cooperation, follow-
up activities and assistance. The 
Organisation has sought to avoid 
sanctions or confrontation and, as 
a matter of fact, it has not really 
disposed of any kind of efficient 
restrictive measures156. After 
the historical enlargement and 
institutional reform in the 1990s, 
the Council of Europe now faces 
another type of challenge: soft 
power human rights instruments, 
the “normative institutionalism” 
versus classical, “power realism”157 
which demands new approaches 
and methods. No one can predict 
whether the newly established 
156  Sanction capabilities of 
intergovernmental organisations would 
deserve separate analyses if the terms 
sanctions and intergovernmentalism 
are mutually exclusive factors.
157  Expressions in quotation marks 
borrowed from Professor Ferenc 
Gazdag, unpublished reviser opinion 
given to the present article.
complementary procedure will 
succeed in achieving what its 
committed supporters hoped for in 
terms of the enforcement of norms 
and standards. Bearing in mind 
that the real goal is not to punish 
the members states but to motivate 
them with strengthened tools, in 
the event that the Committee of 
Ministers decides to apply the 
exclusion option, the mechanism 
must be considered to have failed158.
In the light of the findings 
of the present paper the Council 
of Europe apparently has a 
double history. During the first 
period lasting from its foundation 
until the eastern enlargement 
the Organisation focused on 
developing the institutional 
and legal framework of liberal 
democracies along the rules of 
intergovernmentalism. After the 
door was opened to Eastern Europe 
from a fully different historical, 
political, social background, the 
CoE irrevocably turned a “new 
page”159.
158  The Conclusion reflects the 
author’s opinion.
159  After Professor Ferenc Gazdag, 
unpublished reviser opinion given to 
the present article.
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vI.4. new strategies for the hungarian 
(Political) Elite in the light of Demographic 
trends among hungarians in transylvania
lásZló peRcZe160
Abstract
A newly established and permanently changing world order is characterized by 
a kind of multipolarity (multi-centered world order is being unfolding). Besides power 
units like the USA and Russia, other emerging countries, China and India are going to 
play a decisive role in the future. The region of Central and Eastern Europe including 
the Carpathian Basin became more the part of the Western European sphere of interest, 
yet geographically lays at the border as a kind of buffer zone. The 20th century brought 
an artificial disintegration of this socially and economically integrated area. In this 
particularly complex geopolitical structure, the fate and the future of a still-existing 
Hungarian minority in the so called “Szeklerland”, in Transylvania is very remarkable. 
A significant question occurs whether such a small community in Romania is able to 
define its own elite group. Moreover, does it have a clear vision/scenario for the future? 
The future demographic trends among the Hungarian population in Transylvania 
will undoubtedly have a major impact on the future strategies of its elite, mainly on a 
political level. The question is whether the elites are ready to face a significant decrease 
of Hungarians, especially in the so-called diaspora regions in the next ten years and 
whether they can go on with the existing strategies or they will need to readapt or change 
them in order to ensure the continuity of their representation.
Keywords: Carpathian Basin, minority, demography, elite, strategies and 
scenarios
160  PhD Student – CUB IR Doctoral School, perczelaszlo@gmail.com
VI�4�1� Preface
The political elite, by the 
most accepted definition, consists 
of individuals who, through their 
positions in power organizations 
and movements, have a regular 
and serious influence on the results 
of political processes and the 
functioning of political institutions, 
thus participating in decisions 
that affect the society as a whole 
(putnam, R. d. 1976; higley, 
j. – mooRe, g. 1981). However, 
the specificity and interpretation 
of a minority elite is rather more 
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complex. 
This paper is trying to unfold 
and demonstrate as a pilot the 
demographic situation in order to 
be able to give a basis for a further 
research of the Hungarian minority 
elites in Romania. The overall 
purpose is to outline the challenges 
facing the minority elite (political) 
in the country through exploring 
the expected demographic situation 
in the forthcoming ten years. The 
review of the methodological 
problems and difficulties of the elite 
research, mainly in the political 
science literature, is relatively 
available. However, the elite 
research in Romania is not as rich 
in a Central European comparison. 
In this article, our subject of 
the research will be approximate 
through a literature review method. 
With the help the current knowledge 
including substantive findings 
(stated by Erdélystat) as well as 
theoretical and methodological 
contributions to our particular 
topic, we will be able to define the 
forthcoming challenges facing the 
elites.
The Romanian electoral 
(political) system
The Romanian electoral 
system is a bicameral system, 
composed of the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate, which 
are elected in constituencies, on 
the basis of a closed list system 
and independent candidatures, 
according to the principle of 
proportional representation. The 
two Chambers have different 
numbers of members: The Chamber 
of Deputies is composed of 332 
Deputies, and the Senate, of 137 
senators. Thus, for the election 
of the Chamber of Deputies the 
representation norm is of one 
deputy to 70,000 inhabitants, and 
for the election of the Senate, of 
one senator to 160,000 inhabitants. 
The electoral threshold is 5% on 
national level or 20% in at least 
4 constituencies, and 8-10% for 
coalitions or electoral alliances. 
The President is elected in a two-
round system for a five-year term, 
and the winning candidate has to 
obtain a majority of 50%+1 of the 
votes of all registered voters.
While ethnic bloc voting 
among Hungarians in Transylvania 
has been a constant driving force 
behind the electoral success 
of RMDSZ and its political 
monopoly over the past 30 years, 
assuring political representation 
for the Hungarian minority on the 
national level, it is worth noting 
the decreasing trend among the 
number of voters during the same 
timeframe: it went down from 7.2% 
of votes in 1990 to 5.24% in 2012. 
Another important fact is that 
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the majority of Hungarians live in 
so-called diaspora regions, thus 
60% percent of voters are from 
regions where they form a minority. 
It is some of these regions where 
electoral disinterest, increasing 
assimilation, an ever-fracturing 
collective identity, and a significant 
demographic loss projected for the 
next 10 years – all lead the question: 
whether the existing strategies of 
the Hungarian political elite will 
have to be changed in order to 
assure political representation on a 
national level in the near future.
VI�4�2� Demographic trends 
in Romania
Hungarian population in 
Transylvania: forecast for 
2011-2031�
In 2016 ErdélyStat, a site 
dealing with Transylvanian 
statistics and analyses published the 
digital version of a comprehensive 
analysis on the expected evolution 
of the Hungarian population in the 
upcoming decade (Kiss t. – csata 
i. 2016): Hungarian population in 
Transylvania: forecast for 2011-
2031. 
These statistics have 
a special significance and is 
extremely relevant mainly for 
two reasons: first, it is the first of 
its kind in the post-1990 decade 
and secondly, because it forecasts 
a serious decrease in the number 
of Hungarians in Transylvania 
within the next 10 years, especially 
in the so-called diaspora regions 
(Maros, Kolozs, Arad, Brassó, 
Temes, Fehér, Hunyad, Máramaros, 
Szeben, Beszterce-Naszód 
counties). According to the analysis 
the necessity for new strategies for 
the Hungarian Political Elite in 
the Light of Demographic Trends 
among Hungarians in Transylvania 
occurs.
Hungarian population 
in Transylvania: historic 
context (1910/19 – 
2011/2018)
Following the Treaty of 
Trianon (1920) the ratio of the 
Hungarians in the Romanian 
population remained almost 
unchanged until the 1970s. 
According to former calculations 
(Kiss t. 2010) based upon the 1966 
census the number of Hungarians 
was 1 619 592, thus Hungarians 
made up 8.5% of the total 
population of Romania, and 23.8% 
of Transylvania. Today, according 
the statistics based on the 2011 
census, the number of Hungarians 
is 1 237 764, but the ratio dropped 
significantly compared to earlier 
decades, to only 6.5% of Romania’s 
population, and to 19.1% of the 
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population in Transylvania. 
It is also worth mentioning 
that while in 1910 Hungarians made 
up 64% of the urban population 
in Transylvania, by the 1990s the 
most important cities (Kolozsvár, 
Nagyvárad, Marosvásárhely etc.) 
have become predominantly 
Romanian, due to the Romanization 
policies of the government161, yet, 
is also true that other natural factors 
played a significant role in this 
process:as well as other factors: 
emigration, decreasing birth rates, 
aging population, and increasing 
assimilation among the younger 
generations in the so-called 
diaspora regions and big cities.
161  Lucian Boia, Cum s-a românizat 
România, [How Romania Became 
Romanian] Humanitas, 2015
year Hungarian population
% of total population
Transylvania Romania
1966 1 619 592 23,8 8,5
1977 1 713 928 22,5 7,9
1992 1 624 959 20,8 7,1
2002 1 431 807 19,6 6,6
2011 1 279 402 18,9 6,3
Table 18: The number and proportion of Hungarians in Romania and Transylvania 
according to the censuses of the period between 1966 and 2011
The number refers to the whole territory of Romania (99 percent of Hungarians of 
Romania live in Transylvania)
Source: Kiss t. 2015 on the basis of census data
Today, according to the 
2011 census, more than half of the 
Hungarians of Transylvania live in 
regions where they form a minority, 
and they make up the majority only 
in two counties, Hargita (85.21%) 
and Kovászna (73.74%), while they 
form a relatively large percentage of 
the population in Maros (38.09%), 
Szatmár (34.65%), Bihar (25.27%), 
Szilágy (23.35%) and Kolozs 
(15.93%) counties162.
Therefore, in the past 30 
years, the demographic trends have 
been negative for the Hungarians 
in Transylvania, meaning that 
their ratio dropped by 2% relative 
to the number of Romanians, 
most affected being the so-called 
diaspora regions. This fact is 
extremely important with regard 
162  http://www.recensamantromania.
ro/rezultate-2/
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to the political context, as out of 
the approximately 1.2 million 
Hungarians only about 600 000 live 
in Szeklerland where they form the 
majority of the population. Thus, 
the majority of the Hungarian 
voters live in regions as a minority, 
and the mobilization strategies 
applied by the political elite (bloc 
voting under the slogans for 
national unity) should be applied in 
a different way.
The methodology
The cohort component 
up until the recent past was a 
predominant method in the field 
of population projection and it 
still is a widely used method. Its 
advantage comes from the fact that 
proceeding from the age structure 
(that is recorded by census or other 
administrative database) it is able to 
approximate in a relatively accurate 
way the expected evolution of 
the number and structure of the 
population. This is true primarily 
for the number of deaths and birth 
rates. These predominantly depend 
on the age structure because the 
number of death cases depend on 
the level of aging and the number 
of births depends on the size of the 
female contingent with the fertile 
age.
On the other hand, the 
willingness for childbearing and the 
probability for mortality in some 
cultures change in a somewhat slow 
way so there may be formulated 
more or less realistic hypotheses 
related to their future evolution.
According to the study 
when it comes to the migration 
and immigration, the capacity of 
forecasting of the demographer 
is quite limited. There are some 
theories that try to fix the location of 
migration within a human walk of 
life. And indeed, in some societies, 
entering the labour market, certain 
stages of the educational course of 
life or the founding of a family have 
a great chance to draw a spatial 
displacement. In spite of this, 
migration does not have a place 
universally recordable within the 
human stage of life.
The number of migrants 
depends on factors, that can change 
on the short term (for example 
migration politics) or those that 
are not in the range of competence 
of the demographers (for example 
the evolution of economic trends). 
Thus, the forecast calculations of 
population cannot be considered 
as forecasts for the future, only as 
model-calculation, in other words: 
“if…than’’ type of statements.
“Our own forecast 
calculations, that model the 
evolution of the Transylvanian 
Hungarian and the total Romanian 
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population between the years 2011 
and 2031 can be considered also 
as a “if…than” type of analysis.” 
states Erdélystat.
„The question is even more 
complicated due to fact that because 
we are speaking about a minority 
population, we had to determine 
(with the tools of demography) its 
borders and also what we consider 
to be ethnic border crossing.”
Figure 44: Hungarian population in Transylvania: forecast for 2011-2031
Source: Erdélystat
„It is also important, that 
in opposition to an analysis of 
ours, that was based on the 2002 
demographical data, now we 
did not define the Hungarian 
community as an ethnic group, but 
a language-based one. We forecast 
the population on four levels. 
These are the following: Romania, 
Transylvania, the 16 counties of 
Transylvania and the 50 educational 
micro-regions.” states Erdélystat.
VI�4�3� The results of 
the population-forecast 
according to the ethno-
demographic regions
The Szeklerland region in the 
eastern part of Transylvania is the 
most compact Hungarian ethnic 
block, and the sole region being 
populated overwhelmingly by 
Hungarians. Szeklerland comprises 
Hargita and Kovászna counties, and 
the East-Central part Maros county. 
The proportion of Hungarians in 
this territory is 80 percent. The 
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475 thousand Hungarians living 
there make up 38 percent of the 
entire Hungarian community. The 
Hungarian majority of the territory 
creates a unique opportunity 
for putting to work minority 
institutions, the use of the Hungarian 
language, as well as to formulate 
ethno-political claims. It is worth 
mentioning that unlike the central 
and southern regions, Szeklerland 
and its inhabitants share a strong 
sense of regional identity, forming a 
strong electoral basis for RMDSZ, 
where electoral mobilization was 
and is the strongest. 
There are two distinct 
patterns of electoral participation 
of the Hungarian minority: 
lower turnout in ethnically non-
competitive counties (i.e. low 
ethnical diversity, with the size of 
Hungarian minority below 8% or 
above 50% of the county’s total 
population); higher turnout in 
ethnically competitive counties 
(i.e. higher ethnical diversity, with 
the size of the Hungarian minority 
between 8% and 50% of the 
county’s population). 
The findings support the 
“strategic mobilization hypothesis” 
according to which electoral 
mobilization was unevenly 
distributed due to various stakes 
attributed to voting in different 
electoral districts, followed by a 
pragmatic cost/benefit logic adopted 
by the leaders and partisans of the 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians 
in Romania (DAHR)163.
Regional differences
The border-region called 
Partium (Bihar, Szatmár and Szilágy 
counties) is another area with a 
relatively high concentration of 
Hungarians. According to the 2011 
census 315 thousand Hungarians 
live there making up 25 percent 
of the Transylvanian Hungarian 
community. The proportion of the 
Hungarians in these three counties 
is 28 percent on average, but in the 
ethnically mixed North-Western 
part of the region almost half of the 
population is Hungarian.
Central Transylvania is 
composed by Kolozs county and 
the Western part of Maros county. 
Hungarians make up 22 percent 
of the population. The two main 
political and cultural centres of the 
Hungarian community Kolozsvár 
and Marosvásárhely, with 16 percent 
of Hungarians and 45 percent 
of Hungarians, respectively) are 
situated in Central Transylvania. 
The number of Hungarians in this 
region is 262 thousand making up 
21 percent of the Transylvanian 
163  Tatar, Marius Ioan: Ethnicity, 
strategic mobilization and voting in 
the Romanian parliamentary elections 
of 2008, Journal of Identity and 
Migration Studies, 5(2), 86-107, 2011.
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Hungarian community.
Northern- and Southern 
Transylvania and Banat are also 
home of Hungarian communities of 
significant size. These communities 
are dispersed, and live locally in a 
minority situation. The proportion 
of the Hungarians is below 10 
percent in all of the counties 
situated in these three regions, yet 
the total number living dispersed 
in these extended areas makes up 
17 percent of the Transylvanian 
Hungarian community.
From obvious reasons, and 
due to several factors the latter 
regions are the most vulnerable, 
and according to the study, the 
latter regions will suffer the highest 
population loss in the next ten years, 
and also due to certain assimilation 
trends (inter-ethnic marriages 
etc.) and a shift towards the so-
called mixed parties (USR, PLUS, 
POL). Thus, there are significant 
signs indicating that the electoral 
preference of Hungarian voters 
living in minority areas may need 
re-evaluation.
It is worth noting, that the 
changing of the language ratio 
in some counties depends on a 
great extent on the initial starting 
point. Thus, from the counties of 
Szeklerland and Partium in the 
case of Hargita, Kovászna, Szatmár 
and Szilágy a growing of ratio is 
expected, while in the cases of 
Bihar and Maros a slight decrease 
of ratio is likely. In all the counties 
outside of the mass Hungarian 
areas we can count on a significant 
decrease of ratio.
The bottom line of the analysis 
is that the Hungarian population of 
Transylvania will decline at roughly 
the same rate as that of the country 
as a whole, meaning that the total 
population will fall to 16.68 million 
by 2031 from the 20.12 million in 
2011 while the ratio of Hungarians 
will edge lower to 6.52 percent 
from 6.64 percent.
Although the mortality rate in 
Transylvania decreased in the last 
few years, the Hungarian population 
in the Hungarian-populated regions 
decreased rapidly according to the 
latest statistics, which represents 
the changes in the Hungarian 
population in the first few months 
of 2018.
The Hungarian population 
decreased rapidly in Szeklerland, 
between January and November 
2018, approximately 61,738 
children were born, which is 197 
more childbirths than in 2017 
between the same months. In 
the first part of 2018, the rate of 
childbirth was low, but in the 
second part of the year, it increased 
significantly. Between August and 
November, 24,321 children were 
born which is more than the 23,080 
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in 2017. In the first eleven months, 
76,493 people died which is 812 
less than in 2017.
This strong positive trend 
leads back to November 2018 
when only 6,794 death cases were 
registered, which is 431 less than 
two years ago. In the first eleven 
months of 2018, the population of 
Szeklerland decreased by 14,755 
people which is still a very high 
rate and devastating number, but it 
is a positive fact that, in 2017, the 
population decreased by 15,764. 
The population’s decrease was the 
strongest in March 2018, when 
Szeklerland lost 3,200 Hungarian 
residents in one month. The 
decreasing tendency in Szeklerland 
continues In the counties of Hargita 
and Kovászna, 4,839 children were 
born in the first eight months of 2018 
which is 22 less than the previous 
year’s statistics. In the same year, 
5,886 people died in Szeklerland 
which is a 4% of growth since 2017 
when 5,657 residents passed away.
The low decrease of 
childbirth and the growing number 
of death cases is a combination, 
which means that the population 
decreased the most in Szeklerland 
from all the Transylvanian regions. 
The rate of natural decrease 
between January and November 
2018 is approximately 1,047 which 
is significantly more than in 2017 
(796). However, the number of 
marriages increased in Szeklerland: 
in the first eleven months of last 
year, 2,597 couples got married, 
which is an average growth of 
1,5%.
In the region of the Partium, 
10,544 children were born until the 
end of 2018, and 13,706 people 
passed away. Kolozs and Maros 
counties are the most significant 
Hungarian-populated regions of 
Central-Transylvania. Here, 11,562 
children were born, and 13,896 
residents died in 2018. The statistics 
revealed that the population’s 
decrease became more intensive in 
Central-Transylvania in the last few 
years, especially last year. Temes 
is the only Transylvanian county 
among the Hungarian-populated 
regions where the number of 
childbirths is more than the 
mortality rate: 6,630 children were 
born in 2018, and 6255 people died. 
In South- and North-Transylvania, 
the population’s decrease is not as 
significant as in any other region.
The decline in the number 
of newborns was far more 
accentuated among Hungarians 
living in minority, in the so-called 
‘diaspora regions’. If the Hungarian 
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community living in Romania is 
not prepared to meet this challenge, 
there is a big chance that a lot of 
Hungarian language educational 
institutions will have to close in the 
coming decade. The result of this 
process could mean a break up in 
the chain of Hungarian language 
K-12 education in the diaspora 
regions.
VI�4�4� Threats and 
weaknesses
Linguistic and cultural 
assimilation in the diaspora 
regions of Transylvania
Another important factor of 
the declining number of Hungarians 
is cultural, linguistic assimilation. 
This phenomenon is particularly 
relevant in the so-called diaspora 
regions. Assimilation can be 
attributed to a number of factors, 
and mixed marriages are one of 
the most important among them. 
According to the latest statistics, 
the rate of mixed marriages in 
Szeklerland is 4.3 percent; in 
southern Transylvania it is 44.2 
percent while in the Bánság region 
it amounts to more than 50 percent. 
It is a well-known statistical fact 
that most of the children growing 
up in mixed marriages will attend 
Romanian schools, and they tend to 
use Romanian as their first language 
at home as well as in their everyday 
social interactions. According to the 
statistics only 32.2 of the children 
living in mixed marriages were 
registered as Hungarians by their 
parents during the 2011 census164.
Another well-known 
sociological fact is that people 
with a lower educational and 
social status are more prone to 
assimilation. One has to emphasize 
the rapid dissolution of the 
Hungarian language educational 
system in the area of the dispersed 
Hungarian communities. The 
cultural and linguistic assimilation 
of Hungarians is thus a lot more 
accentuated in the diaspora regions, 
as presented in a study published by 
KSH (Kapitány B. – Kiss t. 2010).
As the authors point out in 
the case of Kolozsvár, which has 
long been the cultural center of 
Transylvanian Hungarians, the 
ongoing trends in the Hungarian 
education system can serve as a 
relevant paradigm: while there 
are 5 Hungarian schools for 
the Hungarian elite in the city 
center, between 2005 and 2010 
the number of Hungarian classes 
decreased from 10 to 5 in the 
suburban regions, the residence of 
the working-class Hungarians. The 
situation is even more dramatic in 
164  http://regi.itthon.ma/
erdelyorszag.php?cikk_id=2690
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the southern diaspora region: for 
instance, in Szeben county out of 
the 800 children with Hungarian 
ancestry (many of them from mixed 
marriages) only 400 were registered 
as Hungarians at birth, and only 
129 of them started their education 
in Hungarian.
With regard to the entire 
education system in Hungarian 
the significant decrease of children 
in the elementary schools was 
registered in 1996/1997. In the 
case of high schools the critical 
point was reached in 2004/2005. 
Universities were first hit by it in 
2008/2009, and while the number 
of university-aged Hungarians 
was 108 595 in 2009, this number 
dropped to 68 834 in 2018.
Demographic loss and the 
Future strategies for the 
Political Elite
An important study published 
by Tamás Kiss concludes that in 
the past 30 years Transylvanian 
Hungarians have been an extremely 
politically activated ethnic group by 
the RMDSZ, one of the most stable 
ethnic parties in the region (Kiss t. 
2016). Yet, according to the same 
paper, empirical evidence shows 
that while ethnic block-voting 
seems to persist, there was a shift 
in voters’ motivations. In the 1990s 
ethnopolitical claims concerning 
language use, the educational 
system and national symbols were 
the primary factors driving ethnic 
mobilization.
Yet it is worth noting, while 
there is no relevant statistical 
analysis on the 2019 EP elections, 
it has been observed, that for the 
first time after 1990 a significant 
number of Hungarian votes 
from the Central and minority 
areas, especially in the big cities 
like Kolozsvár, Marosvásárhely 
and other urban centers went to 
the so-called mixed parties, the 
Freedom, Unity and Solidarity 
Party (PLUS) and Save Romania 
Union - or rather Romanian party 
coalitions with an ethnic message 
for Hungarian voters. Previously, in 
the local elections of 2016, similar 
trend was going in Marosvásárhely, 
with regard to the mixed Freemen’s 
Party (POL). RMDSZ lost a 
significant number of votes, mainly 
in the big cities and the regions 
where Hungarians are a minority. 
These developments are signalling 
an important shift in electoral 
behaviour.
As for electoral perspectives 
of the Democratic Alliance 
of Hungarians in Romania 
(RMDSZ), the party representing 
Hungarian speakers of Romania, 
the proportional evolution of 
Hungarian speakers among 
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voting age population is of crucial 
importance. The main question 
is, whether future demographic 
evolutions will make it possible 
for a party representing Hungarian 
speakers to pass the threshold of 
5 percent at future parliamentary 
elections. According to the 
projection results the proportion 
of Hungarian speakers will remain 
quite stable at national level in 
the next two decades. In 2031 the 
proportion of those with Hungarian 
mother tongue will be of 6,4 among 
the total population and 6,5 among 
the voting aged population.
The political chances of so-
called mixed parties, or Romanian 
parties with a mixed message – for 
Hungarian voters - was discussed165 
in an essay and an analysis (Kiss t. 
– sZéKely i. g. 2018) published in 
2012.
Over the past two decades 
RMDSZ has been the most stable 
actor in the Romanian party system, 
with a strong and constant electoral 
support based on ethnic voting, 
fuelled by the need for Hungarian 
unity.
However, as Tamas Kiss 
argues in his article (Kiss t. – 
sZéKely i. g. 2018), beyond this 
apparent stability, the linkages 
165  Miklós Bakk – István-Gergő 
Székely: Egy regionalista vegyes párt 
esélyeiről Erdélyben [On the Chances 
of a Regionalist Mixed Party in 
Transylvania], 2012.
between RMDSZ and its voters 
have undergone a gradual, yet 
significant shift. The ethnic 
block voting of Transylvanian 
Hungarians was closely connected 
to the concept of a self-standing and 
parallel “Minority Society,” and to 
the practices of institution building 
that the minority elites engaged in 
in the early 1990s.
However, since its first 
participation in the Romanian 
government in 1996, RMDSZ 
has gradually departed from 
this strategy, a phenomenon that 
was also closely connected to a 
process of elite change within 
the organization. The present 
RMDSZ leadership puts less 
and less emphasis on policy 
programs that could reinforce 
the institutional system of the 
minority; consequently, it is unable 
(and unwilling) to organizationally 
integrate the community activists of 
the minority society who previously 
had played a key role in the process 
of (electoral) mobilization. At the 
rhetorical level, RMDSZ did not 
abandon the goal of building a 
parallel Hungarian minority society, 
but in its linkages to the Hungarian 
electorate, clientelistic exchanges 
have become predominant.
Consequences
As a consequence of these 
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events, and with the perspective 
of a significant decrease of 
Hungarians in the diaspora regions, 
in our view the Hungarian political 
elite is facing new challenges, 
as the electoral threshold for the 
parliamentary representation in 
Romania is 5%, and during the last 
parliamentary election in 2016 it 
had 6.19% of the votes, while in 
the EP elections it had 5.3% of the 
votes. According to scholars the 
difference is the result of a greater 
presence of the Romanian voters. 
According to experts the situation 
could become even more critical 
for RMDSZ, as the 2016 elections 
saw a turnout of 39.5%, and while 
the majority166 of Hungarians voted 
for RMDSZ, it barely passed the 
electoral threshold (5%) with a 
result of 5,1%.
Two major consequences of 
the present election system will 
very probably have a negative 
effect, as pointed out by a Quaestum 
Analysis study in 2012.167 1. The 
first one, the motivation for voting 
for Hungarian candidates will 
decrease dramatically in counties 
with less than 7% Hungarian 
population. There is a strong 
166  Tibor Toró: Minority Elites and 
Political representation in Romania 
after 1989. The self organization of teh 
hungarians at the local level, a case 
study.
167  http://itthon.transindex.
ro/?cikk=17409
chance that the electoral preference 
of many Hungarian voters will 
turn to Romanian parties. At the 
same time, voters will probably 
be inclined to vote for Romanian 
parties, as they will think that 
the pose no threat to the RMDSZ 
parliamentary representation on the 
central level. 2. With only a minor 
chance for the RMDSZ to be in 
coalition governments in the future, 
the party will lose its weight and 
importance in the political arena - 
thus becoming less to Hungarian 
voters in the diaspora regions and 
cities.
These two effects even more 
strengthened by the demographic 
trends projected for 2030, which 
may jeopardize the parliamentary 
representation for the Hungarians 
thus making it inevitable for 
RMDSZ to develop new strategies 
for electoral mobilization.
VI�4�5� Conclusion and 
discussion
The above examined 
demographic exploration could be 
a field for a further investigation, 
which can be linked to the strategies 
of the elite (political) based on in-
depths interviews regarding the 
future strategies of the Hungarian 
elites, the demographic issue and 
the projection for the near future 
will be of great importance as the 
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possible strategies for them.
The Hungarian political 
elite, which predominantly 
means RMDSZ, will be facing an 
important challenge: it has to find 
the proper tools to find the ever 
increasing assimilation trends 
among the Hungarians living in the 
diaspora regions, otherwise it might 
lose the majority of its electoral 
basis. According to the statistics, 
Hungarians living in the diaspora 
are less compelled to vote based 
on ethnic preferences168, and their 
weakening national identity means 
this trend will become stronger in 
the future. 
Negative demographic 
trends, a significant decrease in 
number of Hungarians projected for 
2030, a weakening national identity 
168  https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/314164896_Egy_
regionalista_vegyes_part_eselyeirol_
Erdelyben
among Hungarians living in the 
diaspora regions - in our view all 
these are posing a new and pressing 
challenge to the RMDSZ which 
will have to find the appropriate 
responses and strategies in order to 
ensure the political representation 
of the Hungarian community in the 
future.
The future demographic 
trends among the Hungarian 
population in Transylvania will 
undoubtedly have a major impact 
on the future strategies of its elite, 
mainly on a political level. The 
question is whether the elites are 
ready to face a significant decrease 
of Hungarians, especially in the so-
called diaspora regions in the next 
ten years and whether they can 
go on with the existing strategies 
or they will need to readapt or 
change them in order to ensure the 
continuity of their representation.
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